May 10th, 2012

Historic “Foreign Official” Appeals Filed

For the first time in FCPA history, “foreign official” is headed to an appellate court.

Yesterday, Carlos Rodriguez and Joel Esquenazi filed appeals (here) and (here) in the 11th Circuit challenging their convictions. As noted in this previous post, in August 2011 a federal jury (after a two week trial) convicted Esquenazi and Rodriguez on all counts for their roles in a scheme to pay bribes to alleged Haitian officials at Haiti Telecom. In the prior post discussing the verdict, I noted that given the “foreign official” jury instructions at trial, the defendants have a good chance to challenge the instruction on appeal should they so choose. This was before the strange developments concerning the existence of Haiti Teleco – see here, here and here for prior posts.

As noted in this DOJ release announcing the jury verdict, Esquenazi and Rodriguez were convicted of one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and wire fraud; seven counts of FCPA violations; one count of money laundering conspiracy; and 12 counts of money laundering. In October 2011, Esquenazi was sentenced to an FCPA record 15 years in prison and Rodriguez was sentenced to 7 years in prison - see here for the prior post.

The remainder of this post summarizes the initial briefs of Rodriguez and Esquenazi.

Rodriguez Brief

Representing Rodriguez in his appeal are Foley & Lardner attorneys David Simon (here), Michael Halfenger (here), James Cirincione (here), Pamela Johnson (here), Jaime Guerrero (here), Kenneth Winer (here), and Lauren Valiente (here).

The brief presents the following issues.

“1. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in its jury instruction regarding what constitutes an “instrumentality” of a foreign government for purposes of construing the counts, including the money laundering counts, that were dependent upon the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).

2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances and history regarding a declaration from the current Haitian Minister of Justice that stated that Telecommunications D’Haiti (“Teleco”) was not an “instrumentality” of the Haitian government that the Government turned over just after the jury’s verdict followed by a second declaration that the United States Government was involved in procuring that reversed the first declaration, which contained clear exculpatory evidence .

3. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in its “knowledge” jury instruction regarding the FCPA-dependent counts, including the money laundering counts.

4. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdicts as to the FCPA counts.

5. Whether the District Court plainly erred when it submitted the wire fraud-dependent counts, including the money laundering counts, to the jury based on an erroneous jury instruction that failed to require proof that of the jurisdictional facts necessary for federal wire fraud, that is that the wire communications crossed state lines (i.e., inter-state communications).

6. Whether the District Court plainly erred in its mens rea instruction to the jury regarding the wire fraud-dependent counts, including the money laundering counts, because the jury was not asked to find intent to defraud for the wire fraud-dependent counts.

7. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts as to the wire fraud-dependent counts.

8. Whether the Government’s attempt to change the basis of its wire fraud theory from wire transfers to facsimiles constitutes an impermissible variance from its initial theory of the case.

9. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in its jury instruction of what constituted a violation of the Haitian bribery law as proper predicate for the money laundering counts.

10. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in not granting a motion to dismiss the money laundering counts where the “proceeds” of the predicate crimes were the same transfers of money that were charged as the money laundering transactions, thereby violating the merger rule, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdicts as to the money laundering counts for the same reason.

11. Whether Mr. Rodriguez’s sentence must be vacated.

12. Whether the forfeiture order and the forfeiture aspect of the amended judgment and commitment order must be vacated because the oral sentence pronounced by the District Court did not order forfeiture.”

In summary, the brief argues as follows (internal citations omitted).

“1. The District Court abused its discretion by refusing to charge the jury using Mr. Rodriguez’s proposed instructions as to the terms “foreign official” and “instrumentality.” The interpretation of these terms under the FCPA is an issue of first impression in this Court. However, the District Court’s instructions conflict with this Court’s existing precedent. The District Court instructed the jury that an instrumentality of the Haitian government “is a means or agency through which a function of the foreign government is accomplished.” This Court explicitly rejected such a definition while interpreting another statute that contains the term “instrumentality” in a virtually identical statutory context. Addressing whether a private corporation that operated a prison system on behalf of the State of Florida was an “instrumentality of a state,” this Court held that the term “instrumentality of a state” referred to “governmental units or units created by them,” and rejected the functionality test incorporated into the instructions given by the District Court.. Mr. Rodriguez’s proposed instructions were consistent with this Court’s precedent. Because this Court rejected the functionality test in the context of another statute, the District Court abused its discretion by giving such an instruction in this case, in which Mr. Rodriguez may lose his liberty for seven years.

2. The District Court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Rodriguez’s motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding two contradictory declarations executed by Jean Max Bellerive, the Minister of Justice and Public Safety for Haiti (the Haitian government’s analog to the United States Attorney General). During the course of Mr. Rodriguez’s trial, Bellerive signed a declaration stating that Teleco “has never been and until now is not a State enterprise. Since its formation to date, it has and remains a Company under common law.” The Government disclosed this declaration five days after Mr. Rodriguez had been convicted. In opposing Mr. Rodriguez’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, the Government produced a second declaration signed by Bellerive that “clarified”several of the declarations key statements about Teleco’s status under Haitian law. The United States government substantially assisted the Minister in preparing the second, “clarifying” declaration. Despite the confusion created by the conflicting declarations, the District Court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the potential Brady issues posed by these events. That was an abuse of discretion.

3. The District Court also abused its discretion by rejecting Mr. Rodriguez’s requested jury instructions as to the “knowledge” requirement of the FCPA and by giving a deliberate ignorance instruction with no basis in the evidence.

4. The District Court erred by denying Mr. Rodriguez’s motion for acquittal, because the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s determination that Teleco was an “instrumentality” of the Haitian government under the FCPA, and because no evidence was admitted at trial establishing that Teleco performed a function of the Haitian government.

5. The District Court erred by denying Mr. Rodriguez’s motion for acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Most of the trial testimony centered on Mr. Rodriguez’s co-defendant, Esquenazi, who had been the CEO of the small telecommunications company at issue here. He, not Mr. Rodriguez, had direct contacts with Haitian citizens. The Government’s evidence against Mr. Rodriguez amounted to the fact that he signed Terra’s checks and Terra’s former Comptroller, Perez, thought Mr. Rodriguez was in one meeting where bribes were discussed. Perez’s testimony was uncorroborated, contradicted by his earlier statements to the Government, and inherently unreliable. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Mr. Rodriguez conspired to violate any federal law.

6. The District Court erroneously instructed the jury as to the jurisdictional element for the interstate wire fraud communication counts and the elements of money laundering, because the jury was not instructed that the wires must cross state lines, and the jury was not instructed that Government had to prove that the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity resulted from a felony under Haitian law to support a money laundering conviction.

7. The evidence does not support the jury’s determination that Mr. Rodriguez committed wire fraud, because there is no evidence that any interstate wires were sent. The District Court evidence adduced at trial does not support the jury’s verdict as to any count of conviction, even when the evidence is construed in favor of the Government.

8. Finally, the District Court’s Amended Judgment and Commitment Order imposed an invalid sentence by including forfeiture because the District Court did not announce an order of forfeiture as part of Mr. Rodriguez’s orallyimposed sentence.”

Esquenazi Brief

Representing Esquenazi in his appeal are Perkins Coie attorneys Markus Funk (here) and Michael Sink (here) and Michael Rosen (Michael Rosen P.A.).

Esquenazi adopted portions of co-appellant Rodriguez’s brief relating to the FCPA, intra-state wire fraud issues, and the Haitian bribery and in addition the brief presents the following issues.

1. “Whether the district court erred by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Brady issues.”

2. “Whether Esquenazi is entitled to an acquittal because employees of Haiti Teleco were not “foreign officials” within the meaning of FCPA simply because the National Bank of Haiti owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government appoints board members and directors.”

3. “Whether the FCPA jury instructions adequately conveyed the requisite governmental function necessary to establish that Haiti Teleco was an “instrumentality” of the Haitian government and Esquenazi’s knowledge of the same.”

4. “Whether the district court erred by improperly applying the sentencing guidelines as to leadership role, perjury and loss amount.”

In summary, the brief argues as follows (internal citations omitted).

“Although the FCPA is aimed at corrupt payments made to “foreign officials,” the Government never established that Haiti Teleco performed government functions similar to a governmental department or agency, such that Haiti Teleco’s employees would qualify as “foreign officials.” Instead, the Government relied on the National Bank of Haiti’s ownership of stock in Haiti Teleco and the Haitian government’s appointment board members and directors. Six days after the jury reached its verdict, however, the Government disclosed the existence of a declaration from the then-current Prime Minister of Haiti, Jean Max Bellerive, prepared ten days prior to the case going to the jury. The declaration stated that Haiti Teleco “has never been and is not a State enterprise,” and that the by-laws of the company had never been changed as required by law to make Haiti Teleco a government-owned entity.

Under Brady v. Maryland, the Government has an affirmative obligation under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to “learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case” and disclose any potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant. Esquenazi requested a Brady hearing to determine if and when the Government knew of the contents of this critical declaration. The district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing under the circumstances.

Esquenazi is also entitled to an acquittal on all FCPA-based counts because the term “instrumentality” in the FCPA should be construed to encompass only foreign entities performing governmental functions similar to departments or agencies. Here, the Government failed to establish that Haiti Teleco performed a governmental function. Despite the Government’s continued reliance on the premise that state-ownership or state-control of a business entity makes that entity and “instrumentality” of the government under the FCPA, that theory was explicitly considered by the drafters of the FCPA, but not included in the statute, and is inconsistent with the language of the statute as drafted. Because so many individuals and companies prosecuted by the Government prefer to resolve their cases prior to trial, the validity of the Government’s theory has seldom been tested in court, and never before by a United States Court of Appeals. This case presents an opportunity to review the Government’s aggressive enforcement of a less-than-clear federal statute and properly limit its scope to corrupt payments made to “foreign officials,” including employees of “instrumentalities” that perform governmental functions similar to governmental departments and agencies.

Esquenazi is also entitled to an acquittal or a new trial because the jury instructions failed to require that the jury determine whether Haiti Teleco ever exercised a government function akin to a department or agency, or even define “governmental function.” Because the jury could have reached its verdict without any consideration of the function of Haiti Teleco, the jury instructions were deficient.

Finally, the district court improperly calculated Esquenazi’s sentence. Esquenazi’s leadership role should have been that of an organizer or manager rather than a leader. Further, his enhanced sentence for perjury was improper both as to the substance of the district court’s findings and the procedure by which it made the determination.”

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:05 am. Post Categories: Carlos Rodriguez • Foreign Official • Joel Esquenazi • Knowledge

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May 9th, 2012

SEC To Be Put To Its Burden – Motion To Dismiss Filed In Jackson And Ruehlen Enforcement Action

In February, the SEC announced here charges against “three oil services executives [associated with Noble Corporation] with violating the FCPA by participating in a bribery scheme to obtain illicit permits for oil rigs in Nigeria in order to retain business under lucrative drilling contracts.” Previously Noble Corporation (along with several other companies in an enforcement action I dubbed CustomsGate) resolved an FCPA enforcement action involving both a DOJ and SEC component (total settlement amount was approximately $8.2 million ($2.6 million criminal fine via a non-prosecution agreement; $5.6 million in disgorgement and interest via a SEC complaint) – see here for the prior post.

Like the vast majority of FCPA defendants in SEC enforcement actions, one of the individual defendants, Thomas O’Rourke (the former controller and head of internal audit at Noble Corporation), chose to settle the SEC’s complaint without admitting or denying the SEC allegations.

Not so with the other two individual defendants: Mark Jackson (former Noble Corporation CEO) and James Ruehlen (current Director and Division Manager of Noble’s subsidiary in Nigeria). This prior post contained the comments of Jackson’s lawyer, David Krakoff (here - BuckleySandler) who stated as follows: “We unequivocally deny the SEC’s baseless allegations. Mr. Jackson will vigorously defend himself in court where the evidence will show what the SEC already knows, that at all times Mr. Jackson acted in good faith at Noble. He looks forward to clearing his good name in this proceeding.” The prior post also contained the comments of Ruehlen’s lawyer F. Joseph Warin (here - Gibson Dunn & Crutcher) who stated that “the claims against Mr. Ruehlen are wrong and they will be proven so at trial.”

I noted in the prior post that this could get interesting as the SEC is rarely put to its burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions (or any of its actions for that matter).

Yesterday Jackson and Ruehlen filed separate motions to dismiss (see here and here).

To my knowledge, this is the first time since the SEC lost the Mattson and Harris individual enforcement actions in 2002 (see here for a prior post discussing the case) that the Commission will be put to its burden of proof in an FCPA enforcement action.

Thus, yesterday’s motion is a significant event in terms of the SEC’s FCPA enforcement program.

The remainder of this post summarizes the motion to dismiss (internal citations omitted).

Ruehlen Motion to Dismiss

Ruehlen was charged in the SEC complaint (here) with Count 1 - FCPA anti-bribery violations; Count 2 – aiding and abetting Noble Corp’s FCPA anti-bribery violations; Count 3 - aiding and abetting Noble Corp’s failures to make and keep accurate books, records, and accounts and to devise and maintain internal accounting controls; and Claim 4 knowingly circumventing Noble’s internal controls and falsifying or causing to be falsified Noble’s books, records, and accounts in violations of FCPA’s books and records provisions.

In summary, the motion states as follows.

“Despite the repetition of the word “bribe” fifty-three times in its Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege a violation of law. The FCPA distinguishes between prohibited corrupt payments made to obtain or retain business (i.e., bribes), and permissible payments to “secure the performance of a routine governmental action,” such as “obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents” or for “processing governmental papers” (i.e., facilitation payments). The Complaint assumes that all payments to foreign officials are per se illegal bribes, never acknowledging the FCPA’s exception for facilitation payments.

The distinction between a permissible facilitation payment and an unlawful bribe turns on the purpose and effect of the payment, namely whether it is being made to induce the recipient to act improperly based on his or her particular role, duties, or responsibilities in order to obtain or retain business—facts that the SEC must allege to state a claim. Despite investigating this matter for nearly five years, the SEC apparently does not know—and therefore cannot allege—the identity, role, duties, or responsibilities of any “Nigerian government officials” to whom Noble or Mr. Ruehlen allegedly authorized payments. By failing to identify the particular foreign officials to whom Noble and Mr. Ruehlen allegedly authorized payments, Mr. Ruehlen and this Court are simply left to guess whether the alleged unidentified government officials had the power to assist Noble in obtaining or retaining business by engaging in non-routine governmental action, as the statute requires. Accordingly, the SEC fails to satisfy its burden of pleading plausible facts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Twombly that the payments at issue were prohibited bribes under the FCPA, rather than lawful facilitation payments.

Second, without identifying the intended recipients of the alleged payments or alleging facts showing how these officials abused their authority on Noble’s behalf, Plaintiff fails to allege that Mr. Ruehlen acted “corruptly,” that is, with “a bad purpose or evil motive,” or with the “intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official position.” To the contrary, the Complaint shows that Mr. Ruehlen reasonably believed that the payments were proper because, among other things, they had been reviewed and approved by Noble’s senior management who were tasked with ensuring Noble’s compliance with the FCPA and approving facilitation payments. The failure to plausibly allege facts showing corrupt intent provides an independent basis to dismiss the claims against Mr. Ruehlen.

Third, to the extent that Plaintiff’s first and second claims against Mr. Ruehlen survive these challenges, the Court must nevertheless dismiss them because the law in effect at the time failed to give Mr. Ruehlen “fair notice” of the interpretation now being advanced by the SEC in this case. In addition, the SEC’s strained and subjective interpretation of the FCPA’s facilitation payment exception makes it impossible for well-intentioned individuals to navigate between lawful and unlawful conduct and, therefore, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Ruehlen.

Fourth, Claims 3 and 4 must be dismissed because the SEC fails to specify the particular book, record, or account that it claims Mr. Ruehlen knowingly falsified (or unreasonably caused to be false) or the particular internal control that he allegedly knowingly circumvented. Additionally, to the extent that the alleged violations refer to Noble’s decision to treat the special handling fees as facilitation payments rather than bribes, these violations are entirely predicated on the underlying FCPA violations alleged in Claims 1 and 2. Finally, this action is governed by the five-year statute of limitations. Because the claims against Mr. Ruehlen are principally based on alleged conduct that occurred outside the limitations period and because the SEC raises no basis for tolling, they are time-barred and must be dismissed.”

Jackson Motion to Dismiss

Jackson was charged in the SEC complaint (here) with Count 1 – FCPA anti-bribery violations; Count 2 – aiding and abetting Noble Corp’s FCPA anti-bribery violations; Count 3 – aiding and abetting Noble Corp’s failures to make and keep accurate books, records, and accounts and to devise and maintain internal accounting controls; Count 4 knowingly circumventing Noble’s internal controls and falsifying or causing to be falsified Noble’s books, records, and accounts in violations of FCPA’s books and records provisions and Rule 13b2-1; Count 5 – misleading auditors; Count 6 – signing false certifications; and Count 7 – control person liability.

In summary the motion states as follows.

“The Complaint against Jackson must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Only factual allegations—not unsupported conclusions or accusations of legal violations—may sustain a Complaint. But, stripped of its conclusions about what Jackson “knew,” the Complaint comes up woefully short in pleading several essential elements of Claim I, a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) anti-bribery violation—that Jackson acted with corrupt intent, and that he knew payments would be made to a foreign official to obtain sought-after unlawful acts from that foreign official. Instead, the factual allegations in the Complaint regarding alleged bribes are equally consistent, if not more, with wholly legal actions under the “facilitating payments” exception to the FCPA. The bribery claim therefore must be dismissed as implausible under controlling Supreme Court precedent. And because the other claims in the Complaint are entirely dependent on the existence of illegal bribes, they too must be dismissed. Finally, because the vast majority of the conduct alleged in the Complaint took place well over five years before the Complaint was filed, the bribery claim and many of the derivative claims are barred by the statute of limitations.”

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:06 am. Post Categories: FCPA Trials • James Ruehlen • Mark Jackson • Permits / Licenses / Customs / Tax • SEC

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May 8th, 2012

Wal-Mart And FCPA Reform

A hot topic of late is what impact Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny will have on FCPA reform efforts.

Last week, in an editorial (here) USA TODAY stated as follows. “Supporters of weakening the act argue that the Justice Department has become too powerful and arbitrary. Some Chamber proposals, such as clearer enforcement guidelines, are relatively non-controversial. But others would seriously undermine the law. The most troublesome would give companies an automatic defense merely for implementing internal compliance programs to prevent and police bribery. The proposal would amount to giving companies a get-out-of-jail-free card. It’s not hard to imagine corporations drawing up a set of cookie-cutter guidelines designed to meet the letter of the law, which might or might not reflect their commitment to thwarting corruption.”

[Dear USA TODAY Editorial Board, as noted in my article "Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense" (here) an FCPA compliance defense would not eliminate corporate criminal liability under the FCPA or reward “fig leaf” or “purely paper” compliance programs. A compliance defense would not apply to corrupt business organizations, activity engaged in or condoned by executive officers, or activity by any employee if it occurred in the absence of preexisting compliance policies and procedures. A growing chorus of former Department of Justice officials, including those who used to enforce the FCPA, support an FCPA compliance defense and a compliance defense will better incentivize more robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and thus best advance the FCPA’s objective of reducing bribery. As noted in this prior post, that’s not weakening the FCPA, that is strengthening the FCPA and best advancing its objective of reducing bribery.]

In an opposing view (here) also published by USA TODAY, former U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey (who represents the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform with regard to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) stated as follows. “Some suggest that increased FCPA enforcement has proved the law’s utility without the need for changes. But the opposite is true: Aggressive enforcement has alerted business and the courts alike to its flaws. That is why clarifying the FCPA has drawn bipartisan support.”

[I agree that high-profile instances of FCPA scrutiny such as News Corp.'s and Wal-Mart's has shined a much needed light on FCPA enforcement and caused those who do not ponder FCPA issues every day to take notice. See here and here for prior posts. And indeed, Mukasey is right, as noted in this previous post, certain aspects of FCPA reform share bipartisan support.]

This Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post by Samuel Rubenfeld titled “Wal-Mart Bribery Allegations Stir Up FCPA Debate Anew” contains the views of many including a statement I liked from Ian Koski, a spokesman for Sen. Chris Coons (D., Del. who has been open to amending the FCPA) that the Wal-Mart investigation is ongoing and that the senator wouldn’t decide legislative policy based on a news story.

In this post Tom Fox (FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog) said that Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny “will sound the death knell for any efforts to amend” the FCPA. Fox also penned a guest post on the FCPA Blog (here) titled “How Wal-Mart Killed The Compliance Defense.” Also on the FCPA Blog, (here) Professor Andy Spalding penned a post titled “The Good Faith Compliance Defense, Unscathed.” Professor Peter Henning, writing on the New York Times DealBook page (here), stated as follows. “The investigation of Wal-Mart has brought the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the attention of the public in a way not seen since the 1970s scandals that led to its adoption. Congress may find it politically impossible to adopt changes to the statute that would arguably make it more difficult to pursue cases as long as the allegations of foreign bribery by a leading American company remain in the headlines.” Likewise, Michael Volkov (Corruption, Crime and Compliance Blog) stated (here) that “Congress is not going to amend the FCPA anytime soon, and especially not in an election year” and yesterday he stated (here) that “FCPA reform is dead — not just for this year but for years to come.”

What to make of all this?

For starters, let’s observe what I submit are facts. The reason Wal-Mart has dominated the news cycle the past few weeks is not because the company is under FCPA scrutiny, this was known in December 2011 when Wal-Mart disclosed its FCPA scrutiny, becoming one of approximately 100 companies known to be under FCPA investigation. Rather, the reason Wal-Mart has dominated the news is because of how the company acted, or failed to act, since learning of potential FCPA issues in approximately 2005. This is a corporate governance issue, not an FCPA issue, and thus should not impact limited and sensible FCPA reform.

However, many people, including politicians who are ultimately responsible for reform, are unlikely to make this critical distinction and thus the recent news regarding Wal-Mart could impact FCPA reform.

Exhibit A and B in the politicization of FCPA reform are nearly identical letters here and here from Elijah Cummings (Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform) and Henry Waxman (Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce) to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Retail Industry Leaders Association and the President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The letters state as follows. “We are concerned about the role that Wal-Mart officials may have played in the Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform. It would appear to be a conflict of interest for Wal-Mart officials to advise on ways to weaken the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at a time when the leadership of the company was apparently aware of corporate conduct that may have violated the law.”

Regardless of any impact Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny may have on FCPA reform, FCPA reform was unlikely to happen this year even before the recent coverage of Wal-Mart. When the DOJ in November 2011 promised FCPA guidance in 2012 (see here for the prior post), this forestalled introduction of an actual FCPA reform bill. Guidance has still not been released and when it is, there is likely to be an absorption period that flows into the election season.

Honestly debating and considering changes to a statute titled the “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ is a political hot potato. It always has been and will always be. For instance, several reform bills in the 1980′s sought to change the name of the law to the “Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act” so that an honest and considered debate could occur.

Certain FCPA amendments occurred in 1998, but the last period of major substantive FCPA reform occurred in the 1980′s. Those reform efforts took approximately eight years.

FCPA reform is not dead, nor should it be. But it is likely going on a summer vacation. For more on my views on FCPA reform see this recent video (with many thanks to Levick Strategic Communications for the opportunity).

I conclude this post with guiding words from key players during the FCPA reform debates in the 1980′s.

In 1981, Senator Alfonse D’Amato opened Senate hearings on a bill to amend the FCPA. He stated that the bill “provides us with a good opportunity to assess the effect of recently enacted legislation and its implementation.” Senator D’Amato noted as follows. “The discussion which takes place during these hearings is not a debate between those who oppose bribery and those who support it. I see the major issue before us to be whether the law, including both its antibribery and accounting provisions, is the best approach, or whether it has created unnecessary costs and burdens out of proportion to the purposes for which it was enacted, and whether it serves our national interests.”

In an opening statement during Senate hearings, Senator John Chafee, a leader in the FCPA reform movement stated: “We’ve learned a great deal about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the last three years. We’ve learned that the best of intentions can go awry and create confusion and great cost to our economy.” During the hearing, Senator Chafee further stated as follows: “Critics have attempted to characterize my bill as a signal to U.S. companies that they can return to the ‘bad old days’ of foreign bribery. That is not my intent, nor should it be the signal. I abhor bribery, whether domestic or foreign, but I also dislike confusion. Thus, my bill will eliminate uncertainty while maintaining strong prohibitions against bribery. The ambiguities and murkiness of the bill’s language have caused U.S. companies to withdraw from legitimate markets and contributed to the decline in the U.S. share of world exports. We need to end this confusion.”

During Senate hearings, Senator D’Amato also noted as follows: “The thing that bothers me about this kind of a debate is that we tend to posture this thing as if somebody were for or against bribery. I think it is important to state for the record that bribery of any foreign official by any U.S. concern is bad for our national health, and it is something that we have got to stop, we have got to deal with, and we have, I think, gone a long way with the FCPA. What we proposed to do is to simplify that law and to make it workable so that we can set that standard in concrete from now on and not have the abuses that occurred prior to 1977, but not by stopping exports, but by stopping bribery. That is the objective.” Senator D’Amato further stated as follows. “I think it is very important that in the committee’s work that we not create the attitude that this committee is making it easier for businesses to engage in illegal activity. That has, in fact, been suggested, not only by our distinguished colleague from Wisconsin [Senator Proxmire, a Senate leader in enactment of the FCPA who generally opposed the reform efforts], but also by certain journalists, who are questioning the need for proposed changes. I think that rather than hampering prosecution of illegal acts, [the reform bill at issue] would clarify and make possible just prosecution of those who engage in bribery. It would eliminate any ‘gray area’ by clearly spelling out the limits of the law.”

During Senate hearings, Senator John Heinz stated as follows. “… There are many people that are extremist, and there are others who get carried away by their enthusiasm who are going to argue that even if we change the provisions in the present act, that are unnecessary or ambiguous or uncertain, that even though we are not doing so, we are legalizing bribery. That strikes me as the worst kind of demagoguery, because it implies that everything that Congress has done in the past is perfect. And does anybody believe that?”

During the Senate hearing, William Satterwhite (Senior VP, General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer of Enserch Corp.) testified. He began his testimony as follows: “Before I begin my comments, I would like to state for the record, Enserch Corp. is not in favor of bribery. It is a sad commentary on the political atmosphere surrounding this legislation that those who support the bill feel compelled to make clear that they do not condone corruption.”

My favorite quote from the FCPA reform debates of the 1980′s and one that rings true today is from William Brock (U.S. Trade Representative) who observed, during a 1982 FCPA reform hearing, as follows. “Just because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act spotlights a sensitive subject, some people wish to turn a ‘blind eye’ to its shortcomings rather than risk being accused of being ‘soft on bribery.’ That is too easy a way out. Retreating from controversy will not cure the law’s deficiencies. [… ] Is there any U.S. law that ought to be above such review and clarification – especially one as complex as the FCPA.”

Posted by Mike Koehler at 5:05 am. Post Categories: FCPA Reform • Legislative History

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May 7th, 2012

An Important FCPA Case You’ve Likely Never Heard About

Last week (here) I noted, in connection with Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure, that the enforcement theory that payments outside the context of foreign government procurement fall under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions has been subjected to judicial scrutiny three times. After summarizing those three instances, I noted that the scorecard was as follows: US – 1; Defendants – 2; or if you prefer US – .5; Defendants – 2.5 (recognizing that the 5th Circuit decision in Kay is equivocal).

Last week in doing some research, I stumbled upon a fourth instance where this enforcement theory was subjected to judicial scrutiny.

The result? DOJ lost.

Thus, the scorecard is as follows when an enforcement agency is put to its burden of proof on the enforcement theory that payments outside the context of foreign government procurement fall under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions: US – 1; Defendants – 3; or if you prefer US – .5; Defendants – 3.5 (again recognizing that the 5th Circuit decision in Kay is equivocal).

This 1990 FCPA enforcement action is so obscure it was not even cited in any of the decisions of the other challenges which occurred between 2002-2004. For instance, in the Kay trial court decision in 2002, the court stated that it was confronting an issue of first impression in the federal courts.

Below is a summary of U.S. v. Alfredo Duran.

AEA Aircraft Recovery (“AEA”) was a division of Summerland Engineering Corp. (a Florida corporation) and engaged in the business of recovery of seized aircraft. The sole shareholder of Summerland was Robert Gurin.

In 1989, the DOJ charged Joaquin Pou (a Dominican Republic citizen and an agent of AEA, Summerland and Gurin), Alfredo Duran (a U.S. citizen and agent of AEA, Summerland, and Gurin) and Jose Guasch (a U.S. citizen and agent of AEA, Summerland, and Gurin) with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. See here for the criminal indictment. In a criminal information (see here) the DOJ also charged Robert Gurin.

According to the charging documents, the defendants conspired to make payments to officials of the Dominican Republic in order to obtain the release of two aircraft seized by the government of the Dominican Republic. The charging documents then proceed to set forth various acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Gurin and Guasch pleaded guilty and Pou (a citizen of the Dominican Republic) became a fugitive. Gurin was sentenced to 5 years probation and 100 hours of community services and Guasch was sentenced to 4 years probation, 1 month of house arrest and 75 hours of community service.

Duran, a former Florida state Democratic Party chairman, pleaded not guilty and put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial. At the close of the DOJ’s case, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (see here). Duran argued that “no reasonable jury could find that the purpose of any of the alleged intended payments was to assist [...] in obtaining or retaining business” and that the government “has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove any intended payments were not facilitating or expediting payments for the purpose of expediting or securing routine governmental action (i.e. grease payments).”

The motion stated that “the legislative history to the 1977 Act makes clear that the evil redressed by the Act was the use of bribery by U.S. corporations to obtain contracts for the sale of good or services to foreign countries.” The motion then referenced that in 1988 Congress “created an exception for expediting or facilitating payments for the purpose of securing routine governmental action.” The motion stated, “by clear implication, payments in respect of the awarding of procurement contracts of the foreign government are the type of payments targeted” by the FCPA.

The motion then stated as follows. “The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, shows at best that payments were to be made to Joaquin Pou and, through him, to unidentified Dominican government officials for the purpose of obtaining the release of a single aircraft to its owner. Clearly, this is not what Congress intended by the phrase obtaining or retaining business … The fact that this intended payment may have indirectly benefited Gurin’s business by facilitating the release of an aircraft does not establish the type of direct business purpose contemplated by the statute.” Duran argued that “the government has failed to establish that the intended payments in this case were for the specific purpose of obtaining or retaining business … and, accordingly, a judgment of acquittal should be entered.

Turning next to facilitating payments, the motion argued that “the government bears the burden of disapproving that the payment was not a ‘facilitating or expediting payment” and that had “Congress intended the ‘facilitating or expediting payment exception’ to be an affirmative defense, it would have placed it” in the portion of the FCPA containing affirmative defenses. The motion stated as follows. “By its nature, therefore, the exception creates an additional element which the government must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the crime.” The motion then goes through the legislative history of facilitating payments and how in the original FCPA the concept was imbedded in the definition of “foreign official” and how in 1988 Congress created the stand-alone facilitating payment exception.

As to the evidence at trial, the motion stated as follows. “Here the evidence introduced by the prosecution is only consistent with a finding that the purpose of the alleged intended payments was to facilitate or expedite the release of an aircraft. The Defendant had been told by an undercover government informant that there was no legal holds upon the aircraft. He was led to believe that neither the Dominican Republic nor any other government held any legal claim to or right in the aircraft. He understood that it was simply a straightforward matter of expediting the release of an aircraft on behalf of the owner. Any intended payment was simply for the purpose of hurrying along a bureaucratic process. The purpose of the alleged intended payment was to expedite a routine governmental action. Consequently, no reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant agreed upon an illegal objective.”

Elsewhere, the motion stated as follows. “The facts simply show that the army of the Dominican Republic had no discretion in the matter of the release of the aircraft, and that some government officials were simply trying to line their pockets outside of their official capacities.” Further the motion stated as follows. “There was no decision-making process in this case, the facts merely demonstrate a ministerial or clerical matter involving the processing of government papers and the automatic release of the aircraft.”

On April 17, 1990, U.S. District Court Judge Jame Kehoe granted a judgment of acquittal (see here).

Original source media accounts note that Judge Kehoe said “the government failed to prove the charges against [Duran] were a crime under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” According to media reports, Judge Kehoe refused a government request to stay acquittal while prosecutors appealed. Duran is reported as stating, “I feel that I have been throughly vindicated. I was ready to take the stand in my own defense. I am very happy.”

An additional dynamic in the case was that Pou fled the U.S. and Judge Kehoe agreed with the defense that all evidence concerning Pou should be excluded from the case.

According to media reports, the case began when the Government used an informant to pose as an agent for the owner of a drug plane seized by the Dominican military. Media reports suggest that the government was investigating Gurin in light of allegations he had bribed high-ranking military officials in the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean countries to recover drug planes.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 5:01 am. Post Categories: 1989 - 1997 Enforcement Actions • AEA Aircraft Recovery • Alfredo Duran • DOJ Enforcement Action • Dominican Republic • Facilitating Payments • FCPA Jurisprudence • FCPA Sentences • FCPA Trials • Foreign Nationals • Individual Enforcement Action • Joaquin Pou • Jose Guasch • Obtain or Retain Business • Robert Gurin

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May 4th, 2012

Friday Roundup

From the campaign stump, Wal-Mart civil suits start to pour in – plus a comment regarding statute of limitations, where should the money go, don’t believe the hype, and for the weekend reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

From The Stump

Zein Obagi (here – a fiscally conservative Democratic candidate for California’s new 33rd Congressional District) earlier this week posted a letter (here) he sent to U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). Titled “Keeping California Companies Competing Abroad Competitive” the letter begins as follows. “I am writing to ask you to show our party’s understanding of international trade by updating and clarifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As you know Senator, both sides of the aisle have put forth efforts to clarify the FCPA, to assist in its enforcement and also keep America competitive with foreign nations’ trade practices.” In the letter, Obagi states that “California businesses expend enormous resources with insufficient assurances that they will not run afoul of the FCPA.”

Kudos to Obagi for the courage to tackle the politically sensitive issue of reforming the FCPA. His letter reminds us of an issue lost in the FCPA reform debate – that certain aspects of FCPA reform share bipartisan support. See here for the transcript of the Senate’s 2010 FCPA hearing (particularly statements from Democratic Senators Amy Klobuchar and Chris Coons) and here for the transcript of the House’s 2011 FCPA hearing (particularly statements from Democrat Representative John Conyers).

Wal-Mart Civil Suits Begin to Pour In

One of my earlier Wal-Mart posts (here) noted that not only will the DOJ and SEC likely be examining the conduct of Wal-Mart executives, but so too will plaintiff law firms representing shareholders who will likely scour Wal-Mart’s SEC filings and other statements to the market in bringing derivative claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty and potential Section 10(b) claims based on material omissions concerning Wal-Mart Mexico. On this score, shareholders are likely to allege, among other things, that Wal-Mart’s officers and directors demonstrated conscious disregard for fiduciary duties by failing to act diligently in the face of known facts suggesting a duty to act.

Approximately ten days later the civil suits are starting to pour in. See here (New York Times) and here (Los Angeles Times) for the derivative lawsuit brought by the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, the country’s second-largest public pension fund, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, against current and former board members and executives of Wal-Mart Stores Inc., accusing them of using bribery and corruption to gain authorization from Mexican government officials to build new stores.

The complaint (here) generally tracks the New York Times article (see here for a prior summary), but also includes allegations suggesting potential insider trading. The complaint alleges as follows. “[T]he trading records of defendants [H. Lee Scott Jr.] and [Eduardo] Castro-Wright show that both of these defendants began selling millions of dollars worth of Wal- Mart shares in the months after The New York Times first contacted the Company regarding possible FCPA infractions by Wal-Mex in December 2011. Scott and Castro-Wright were divesting their shares in Wal-Mart in apparent anticipation of the publication of The New York Times exposé and the corresponding stock drop that would undoubtedly occur, and did occur. On the three trading days after The New York Times’ April 21, 2012 exposé, Wal-Mart stock dropped eight percent, wiping out all of its gains in 2012. Scott and Castro-Wright sold uncharacteristically large amounts of stock while in possession of the materially adverse nonpublic information that the Company was exposed to undisclosed liability for massive FCPA penalties and other contingences relating to the bribes and cover-up …”.

In addition, yesterday Gilman Law LLP announced here a derivative lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas against Wal-Mart. According to the release, the “complaint alleges the Directors of Wal-Mart breached their fiduciary duties by violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and engaging in a six-year-long cover-up of a massive bribery scheme concerning Wal-Mart’s expansion in Mexico.”

Wal-Mart Statute of Limitations

In recent days, there has been much talk about the FCPA’s statute of limitations (5 years) and how the limitations period can generally be extended through conspiracy charges. All correct observations as to a fundamental black-letter law concept. Except in corporate FCPA inquiries, one can generally toss aside fundamental black-letter law concepts because they simply do not matter.

Sure, Wal-Mart (or any other company subject to FCPA scrutiny) can talk about statute of limitations around conference room tables behind closed doors in Washington D.C., but to truly challenge the DOJ on this issue (as all others) first requires that the company be criminally indicated, something few corporate leaders are willing to let happen. Cooperation is the name of the game in corporate FCPA inquiries and to assert statute of limitations issues is not cooperating. Given the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving FCPA enforcement actions (to learn more about these “carrots” and “sticks” please read ”The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” – here), one of first steps during a corporate disclosure of FCPA issues (one that Wal-Mart made in December 2011) is to enter into a tolling agreement or to waive any statute of limitations defenses.

As evidence, dig into the details of most FCPA enforcement actions and one quickly discovers that the conduct at issue is old – in some cases very old. The 2012 Biomet enforcement action (see here for the prior post) concerns conduct going back to 2000; the 2012 Smith & Nephew enforcement action (see here for the prior post) concerns conduct going back to 1998; and the 2012 Marubeni enforcement action (see here for the prior post) concerns conduct going back to 1995 (17 years ago) with the last act alleged occurring in 2004.

For a similar post on fundamental black letter law concepts in FCPA enforcement actions, see this prior post “Does DOJ Expect FCPA Counsel to Roll Over and Play Dead?”

Don’t Believe the Hype

Writing at the Huffington Post (here), Professor Brandon Garrett (here - University of Virginia School of Law) says “Don’t Believe the Hype on Corporate Bribery.” Professor Garrett notes that ”at first, foreign bribery prosecutions may seem big and brash and the farthest thing from a wrist-slap” but he cautions that many FCPA enforcement actions “can be smaller than they appear.”

I frequently am put in the “the DOJ is too aggressive in enforcing the FCPA” camp and in many respects that is true. However, I have also frequently stated (see here for my Facade of FCPA Enforcement article, here for my Senate testimony and here and here for prior posts as to the same Siemens and BizJet enforcement actions Professor Garrett references) that in egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation the DOJ’s aggressive rhetoric does not match the reality of the enforcement action.

See this prior post for discussion of Professor Garrett’s article “Globalized Corporate Prosecutions.”

Where Should the Money Go

This prior post discussed the recent letter by Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (“SERAP”) (a non-governmental civil society organization in Nigeria) to SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami (with a copy to Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer and Deputy Chief, Fraud Section Charles Duross) regarding “FCPA civil penalty and disgorgement proceeds that companies agree to pay to resolve US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations.”

The specific SERAP proposal is as follows. “…[A]fter, and ony after, public notice of an FCPA settlement agreement, the victim foreign government entity and any applicant NGO would have 60 days to file a request that the Enforcement Division pay some or all of the agreed payment proceeds to or for the benefit of the victim government entity or to a home country-based or US based NGO that would present a proposal [to] spend the proceeds for public purposes (e.g. on public health programs) in the country of the victim entity. Thereafter, the Enforcement Division would have 60 days to act upon the request, favorably or not in its discretion; in this context the Enforcement Division should provide a brief statement of its reasons for its decisions. In reaching its decisions the Enforcement Division would have the inherent authority to consult with Executive Branch agencies of the US government.

Recently the SEC responded to the letter (see here). The SEC thanked SERAP for its ‘thoughtful submission” and stated that it will “give appropriate consideration” to its suggestions while also noting as follows. “Although the macro effects of corruption can be ascribed generally, the framework of our securities laws requires a proximate connection to the harm caused by a particular violation. The question of identifying investors or other parties that suffer cognizable harm in connection with the securities law violation(s) at issue in a given enforcement matter is driven by the facts and circumstances of that particular case.”

For more, including my views, see here from Trustlaw.

Others are also thinking about the issue of where FCPA enforcement proceeds should go. In this draft paper titled “Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Reduce Rent Seeking and Better Deter Transnational Bribery,” Matthew Turk argues as follows: “(1) the SEC should cease retaining profits disgorged by corporate defendants; (2) disgorgements should be transferred to the Host country where the bribe took place, conditional on the Host government’s cooperation with the FCPA investigation; and (3) if cooperation is not forthcoming, disgorgement proceeds should be transferred to the OECD Working Group, an international organization designed to facilitate the enforcement of an important anti-bribery treaty.” According to Turk, ”Reforming disgorgement practices in the manner suggested here would not constitute a legalistic attempt to ratchet the total level of anti-corruption enforcement up or down in a particular direction. Instead it would re-allocate the proceeds from FCPA enforcement on a global scale so as to properly align the incentives of the parties involved and provide greater access to the information required for effective enforcement.”

Weekend Reading Stack

I recommend this recent Q&A in Metropolitan Counsel with Homer Moyer (Miller & Chevalier) a “Dean” of the FCPA. Might as well make it a Homer Moyer weekend – see here for a prior Q&A post on this site with Moyer.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 5:05 am. Post Categories: FCPA Reform • FCPA Scholarship • Related Civil Litigation • Statute of Limitations • Victims • Wal-Mart

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