November 20th, 2014

DOJ And SEC Officials Talk FCPA

Speaking8In what has become a mid-November tradition, DOJ and SEC officials yesterday gave speeches at a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act conference.

Topics discussed included the following:  individual prosecutions, voluntary disclosure and cooperation, compliance programs, asset recovery, foreign law enforcement cooperation.  (For factual information concerning DOJ and SEC individuals prosecutions see this prior post and as relevant to the issue of “success” – a topic touched upon in both speeches – you might want to read the article ”What Percentage of DOJ FCPA Losses is Acceptable?“)

In many respects, yesterday’s DOJ and SEC speeches were very similar to previous speeches delivered by enforcement agency officials in September and October (see here, herehere and here for prior posts).

This post excerpts this speech by Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell and this speech by Andrew Ceresney, Direct of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.

DOJ

Caldwell began her remarks as follows.

“I want to focus my remarks on one of our most important enforcement priorities – our efforts to combat corruption around the world.

At the Criminal Division, we are stepping up our efforts in the battle against corruption, at home and abroad.  Through our Public Integrity Section, which prosecutes corruption cases involving U.S. federal, state, and local officials, we are attacking domestic corruption.

More relevant to this audience, we are also deeply committed to fighting corruption abroad.  Now, more than ever, we are bringing to justice individuals and corporations who use foreign bribery as a way to gain a business advantage.  In part, we are doing this using the tools and methods that have made our past enforcement efforts so successful – FCPA prosecutions and penalties.

But there have been some really big changes in the Justice Department’s FCPA work since I last worked there.  First, thanks to the expertise and knowledge we have acquired over the years, we are now able to investigate FCPA cases much more quickly.  We also are better equipped to prosecute individuals who are actually making corrupt payments, as well as intermediary entities hired to serve as conduits for bribes.

And now we also are prosecuting the bribe takers, using our money laundering and other laws.  And, importantly, we have begun stripping corrupt officials of the proceeds of their corruption involving both bribes and kleptocracy, using both criminal and civil authorities.

The Criminal Division’s FCPA enforcement program and our Kleptocracy Initiative are really two sides of the same anti-corruption coin.  We bring those who pay bribes to justice, no matter how rich and powerful they are.  But by itself, that is not enough.  We also attack corruption at its source – by prosecuting and seizing the assets of the corrupt officials who betray the trust of their people.

Another big change – one that has been building for years but now has really developed momentum – is that we increasingly find ourselves shoulder-to-shoulder with law enforcement and regulatory authorities in other countries.  Every day, more countries join in the battle against transnational bribery. And this includes not just our long-time partners, but countries in all corners of the globe.

Together with our foreign law enforcement and regulatory partners we are taking a truly global approach to rooting out international corruption.  And make no mistake, this international approach has dramatically advanced our efforts to uncover, punish and deter foreign corruption.

Increasingly, we and our counterparts share information about bribery schemes.   We report schemes to one another.  And, where appropriate, we discuss strategy and coordinate our use of investigative techniques, so that we can obtain the best possible results, especially in very high-impact cases.

These efforts are incredibly important. The World Bank estimates that more than $1 trillion is paid every year in bribes, which amounts to about 3 percent of the world economy.  That amount is stunningly wasteful.  No one benefits from corruption other than the corrupt officials.

But corruption is far more insidious and harmful than can be measured numerically.  We all know that when corruption takes hold, the fundamental notion of playing-by-the-rules gets pushed to the side, and individuals, businesses and governments instead begin to operate under a fundamentally unfair – and destabilizing – set of norms.  This undermines confidence in the markets and governments, and destroys the sense of fair play that is absolutely critical for the rule of law to prevail.

In emerging economies, corruption stifles economic development that would lift people out of poverty, improve infrastructure, and better people’s lives.  And the fruits of corruption can prop up autocratic and oppressive rulers even in wealthier countries.

Make no mistake, the effects of foreign corruption are not just felt overseas.  In today’s global economy, the negative effects of foreign corruption inevitably flow back to the United States.  For one, American companies are harmed by global corruption.  They are denied the ability to compete in a fair and transparent marketplace.  Instead of being rewarded for their efficiency, innovation, and honest business practices, U.S. companies suffer at the hands of corrupt governments and lose out to corrupt competitors.

International corruption also presents broader public safety concerns.  Indeed, criminal networks of all kinds, including narcotics traffickers, cyber criminals, terrorists, and human traffickers, often take advantage of countries whose commitment to the rule of law is weakened by corruption of its officials.  And, as we’ve seen in the more extreme cases, thoroughly corrupted regimes have created safe havens for criminals by giving them a secure base from which they can orchestrate their criminal activities.

You have no doubt heard my predecessors speak of the evils of corruption.  It is because of these evils that the fight against international bribery has been, and continues to be, a core priority of the Department of Justice.

Our commitment to the fight against foreign bribery is reflected in our robust enforcement record in this area, which includes charges against corporations and individuals alike from all over the world.  Since 2009, we have convicted more than 50 individuals in FCPA and FCPA-related cases, and resolved criminal cases against more than 50 companies with penalties and forfeiture of approximately $3 billion.  Twenty-five of the cases involving individuals have come since 2013 alone.  And those are just the cases that are now public.  These individuals run the gamut of actors involved in bribery schemes: corporate executives, middlemen, and corrupt officials.”

Caldwell next focused on asset recovery and international cooperation:

“As our enforcement actions demonstrate, we are focusing our attention on bribes of consequence – ones that fundamentally undermine confidence in the markets and governments.  And our record of success in these prosecutions has allowed us to show – rather than just tell – corporate executives that if they participate in a scheme to improperly influence a foreign official, they will personally risk the very real prospect of going to prison.

[...]

Stripping individuals of the proceeds of their conduct – and thus depriving them of the very profits that are driving the corrupt conduct in the first place – is one technique that we are using increasingly in our fight against foreign bribery.  And, we are not just pursuing these corrupt proceeds through criminal actions.

The FCPA Unit’s efforts to eradicate foreign corruption also are assisted by the work of our Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, through which prosecutors in the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section and Office of International Affairs are pursuing ill gotten riches from corrupt officials using our civil authority. [...] [W]e are ready, willing, and able to confiscate the riches of corrupt leaders who drain the resources of their countries for their own benefit.”

[O]ur efforts to hold bribe takers as well as bribe payors accountable for their criminal conduct are greatly aided by our foreign partners.  Transnational bribery is a global problem and an international solution truly is beginning to develop.  Every day, more countries reject the notion that bribery in international business is inevitable and acceptable.  Indeed, in just the last few years several countries have enacted new anti-corruption laws or enhanced existing laws.  Admittedly, the global trend against foreign corruption continues to face many challenges, but the tide has turned and I truly believe that it is now on our side.

This level of collaboration is the product of hard work and strategic coordination, which has allowed us to forge the international partnerships that are essential to fight global corruption.  For example, just a couple of weeks ago, about 200 judges, prosecutors, investigators, and regulators from more than 50 countries, multi-development banks, and international organizations around the world joined prosecutors, investigators, and regulators from the Criminal Division, SEC, and FBI in Washington, D.C., for a week long training course to exchange ideas and best practices on combating foreign corruption.

I had the opportunity to participate in this meeting and saw its value first-hand.  The meeting provided a critical opportunity for the people who fight global corruption in the trenches every day to meet face-to-face, discuss ongoing cases, identify new opportunities to collaborate, and improve intelligence sharing.

The results from this increased international collaboration speak for themselves.”

[...]

[T]hese coordinated global actions sent a powerful message – countries all over the world are now engaged in the fight against foreign bribery and together, we can and will hold to account individuals and companies who engage in corruption, regardless of where they operate or reside.

The increase in international collaboration is not only enhancing our own FCPA enforcement efforts but it is also resulting in anti-corruption enforcement actions by other countries.”

[...]

Continued international collaboration is absolutely critical if we are going to have a meaningful impact on corruption across the globe and we are committed to maintaining – and enhancing – our working relationships with our foreign partners.

By enhancing our coordination with our overseas counterparts, continually improving our already successful methods of investigating and prosecuting FCPA cases, and increasing our efforts to prosecute corrupt officials and recover their ill-gotten gains, we are now, more than ever, making a tangible difference in the fight against foreign bribery.”

Caldwell next shifted to voluntary disclosure and cooperation and stated:

“When I last worked at the department and even over the 10 years that I was in private practice, it seemed that many FCPA investigations were initiated by self-disclosures.  While we of course still welcome self-disclosure, today we are far from reliant on it.

[...]

And in a world of whistleblowers and international cooperation, I expect that will be the case more often than not going forward.  That said, we still encourage and reward self-disclosure and cooperation.

When you detect significant potential criminal conduct at your company, or a company that has retained you, I encourage you to disclose it to the Justice Department – and to do so in a timely manner.  As I am sure you all know, the department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations provides that prosecutors should consider “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents” in deciding how to proceed in a corporate investigation.

So, in addition to promptly disclosing the conduct to us, I also encourage you to conduct a thorough internal investigation and to share with us the facts you uncover in that investigation.  We do not expect you to boil the ocean in conducting your investigation but in order to receive full credit for cooperation, we do expect you to conduct a thorough, appropriately tailored investigation of the misconduct.

And we expect you to provide us useful facts in a timely manner.  And that includes, importantly, facts about the individuals responsible for the misconduct, no matter how high their rank may be.

[...]

The sooner you disclose the conduct to us, the more avenues we have to investigate culpable individuals.  And, the more open you are with us about the facts you learned about that conduct during your investigation, the more credit you will receive for cooperation.

But, if you delay notifying us about an executive’s conduct or attempt to whitewash the facts about an individual’s involvement, you risk receiving any credit for your “cooperation.”

This does not mean that we expect you to use law-enforcement style techniques to investigate your employees.  To the contrary, it simply means that when you do an internal investigation, and you choose to cooperate with us, you should understand that we will expect to hear not just what happened, but who did what, when, and where.

We also expect that a truly cooperating company will provide relevant documents in a timely fashion, even if those documents are located overseas.  We recognize that some countries’ laws pose real challenges to data access and transfer of information, but we also know that many do not.

The Criminal Division investigates and prosecutes a large volume of international cases and through these cases, we have developed an understanding of these laws.  We will not give full cooperation credit to companies that hide behind foreign data privacy laws instead of providing overseas documents when they can.  Foreign data privacy laws exist to protect individual privacy, not to shield companies that purport to be cooperating in criminal investigations.

Put simply, cooperation – and the quality and timeliness of that cooperation – matter.  This is a well-established principle that we have applied in criminal cases across the spectrum – from violent and organized crime cases to corporate fraud cases – for decades.

If a company works with us, it not only helps the Department, but it helps itself.

[...]

Fighting corruption is not a choice we have made. It is, increasingly, a global imperative.  Given the critical nature of this mission, we are bringing more resources to bear than ever before – and we will continue doing so.  We have achieved significant successes using our traditional FCPA enforcement tools.  We are building on those successes and continuing to evolve our enforcement efforts.  Especially with the power of so many countries now standing by our side, we are determined to use every lawful means available to hold the perpetrators of corruption to account.”

SEC

Ceresney began his remarks as follows.

“Pursuing such [FCPA] violations remains a critical part of our enforcement efforts, as international bribery has many nefarious impacts, including sapping investor confidence in the legitimacy of a company’s performance and undermining the accuracy of a company’s books and records. Our specialized FCPA unit as well as other parts of the Enforcement Division continue to do remarkable work in this space, bringing significant and impactful cases often in partnership with the DOJ and FBI. [...] Looking ahead, I anticipate another productive year of FCPA enforcement, as we have a robust pipeline of investigations across the globe. I thought I would spend my time this morning discussing some areas we will be focusing on in the coming year and beyond, and then, if we have time, I can take some questions.”

Under the heading “Focus on Individuals,” Ceresney stated:

“Let me start with cases against individuals. It is a hot topic of the day, in the face of some significant enforcement actions against entities alone, to ask the question of whether enforcement actions against entities are as impactful as actions against individuals, and whether actions against entities actually deter misconduct.

I always have said that actions against individuals have the largest deterrent impact. Individual accountability is a powerful deterrent because people pay attention and alter their conduct when they personally face potential punishment. And so in the FCPA arena as well as all other areas of our enforcement efforts, we are very focused on attempting to bring cases against individuals.

That is not to say that cases against companies are unimportant — in fact, I think FCPA enforcement is perhaps one of the best examples of how actions against entities can have a tremendous deterrent effect. Our actions against entities have had a tremendous impact in the last 10 years on FCPA compliance. Companies have increased their compliance spending and focus exponentially — the attendance at this conference is but one example of that. And these actions continue to provide significant deterrence and send important messages about areas that companies should be focused on. Every action we bring is scrutinized closely and dissected for information on areas of risk. That is a great dynamic and one we should continue to foster. But individual accountability is critical to FCPA enforcement — and imposing personal consequences on bad actors, including through bars and monetary sanctions, will continue to be a high priority for us.

Now it is important to recognize that FCPA cases against individuals can present some unique challenges for us and we simply are unable to bring cases against individuals in connection with a number of our cases. For example, in many cases we face significant investigative hurdles, including difficulties in gathering specific testimony and documents from overseas that will be admissible at trial. This is one area where we have been working closely with our counterparts in other jurisdictions, to access foreign witnesses, bank statements, and company records. These efforts have been more and more successful as we form strong partnerships with other countries to combat corruption.

When the conduct involves foreign nationals — as it often does — another challenge can be establishing personal jurisdiction over the bad actor. We have had some favorable decisions in this area, but it still remains a challenge in certain cases. Statute of limitations issues also complicate these cases.

Despite these various challenges, we continue to vigorously pursue cases against individuals.”

Under the heading “Importance of FCPA Compliance Programs,” Ceresney stated:

“This is a message that I think has started to get through in the past 5 years. Nothing situates a company better to avoid FCPA issues than a robust FCPA compliance program.

The best companies have adopted strong programs that include compliance personnel, extensive policies and procedures, training, vendor reviews, due diligence on third-party agents, expense controls, escalation of red flags, and internal audits to review compliance. You can look to our Resource Guide on the FCPA that we jointly published with the DOJ, to see what some of the hallmarks of an effective compliance program are. I won’t mention them all because you should be familiar with many that relate to policies, procedures and training. But, I’ll highlight just a few others. Companies should perform risk assessments that take into account a host of factors listed in the guide and then place controls in these risk areas. Companies should have disciplinary measures in place to deter violations and compliance programs should be periodically tested and reviewed to ensure they are keeping pace with the business. Such programs, properly implemented, will also help companies avoid other problems at foreign subsidiaries, like self-dealing, embezzlement and financial fraud.

As part of our settlements, we have on occasion required the retention of a monitor to assist in administering such compliance programs. For those companies that have developed robust programs during the investigation, we have required self-reporting and certifications. But the overwhelming message that one has to take away from our actions is how important such programs are for ensuring compliance.

Of course, it is critical for such programs to be real programs. When I was in private practice, I saw companies that had great paper programs but did not implement them effectively. When the business would push back, they would remove requirements and make exceptions. The best companies would put the compliance program ahead of business interests and allow decisions to be made to ensure compliance with the law, no matter the business consequences. It is that sort of attitude that is the measure of whether such programs will be successful.

As I said, we have seen many companies improving and properly implementing their compliance programs, as the message from our cases over the years has penetrated the legal and compliance community. But there is still more work to be done, particularly for small-to-medium sized companies trying to enter foreign markets to grow their businesses. As those businesses seek to expand and globalize, their compliance functions must keep pace.

[...]

The bottom line is that no responsible company should operate overseas without a comprehensive compliance program to guard against FCPA risk.

One other aspect of compliance programs is the benefit that companies will derive from having them if a problem should arise. I can tell you that the SEC staff will look well on companies that have robust programs and that the existence of such programs will pay dividends should an FCPA issue arise despite the existence of such programs.”

Under the heading “Cooperation,” Ceresney stated:

“Related to the issue of the existence of FCPA compliance programs, I wanted to focus for a moment on self-reporting and cooperation. The existence of FCPA compliance programs place the company in the best position to detect FCPA misconduct. But the question is what a company does once it learns of such misconduct. There has been a lot of discussion recently about the advisability of self-reporting FCPA misconduct to the SEC. Let me be clear about my views — I think any company that does the calculus will realize that self-reporting is always in the company’s best interest. Let me explain why.

Self-reporting from individuals and entities has long been an important part of our enforcement program. Self-reporting and cooperation allows us to detect and investigate misconduct more quickly than we otherwise could, as companies are often in a position to short circuit our investigations by quickly providing important factual information about misconduct resulting from their own internal investigations.

In addition to the benefits we get from cooperation, however, parties are positioned to also help themselves by aggressively policing their own conduct and reporting misconduct to us. We recognize that it is important to provide benefits for cooperation to incentivize companies to cooperate. And we have been focused on making sure that people understand there will be such benefits. We continue to find ways to enhance our cooperation program to encourage issuers, regulated entities, and individuals to promptly report suspected misconduct. The Division has a wide spectrum of tools to facilitate and reward meaningful cooperation, from reduced charges and penalties, to non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements in instances of outstanding cooperation.

Last year, for example, we announced our first-ever non-prosecution agreement in an FCPA matter with a company that promptly reported violations and provided real-time, extensive cooperation in our investigation.

More commonly, we have reflected the cooperation in reduced penalties. Companies that cooperate can receive smaller penalties than they otherwise would face, and in some cases of extraordinary cooperation, pay significantly less.

[...]

The bottom line is that the benefits from cooperation are significant and tangible. When I was a defense lawyer, I would explain to clients that by the time you become aware of the misconduct, there are only two things that you can do to improve your plight — remediate the misconduct and cooperate in the investigation. That obviously remains my view today. And I will add this — if we find the violations on our own, and the company chose not to self-report, the consequences will surely be worse and the opportunity to earn significant credit for cooperation may well be lost.

[...]

The SEC’s whistleblower program has changed the calculus for companies considering whether to disclose misconduct to us, knowing that a whistleblower is likely to come forward. Companies that choose not to self-report are thus taking a huge gamble because if we learn of the misconduct through other means, the result will be far worse.”

Under the heading “Items of Value,” Ceresney stated:

“The statute precludes the payment or provision of “anything of value” to a foreign official in order to induce that official to take official action for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. Obviously, money or property is an item of value. Gifts to foreign officials also easily qualify as items of value.

But we also have successfully brought FCPA cases where other, less traditional, items of value have been given in order to obtain or retain business. For example, in three separate actions, Stryker, Eli Lilly and Schering-Plough, we brought bribery charges against pharmaceutical or medical technology companies that made contributions to charities that were headed by or affiliated with foreign government officials to induce them to direct business to the companies.

We also have charged companies for providing items of value to family members of foreign officials. In Tyson Foods, for example, we charged the company for providing no-show jobs to the spouses of foreign officials who were responsible for certifying the company’s products for export. More recently, in Weatherford, we charged the company for a variety of bribes to foreign officials and their families, including paying for the honeymoon of an official’s daughter and a religious trip by an official and his family that was improperly recorded as a donation.

As these examples make clear, bribes come in many shapes and sizes. So it is critical that we carefully scrutinize a wide range of unfair benefits to foreign officials when assessing compliance with the FCPA — whether it is cash, gifts, travel, entertainment, or employment of the family and friends of foreign officials. We should and will continue to pursue a broad interpretation of the FCPA that precludes bribery in all forms.”

In conclusion, Ceresney stated:

“[T]he Enforcement Division will continue to look for opportunities to enhance our impact with respect to FCPA enforcement. We have made significant progress over the last 10 years but there is still much more we can do. We will continue our efforts to level the playing field for companies doing business abroad and hold corrupt actors accountable when they fail to play by the rules.”





November 19th, 2014

Actionable Intelligence On The Risk Of Bribery Internationally

Today’s post is from Alexandra Wrage (President of TRACE International).

*****

Compliance officers and in-house counsel for multi-national companies are well aware of the risks and consequences of bribery schemes. What to do about it is the challenging part. Companies have long relied on Transparency International’s authoritative country-by country corruption risk ratings to prioritize their limited resources. But knowing what specific steps are necessary to mitigate your risks is not something that can be gleaned from an overall country risk rating.  Because two countries with the same overall risk rating can present very different types of corruption risk, the ratings alone don’t provide actionable intelligence. A compliance officer needs to know how corruption in a particular country will confront their business. Last week, another tool in the compliance and risk assessment arsenal was launched to meet this need: the TRACE Matrix.

We at TRACE have long heard the laments from compliance officers and general counsel that they need the actionable information that would come from more granular country risk ratings.  One general counsel noted after looking at other indices, “once you get past the first 30 – 40 countries, all those lower countries start to look the same. If you are comparing Angola to Romania, the ranking isn’t useful, but if you are able to give guidance as to what types of corruption you might see, that would be extremely helpful.”

Enforcement officials have also recognized the limitations of country level risk ratings. “Multinational companies need additional tools beyond those currently available to more effectively measure country risk.”  Charles Duross, Partner at Morrison & Foerster LLP and the former deputy chief in the fraud section in the criminal division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

And so, working in collaboration with RAND Corporation, TRACE set out to develop an actionable business bribery index for the compliance community.  This project involved more than a year of research and benchmarking.  We asked companies what features they would like to see in a business bribery index and asked them to identify information that would assist their assessment of business bribery risk.   As part of our research, we also conducted interviews with regulators and enforcement officials to understand their views of country risk assessments.

The resulting TRACE Matrix provides not only a country level risk-rating but also four different domain risk ratings and nine different sub-domains of risk.  Although the TRACE Matrix can be used to rank countries by their composite scores, it is also possible to view the results for specific risk factors included in the composite score to identify what drives the overall score. This allows firms to identify not only where a country falls in terms of overall business bribery risk, but also to use the domain and subdomain scores to tailor compliance practices further.   For example, if the business is one that has to have many interactions across many government offices, then a country with a high risk in this domain would be of particular concern.

In the 1990s, Transparency International gave the world the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). TI gets great credit for raising awareness of this issue and putting countries on notice that levels of corruption were being monitored.  The CPI is a valuable instrument for addressing overall levels of perceived corruption in a particular country.  It combines numerous surveys about perceived levels of corruption across government functions:  judiciary, health, education, etc. These country level ratings are informative, but they also obscure important and actionable differences among countries with similar ratings. The business community’s needs are more specific.

The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators also aggregates corruption-related data, but as the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre states, “the main use of the indicators by international organization [sic] and donors is to incentivize developing nations to improve their governance and to improve the allocation of aid.”   Another valuable tool, this alone does not meet the needs of the business community.

Companies that use existing indices to measure threats associated with business corruption risk developing either overly aggressive or inadequate compliance and due diligence procedures. They need more nuanced data to tailor their compliance processes appropriately.

So, after hearing from the business community for years that a tailored tool to gauge levels of commercial bribery was needed we set out to explore just what should be measured.   Most respondents cited “touches” with the government as the most important indicator for commercial bribery.   In a great assessment of ports in Nigeria, the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) determined that 142 signatures were needed to clear cargo in the port of Lagos.  That’s a powerful indicator of the likelihood of a bribe demand.

At the same time, as one participant noted, the compliance community needs “something that is more targeted, more precise than the CPI, [but] the more complicated it gets, the less likely people will be to use it.”

And so, leveraging our own experience and tapping our stakeholders all over the world, we identified four domains relevant to companies

(1)   business interactions with government,

(2)   anti-bribery laws and enforcement,

(3)   government transparency and civil service, and

(4)   capacity for civil society oversight.

RAND further refined this by including nine sub-domains. For example, when it came to business interactions with government, the Matrix addresses the nature of contact with local governments, expectations of paying bribes and regulatory burdens. Likewise, in examining capacity for civil society oversight, the Matrix addresses the quality and freedom of media, as well as human capital and social development.

Ultimately, by offering a clear, actionable snapshot of the risk of commercial bribery in a country, the TRACE Matrix should help multinational companies make better decisions about foreign investments, bolster compliance and reduce the likelihood of violating anti-bribery laws.  No approach is perfect and we expect a lot of debate about the weighting of the data and about scores or rankings that people find surprising. But we hope it will provide a practical and effective tool to help assess bribery risk and thereby enable in-house counsel and compliance professionals to allocate their limited resources with more confidence.

Alexandra Wrage is the president of TRACE International, a nonprofit antibribery compliance organization offering practical tools and services to multinational companies, including the TRACE Matrix. 

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:03 am. Post Categories: ComplianceGuest Posts




November 18th, 2014

“World Tour” For Saudi Officials Results In Individual SEC FCPA Enforcement Action

World TourYesterday, for the first time since April 2012, the SEC brought a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against an individual.  Like the previous five SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2014, the enforcement action was brought via the SEC’s administrative process.

The enforcement action was against Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi, individuals who worked in sales at FLIR Systems Inc., (an Oregon-based company that produces thermal imaging, night vision, and infrared cameras and sensor systems).

The enforcement action is similar to previous FCPA enforcement actions against Lucent Technologies and UTStarcom in that the action focused on certain bona fide business travel that morphed into excessive travel and entertainment of foreign officials.

In summary fashion, the SEC’s order states:

“During 2009, Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi arranged expensive travel, entertainment, and personal items for foreign government officials in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to influence the officials to obtain new business for their employer, FLIR Systems, Inc. and to retain existing business for FLIR with the Saudi  Arabia Ministry of Interior (the “MOI”). Timms and Ramahi subsequently provided false explanations for the gifts to FLIR and attempted to conceal the gifts’ true value by submitting false documentation to the company.”

In the order Timms is described as follows.

“Stephen Timms … is a United States citizen who resides in Thailand. FLIR hired Timms in November 2001. He was promoted to Middle East Business Development Director for FLIR’S Government Systems division in September 2007. Timms was the head of FLIR’s Middle East office in Dubai during the relevant time period, and was one of the company executives responsible for obtaining business for FLIR’s Government Systems division from the MOI.”

Ramahi, a United States citizen who resides in the United Arab Emirates, is described as follows.

“Ramahi was hired by FLIR in late 2005 and worked in business development in Dubai. During the relevant period, Ramahi’s manager was Timms, the head of FLIR’s Middle East office.”

Under the heading “FLIR’s Business with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,” the order states:

“In November 2008, FLIR entered into a contract with the MOI to sell thermal binoculars for approximately $12.9 million. Ramahi and Timms were the primary sales employees responsible for the contract on behalf of FLIR. In the contract, FLIR agreed to conduct a “Factory Acceptance Test,” attended by MOI officials, prior to delivery of the binoculars to Saudi Arabia. The Factory Acceptance Test was a key condition to the fulfillment of the contract. FLIR anticipated that a successful delivery of the binoculars, along with the creation of a FLIR service center, would lead to an additional order in 2009 or 2010.

At the same time, Ramahi and Timms were also involved in FLIR’s negotiations to sell security cameras to the MOI. In May 2009, FLIR signed an agreement for the integration of its cameras into another company’s products for use by the MOI. The contract was valued at approximately $17.4 million and FLIR hoped to win additional future business with the MOI under this agreement.”

Under the heading “World Tour” for Saudi Officials” the order states:

“In February 2009, Ramahi and Timms began preparing for the Factory Acceptance Test, which was scheduled to occur in July 2009 in Billerica, Massachusetts. Timms requested the names of the MOI officials who would attend the test so that travel arrangements could be made for them by FLIR’s travel agent in Dubai, UAE. Timms subsequently contacted the United States Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for assistance to obtain visas for the MOI officials to attend the Factory Acceptance Test.

Ramahi and Timms then sent MOI officials on what Timms later referred to as a “world tour” before and after the Factory Acceptance Test. Among the MOI officials for whom Ramahi and Timms provided the “world tour” were the head of the  MOI’s technical committee and a senior engineer on the committee, who played a key role  in the decision to award FLIR the business.

In June 2009, Ramahi made arrangements for himself and MOI officials to travel from Riyadh to Casablanca, where they would stay for several nights at FLIR’s expense. The MOI officials then traveled to Paris with FLIR’s third-party agent, where they would also stay for several nights at a luxury hotel, also paid for by FLIR. Ramahi met the MOI officials and FLIR’s third-party agent in Boston for the equipment inspection at FLIR’s nearby facilities. On the way back from Boston, Ramahi traveled with most of the MOI officials to Dubai and arranged airfare and hotel accommodations for one MOI official to travel to Beirut before returning to Riyadh, all at FLIR’s expense. Timms received the travel itinerary ahead of the officials’ departure on the “world tour.”

The trip proceeded as planned. In total, the MOI officials traveled for 20 nights on their “world tour,” with airfare and hotel accommodations paid for by FLIR. In addition, while the MOI officials were in Boston, Ramahi and the third-party agent also took the MOI officials on a weekend trip to New York City at FLIR’s expense. There was no business purpose for the stops outside of Boston.

While in the Boston area, the MOI officials spent a single 5-hour day at FLIR’s Boston facility completing the equipment inspection. The agenda for their remaining 7 days in Boston included just three other 1-2 hour visits to FLIR’s Boston facility, some additional meetings with FLIR personnel at their hotel, and other leisure activities, all at FLIR’s expense.

Timms approved expenses incurred by Ramahi and the MOI officials in connection with the extended travel, and Timms’ manager approved the expenses for the air travel provided to the MOI officials in connection with their “world tour.” FLIR’s  finance department processed and paid the approved air expenses the next day.”

Under the heading “Expensive Watches for Saudi Officials,” the order states:

“In March 2009, while Ramahi was present, Timms provided expensive gifts to five MOI officials. At Timms’ and Ramahi’s instruction, in February 2009, FLIR’s third-party agent purchased five watches in Riyadh, paying approximately 26,000  Saudi Riyal (about U.S. $7,000).

In mid-March 2009, Ramahi and Timms traveled to Saudi Arabia for a nine-day business trip to discuss several business opportunities with MOI officials. According to Timms’ expense report, the purpose of the trip was to meet with MOI officials regarding FLIR’s efforts to sell its security cameras. During the trip, Timms, with Ramahi’s knowledge, gave the five watches to MOI officials. Ramahi and Timmsbelieved the MOI officials to be important to sales of both the binoculars and the security cameras. The MOI officials who received the watches included two of the MOI officials who subsequently went on the “world tour” travel.

Within weeks of his visit to Saudi Arabia, Timms submitted an expense report to FLIR for reimbursement of the watches. At the time of his submittal, Timms confirmed that each watch cost $1,425 and was for “Executive Gifts.” Shortly thereafter, Timms identified the names of the MOI officials who received the watches. The reimbursement was approved by Timms’ manager and paid out to Timms.”

Under the heading “The Cover Up,” the order states:

“In July 2009, in connection with an unrelated review of expenses in the Dubai office, FLIR’s finance department flagged Timms’ reimbursement request for the watches. In response to their questions, Timms claimed that he had made a mistake and falsely stated that the expense report should have reflected a total of 7,000 Saudi Riyal(about $1,900) rather than $7,000 as submitted.

At his supervisors’ request, Ramahi secured a second, fabricated invoice reflecting that the watches cost 7,000 Saudi Riyal, which Timms submitted to FLIRfinance in August 2009. Ramahi also told FLIR investigators that the watches were each purchased for approximately 1,300-1,400 Saudi Riyal (approximately $377) by FLIR’s third-party agent.

In September 2009, the FLIR finance department attempted to contact FLIR’s third-party agent. In e-mail correspondence, the FLIR finance department asked the agent a series of questions about the watches. Unknown to the finance department, Timms drafted responses to the questions on behalf of the agent. At Timms’ direction, the agent maintained the false cover story: that the watches cost a total of 7,000 Saudi Riyal, not U.S. $7,000.

In July 2009, Ramahi and Timms claimed that the MOI’s luxury travel and “world tour” had been a mistake. They told the FLIR finance department that the MOI had used FLIR’s travel agent in Dubai to book their own travel and that it had been mistakenly charged to FLIR. They promised to send an invoice to the MOI to pay for the“world tour” travel. Instead, however, Ramahi and Timms used FLIR’s agent to give the appearance that that the MOI paid for their travel. Timms also oversaw the preparation of false and misleading documentation of the MOI travel expenses that was submitted to FLIR’s finance department. For example, Timms obtained an invoice from the Dubai travel agency showing direct flights from Boston to Riyadh—a route not taken by the MOI officials on their “world tour.” Timms submitted the false invoice to FLIR finance as the “corrected” travel documentation.”

Under the heading, “FLIR’s FCPA-Related Policies and Training,” the order states:

“At all relevant times, FLIR had in place a code of conduct which prohibited FLIR employees from violating the FCPA. The policy required employees to record information “accurately and honestly” in FLIR’s books and records, with “no materiality requirement or threshold for a violation.”

Both Ramahi and Timms received training on their obligations under the FCPA and FLIR’s policy prior to the provision of expensive gifts of travel, entertainment, and personal items to the MOI. On or around May 13, 2007 and on or around December 2, 2008, Timms completed FLIR’s two-part FCPA-specific online training courses, including courses focused on “Understanding the Law” and “Dealing with Third Parties.” Ramahi only completed part one of the two-part series in May 2007. The training course completed by both Ramahi and Timms, entitled “Understanding the Law,” gave examples of prohibited gifts under the FCPA and specifically identified gifts of luxury watches, vacations and side trips during official business travel.”

As stated in the order:

“Respondents violated [the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions] by corruptly providing expensive gifts of travel, entertainment, and personal items to the MOI officials to retain and obtain business for FLIR. Respondents also violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder, by knowingly circumventing FLIR’s existing policies and controls, placing a fabricated invoice for the watches into FLIR’s books and records and falsifying FLIR’s records regarding the MOI officials’ extended personal travel paid by FLIR. As a result of this same conduct, Respondents caused FLIR’s books and records to be not accurately maintained in violation of [the books and records provisions of the FCPA].”

As noted in the SEC’s order and release, “without admitting or denying the findings, Timms and Ramahi consented to the entry of the order and agreed to pay financial penalties of $50,000 and $20,000 respectively.”

In the SEC’s release, Andrew Ceresney (Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division) states:

“This case shows we will pursue employees of public companies who think it is acceptable to buy foreign officials’ loyalty with lavish gifts and travel. By making illegal payments and causing them to be recorded improperly, employees expose not only their firms but also themselves to an enforcement action.”

According to media reports, Timms is represented by Solomon Wisenberg (Nelson Mullins) an Ramahi is represented by Lisa Prager (Schulte Roth & Zabel).

According to the SEC’s release, “the SEC’s investigation is continuing.”  As relevant to any potential FCPA enforcement action against FLIR, the SEC’s order states under the heading “FLIR Profits from Sales to the Saudi Ministry of Interior” as follows.

“Following the equipment inspection in Boston, the MOI gave its permission for FLIR to ship the thermal binoculars. The MOI later placed an order for additional binoculars for an approximate price of $1.2 million. In total, FLIR received payments from the MOI for the binoculars that exceeded $10 million.

From September 2009 through August 2012, FLIR also shipped the security cameras and related accessories to the MOI. FLIR received payments for the cameras exceeding $18 million. FLIR subsequently submitted a bid to sell additional security cameras to the MOI. The bid expired before the contract was awarded by the MOI.”

Based on a review of FLIR’s SEC filings, it does not appear that the company has disclosed any FCPA scrutiny.





November 17th, 2014

DOJ Gets It Right In Recent FCPA Opinion Procedure Release

i found you!In this November 2010 post regarding the FCPA guidance, I flagged the below statement as one of the ten most meaningful statements in the Guidance.

“Successor liability does not […] create liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a foreign company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer.” (Pg. 28)

I flagged the statement because … well … it was an accurate statement of black-letter law, but one often overlooked when analyzing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the connection with merger and acquisition activity.

Last Friday, the DOJ released this FCPA opinion release dated November 7th.  The Requester was a U.S. issuer in the consumer products industry and contemplating an acquisition of a foreign target.  In pertinent part, the opinion release states:

“Requestor is a multinational company headquartered in the United States. Requestor intends to acquire a foreign consumer products company and its wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, the “Target Company”), both of which are incorporated and operate in a foreign country (“Foreign Country”). In the course of its pre-acquisition due diligence of the Target Company, Requestor identified a number of likely improper payments – none of which had a discernible jurisdictional nexus to the United States – by the Target Company to government officials of Foreign Country, as well as substantial weaknesses in accounting and recordkeeping. In light of the bribery and other concerns identified in the due diligence process, Requestor has set forth a plan that includes remedial pre-acquisition measures and detailed post-acquisition integration steps.

Requestor seeks an Opinion as to whether the Department, based on the facts and representations provided by Requestor that the pre-acquisition due diligence process did not bring to light any potentially improper payments that were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, would presently intend to bring an FCPA enforcement action against Requestor for the Target Company’s pre-acquisition conduct. Requestor does not seek an Opinion from the Department as to Requestor’s criminal liability for any post-acquisition conduct by the Target Company.

Requestor intends to acquire 100% of the Target Company’s shares beginning in 2015. The Target Company’s shares are currently held almost exclusively by another foreign corporation (“Seller”), which is listed on the stock exchange of Foreign Country. Seller is a prominent consumer products manufacturer and distributor in Foreign Country, with more than 5,000 full-time employees and annual gross sales in excess of $100 million. The Target Company represents part of Seller’s consumer products business in Foreign Country and sells its products through several related brands.

Seller and the Target Company largely confine their operations to Foreign Country, have never been issuers of securities in the United States, and have had negligible business contacts, including no direct sale or distribution of their products, in the United States.

In preparing for the acquisition, Requestor undertook due diligence aimed at identifying, among other things, potential legal and compliance concerns at the Target Company. Requestor retained an experienced forensic accounting firm (“the Accounting Firm”) to carry out the due diligence review. This review brought to light evidence of apparent improper payments, as well as substantial accounting weaknesses and poor recordkeeping. On the basis of a risk profile analysis of the Target Company, the Accounting Firm reviewed approximately 1,300 transactions with a total value of approximately $12.9 million. The Accounting Firm identified over $100,000 in transactions that raised compliance issues. The vast majority of these transactions involved payments to government officials related to obtaining permits and licenses. Other transactions involved gifts and cash donations to government officials, charitable contributions and sponsorships, and payments to members of the state-controlled media to minimize negative publicity. None of the payments, gifts, donations, contributions, or sponsorships occurred in the United States and none was made by or through a U.S. person or issuer.

The due diligence showed that the Target Company has significant recordkeeping deficiencies. The vast majority of the cash payments and gifts to government officials and the charitable contributions were not supported by documentary records. Expenses were improperly and inaccurately classified in the Target Company’s books. In fact, the Target Company’s accounting records were so disorganized that the Accounting Firm was unable to physically locate or identify many of the underlying records for the tested transactions. Finally, the Target Company has not developed or implemented a written code of conduct or other compliance policies and procedures, nor have the Target Company’s employees, according to the Accounting Firm, shown adequate understanding or awareness of anti-bribery laws and regulations. In light of the Target Company’s glaring compliance, accounting, and recordkeeping deficiencies, Requestor has taken several pre-closing steps to begin to remediate the Target Company’s weaknesses prior to the planned closing in 2015.

Requestor anticipates completing the full integration of the Target Company into Requestor’s compliance and reporting structure within one year of the closing. Requestor has set forth an integration schedule of the Target Company that encompasses risk mitigation, dissemination and training with regard to compliance procedures and policies, standardization of business relationships with third parties, and formalization of the Target Company’s accounting and recordkeeping in accordance with Requestor’s policies and applicable law.”

Under the heading “Analysis” the opinion release states:

“Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, as represented by Requestor, the Department does not presently intend to take any enforcement action with respect to preacquisition bribery Seller or the Target Company may have committed.

It is a basic principle of corporate law that a company assumes certain liabilities when merging with or acquiring another company. In a situation such as this, where a purchaser acquires the stock of a seller and integrates the target into its operations, successor liability may be conferred upon the purchaser for the acquired entity’s pre-existing criminal and civil liabilities, including, for example, for FCPA violations of the target.

“Successor liability does not, however, create liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a foreign company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer.” FCPA – A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at 28 (“FCPA Guide”). This principle, illustrated by hypothetical successor liability “Scenario 1” in the FCPA Guide, squarely addresses the situation at hand. See FCPA Guide, at 31 (“Although DOJ and SEC have jurisdiction over Company A because it is an issuer, neither could pursue Company A for conduct that occurred prior to the acquisition of Foreign Company. As Foreign Company was neither an issuer nor a domestic concern and was not subject to U.S. territorial jurisdiction, DOJ and SEC have no jurisdiction over its pre-acquisition misconduct.”).

Assuming the accuracy of Requestor’s representations, none of the potentially improper pre-acquisition payments by Seller or the Target Company was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. For example, none of the payments occurred in the United States, and Requestor has not identified participation by any U.S. person or issuer in the payments. Requestor also represents that, based on its due diligence, no contracts or other assets were determined to have been acquired through bribery that would remain in operation and from which Requestor would derive financial benefit following the acquisition. The Department would thus lack jurisdiction under the FCPA to prosecute Requestor (or for that matter, Seller or the Target Company) for improper payments made by Seller or the Target Company prior to the acquisition. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (setting forth statutory jurisdictional bases for anti-bribery provisions).

The Department expresses no view as to the adequacy or reasonableness of Requestor’s integration of the Target Company. The circumstances of each corporate merger or acquisition are unique and require specifically tailored due diligence and integration processes. Hence, the exact timeline and appropriateness of particular aspects of Requestor’s integration of the Target Company are not necessarily suitable to other situations.

To be sure, the Department encourages companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions to (1) conduct thorough risk-based FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence; (2) implement the acquiring company’s code of conduct and anti-corruption policies as quickly as practicable; (3) conduct FCPA and other relevant training for the acquired entity’s directors and employees, as well as third-party agents and partners; (4) conduct an FCPA-specific audit of the acquired entity  as quickly as practicable; and (5) disclose to the Department any corrupt payments discovered during the due diligence process. See FCPA Guide at 29. Adherence to these elements by Requestor may, among several other factors, determine whether and how the Department would seek to impose post-acquisition successor liability in case of a putative violation.”

In the release, the DOJ got it right.

Not all bribery that allegedly occurs in the world is subject to the DOJ’s jurisdiction and just because a company that is subject to the FCPA acquires a foreign company, such an acquisition does not magically create FCPA liability where there was none before.  In layman’s terms, what happened is similar to the following:  a foreign person – not subject to U.S. law – was speeding in a foreign country and just because a U.S. company then purchases the car does not create liability under U.S. law for speeding.

The DOJ also got it right as a matter of policy.  By its opinion, the contemplated transaction is likely to close whereas a contrary opinion might have caused the Requestor to abandon the transaction.  If the transaction indeed closes, a previously compromised foreign company is going to be brought within the corporate family of a U.S. company subject to the FCPA with an existing internal controls system.

On this score, I am reminded of Richard Alderman’s (former Director of the UK Serious Fraud Office) comment “that society benefits if an ethical corporation takes over and sorts out a corporation that has corruption problems.”

*****

The DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure program is often criticized because of the length of time it takes to obtain an opinion.  On this issue, the opinion release highlights the following dates.  The request was initially submitted on April 30th, the Requestor provided supplemental information on May 12th, July 30th, and October 9, 2014, and the release was issued on November 7th.  Thus, from start to finish, the process took approximately six months.

*****

As to background information of the DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure program:

The FCPA, when enacted, directed the DOJ Attorney General to establish a procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries by those subject to the FCPA concerning conformance of their conduct with the DOJ’s “present enforcement policy.  Pursuant to the governing regulations of the so-called DOJ Opinion Procedure Release Program, only “specified, prospective—not hypothetical—conduct” is subject to a DOJ opinion.  While the DOJ’s opinion has no precedential value, its opinion that contemplated conduct conforms with the FCPA is entitled to a rebuttable presumption should an FCPA enforcement action be brought as a result of the contemplated conduct.  Since the program went live in 1980, the DOJ has issued approximately sixty releases on a wide range of issues from charitable contributions to gifts, travel and entertainment, to third parties.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:03 am. Post Categories: Merger IssuesOpinion Procedure ReleaseSuccessor Liability




November 14th, 2014

In the Words Of Roderick Hills

Roderik HillsRecently, the SEC noted the passing of Roderick Hills (Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1975 to 1977).  It was during this time period in which Congress was engaged in its multi-year investigation and deliberation of the so-called foreign corporate payments problem.

As told in “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Hills was a prominent voice during this process and he testified at several Congressional hearings.

While the SEC (compared to the DOJ and other government departments) played the most prominent and trusted role during Congress’s consideration of the foreign corporate payments problem, the SEC’s role was also the most curious as the Commission was a reluctant actor in Congress’s quest for a new and direct legislative remedy to the problem.

It is clear from the legislative record that the SEC wanted no part in policing the morality of American business or in determining what was an improper foreign corporate payment. Rather, the SEC – true to its then mission – was focused on ensuring disclosure of material foreign corporate payments to investors by companies subject to its jurisdiction. In other words, the SEC wanted no part in enforcing the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Fast forward to the present when the SEC has a specific FCPA Unit and views enforcement of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions as central to its mission of investor protection.

Below are excerpts from Congressional testimony given by Hills relevant to the above issue.

“We don’t have the skill to say should we, can we, enforce the laws of the rest of the world? I’m sure the West Digest that reports these decisions would be full of cases trying to decide whether a given payment is or is not legal. The legal profession has enough business without going to all the countries of the world to try to establish whether a given transaction is right or wrong. We are concerned with the materiality of these practices.”

Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 19 (1976)

“[Congress] has asked for our views as to the adequacy and effectiveness of the present laws and regulations and any recommendations we may have for improving them. As [Congress] knows, a primary purpose of the Federal securities law and the Commission’s regulations is to protect investors by requiring issuers of securities to make full and fair disclosure of material facts. In my opinion, these statutes provide the Commission adequate authority to require appropriate disclosure about the matters I have been discussing in order to protect stockholders.”

Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Econ. in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 13 (1976)

“The Commission does not oppose direct prohibitions against these payments, but we have previously stated that, as a matter of principle, we would prefer not to be involved even in the civil enforcement of such prohibitions. As a matter of long experience, it is our collective judgment that disclosure is a sufficient deterrent to the improper activities with which we are concerned.”

“[A]s a matter of longstanding tradition and practice, the [SEC] has been a disclosure agency. Causing questionable conduct to be revealed to the public has a deterrent effect. Consistent with our past tradition, we would rather not get into the business, however, we think get involved in prohibiting particular payments. It is a different thing entirely to try to prohibit something, to try to make a decision as to whether it is legal or illegal, or proper or improper. Under present law, if it is material, we cause its disclosure, and we need not get into the finer points of whether it is or is not legal.”

Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 2 (1976)

“[The SEC] would prefer not to be involved in civil enforcement of such [anti-bribery] prohibitions since they embody separate and distinct policies from those underlying the federal securities laws. The securities laws are designed primarily to insure disclosure to investors of all of the relevant facts concerning corporations which seek to raise their capital from the public at large. The [anti-bribery provisions], on the other hand, would impose substantive regulation on a particular aspect of corporate behavior. The Commission recognizes the congressional interest in enacting these prohibitions, but the enforcement of such provisions does not easily fit within the Commission’s mandate.”

Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing Before the S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 98–99 (1977)

The following statement by Senator Proxmire to Hills best captures the SEC’s reluctant role in seeking a new and direct legislative remedy to the foreign corporate payments problem:

“[Y]ou were responsible for about the only action we have taken with respect to foreign bribery and your agreements, your work, with various corporations to persuade them to cleanse their operation have been a fine example of how an agency can work to get this job done even without legislation. Because of that, you see, we would like to have you involved at least on the investigative disclosure basis. And perhaps we can work something out that would protect you from not pushing you into something you think you wouldn’t want to do.”

Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing Before the S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 98–99 (1977)

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:02 am. Post Categories: Legislative HistorySEC