Archive for the ‘Voluntary Disclosure’ Category

Friday Roundup

Friday, August 21st, 2015

Roundup2Wal-Mart related, quotable, spot-on, scrutiny alerts and updates and prosecutorial common law defeat. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Wal-Mart Related

In its recent 2Q FY2016 earnings call Wal-Mart stated:

“FCPA and compliance-related costs were approximately $30 million, comprised of approximately $23 million for the ongoing inquiries and investigations, and approximately $7 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements. Last year, FCPA and compliance-related costs were $43 million in the second quarter. We expect FCPA-related expenses to continue to trend down, so we now expect our full year FCPA-related expenses to range between $130 million and $150 million. This compares to our guidance in February of $160 to $180 million.”

Doing the math, Wal-Mart’s 2Q FCPA and compliance-related costs is approximately $470,000 per working day.

Over the past approximate four years, I have tracked Wal-Mart’s quarterly disclosed pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. While some pundits have ridiculed me for doing so, such figures are notable because, as has been noted in prior posts and in my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples,” settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from corporate FCPA scrutiny.  Pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the largest (in many cases to a degree of 3, 5, 10 or higher than settlement amounts) financial hit to a company under FCPA scrutiny.

While $470,000 per working day remains eye-popping, Wal-Mart’s recent figure suggests that the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have crested as the figures for the past seven quarters have been approximately $516,000, $563,000, $640,000, $662,000, $855,000, $1.1 million and $1.3 million per working day.

In the aggregate, Wal-Mart’s disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses are as follows.

FY 2013 = $157 million.

FY 2014 = $282 million.

FY 2015  = $173 million.

FY 2016 = $63 million (projections for the remainder of the FY of approximately $67 – $87 million)


Regarding the recent BNY Mellon enforcement action, Jay Darden (Paul Hastings and recently the Assistant Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section) stated: “it’s not the U.S. government’s job to regulate hiring policy.” (See here).


In this Corporate Crime Reporter, Lamia Matta (Miller & Chevalier) states:

“Companies are less aggressive in [voluntarily] reporting. Companies are finding that they don’t save a whole lot by going in and self-reporting as soon as they find a problem. They are still subject to extensive investigation. The cost is the same if they self-report and then cooperate as it would be if they just cooperate. The agencies say that is not the case. But if you look at the trends, that does seem to be the case.”

“The other thing is that the decision to self-report is taking a lot longer than it once used to. Companies might think — it may make sense to self-report, but we are going to wait it out a bit before we do so. The process is now much more considered than it once used to be.”

“And companies are not as inclined to buy into the agencies’ aggressive theories of jurisdiction as they might have once been. For all of these reasons, you are seeing companies being less quick to self report. I don’t know if the self-reporting numbers are down or not. They are difficult to track.”


This Bryan Cave alert regarding the recent order in the DOJ’s enforcement action against Lawrence Hoskins (see here for the prior post) is spot-on.

It states:

“This holding directly contradicts the “guidance” provided by the U.S. in its Resource Guide, published jointly by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. That guidance states unequivocally:

‘Individuals and companies, including foreign nationals and companies, may also be liable for conspiring to violate     the FCPA—i.e., for agreeing to commit an FCPA violation—even if they are not, or could not be, independently charged with a substantive FCPA violation.

* * *

A foreign company or individual may be held liable for aiding and abetting an FCPA violation or for conspiring to violate the FCPA, even if the foreign company or individual did not take any act in furtherance of the corrupt payment while in the territory of the United States.’

This Order reminds companies and individuals that some of the legal principles surrounding the FCPA recently have been developed out of settlements with the government instead of through the courts. On issues as important as these, it can be worthwhile to test some of the government’s theories in the only place they can be adjudicated.”

To learn about other selective information, half-truths, and information that is demonstratively false in the FCPA Guidance see “Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance.”

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Ford Motor Co.

Reuters reports:

“The [SEC] is helping German prosecutors to investigate the alleged payment of bribes by Ford to speed the passage of containers through Russian customs, a source at the U.S. carmaker said on Tuesday. Ford and Schenker, the freight business of state-owned German rail company Deutsche Bahn, have been under investigation in Germany since 2013 over suspected bribery and other offences related to the busy Russian port of St. Petersburg. The port is Russia’s European gateway with more than 2,000 companies using it for shipments, according to its website, but it is also known among customers for notoriously long delays. The [SEC] has now joined investigations by prosecutors in Cologne, where Ford’s European headquarters are based, a source at the carmaker told Reuters, confirming a report in Tuesday’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung newspaper. Two Ford employees, eight current and former workers at Schenker and one staffer from a Russian contractor are under investigation, a spokesman at the Cologne prosecutor’s office said.”


In regards to this recent media report, the company stated in this filing:

“Petrobras hereby declares that, in relation to news published in the media concerning the payment of a fine to the U.S. authorities, there are no ongoing negotiations regarding the eventual payment of a fine for the winding up of civil and criminal investigations in the United States regarding the violation of the anti-corruption legislation. Nor has there been any decision by the U.S. authorities regarding the merit of such an investigation or the eventual amounts involved.”

SciClone Pharmaceuticals

One of the longest instances of FCPA scrutiny concerns SciClone Pharmaceuticals.  As highlighted in this prior post, in August 2010 the company disclosed:

“On August 5, 2010 SciClone was contacted by the SEC and advised that the SEC has initiated a formal, non-public investigation of SciClone. In connection with this investigation, the SEC issued a subpoena to SciClone requesting a variety of documents and other information. The subpoena requests documents relating to a range of matters including interactions with regulators and government-owned entities in China, activities relating to sales in China and documents relating to certain company financial and other disclosures. On August 6, 2010, the Company received a letter from the DOJ indicating that the DOJ was investigating Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry generally, and had received information about the Company’s practices suggesting possible violations.”

Recently the company disclosed:

“In July 2015, SciClone reached an agreement in principle with the staff of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a proposed settlement for a range of matters, including without admitting or denying possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The agreement, which includes disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and penalties totaling $12.8 million, is contingent upon the execution of formal settlement documents and approval of the settlement by the SEC’s governing Commission. The Company has not yet reached a resolution of these matters with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and management continues to work diligently to obtain closure on this matter.”

Akamai Technologies 

The company updated its previous FCPA-related disclosure as follows:

“We are conducting an internal investigation, with the assistance of outside counsel, relating to sales practices in a country outside the U.S. that represented less than 1% of our revenue during the three and six months ended June 30, 2015, and in each of the years ended December 31, 2014, 2013 and 2012. The internal investigation includes a review of compliance with the requirements of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other applicable laws and regulations by employees in that market.  In February 2015, we voluntarily contacted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice to advise both agencies of this internal investigation. We are cooperating with those agencies. As of the filing of this quarterly report on Form 10-Q, we cannot predict the outcome of this matter. No provision with respect to this matter has been made in our consolidated financial statements.”

General Cable 

The company recently disclosed the following regarding its previously disclosed FCPA scrutiny.

“We have been reviewing, with the assistance of external counsel, certain commission payments involving sales to customers of our subsidiary in Angola. The review has focused upon payment practices with respect to employees of public utility companies, use of agents in connection with such payment practices, and the manner in which the payments were reflected in our books and records. We have determined at this time that certain employees in our Portugal and Angola subsidiaries directly and indirectly made or directed payments at various times from 2002 through 2013 to officials of Angola government-owned public utilities that raise concerns under the FCPA and possibly under the laws of other jurisdictions. Based on an analysis completed with the assistance of our external counsel and forensic accountants, we have concluded at this time, that we are able to reasonably estimate the profit derived from sales made to the Angolan government-owned public utilities in connection with the payments described above which we believe is likely to ultimately be disgorged. As a result, we recorded an estimated charge in the amount of $24 million as an accrual as of December 31, 2014. There was no change to the accrual in the second quarter of 2015. The accrued amount reflects the probable and estimable amount of the Angola-related profits that the Company believes is subject to being disgorged, and does not include any provision for any fines, civil or criminal penalties, or other relief, any or all of which could be substantial.
We also have been reviewing, with the assistance of external counsel, our use and payment of agents in connection with our Thailand and India operations and certain transactions in our Egypt and China businesses, which may have implications under the FCPA. We have voluntarily disclosed these matters to the SEC and the DOJ and have provided them with additional information at their request, including information in response to an SEC subpoena. The SEC and DOJ inquiries into these matters are ongoing. We continue to cooperate with the DOJ and the SEC with respect to these matters. At this time, we are unable to predict the nature of any action that may be taken by the DOJ or SEC or any remedies these agencies may pursue as a result of such actions. We are continuing to implement a third party screening process on sales agents that we use outside of the United States, including, among other things, a review of the agreements under which they were retained and a risk-based assessment of such agents to determine the scope of due diligence measures to be performed by a third-party investigative firm. We also have provided anti-corruption training to our global sales force, and ultimately will provide such training to all salaried employees. In addition, we have hired a Chief Compliance Officer, who is responsible for the day-to-day management of our compliance function. The Chief Compliance Officer reports to our Chief Executive Officer, and also has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee.”
Another Prosecutorial Common Law Defeat

Related to the above, one of the best guest posts in FCPA Professor history was this 2011 post from Michael Levy in which he described the concept of prosecutorial common law.  Prosecutorial common law is all around us.  Take a look at the footnotes of the FCPA Guidance - most of the “authority” cited for “legal” propositions is DOJ or SEC settlements.

For obvious reasons, prosecutorial common law does not sit well with federal court judges.  For instance, in U.S. v. Bodmer, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, in rejecting the DOJ’s position that the FCPA’s criminal penalty provisions applied to a foreign national prior to the 1998 FCPA amendments, noted as follows – “the Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.”  Likewise as noted in this previous post about the Giffen enforcement action, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York stated that prosecutorial common law ”is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”

Prosecutorial common law recently suffered another defeat when the Southern District of New York ruled that the Food & Drug Administration can’t bar a drug company from marketing a pill for off-label use as long as the claims are truthful.  (See here for the Wall Street Journal article).

The decision follows a 2012 decision in U.S. v. Caronia (see here for the prior post) in which the Second Circuit concluded that the DOJ’s theory of prosecution concerning so-called off-label promotion of drugs was invalid. Prior to Caronia and even after Caronia, the DOJ has used the theory of prosecution to secure billions in settlement against risk-averse pharmaceutical companies.

A good weekend to all.



Issues To Consider From The Mead Johnson Enforcement Action

Monday, August 3rd, 2015

IssuesThis recent post highlighted the SEC FCPA enforcement action against Mead Johnson Nutrition Company.

This post continues the analysis by highlighting various issues to consider from the enforcement action. In sum, the short enforcement action contains several troubling issues that should cause alarm.


Imagine a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action without one single meaningful factual allegation against the corporate defendant resolving the action.

You don’t have to imagine. All you have to do is read the slim administrative cease and desist order against Mead Johnson.

The action was based on alleged conduct in China engaged in by Mead Johnson Nutrition (China) Co., Ltd. There was no finding, inference or suggestion in the SEC’s order that anyone associated with Mead Johnson, the issuer resolving the enforcement action, had knowledge of, participated in, or acquiesced in the improper conduct.

Rather, the order merely states the perfuctory finding that “Mead Johnson China’s books and records were consolidated into Mead Johnson’s books and records, thereby causing Mead Johnson’s consolidated books and records to be inaccurate” together with the conclusory legal finding that “Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead Johnson China’s operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments that occurred over a period of years.”

Invoking a Standard That Does Not Even Exist In the FCPA

Relevant to the above conclusory legal finding, the SEC’s finding that issuers must devise and maintain internal controls “sufficient to prevent and detect” improper payments does not even exist in the FCPA.

As previously highlighted in this article ( “Why You Should Be Alarmed By the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action”)  and subsequently in connection with other recent SEC enforcement actions, invocation of a ‘‘failure to prevent or detect’’ internal controls standard is alarming because such a standard does not even exist in the FCPA and is inconsistent with actual legal authority. Just as important, such a standard is inconsistent with enforcement agency guidance relevant to the internal-controls provisions.

The internal-controls provisions are specifically qualified through concepts of reasonableness and good faith. This statutory standard is consistent with congressional intent in enacting the provisions. Relevant legislative history states: ”

“While management should observe every reasonable prudence in satisfying the objectives called for [in the books-and-records and internal-controls provisions], . . . management must necessarily estimate and evaluate the cost/benefit relationships to the steps to be taken in fulfillment of its responsibilities . . . . The size of the business, diversity of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact by top management with day-to-day operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors which management must consider in establishing and maintaining an internal accounting controls system.”

As highlighted here, the only judicial decision to directly address the substance of the internal-controls provisions states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“The definition of accounting controls does comprehend reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives expressed in it will be accomplished by the system. The concept of ‘‘reasonable assurances’’ contained in [the internal control provisions] recognizes that the costs of internal controls should not exceed the benefits expected to be derived. It does not appear that either the SEC or Congress, which adopted the SEC’s recommendations, intended that the statute should require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe accounting control system at all costs. It appears that Congress was fully cognizant of the cost-effective considerations which confront companies as they consider the institution of accounting controls and of the subjective elements which may lead reasonable individuals to arrive at different conclusions. Congress has demanded only that judgment be exercised in applying the standard of reasonableness.”

In addition, various courts have held—in the context of civil derivative actions in which shareholders seek to hold company directors liable for breach of fiduciary duties due to the company’s alleged FCPA violations— that just because improper conduct allegedly occurred somewhere within a corporate hierarchy does not mean that internal controls must have been deficient.

The ‘‘failure to prevent and detect’ standard is also alarming when measured against the enforcement agencies’ own guidance concerning the internal controls provisions.  As highlighted here, the SEC’s most extensive guidance on the internal controls provisions states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“The accounting provisions’ principal objective is to reaching knowing or reckless conduct.”

“Inherent in this concept [of reasonableness] is a toleration of deviations from the absolute. One measure of the reasonableness of a system relates to whether the expected benefits from improving it would be significantly greater than the anticipated costs of doing so. Thousands of dollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds. Further, not every procedure which may be individually cost-justifiable need be implemented; the Act allows a range of reasonable judgments.”

“The test of a company’s internal control system is not whether occasional failings can occur. Those will happen in the most ideally managed company. But, an adequate system of internal controls means that, when such breaches do arise, they will be isolated rather than systemic, and they will be subject to a reasonable likelihood of being uncovered in a timely manner and then remedied promptly. Barring, of course, the participation or complicity of senior company officials in the deed, when discovery and correction expeditiously follow, no failing in the company’s internal accounting system would have existed. To the contrary, routine discovery and correction would evidence its effectiveness.”

Internal Controls – Which Is It?

Another trouble featuring of the Mead Johnson enforcement action is that the SEC makes contradictory findings regarding Mead Johnson’s internal controls.

On the one hand, the SEC finds:

“Mead Johnson has established internal policies to comport with the FCPA and local laws, and to prevent related illegal and unethical conduct. Mead Johnson’s internal policies include prohibitions against providing improper payments and gifts to HCPs that would influence their recommendation of Mead Johnson’s products.”
The use of the Distributor Allowance to improperly compensate HCPs was contrary to management’s authorization and Mead Johnson’s internal policies.”

Yet on the other hand, the SEC order contains the following conclusory legal finding:

“Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead Johnson China’s operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments that occurred over a period of years.”

The Simplicity of But For

Numerous prior posts (see here along with embedded posts therein) have examined the simplicity of but for allegations or findings in FCPA enforcement actions (i.e. but for the alleged improper payments, the company would not have obtained or retained the alleged business at issue).

The Mead Johnson enforcement action contains such a simplistic finding as the SEC stated that Mead Johnson China “made improper payments to certain health care professionals (“HCPs”) at state-owned hospitals in China to recommend Mead Johnson’s nutrition products to, and provide information about, expectant and new mothers.” (emphasis added).

The but for inference is that without the alleged improper payments, the HCP’s would not have recommended Mead Johnson’s nutrition products.

Such a finding is fanciful.

Mead Johnson’s products (and those of other Western companies) are market leaders in China for the simple fact that “foreign infant formula became preferred by Chinese consumers after a milk scandal in 2008 in which domestic [Chinese] manufacturers mixed melamine with their infant formula products.  Six infants died of severe kidney damage and an estimated 300,000 babies suffered painful kidney stones, causing Chinese customers to lose confidence in domestic [Chinese] infant formula products.” (See here and here).

Alarming Language from the SEC

As troubling as the above issues are, the most alarming aspect of the short Mead Johnson enforcement action is the seeming suggestion by the SEC that issuers have an obligation to self-report internal investigation results that do not find evidence of FCPA violations.

By way of background, the SEC’s order states that in 2011 “Mead Johnson received an allegation of possible violations of the FCPA in connection with the Distributor Allowance in China. In response, Mead Johnson conducted an internal investigation, but failed to find evidence that Distributor Allowance funds were being used to make improper payments to HCPs. Thereafter, Mead Johnson China discontinued Distributor Allowance funding to reduce the likelihood of improper payments to HCPs, and discontinued all practices related to compensating HCPs by 2013.” (Emphasis Added).

Even though the SEC noted that Mead Johnson’s internal investigation failed to find evidence of FCPA violations, the SEC’s order next states: “Mead Johnson did not initially self-report the 2011 allegation of potential FCPA violations and did not thereafter promptly disclose the existence of this allegation in response to the Commission’s inquiry into this matter.” Subsequently, the SEC’s order similarly states: “Despite not self-reporting the 2011 allegation of potential FCPA violations or promptly disclosing the existence of this allegation in response to the Commission’s inquiry into this matter, Mead Johnson subsequently provided extensive and thorough cooperation.”

Perhaps it was merely inartful language, but if the SEC’s position is that issuers have an obligation to self-report internal investigation results that do not find evidence of FCPA violations, then such a position is truly alarming and without any legal support.


Contrary to this report, Mead Johnson did not first disclose its FCPA scrutiny “early last year” but rather in October 2013 (see this prior post).

Nevertheless, the time between public disclosure and the enforcement action was less than two years, an unusually speedy resolution given that the norm in FCPA inquiries is often 2-4 years with several examples in the 5-7 year range.


Issues To Consider From The Louis Berger Enforcement Action

Wednesday, July 22nd, 2015

IssuesThis recent post highlighted the DOJ FCPA enforcement action against Louis Berger International (LBI) and two former employees.

This post continues the analysis by highlighting various issues to consider from the enforcement action.

Not The First Time

Last week’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against LBI was not the only recent enforcement action against the company or related entities.

As highlighted here, in November 2010 the company reached a global settlement with the DOJ related to an investigation of its cost allocating methodologies for overseas U.S. federal contracts. As part of the settlement, the company paid a total of $65 million and the settlement was composed of three separate agreements:

  • A two-year deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ in which an independent monitor was appointed.
  • A related civil settlement agreement with the DOJ and the relator of a whistleblower lawsuit. In accordance with the agreement, the company accepted responsibility for the actions of former employees who violated the U.S. False Claims Act.
  • An Administrative Agreement with the company’s lead federal agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development.

As highlighted here, in December 2014 Derish Wolff (the former President, CEO and Chairman of the company) pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the U.S. Agency for International Development with respect to billions of dollars in contracts for reconstructive work in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As highlighted here, in November 2010 Salvatore Pepe (a former controller and the former CFO of the company) and Precy Pellettieri (a former controller of the company) also pleaded guilty to criminal informations charging them with conspiring to defraud the government with respect to the above conduct.

Government Contracts

Despite the prior enforcement action and the company’s FCPA scrutiny, Louis Berger has raked in numerous government contracts.

For instance, in just the past 9 months the company has been awarded the following government contracts.
  • A $14.8 million operations and maintenance fuels contract by the Defense Logistics Agency Energy for Fort Knox, Kentucky (see here).
  • A $21.6 million operations and maintenance fuels contract by the Defense Logistics Agency Energy at Fort Bliss, Texas (see here).
  • A $20 million contract with Florida’s Turnpike Enterprise to provide facility maintenance and repair services for toll plaza buildings along turnpike roadways in South Florida (see here).
  • A contract to provide air terminal and ground handling services at Kunsan Air base and Gimhae Republic of Korea air base in South Korea under a five-year contract with the United States Transportation Command (see here).
  • A contract from the U.S. Army, Europe to provide transient aircraft services at Stuttgart Army Airfield, Stuttgart Germany, a U.S. Army Airfield operated and maintained by the U.S. Army (see here).
  • A $95 million contract to assist the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Pittsburgh District in responding to natural disasters and emergencies by providing temporary emergency power (see here).

World Bank Sanction

In February 2015, the company announced that it had accepted a World Bank Sanction based on the Vietnam conduct alleged in last week’s FCPA enforcement action. As noted in the company’s release:

“Louis Berger Group, the U.S.-based operating company within Louis Berger, has been barred from working on World Bank-funded projects for 12 months, subject to compliance with certain conditions. In addition, the Louis Berger parent has accepted terms of a conditional non-debarment for the same period. The sanctions are based on findings of misconduct under the World Bank standards by former employees on two 2007/08 World Bank-funded contracts in Vietnam that Louis Berger self-identified and self-reported to the U.S. government and World Bank.”

Rogue Employees?

Notwithstanding the above prior enforcement action, in relation to last week’s FCPA enforcement action it is fair to pose the question of whether the conduct at issue was engaged in by rogue employees (Richard Hirsch – an employed located in the Philippines, who at times oversaw the Company’s overseas operations in Indonesia and Vietnam and James McClung an employee located in India, who at times oversaw the Company’s overseas operations in Vietnam and India).

For instance, the DPA makes several references to the employees concealing conduct and otherwise creating false documents. Moreover, the DPA twice mentions the “nature and scope of the conduct” as a presumed mitigating factor, something not often found in FCPA resolution documents.

Moreover, compared to most corporate FCPA enforcement actions, there is little mention in the LBI action regarding the company’s control environment or compliance policies and procedures.

Was That Really a Voluntary Disclosure?

The DPA states that LBI voluntarily disclosed the conduct at issue and the Sentencing Guidelines calculation in the DPA credits the company for voluntarily disclosing.

Yet, is it really a voluntary disclosure when the company only took action after – in the words of the DPA – “the government had made LBI … aware of a False Claim Act investigation …”?

Did the Company Need a Compliance Monitor?

The DPA requires that LBI engage a compliance monitor for a three-year period.

Notwithstanding LBI’s prior troubles, query whether the compliance monitor was truly necessary or a government required transfer of shareholder wealth to FCPA Inc. (see here for the prior post).

For instance, in the DPA the DOJ stated that the company “has engaged in extensive remediation, including terminating the employment of officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all Company contracts.”

Moreover, LBI’s press release (which the company had to clear with the DOJ pursuant to the DPA) states:

“Since 2010, Louis Berger has undergone a massive $25+ million reform effort that resulted in new internal controls, new policies and procedures, and comprehensive systems investments, including a new global accounting system. The company has actively supported the government in its investigation of the culpable individuals and their activities. In addition to separating these former managers from the company, the firm also has added new managers to key positions, including chief financial officer and controller, and regional management teams throughout Asia and the Middle East. Additionally, the company implemented a new corporate operational model to ensure greater centralized oversight and control of overseas business activities. Moreover, the company has reformed its ownership structure by implementing an Employee Stock Ownership Program. The company established an independent compliance and ethics department under the oversight of an independent audit committee, introduced a global helpline through which employees can report potentially non-compliant activities, and implemented a global code of business conduct. Investments also have funded annual worldwide compliance, ethics and anti-corruption training for all employees.”


Regardless of the merits of the voluntary disclosure, according to LBI’s press release the company self-reported the conduct at issue to the U.S. government starting in 2010.

Thus, LBI’s FCPA scrutiny lasted 5 years.

Another Week And More SEC Speeches

Wednesday, May 20th, 2015

Speaking8SEC enforcement officials sure do make a lot of speeches.

Last week, it was Andrew Ceresney (Director of the Division of Enforcement) who delivered speeches in Texas and New York.

In this speech, Ceresney focused on the SEC’s “cooperation program” (announced in 2010 see here for the prior post) and how the SEC uses “cooperation agreements and other cooperation tools.”

According to Ceresney:

“My bottom line is twofold:  first, the cooperation program has succeeded in making the Commission’s enforcement program more effective by obtaining significant results which protect investors and deter misconduct; and second, those who are willing and able to help us can thereby help themselves in significant ways.”

Ceresney continued as follows.

“In laying out the range of options for considering and rewarding self-reporting and cooperation, the Commission noted that such credit could range from the “extraordinary” step of declining an enforcement action, to narrowing charges, limiting sanctions, or including mitigating or similar language in charging documents.  The Commission has used each of these approaches in its cases over the years.

To take one example of how this plays out in practice, look at our recent announcement of settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) charges against FLIR Systems Inc.  As the order in that case noted, the company self-reported, cooperated, and undertook significant remedial efforts.  The settlement required the company to pay around $7.5 million in disgorgement, plus prejudgment interest, but a penalty of only $1 million, whereas penalties in FCPA settlements often are set at an amount equal to the disgorgement amount.

Similarly, the Commission filed an FCPA action against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company earlier this year. The order in that case notes the company’s prompt self-reporting, remedial acts, cooperation, and disciplinary actions against employees.  The settlement ordered disgorgement and prejudgment interest of over $16 million, but no penalty at all.  As you can see from those two examples, Seaboard continues to provide a framework under which entities can receive cooperation credit in settlements.”

Let’s pause for a moment to reflect on Ceresney’s suggestion that Goodyear uniquely benefited from receiving no civil penalty and FLIR Systems uniquely benefited because its civil penalty was “only $1 million” and his assertion that “penalties in FCPA settlements often are set at an amount equal to the disgorgement amount.”

For starters, between 2011 and 2014 the SEC resolved 36 corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  22 of the actions 61% did not involve any civil penalty in the settlement amount.  Of the 12 enforcement actions that involved disgorgement and a civil penalty amount (note Oracle and Ball Corp. involved only a civil penalty), in only the Allianz enforcement action did the civil penalty amount equal the disgorgement amount.  In every other situation (92%), the civil penalty amount did not equal (by a large margin) the disgorgement amount.

In short, Ceresney’s statement that “penalties in FCPA settlements often are set at an amount equal to the disgorgement amount” is simply false as evidenced in SEC FCPA enforcement actions between 2011-2014.

Ceresney next talked about self-reporting and cooperation and stated as follows.

“The discussion of whether and when to self-report is, I think, a bit more developed in the context of FCPA cases than in other types of cases.  As I have previously said, companies are gambling if they fail to self-report FCPA misconduct to us.  After all, given the success of the SEC’s whistleblower program, we may well hear about that conduct from another source.  But self-reporting is advisable not just in the FCPA context.  Firms need to be giving additional consideration to it in other contexts as well.  This includes self-reporting by registered firms of misconduct by associated persons, for example, and misconduct by issuer employees.  Where Enforcement staff uncovers such misconduct ourselves, a natural question for us to ask is why the firm didn’t tell us about it.  Was it because the firm didn’t know of the misconduct?  If so, what does that say about the firm’s supervisory systems, compliance program, and other controls?  On the other hand, if the firm did know about it, and the misconduct was significant, why didn’t the firm report it to us?  There will be significant consequences in that scenario from the failure to self-report.

As for the nature of cooperation, I think that the bar has been raised for what counts as good corporate citizenship in the last 15 years or so.  For example, internal investigations have now become common, a clear best practice for any company that discovers significant potential misconduct.  And sharing the results of those internal investigations with the government has become commonplace, as companies recognize the immense benefits that can accrue to them from doing so.  Some government officials have reemphasized recently the need for companies to share information on individual wrongdoers in order to receive credit for their cooperation.  I wholeheartedly agree, and this has long been a central tenet of cooperation with the SEC. When a company commits to cooperation and expects credit for that assistance, the Enforcement staff expects them to provide us with all relevant facts, including facts implicating senior officials and other individuals.  In short, when something goes wrong, we want to know who is responsible so that we can hold them accountable.  If a company helps us do that, they will benefit.”

Ceresney next spoke about the SEC’s use of NPAs and DPAs, part of the SEC’s cooperation program announced in 2010.

“Since the start of the cooperation program, the Commission has announced just five DPAs and five NPAs.  [Note: the SEC has used such agreements three times in the FCPA context:  Tenaris (DPA), Ralph Lauren (NPA) and PBSJ (DPA)]. While these types of agreements are a good option in some extraordinary cases, they have been a relatively limited part of our practice.  I think this is appropriate and should continue to be the case.

In contrast to the limited number of DPAs and NPAs, the Division of Enforcement has signed over 80 cooperation agreements over the last five years.  These cooperation agreements, and the benefits they have provided, are really at the heart of our cooperation program.

As I mentioned, cooperation agreements have long been a staple of criminal prosecutions.  The reason for this is simple:  to break open a case, you often need assistance from someone who participated in or knew of the misconduct.  These people can answer your questions, and they can lead you to ask the questions you hadn’t yet thought of.  They can also be strong witnesses in outlining the misconduct for a jury.  This is no less true in our civil cases than in criminal cases.  Given the complexity of so many cases in our docket, we have much to gain by enlisting those who can guide us during our investigation and who can then tell a fact finder what happened from an insider’s perspective or otherwise explain the contours of the misconduct with specificity.

Over the last five years, we have signed up cooperators in all manner of cases.”

Ceresney next turned to a question that he suspected was on the minds of many in the audience:

“[I]s cooperation worth it?  Does it provide significant enough benefits to make it worthwhile?  Particularly given some of the downsides, including the need to potentially testify against others, can it pay sufficient dividends to justify the sacrifice?  Of course, in the criminal realm, a reduction in sentence is a very significant benefit of cooperation and serves to incentivize cooperation.  Have we been able to offer benefits sufficient to incentivize cooperation on the civil side?

My answer to that is a simple yes.  Let me start by talking about the cooperation calculus for individuals.  Say that you represent someone who fits this profile:  they are caught up in an investigation where charges are likely, but there are others who are more culpable or are in a more senior role.  True, they can hunker down during the investigation and hope for the best.  But if they come forward and assist the investigative staff, they can be affirmatively helping themselves as well.  Our history over the last five years demonstrates that the benefits are real in terms of charging decisions, monetary relief, and bars.  Let me go through each of those categories of benefits.

First, charging decisions.  Usually if a defendant is at a certain level of seniority, has engaged in serious misconduct, and we have significant evidence, the staff is not going to be in a position to recommend against charges entirely.  But there are situations where an individual is on the bubble.  The person might be a somewhat peripheral or lower-level player, where charges are possible but where exercising prosecutorial discretion against bringing charges is also a valid option.  Or there may be situations where the evidence is less clear, and without cooperation we would have a hard time making a case against that individual or against others.  The staff may also consider whether the conduct is sufficient to justify an injunction or a cease-and-desist order – after all, if an individual’s conduct suggests they are not likely to break the law again, and if the individual accepts responsibility through cooperation, it weighs against that sort of relief.

The bottom line is that it is possible to convince the staff that forward-looking relief is not necessary based on your client’s conduct and risk profile, and this can happen when your client quickly and fully owns up to their conduct and tries to make it right by helping us in our investigation.  Or, if we believe a charge is necessary, in the right case we may reflect your client’s cooperation in making a recommendation about which violations to charge – for example, a cooperator might avoid scienter-based charges.

For obvious reasons, the Commission does not normally announce instances where, in the exercise of discretion, it determines that no charges are appropriate.  And unless that individual testifies, that exercise of discretion likely will not become public.  But I can tell you, based on an analysis of our cooperation agreements, that a significant percentage involved instances where the Division declined to recommend charges.


Second, a significant reduction in monetary relief is another potential benefit of cooperation.  In most cooperation cases, the Commission enters into bifurcated settlements.  This postpones the determination of any civil penalty until after the cooperation is complete, much like a deferred sentencing in the criminal realm.  What this means is that, if there is a trial or a hearing in which the cooperator takes the stand and testifies, that cooperation can be taken into account when setting any monetary penalty.  Again, the numbers bear out that cooperators receive significant benefits.  In cases where a cooperator has been charged and we have resolved the penalty question, two-thirds of the time the cooperator has paid no penalty at all.  For example, our bifurcated proceeding with our first testifying cooperator resulted in a termination with no civil penalty.



To be clear, this flexibility ordinarily does not extend to disgorgement, for reasons that I think should be obvious.  Where someone is in possession of what clearly are the proceeds of wrongdoing, the Commission typically seeks to disgorge it.  That said, in some cases there is flexibility as to how to calculate disgorgement, and the Enforcement staff might take a narrower view of what should be disgorged in recognition of cooperation.


Let me point out that the cooperation program also may have important implications not only for potential cooperators, but also for their attorneys.  The defense bar would benefit from heightened attention to the fact that our use of our cooperation tools has changed the calculus for individuals whose conduct is under investigation.  Among other things, counsel need to take seriously the challenges posed by representing multiple clients when one client is in a position to obtain significant benefits by cooperating.  This is especially true when one client’s cooperation might threaten another of a lawyer’s clients.  Additionally, counsel should keep in mind that, just as corporate cooperation credit is greatly enhanced by early self-reporting, the same is true with individuals.  The earlier that someone comes in to start a conversation about cooperation, the better it will be for the client, because early action allows us to achieve the efficiency, speed, and effectiveness that result in the highest amount of cooperation credit being given.  So, just as we have seen the bar raised in terms of corporate cooperation, I think we are seeing a similar evolution when it comes to individuals.”


In this speech, also last week, Ceresney talked about the SEC’s litigation program.  Among other things, he stated:

“Litigation and trials are among the most important work of the Commission’s Enforcement staff and we have dedicated the necessary resources to ensure that we have and will continue to have a strong record of success.


The cases that litigate are typically those where the evidence is less clear cut, the law is unsettled, the defendants have determined to spare no expense in attempting to clear their names, or, in many cases, all of the above.”

In the speech, Ceresney also elaborated on the factors the SEC recently released in determining whether to bring an enforcement action internally through its administrative process or in federal court.  (See here for the prior post).

Friday Roundup

Friday, May 8th, 2015

Roundup2The anti-bribery business, quotable, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

“The Anti-Bribery Business”

Several articles have been written about FCPA Inc., a term I coined in April 2010 (see here), as well as the “facade of FCPA enforcement” (see here for my 2010 article of the same name).

The articles have included: “Cashing in on Corruption” (Washington Post); “The Bribery Racket” (Forbes); and “FCPA Inc. and the Business of Bribery” (Wall Street Journal).

I talked at length with The Economist about the above topics and certain of my comments are included in this recent article “The Anti-Bribery Business.”

“The huge amount of work generated for internal and external lawyers and for compliance staff is the result of firms bending over backwards to be co-operative, in the hope of negotiating reduced penalties. Some are even prepared to waive the statute of limitations for the conclusion of their cases. They want to be sure they have answered the “Where else?” question: where in the world might the firm have been engaging in similar practices?

In doing so, businesses are egged on by what Mr Koehler calls “FCPA Inc”. This is “a very aggressively marketed area of the law,” he says, “with no shortage of advisers financially incentivised to tell you the sky is falling in.” Convinced that it is, the bosses of accused companies will then agree to any measure, however excessive, to demonstrate that they have comprehensively answered the “Where else?” question. So much so that even some law enforcers have started telling them to calm down. Last year Leslie Caldwell, head of the DOJ’s criminal division, said internal investigations were sometimes needlessly broad and costly, delaying resolution of matters. “We do not expect companies to aimlessly boil the ocean,” she said.

Her words have provided scant comfort: defence lawyers say that their clients feel that if they investigate problems less exhaustively, they risk giving the impression that they are withholding information. Some say the DOJ is maddeningly ambiguous, encouraging firms to overreact when allegations surface.”


Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell is spot-on in this recent Q&A in Fraud Magazine as to the importance of uniquely tailored compliance.

“I think companies have to tailor their compliance programs and their investigative mechanisms to their businesses. There’s no one-size-fits-all compliance program. Different businesses have different risks. And a company needs to do an assessment that’s very tailored to their risks and game out what could go wrong and figure out how to prevent that from happening.”

She is less than clear though when describing when the DOJ would like companies to voluntarily disclose:

“We don’t want a company to wait until they’ve completed their own investigation before they come to us. We’ll give them room to do that, but there may be investigative steps that we want to take that maybe the company is not even capable of taking. We definitely don’t want to send a message that the company should complete its own investigation and then come to us. However, we obviously don’t expect a company to report to us as soon as it receives a hotline report that it hasn’t even checked into yet.”

For your viewing pleasure, here is the video of a recent speech by Caldwell (previously highlighted here) along with Q&A.

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates


Reuters reports:

“German engineering firm Bilfinger has become the first international company to disclose to Brazil that it may have paid bribes as it seeks leniency under a new anti-corruption law, Comptroller General Valdir Simão said on Thursday. By reporting potential graft to the comptroller, known by the acronym CGU, Bilfinger hopes to continue operating in Brazil, Simão said, though it may still pay damages. ”The company knows it will be punished in Brazil; it is not exempt from fines,” Simao said at a conference in Sao Paulo adding that in exchange the company could be guaranteed the right to keep operating in Brazil. Companies that are convicted for bribery could be banned from future contracts in Brazilunder the law, which took effect in January 2014. Bilfinger said in March that it may have paid 1 million euros to public officials in Brazil in connection with orders for large screens for security control centers during the 2014 soccer World Cup. It is conducting an internal investigation and collaborating with Brazilian authorities, Bilfinger said in a statement at the time. Five companies are pursuing leniency deals with the CGU, Simao said, adding that such deals are “quite new” for the country. Four are tied to a scandal at Brazil’s state-run oil firm Petroleo Brasileiro SA, he said.”

As highlighted in this previous post, in December 2013 German-based Bilfinger paid approximately $32 million to resolve an FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.  The enforcement action was resolved via a three-year deferred prosecution agreement.


Reuters reports:

“A Chinese regulator investigated Siemens AG last year over whether the German group’s healthcare unit and its dealers bribed hospitals to buy expensive disposable products used in some of its medical devices, three people with knowledge of the probe told Reuters. The investigation, which has not previously been reported, follows a wide-reaching probe into the pharmaceutical industry in China that last year saw GlaxoSmithKline Plc fined nearly $500 million for bribing officials to push its medicine sales. China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) accused Siemens and its dealers of having violated competition law by donating medical devices in return for agreements to exclusively buy the chemical reagents needed to run the machines from Siemens, the people said.”

In 2008, Siemens paid $800 million to resolve DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions that were widespread in scope.  The enforcement action remains the largest of all-time in terms of overall settlement amount.

Dun & Bradstreet

The company recently disclosed the following update regarding its FCPA scrutiny.

“On March 18, 2012, we announced we had temporarily suspended our Shanghai Roadway D&B Marketing Services Co. Ltd. (“Roadway”) operations in China, pending an investigation into allegations that its data collection practices may have violated local Chinese consumer data privacy laws. Thereafter, the Company decided to permanently cease the operations of Roadway. In addition, we have been reviewing certain allegations that we may have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and certain other laws in our China operations. As previously reported, we have voluntarily contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to advise both agencies of our investigation, and we are continuing to meet with representatives of both the SEC and DOJ in connection therewith. Our investigation remains ongoing and is being conducted at the direction of the Audit Committee.

During the three months ended March 31, 2015 , we incurred $0.4 million of legal and other professional fees related to matters in China, as compared to $0.3 million of legal and other professional fees related to matters in China for the three months ended March 31, 2014.

As our investigation and our discussions with both the SEC and DOJ are ongoing, we cannot yet predict the ultimate outcome of the matter or its impact on our business, financial condition or results of operations. Based on our discussions with the SEC and DOJ, including an indication from the SEC in February and March 2015 of its initial estimate of the amount of net benefit potentially earned by the Company as a result of the challenged activities, we continue to believe that it is probable that the Company will incur a loss related to the government’s investigation. We will be meeting with the Staff of the SEC to obtain and to further understand the assumptions and methodologies underlying their current estimate of net benefit and will subsequently provide a responsive position. The DOJ also advised the Company in February 2015 that they will be proposing terms of a potential settlement, but we are unable to predict the timing or terms of any such proposal. Accordingly, we are unable at this time to reasonably estimate the amount or range of any loss, although it is possible that the amount of such loss could be material.”


The company disclosed as follows concerning civil litigation filed in the aftermath of its November 2014 FCPA enforcement action (see here for the prior post).

“On January 23, 2015, the City of Riviera Beach General Employees’ Retirement System filed a new shareholder derivative lawsuit in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County against three of our current directors and one former director. We are also named as a nominal defendant. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that our directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to ensure that we had sufficient internal controls and systems for compliance with the FCPA; that we failed to provide adequate training on the FCPA; and that based on these actions, the directors have been unjustly enriched. Purportedly seeking relief on our behalf, the plaintiff seeks an award of restitution and unspecified damages, costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees). We and the individual defendants have filed a demurrer requesting dismissal of the complaint in this case.

On January 30, 2015, we received a demand pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law from the law firm of Scott + Scott LLP on behalf of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 38 Pension Fund to inspect certain of our books and records. The alleged purpose of the demand is to investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duties by our directors and executive officers in connection with the matters relating to our FCPA settlement with the SEC and DOJ, and alleged lack of internal controls. We objected to the demand on procedural grounds by letter. On May 1, 2015, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 38 Pension Fund filed an action against us in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel the inspection of the requested books and records.

On March 13, 2015, we received a demand pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law from the law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP on behalf of Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System to inspect certain of our books and records. The alleged purpose of the demand is to investigate potential wrongdoing, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duties by our directors and executive officers in connection with the matters relating to our FCPA settlement with the SEC and DOJ, and alleged lack of internal controls. We objected to the demand on procedural grounds by letter. On April 21, 2015, Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System filed an action against us in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel the inspection of the requested books and records.”


The company disclosed its FCPA scrutiny earlier this year and stated as follows in its recent quarterly filing:

“For the first quarter of 2015 approximately $1 million was recorded for legal and other professional services incurred related to the internal investigation of this matter. The Company expects to incur additional costs relating to the investigation of this matter throughout 2015.”

For the Reading Stack

From Global Compliance News by Baker & McKenzie titled “When a DPA is DOA:  What The Increasing Judicial Disapproval of Corporate DPAs Means for Corporate Resolutions With the U.S. Government.”

“The legal setting in which corporations are negotiating with U.S. regulators is always evolving. Federal judges’ increasing willingness to second-guess negotiated settlements between the government and corporations is likely to encourage government attorneys to seek even more onerous settlements to ensure that judges do not reject them or criticize the agency in open court. Companies and their counsel should be ready to push back, using the judicial scrutiny to their advantage where possible.”


A good weekend to all.