Archive for the ‘Third Parties’ Category

Harder Files Motion To Dismiss

Thursday, October 22nd, 2015

HarderAs highlighted in this previous post, in January 2015 the DOJ criminally charged Dmitrij Harder (pictured), the former owner and President of Chestnut Consulting Group Inc. and Chestnut Consulting Group Co., for allegedly bribing an official with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”).

The enforcement action was notable in that it invoked the rarely used “public international organization” prong of the FCPA’s “foreign official” element.

Recently, Harder filed this motion to dismiss:  In summary fashion it states:

“The Indictment fails to accurately allege the elements of a violation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) – it is devoid of any allegations that Mr. Harder paid an allegedly corrupt payment to a “foreign official,” fails to state required allegations when an allegedly corrupt payment is made to a third party, and impermissibly substitutes “public international organization” in the charging language against Mr. Harder. The FCPA counts should also be dismissed because the provision permitting the President to expand the term “foreign official” by identifying “public international organizations” as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(B) is unconstitutional. Finally, the Travel Act counts fail to state an offense under the Pennsylvania anti-bribery statute and because the Travel Act does not apply extraterritorially to the facts of this case.”

As relevant to the FCPA’s third-party payment provisions, the motion states:

“Under the FCPA, when an allegedly corrupt payment is made to a person who is not a “foreign official” (like “EBRD Official’s Sister”), it is a crime only if the payment is made by the defendant “while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3). The statutory language of the FCPA does not mention the phrase “for the benefit of.” The Indictment therefore fails in two ways: (1) it purports to expand the statute’s reach and criminalize payments made “for the benefit” of a foreign official; and (2) it fails to set forth any factual allegations that the allegedly corrupt payments were made by Mr. Harder “while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official.” The Indictment also fails to state an offense because it charges Mr. Harder with inducing a foreign official to use his influence with a public international organization under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3)(B), but that prong of the FCPA only addresses acts intended to influence a “foreign government” and not a “public international organization.”

As relevant to the FCPA’s “foreign official” element and specifically the “public international organization” component of the “foreign official” definition, the motion states:

“The FCPA counts in the Indictment (Counts One through Six) should be dismissed because the FCPA statute is unconstitutional to the extent criminal liability is premised upon allegedly corrupt payments in connection with “public international organizations.” In this regard, the FCPA states, without any explanation or limitation, that the President of the United States is empowered to designate entities as “public international organizations,” whose employees are then considered to be “foreign officials” covered by the FCPA. But Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers to the President in criminal matters without providing some direction (such as policy, scope, or limitations), and Congress failed to do this in the FCPA. Further, because the FCPA is vague as to what conduct is criminal – because the term “public international organization” is not clearly defined nor are the designated entities so easily identified – this portion of the FCPA is void for vagueness, particularly because an individual can be convicted without proof that the defendant knew that the entity in question was a “public international organization” and therefore covered by the FCPA. Mr. Harder believes this to be the first case where the government has charged anyone under the “public international organization” prong of the FCPA, and the constitutional defects arising from that portion of the statute are readily apparent.

Mr. Harder has not found any case that has reviewed the constitutionality of the definition of “public international organization” for purposes of the FCPA – the key element to the government’s case against Mr. Harder. The term “public international organization” was not in the FCPA when it was originally enacted in 1977. Only when the FCPA was amended as of November 10, 1998, was the term “public international organization” inserted into the FCPA. See PL 105-366 (Nov. 10, 1998). This term, as utilized in the FCPA, violates two important constitutional doctrines: the non-delegation doctrine and the void for vagueness doctrine.


Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers to the President in criminal matters without providing some direction (such as policy, scope, or limitations), and Congress failed to do this in the FCPA. Further, because the FCPA is vague as to what conduct is criminal – because the term “public international organization” is not clearly defined nor are the designated entities so easily identified – this portion of the FCPA is void for vagueness, particularly because an individual can be convicted without proof that the defendant knew that the entity in question was a “public international organization” and therefore covered by the FCPA. Mr. Harder believes this to be the first case where the government has charged anyone under the “public international organization” prong of the FCPA, and the constitutional defects arising from that portion of the statute are readily apparent.4 Mr. Harder has not found any case that has reviewed the constitutionality of the definition of “public international organization” for purposes of the FCPA – the key element to the government’s case against Mr. Harder. The term “public international organization” was not in the FCPA when it was originally enacted in 1977. Only when the FCPA was amended as of November 10, 1998, was the term “public international organization” inserted into the FCPA. See PL 105-366 (Nov. 10, 1998). This term, as utilized in the FCPA, violates two important constitutional doctrines: the non-delegation doctrine and the void for vagueness doctrine.”

Harder is represented by Ian Comisky (Blank Rome) and Stephen LaCheen (LaCheen, Wittels & Greenberg).

U.S. District Court judge Paul Diamond (E.D. Pa.) is presiding over the case.

Friday Roundup

Friday, September 25th, 2015

Roundup2More on the Yates Memo, scrutiny alerts, survey says, and FCPA reform.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

More on the Yates Memo

Once again a private company has marketed a public official to drive attendance to its paid event.

Earlier this week, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell delivered this speech reiterating various aspects of the “Yates Memo.” Caldwell stated:

“[O]ur focus on individuals stems from the reality that corporations act through human beings, and that justice usually requires identifying those responsible for criminal conduct and holding them personally accountable.  Prosecuting the corporate entity, and imposing a fine and other impersonal conditions, simply is not enough – in most instances – to fully punish and, more importantly, deter corporate misconduct.”

Regarding the cooperation credit aspects of the “Yates Memo,” Caldwell stated:

“We recognize, however, that a company cannot provide what it does not have.  And we understand that some investigations – despite their thoroughness – will not bear fruit.  Where a company truly is unable to identify the culpable individuals following an appropriately tailored and thorough investigation, but provides the government with the relevant facts and otherwise assists us in obtaining evidence, the company will be eligible for cooperation credit.  We will make efforts to credit, not penalize, diligent investigations.  On the flip side, we will carefully scrutinize and test a company’s claims that it could not identify or uncover evidence regarding the culpable individuals, particularly if we are able to do so ourselves.

As I have said before, it is not our intent to outsource our investigation of corporate wrongdoing to companies and their outside advisors.  As in the past, we will not sit idle, waiting for a company to conduct or complete its investigation.  Regardless of a company’s cooperation, federal agents and prosecutors will conduct thorough investigations.  If, through this process, we are able to identify the culpable individuals when the company itself did not do so, as well as evidence that would support the charging and prosecution of those individuals, we will assess whether that evidence truly was unavailable to the company.

We, of course, recognize that we sometimes can obtain evidence that a company cannot.  We often can obtain from third parties evidence that is not available to the company.  Also, we know that a company may not be able to interview former employees who refuse to cooperate in a company investigation.  Those same employees may provide information to us, whether voluntarily or through compulsory process.  Likewise, there are times when, for strategic reasons, we may ask that the company stand down from pursing a particular line of inquiry.  If so, the company will not be penalized for failing to identify facts subsequently discovered by government investigators.”

Caldwell also answered questions after the speech.  It appears that this Q&A was recorded and the same private company put the Q&A behind its paywall.

It’s just plain wrong that a private company is selling the words of public officials. It ought to stop.

Scrutiny Alerts


As highlighted here, in 2010 as part of the CustomsGate enforcement actions, Transocean resolved a $20.7 million FCPA enforcement action (involving a DOJ and SEC component) concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.

Bloomberg reports:

“Transocean Ltd., the world’s largest offshore rig contractor, is being linked for the first time to the corruption probe of Petroleo Brasileiro SA, the state-owned energy giant at the center of Brazil’s biggest corporate scandal. A former executive at Brazil’s state-run oil company has testified to receiving what he says were payments made by someone claiming to be a Transocean agent in exchange for a rig-operation contract from Petrobras.”


This CBCNews report goes in-depth regarding new allegations in a civil suit concerning SNC-Lavalin. According to the article:

“Top executives for years endorsed bribes and lavish gifts — including a yacht and even prostitutes — to win contracts from Libya’s Gadhafi regime.”

To cement ties, [the complaint] alleges specific SNC executives signed off on or approved numerous favours to help Gadhafi, including:

  • providing SNC staff and hiring university professor as tutors;
  • helping to obtain a Canadian visa;
  • considering appointing Saadi Gadhafi an SNC vice-president;
  • officially sponsoring his Italian Serie A professional soccer team.

One of the largest expenses included the purchase of a Palmer Johnson yacht worth $38 million for Saadi Gadhafi ”organized and validated by CFO Laramée and approved by the then CEO Lamarre.” Saadi Gadhafi visited Canada in 2008, and SNC Lavalin picked up the bill — more than $2 million.”

Survey Says

KPMG recently conducted a worldwide online survey of corporate risk leaders to find out the strengths and weaknesses of their companies’ programs to combat bribery and corruption.  According to the survey responses:

“There is a sharp increase in the proportion of respondents who say they are highly challenged by the issue of Anti-Bribery Compliance (ABC) compared with a survey KPMG conducted four years earlier.

As companies continue to globalize, management of third parties poses the greatest challenge in executing ABC programs.

Despite the difficulty of monitoring their business dealings with third parties, more than one third of the respondents do not formally identify high-risk third parties. More than half of those respondents with right to-audit clauses over third parties have not exercised the right.

ABC considerations are accorded too low a priority by companies preparing to acquire, or merge with, other corporations across borders.

Respondents complain they lack the resources to manage ABC risk.

A top-down risk assessment would help companies set priorities, but executives admit that an ABC risk assessment is one of their companies’ top challenges.

Data analytics is an increasingly important and cost-effective tool to assess ABC controls. Yet only a quarter of respondents use data analysis to identify violations and, of those that do so, less than half continuously monitor data to spot potential violations.”

FCPA Reform

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently released this document outlining its policy priorities. Included in the lengthy document was the following:  ”work to reform the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by supporting changes to enforcement practices.”


A good weekend to all.


FCPA “Summer School” – A Free Two-Part Webinar Series

Thursday, September 3rd, 2015

Learn3Don’t let the dog days of summer make you lazy.

Elevate your Foreign Corrupt Practices Act knowledge and practical skills.

Recently, I conducted a two-part FCPA “summer school” series sponsored by Hiperos (a leading third-party management company).

Hundreds participated in the live webinars in July and August, but if you missed out, the webinars can be accessed at the below links.

The first webinar titled “Understanding FCPA Scrutiny and the Enforcement Landscape” provide participants with an understanding of:

  • current FCPA enforcement theories;
  • the long term and short term costs associated with an FCPA enforcement action or merely FCPA scrutiny; and
  • how the FCPA is enforced by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The second webinar titled “FCPA Third Party Compliance Best Practices” provides participants with an understanding of:

  • the FCPA risks of utilizing third parties
  • FCPA compliance best practices relevant to third parties (including pre-engagement, engagement, and post-engagement practices) and learning from third-party compliance failures in past enforcement actions; and
  • how best to effectively communicate compliance expectations to third parties

Friday Roundup

Friday, February 27th, 2015

Roundup2Save the date, scrutiny updates, coming attraction, job alert, and for the reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Save the Date

An event notice for East Coast readers.

On Friday, March 6th, the Fordham Law Review is hosting a free symposium opened to the public titled “Fighting Corruption in American and Abroad.”

To learn more about the event click here.

Preet Bharara (U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York) will be delivering a keynote address and symposium panels will explore the following topics.

(i) What is Corruption?—How Should We Define It, and Why Is It Bad?

(ii) Landmark Domestic Bribery Prosecutions

(iii) Corruption Regulation in Practice via the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and

(iv) The Political Economy of Global Corruption Regulation

I will be appearing on the third panel along with: Lanny Breuer (Partner, Covington & Burling LLP);  Jay Holtmeier (Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP); and Lucinda Low (Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP).

I have previously written about FCPA enforcement during Mr. Breuer’s tenure as Assistant Chief of the DOJ Criminal Division, but my panel presentation will concern a different topic – my forthcoming article:  ”The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery Enforcement.”  The article explores how the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths, including a double standard regarding corporate interaction with “foreign officials” under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and corporate interaction with U.S. officials under the U.S. laws.

Scrutiny Updates

General Cable Corp.

The company initially disclosed FCPA scrutiny in September 2014 and recently disclosed:

“As we previously reported, we have been reviewing, with the assistance of external counsel, certain commission payments involving sales to customers of our subsidiary in Angola. The review has focused upon payment practices with respect to employees of public utility companies, use of agents in connection with such payment practices, and the manner in which the payments were reflected in our books and records. We have determined at this time that certain employees in our Portugal and Angola subsidiaries directly and indirectly made or directed payments at various times from 2002 through 2013 to officials of Angola government-owned public utilities that raise concerns under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and possibly under the laws of other jurisdictions.

On February 20, 2015, based on the analysis completed at that time with the assistance of our external counsel and forensic accountants, we concluded that we were able to reasonably estimate the amount of profit derived from sales made to the Angolan government-owned public utilities in connection with the payments described above, which we believe are likely to ultimately be disgorged. As a result, we have recorded an estimated charge in the amount of $24 million as an accrual as of December 31, 2014. The accrued amount reflects only an estimate of the Angola-related profits reasonably likely to be disgorged, and does not include provision for any fines, civil or criminal penalties, or other relief, any or all of which could be substantial.”


As highlighted in this prior post, the company recently prevailed over the SEC regarding the company’s FCPA scrutiny.  Set forth below is what Cobalt’s CEO (Joe Bryant) said during a recent investor conference call.

ANALYST: [J]ust one additional question for you. Back in January, you mentioned or had a press release that the SEC terminated its investigation; but the Department of Justice was still going forward with its parallel investigation into activities in Angola. Where does that stand now, Joe?

JOE BRYANT: Darn it [...]. I was hoping to get through this conference without anybody bringing up any FCPA questions.

ANALYST: Sorry about that.

JOE BRYANT: No, I would — it’s pretty simple, really. Our focus in the past several years has obviously been with the SEC; and we brought the DOJ into the investigation early on to make sure that they could run a parallel investigation, if that was what they wanted. By the way, I will say that throughout this entire period, I can’t say enough about the working relationship we developed with the SEC and trying to make sure they understood what we did and they had everything we had in terms of the issue at question.

So we got the SEC out of the way. The DOJ is an independent agency, and it will run its process according to its measures. But I do think that we consider this issue largely behind us.”

Juniper Networks

The company disclosed FCPA scrutiny in August 2013 (albeit in short fashion – see here) and recently disclosed as follows.

“The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) are conducting investigations into possible violations by the Company of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Company is cooperating with these agencies regarding these matters. The Company’s Audit Committee, with the assistance of independent advisors, has been investigating and conducting a thorough review of possible violations of the FCPA, and has made recommendations for remedial measures, including employee disciplinary actions in foreign jurisdictions, which the Company has implemented and continues to implement. The Company is unable to predict the duration, scope or outcome of the SEC and DOJ investigations, but believes that an adverse outcome is reasonably possible. However, the Company is not able to estimate a reasonable range of possible loss. The SEC and/or DOJ could take action against us or we could agree to settle. In such event, we could be required to pay substantial fines and sanctions and/or implement additional remedial measures; in addition, it may be determined that we violated the FCPA.”

Mondelez International

Kraft Foods long ago disclosed FCPA scrutiny resulting from its acquisition of Cadbury (see here).  Kraft, currently known as Mondelēz International, Inc., recently disclosed as follows.

“[A]fter we acquired Cadbury in February 2010 we began reviewing and adjusting, as needed, Cadbury’s operations in light of applicable standards as well as our policies and practices. We initially focused on such high priority areas as food safety, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and antitrust. Based upon Cadbury’s pre-acquisition policies and compliance programs and our post-acquisition reviews, our preliminary findings indicated that Cadbury’s overall state of compliance was sound. Nonetheless, through our reviews, we determined that in certain jurisdictions, including India, there appeared to be facts and circumstances warranting further investigation. We are continuing our investigations in certain jurisdictions, including in India, and we continue to cooperate with governmental authorities.

As we previously disclosed, on February 1, 2011, we received a subpoena from the SEC in connection with an investigation under the FCPA, primarily related to a facility in India that we acquired in the Cadbury acquisition. The subpoena primarily requests information regarding dealings with Indian governmental agencies and officials to obtain approvals related to the operation of that facility. We are continuing to cooperate with the U.S. and Indian governments in their investigations of these matters, including through ongoing meetings with the U.S. government to discuss potential conclusion of the U.S. government investigation.”

Coming Attraction

This recent post highlighted judicial rejection of a deferred prosecution between the DOJ and Fokker Services.

Fokker recently announced:

“After careful review of the Court’s decision, Fokker Services decided to file a Notice of Appeal. Fokker Services has noticed recent press articles which contain highly speculative assumptions and amounts, not based on facts. Fokker cannot run ahead of the outcome of its appeal and will make further announcement only if and when applicable.”

While the case is outside the FCPA context, this appeal will certainly be one to follow as DPAs (as well as NPAs) are a prominent feature of FCPA enforcement.

Job Alert

Avon Calling!  Avon Colombia S.A.S., a subsidiary of Avon Products, Inc., based in Medellin, Colombia, is looking for an attorney to join the Ethics & Compliance team.  The Compliance Counsel has day-to-day operational responsibility for managing the compliance program in the Andean Cluster (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).  The program seeks to minimize risk exposure of corporate and regulatory law through company guidance and controls.  A primary activity of the Compliance Counsel is to provide operational advice and interpretation of company policies and procedures, including but not limited to the company’s anti-corruption policy.  As part of the program, the Compliance Counsel supports corporate, regional and local governance, monitoring, auditing, training and communication initiatives.  A primary goal for the Compliance Counsel is to enhance the culture of awareness and adherence to company policies.  Prospective candidates should apply via the Avon website.

Reading Stack

Third parties are not just a corruption risk in the global marketplace, but the domestic marketplace as well.  See here for the New York Daily News article about so-called “expediters” who assist developers navigate bureaucracy “to speed their projects to approval — getting permits faster, addressing violations and filling out key paperwork. It’s an arrangement critics have long slammed as corrupt.”

The most recent edition of the always information Debevoise & Plimpton FCPA Update is here.  Regarding the recent rejection of a DPA in the Fokker Services action (see here) the Update states:

“In the FCPA context and beyond, the Fokker Services decision is a reminder that increased judicial scrutiny of proposed settlement agreements with law enforcement agencies may be the “new normal.” Although the outcome of Fokker Services’ appeal remains to be seen, Judge Leon’s decision may entice prosecutors in future cases to seek harsher terms in DPAs out of concern for heightened judicial scrutiny of proposed DPAs, or instead shy away from DPAs entirely and attempt to achieve sufficient punishment and deterrence through Non-Prosecution Agreements (“NPAs”). In addition, Judge Leon’s concern that no individuals were charged in Fokker Services may further embolden prosecutors to demand individual accountability as part of proposed settlements or in the lead-up to such settlements.”

Some are still drinking the Kool-Aid regarding Morgan Stanley’s so-called declination.  (See here – “A robust compliance program spared Morgan Stanley from prosecution under the FCPA”).  Just goes to show that once a narrative is cast, nothing else seems to matter.

A recent Q&A in the Wall Street Journal’s Risk & Compliance Journal with Pascale Hélène Dubois (the World Bank’s chief suspension and debarment officer).


A good weekend to all.

Issues To Consider From The Alstom Action

Friday, January 2nd, 2015

IssuesThis recent post dived deep into the Alstom FCPA enforcement action.

This post continues the analysis by highlighting various issues to consider associated with the enforcement action.


A Real Head-Scratcher

Alstom entities engaged in conduct in violation of the FCPA.  This is clear from the DOJ’s allegations and consistent with DOJ enforcement theories.  Yet, if the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program is to be viewed as legitimate and credible, the charged conduct must fit (for lack of a better term) the crime.

The charges against Alstom S.A. are a real head-scratcher.

The conventional wisdom for why the Alstom action involved only a DOJ (and not SEC) component is that Alstom ceased being an issuer in 2004 (in other words 10 years prior to the enforcement action).

Yet, the actual criminal charges Alstom pleaded guilty to – violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions –  were based on Alstom’s status as an issuer (as only issuers are subject to these substantive provisions).

In other words, Alstom pleaded guilty to substantive legal provisions in 2014 that last applied to the company in 2004.

This free-for-all, anything goes, as long as the enforcement agencies collect the money nature of FCPA enforcement undermines the legitimacy and credibility of FCPA enforcement.

Enforcement Action Origins

What were the origins of the Alstom enforcement action?

It appears to be a 2011 Swiss enforcement action that began in October 2007.  (See here, here and here).

Indeed, in briefing in an individual enforcement action (Lawrence Hoskins) connected to the Alstom Indonesia conduct, the DOJ stated:

“When the Government began investigating this case, it sought evidence from various countries including Switzerland [...].  The Government obtained orders pursuant to 18 USC 3292, tolling the statute of limitations in this case for the shorter of three years or the time it took to receive the evidence sought.  The first request, to Switzerland, was transmitted on September 22, 2010, and the tolling order reflects tolling beginning on that date.  Switzerland provided responses to the request on December 23, 2013.”

In the Swiss action, “Alstom Network Schweiz AG … was fined CHF2.5 million for negligence in implementing proper controls to prevent bribery by company officials in Latvia, Tunisia and Malaysia, and it was ordered to pay an additional CHF36 million for profits connected to the negligence.”

The foreign law enforcement origins of the Alstom action are typical of other enforcement actions in the Top Ten List of FCPA settlements (Siemens and the Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement actions – KBR/Halliburton, Snamprogetti/ENI, Technip, and JGC Corp).

No Monitor

On one level, it seems odd that the Alstom enforcement action did not involve a corporate monitor as a condition of settlement. After all, the $772 million enforcement action was the largest DOJ FCPA enforcement action of all-time and per the DOJ “Alstom’s corruption scheme was sustained over more than a decade and across several continents. It was astounding in its breadth, its brazenness and its worldwide consequences.”

However, the resolution documents note “that Alstom is already subject to monitoring requirements pursuant to a February 2012 World Bank Resolution.” (See here).  As stated in the DOJ resolution documents: “in the event that the Integrity Compliance Office [of the World Bank] does not certify that the Company has satisfied the monitoring requirements contained in the World Bank Resolution, the Company shall be required to retain an Independent Compliance Monitor.”

Moreover, the vast majority of the alleged improper conduct in the DOJ enforcement action resided in business units that will soon be part of General Electric in 2015.  Thus, to impose a monitor on Alstom would, in effect, have been to impose a monitor on General Electric.

Third Party Red Flags

Most FCPA enforcement actions result from the conduct of third parties and ineffective corporate controls over third parties.

In this regard, the following paragraph from the Alstom enforcement is a dandy regarding third party red flags.

“A number of consultants that Alstom hired raised a number of “red flags” under Alstom’s own internal policies.  Certain consultants proposed for retention had no expertise or experience in the industry sector in which Alstom was attempting to secure or execute the project.  Other consultants were located in a country different than the project country.  At other times, the consultants asked to be paid in a currency or in a bank account located in a country different than where the consultant and the project were located.  In multiple instances, more than one consultant was retained on the same project, ostensibly to perform the very same services.  Despite, these “red flags,” the consultants were nevertheless retained without meaningful scrutiny.”

FCPA enforcement actions of course are no laughing matter, but the following specific allegations sort of make one chuckle.

“Alstom did not perform any due diligence on the consultant even though the consultant had no knowledge about, or experience in, the power industry.  Rather, the information alleges, the consultant “sold furniture and leather products, and exported chemical products and spare parts.”

“An Alstom entity formally retained a consultant on a [rapid transit] project even thought the consultant did not have the requisite expertise in the transport sector.  According to the information, the consultant’s expertise was as a “wholesaler of cigarettes, wines and pianos.”

More Information Needed As to Lack of Cooperation

Repeatedly in the resolution documents, the DOJ states that Alstom did not “cooperate.”

“The Defendant initially failed to cooperate with the Department’s investigation, responding only to the Department’s subpoenas to the Defendant’s subsidiaries.  Approximately one year into the investigation, the Defendant provided limited cooperation, but still did not fully cooperate with the Department’s investigation.”

“The Company and its parent initially failed to cooperate with the Department’s investigation, responding only to the Department’s subpoena.  Approximately one year into the investigation, the Company and its parent provided limited cooperation, but still did not fully cooperate with the Department’s investigation.”

Likewise, at the DOJ press conference, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell stated:

“The guilty pleas and resolutions announced today also highlight what can happen when corporations refuse to disclose wrongdoing and refuse to cooperate with the department’s efforts to identify and prosecute culpable individuals.”


“Alstom did not voluntarily disclose the misconduct to law enforcement authorities, and Alstom refused to cooperate in a meaningful way during the first several years of the investigation.”

If the DOJ wants its cooperation message to be fully absorbed by the corporate community, the DOJ should have been more specific about Alstom’s lack of “cooperation.”

Moreover, if “responding only to the DOJ’s subpoena” is considered lack of cooperation by the DOJ, this is troubling.  (See here for the prior post “Does DOJ Expect FCPA Counsel to Role Over and Play Dead?”).

A “Foreign Official” Stretch?

It was a relatively minor allegation in the context of the overall Alstom enforcement action, but one which caught my eye because of its extraordinarily broad implication.

As highlighted in this previous post, Asem Elgawhart was employed by Bechtel Corporation (a U.S. company) and was assigned by Bechtel to be the General Manager of Power Generation Engineering and Services Company (PGESCo), a joint venture between Bechtel and Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (the alleged “state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Egypt”). According to the DOJ, Elgawhart “used his position and authority as the General Manager of a power generation company to solicit and obtain millions of dollars of kickbacks for his personal benefit from U.S. and foreign power companies that were attempting to secure lucrative contracts to perform power-related services.” “In total,” the DOJ alleged, “Elgawhart received more than $5 million in kickbacks to help secure more than $2 billion in contracts for the kickback-paying companies, all of which he concealed from his employer, from bidding companies that did not pay kickbacks and from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.” Based on these allegations, and as indicated in this DOJ release, Elgawhart was charged in a 8-count indictment with mail and wire fraud, money laundering and various tax offenses.

In the Alstom enforcement action, PGESCo and Elgawhart are described as follows:

As to Egypt, the information concerns bidding on various projects with the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (“EEHC”), the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Egypt.  According to the information, “EEHC was not itself responsible for conducting the bidding [on projects], and instead relied on Power Generation Engineering & Services Co. (“PGESCo”), which was controlled by an acted on behalf of EEHC.”

PGESCo was controlled by and acted on behalf of EEHC. PGESCo worked “for or on behalf of’ EEHC, within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l (f)( 1) [the FCPA's "foreign official" definition].

According to the DOJ, Alstom used a consultant whose primary purpose “was not to provide legitimate consulting services to Alstom and its subsidiaries but was instead to make payments to Egyptian officials, including Asem Elgawhary who oversaw the bidding process.”

In short, in the Alstom action the DOJ alleged that Elgawhary, a Bechtel Corporation employee, was an Egyptian “foreign official.” This is an extraordinarily broad “foreign official” interpretation with implications for any person (privately employed) working on foreign projects with participation by a foreign government department, agency or instrumentality.

Rhetoric Undermined

As highlighted in this post, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell recently defended the DOJ’s frequent use of NPAs and DPAs by stating that the DOJ is able to achieve through such negotiated settlements reforms, compliance controls, and all sorts of behavioral change compared to what it could achieve without use of NPAs and DPAs.

As highlighted in the prior post, the notion that the DOJ is powerless to effect corporate change through old-fashion law enforcement (that is enforcing the FCPA without use of NPAs and DPAs) is plainly false.

Indeed, the Alstom and Alstom Network Schweiz AG plea agreements contain substantively the same corporate compliance program and reporting obligations as the Alstom Power and Alstom Grid DPAs.

False Certification

A likely overlooked allegation in the Alstom enforcement action concerns bidding on various grid projects with alleged state-owned and state-controlled entities in Egypt. According to the charging documents, certain of these projects were “funded, at least in part, by the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”)” and “an Alstom entity “repeatedly submitted false certifications to USAID in connection with these projects, and did not disclose that consultants were being used, that commissions were being paid, or that unlawful payments were being made.”

These allegations are similar to DOJ allegations in the BAE enforcement action (an enforcement action that alleged conduct that could have served as the basis for FCPA violations, but resulted in no actual FCPA charges).  As noted in this previous post, in the BAE action, the DOJ “filed a criminal charge against BAE Systems charging that the multinational defense contractor conspired to impede the lawful functions of the Departments of Defense and State, made false statements to the Departments of Defense and Justice about establishing an effective anti-corruption compliance program to ensure conformance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and paid hundreds of millions of dollars in undisclosed commission payments in violation of U.S. export control laws.”

How to Count FCPA Enforcement Actions

It is a basic issue:  how to count FCPA enforcement actions.

I use the “core” approach to counting FCPA enforcement actions (see here), an approach endorsed by the DOJ, but many in FCPA Inc. use various different creative counting methods that significantly distort FCPA enforcement statistics (see here).

Pursuant to the “core” approach, the Alstom action was one core enforcement action even though it involved the following components all based, in whole or in part, on the same core conduct.

  • Alstom S.A.
  • Alstom Network Schweiz AG
  • Alstom Power Inc.
  • Alstom Grid Inc.
  • Individual enforcement actions against Frederic Pierucci, David Rothschild, William Pomponi, and Lawrence Hoskins.

Counting the above as 8 FCPA enforcement actions instead of 1 core action highly distorts FCPA enforcement statistics and impacts the denominator of just about any FCPA enforcement statistic imaginable.

With several 2014 FCPA Year in Reviews to be published in January, one needs to be cognizant of these creative counting methods.