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The Work Of A Monitor And Checking In On Siemens

Tuesday, January 22nd, 2013

The 2008 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Siemens remains the largest in FCPA history in terms of resolution amount – $800 million ($450 million DOJ, $350 million SEC). The DOJ stated in this release that “for much of its operations across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure for Siemens.” The SEC stated in the release that the “pattern of bribery by Siemens was unprecedented in scale and geographic reach” and the “corruption involved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.”

Not surprisingly, given the nature and extent of the conduct at issue, as part of its plea agreement (here), Siemens was required to engage a corporate monitor for a three year period.

Time passes quickly, and on December 18, 2012, the DOJ filed this ”Notice Regarding Corporate Monitorship” notifying the court that Siemens has “satisfied its obligations under the plea agreement with respect to the corporate compliance monitor engaged by the company.”

This post details the monitor’s work and then highlights the difficulties of anti-corruption compliance in a large, multinational company.

The Work of a Monitor

The recent DOJ filing details the work of the monitor and states as follows.

“In accordance with the plea agreement, the Monitor conducted an initial review and three subsequent reviews of Siemens’s anti-corruption compliance program, and documented the Monitor’s findings and recommendations in four annual reports dated October 5, 2009, October 13, 2010, October 7, 2011, and October 12, 2012. Over the course of those four years, the Monitor conducted on-site or remote reviews of Siemens’ activities in 20 countries; conducted limited or issue-specific reviews in or relating to an additional 19 countries; reviewed over 51,000 documents totaling more than 973,000 pages in 11 languages; conducted interviews of or meetings with over 2,300 Siemens employees; observed over 180 regularly scheduled company events; and spent the equivalent of over 3,000 auditor days conducting financial studies and testing.

During that time, the Monitor made a total of 152 recommendations in over a dozen topic areas, such as third-party risks, financial controls, and compliance policies and training that, pursuant to the plea agreement, were “reasonably designed to improve the effectiveness of Siemens’ program for ensuring compliance with the anti-corruption laws.” Without objection, Siemens AG adopted and implemented all 152 recommendations. Thereafter, the Monitor confirmed that all of the recommendations had been fully implemented.

Those recommendations and the other remedial measures and internal control improvements undertaken by Siemens have included enhanced policies and a revised code of conduct directed at prohibiting corruption; additional and more frequent training for employees, agents, and business partners on the enhanced anti-corruption policies and procedures; additional staffing and resources dedicated to coordinating and overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the anti-corruption program; improved hotline for reporting potential violations of the code of conduct; improved accounting system controls designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate books and records; and improved due diligence and review processes for agreements with agents and business partners, including an express clause related to anti-corruption.

Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the Monitor has met with representatives from the government and the SEC on an annual basis to review the findings and recommendations in the Monitor’s annual reports. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the Monitor certified on October 13, 2010, October 7, 2011, and October 12, 2012, that “Siemens’ compliance program is reasonably designed and implemented to detect and prevent violations within Siemens of anti-corruption laws . . . .”

Based on the monitor’s work, the filing then states as follows.

“[T]he government concludes that Siemens AG has satisfied its obligations under the plea agreement with respect to the corporate compliance monitorship. The government has conferred with the staff of the SEC and the staff of the SEC concludes that Siemens AG has also complied with the terms of the Final Judgment in the civil action with respect to the corporate compliance monitorship.”

As highlighted in my article “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense” (here), even before the Siemens monitor began its work, Siemens had – in the words of the DOJ – “already implemented substantial compliance changes” and was setting “a high standard for multi-nationals to follow.” According to the DOJ, Siemens’ total external costs for this pre-monitor remediation exceeded $150 million. Although Siemens has not, to my knowledge, disclosed its costs associated with its post-enforcement action monitor, one can safely assume that the monitor costs easily exceeded this $150 million figure and perhaps reached as high as the $800 million amount announced on enforcement action day.

I noted in my Compliance Defense article that “there is likely no other company in the world today … that has devoted as many corporate resources towards compliance” and that “likewise, there is likely no other company in the world today .. that faces as many negative consequences should its compliance efforts fail.”

Difficulties of Anti-Corruption Compliance

The discussion of Siemens in my article, and here, demonstrates that not even a company that has “set a high standard for multi-national companies to follow” (again, in the words of the DOJ) can insulate itself from FCPA and related exposure.

This fact (and a fact I submit makes a compelling case for an FCPA compliance defense as outlined in my article) is clear from a review of Siemens most recent annual report (here), filed with the SEC on Nov. 28, 2012. The filing contains a separate section titled “public corruption proceedings.” To be sure, the section lists various proceedings that pre-date 2008 and that may have been indicative of the corporate culture at Siemens that gave rise to the 2008 FCPA enforcement action in the first place. However, certain proceedings in listed in the filing are post 2008, including the following.

“As previously reported, in May 2011 Siemens AG voluntarily reported a case of attempted public corruption in connection with a project in Kuwait in calendar 2010 to the U.S. Department of Justice, the SEC, and the Munich public prosecutor. The Munich public prosecutor discontinued the investigations, which related to certain former employees, but imposed conditions on them. Siemens is cooperating with the U.S. authorities in their ongoing investigations.”

“As previously reported, in July 2011 the Munich public prosecutor notified Siemens AG of an investigation against an employee in connection with payments to a supplier related to the oil and gas business in Central Asia from calendar 2000 to 2009. Siemens is cooperating with the public prosecutor.”

Add to this list a Dodd-Frank whistleblower retaliation complaint (here) recently filed against Siemens in federal court by Meng-Lin Liu, a former compliance officer for Siemens AG in China. As highlighted by this Reuters report, Liu alleges that Siemens fired him after he tried to expose a kickback scheme involving medical equipment sales to hospitals in China.

In pertinent part, the complaint alleges as follows.

“Shortly after he started at [Siemens China Ltd. (SLC)] in March 2008, Liu began encountering and confronting a culture within Siemens’ Chinese healthcare business of evading and circumventing the anti-corruption due diligence systems and controls required by the FCPA and Siemens’ 2008 Plea Agreement.”

” … Liu consistently objected to and tried to remedy systemic evasion of Siemens’ due diligence systems in circumstances where there were major ‘red flags’ indicating extremely high risks of corruption. Ultimately, Liu uncovered incontrovertible evidence that Siemens was submitting inflated bids for many of the multi-million-dollar medical diagnostic and scanning equipment sales it made to public hospitals in China, and then selling the equipment at substantially lower prices to intermediaries designated by the hospital’s procurement officials. In other words, Liu discovered that Siemens itself was complicit in a scheme whereby the end-user hospitals paid amounts to third-party intermediaries that were between 20% and 130% higher than the price Siemens received for the equipment, which was resold by these intermediaries to the end-user hospital at the original Siemens’ inflated bid price. This had all the hallmarks of a classic bribery or ‘kickback’ scheme and there was no legitimate explanation for the huge price differential that existed between prices at which Siemens sold the equipment and the prices paid by the end-user hospitals.”

“Within a week of presenting this evidence to SLC’s CFO for Healthcare, Liu was summarily removed from his position as Compliance Officer, instructed not to report to the office for the remaining four months of his employment contract and given ‘early notice’ that his contract would not be renewed upon its expiration. Four months later his employment was terminated.”

Remembering Senator Arlen Specter

Monday, October 15th, 2012

Yesterday, former Senator Arlen Specter passed away.

In November 2010, Senator Specter chaired a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing titled “Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” (See here for the hearing transcript, here for the video). I had the privilege to testify at the hearing (see here) and to work with Senator Specter’s office after the hearing on several issues of his concern (see here).

Much of the focus of Senator Specter’s comments and concerns centered on the 2008 record-setting FCPA enforcement action against Siemens and the fact that, then, there had not yet been any related enforcement actions against individuals.

In an exchange with Greg Andres (the DOJ representative who testified at the hearing), Specter stated as follows.

SPECTER: Mr. Andres, you talk about collecting more in criminal fines than anyone else, prosecuted more cases than other countries who are parties to the [OECD] convention, and you say you do not hesitate to go after individuals. But whom have you sent to jail? Did anybody go to jail in the Siemens case?”

ANDRES: Senator, as we have said before, in the Siemens case, that investigation is ongoing. There are a number of prosecutions ongoing in Germany.

SPECTER: Are there individuals who are being prosecuted?

ANDRES: That investigation is ongoing, Senator.

SPECTER: Are there any individuals being prosecuted? When you see all the publicity on Siemens, a big fine and $100 billion in revenues, $8 billion in profits, and no jail sentence, what effect does that have? Is this not really a signal that you can violate the act and pay a fine?”

Also during the hearing, Senator Specter stated as follows regarding FCPA reform testimony by Andrew Weissman who testified at the hearing on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce. “I think you [Weissman] make some good points when you talk about a compliance defense, talk about rogue employees.”

Even after the hearing, indeed, even after he left the Senate, Specter continued to question why no individuals were prosecuted in connection with the record-setting Siemens action. At the Dow Jones Global Compliance Symposium in March 2011 he stated as follows. “If you don’t have a jail sentence in a case like Siemens, when are you going to have one?” (See here for the Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post).

Approximately one year after the Senate FCPA hearing, the DOJ brought criminal charges against several former Siemens executives relating to conduct in Argentina. (See here and here for prior posts). As this Wall Street Journal Law Blog post stated, “Justice Department and SEC officials either got the message that day [the Senate 2010 FCPA hearing] or were biting their tongues, knowing that an ongoing investigation would eventually produce charges.” As noted in this previous post, while the Siemens individual enforcement actions (which have largely been dormant for the past year) were a step forward, several issues remain. First, Siemens itself was never charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations for the same conduct its former employees and agents are now facing FCPA anti-bribery charges. Second, the DOJ and SEC have addressed – through individual enforcement actions – only a sliver of the conduct at issue in the 2008 enforcement action. As alleged by the enforcement agencies, the corruption at Siemens involved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas.

Back to Senator Specter.

The timing of the November 2010 Senate hearing and Senator Specter’s motivations in calling it (at the time he was a so-called lame duck) have always been a mystery. Perhaps he was motivated to shine a light on the lack of Siemens individual prosecutions; perhaps he wanted to provide a public and high-profile forum for FCPA reform discussion in that the Chamber’s FCPA reform whitepaper was released a month earlier; perhaps he was motivated by both.

Whatever his motivations, the hearing helped usher in a new era of critical analysis and examination of the FCPA and FCPA enforcement. Thank you Senator Specter for helping to shine light on important FCPA topics.

Off-Target, On-Target

Friday, January 20th, 2012

Off-Target

Ever have one of those situations when you read something multiple times and it still does not make sense?

Earlier this week, CtW Investment Group (here) called on Siemens to end its relationship with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce because the Chamber “has engaged in an expensive campaign to undermine” the FCPA. William Patterson, Executive Director of the CtW Investment Group stated that Siemens “association with the Chamber and its efforts to rollback the FCPA [...] undermines the considerable sums Siemens has invested in compliance.” In a letter (here) to Siemens’ President and Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Patterson stated as follows. “The significant investments [Siemens] has undertaken to overhaul its compliance mechanisms and restore its reputation, however, are undermined by Siemens’ continued membership and support of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which for the past year has waged an expensive lobbying campaign to weaken the FCPA.”

I have no idea if Siemens, as an organization, is in favor of FCPA reform and/or whether it has specifically contributed to the Chamber’s FCPA reform efforts.

However, let’s assume that Siemens is in favor of an FCPA compliance defense (one of the FCPA reform proposals being considered). How is this position “undermined” by the considerable sums Siemens has invested in compliance? As I note in my forthcoming scholarship ”Revisiting an Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” (see here), even the DOJ recognizes that Siemens has ”set a high standard for multi-national companies to follow” and that the company has 600 full-time compliance personnel, its Anti-Corruption Toolkit was designed by industry leaders, and its has 100-plus compliance systems controls in high-risk jurisdictions.

It is precisely because of these above factors that Siemens (and other companies that make similar compliance investments) should be in favor of a FCPA compliance defense!

As Patterson’s letter states, “[T]here is likely no other company in the world today that has recently devoted as many corporate resources to anticorruption compliance than Siemens. [...] On the flip side, there is likely no other company in the world that facts as many negative reputational consequences should its compliance efforts fail …”. [Attribution in the letter would have been appropriate, here is what I said in an October 10, 2011 post titled "Siemens and an FCPA Compliance" - "[T]here is likely no other company in the world today that has devoted as many corporate resources, with the assistance of industry experts, to compliance than Siemens. On the flip side, there is likely no other company in the world today that faces as many negative consequences should its compliance efforts fail than Siemens.”]

The letter also states as follows. “In October 2010, ironically the same month the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report praising enforcement of the FCPA, the Chamber released ‘Restoring Balance” a brief criticizing ‘an active FCPA enforcement environment.” As noted in this prior post, while the OECD loudly praised the U.S. for its “high level” of enforcement, the OECD actually criticized and questioned many of the policies and enforcement theories which yield the “high level” of enforcement.

On-Target

The FCPA Blog (here) recently highlighted a 2008 transcript from the Albert Stanley case. In it, Judge Keith Ellison (S.D. Tex.) stated as follows in an exchange with a DOJ attorney: “I know it’s a growth industry, isn’t it, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? It’s keeping a lot of white collar lawyers busy; is that fair?”

Also on the FCPA Blog, Jan Handzlik (counsel to Lindsey Manufacturing and Keith Lindsey – see here for the prior post discussing Judge Matz’s order vacating the convictions and dismissing the indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct ) commented (here) on the O’Shea acquittal this week and stated as follows. “It’s much more challenging for the government when defendants persist in asserting their innocence.”

Nathan Vardi writes for Forbes. Among his prior works is “The Bribery Racket” (here) a piece that certainly got people talking. In this new piece titled “The FCPA Fiasco: Pressure Tactics In Corruption Cases Backfiring,” Vardi states as follows. “[T]he last decade the federal government has greatly increased its FCPA enforcement, threatening to bring an indictment against any company that does not cooperate and act harshly if companies don’t voluntarily report any potential sins. This game has been cheered on by lawyers and accountants, even journalists, who benefitted immensely from the expensive internal investigations companies initiate to deal with this new reality.” [...] But you can’t have 150 FCPA investigations and dozens of companies essentially admitting to corrupting behavior, resulting in billions of dollars of fines, penalties, and legal and accounting fees, without eventually holding individuals accountable for the alleged violation of U.S. law. And those individuals have much stronger incentives to fight those charges in court, especially now with evidence mounting that the government’s legal argument in many FCPA cases is weak and flawed.”

Finally, in this piece, Miller & Chevalier attorneys Kathryn Atkinson, James Tillen, and Marc Bohn had this to say after noting several recent DOJ FCPA setbacks. “We are also optimistic that the events of 2011 may lead to a healthier level of engagement on substantive issues in the context of settlement-heavy FCPA enforcement. In recent years, not only have most matters been settled, but some have settled with little debate over (or public discussion of) the application of the statutory elements to the facts. In an adversarial system, however, these debates are essential. Each side must be prepared to challenge the other’s view of the facts, and their relevance under the law, and to have its own view challenged as well. When this system breaks down, the substantive dialogue is lost. It is likely the shortage of this substantive dialogue, more than actual ambiguity in the statute itself, that has given rise to recent discussions at conferences, in the media and online, and in Congress expressing frustrations about a lack of clarity in FCPA enforcement. A vigorous exploration of substantive issues in the context of our adversarial system should provide some relief from these frustrations and lead us to more effective and efficient prevention and deterrence.”

I wrote about many of the same issues in 2010 in ”The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” (see here).

*****

A good weekend to all.

The Siemens Argentina Individual Enforcement Actions Are A Step Forward, But Issues Remain

Monday, December 19th, 2011

Last week (see here for the prior post) the DOJ and SEC brought FCPA enforcement actions against several former executives and agents of Siemens. As noted in this initial post, the enforcement action comes nearly three years after the Siemens corporate enforcement action, a portion of which concerned improper conduct in Argentina and allegations that Siemens S.A. (Argentina), and those acting on its behalf, engaged in a bribery scheme in connection with an Argentine government contract to produce national identity cards.

The Siemens Argentina individual enforcement actions were brought after the DOJ faced scrutiny for not bringing any individual enforcement action in connection with a bribery scheme “unprecedented in scale and geographic reach” in which there existed at Siemens a “corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company.”

Thus, the Siemens Argentina individual enforcement actions with allegations (and that is all they are at this point) of individual improper conduct are a welcome development and the DOJ ought to be recognized for bringing what will likely be a difficult case to prosecute. Among other things, extradition issues loom, and many of the defendants are likely to aggressively mount a defense.

While a welcome development, two facts remain unchanged by last week’s development.

First, Siemens itself was never charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations for the same conduct its former employees and agents are now facing FCPA anti-bribery charges. The reason is that FCPA anti-bribery charges would have hurt Siemens too much. In its sentencing memorandum (here), the DOJ in explaining its charging decisions specifically stated as follows. “The Department’s analysis of collateral consequences included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.” As noted last week in a Wall Street Journal article by Vanessa Fuhrmans “Shrugging Off Bribery Case, Siemens Gains Favor in the U.S.” (here), “three years after Siemens AG reached a record foreign-bribery settlement with U.S. authorities, the German industrial conglomerate is capitalizing on business from an unexpected place—the U.S. government.” Among things, the article notes that “Siemens today isn’t just benefitting from its ongoing business with the government. It’s made capturing more business and influence in Washington a central part of its U.S. strategy.”

In short, the notion that certain companies selling certain products to certain customers are essentially immune from FCPA anti-bribery scrutiny remains a troubling issue, notwithstanding last week’s development.

[Incidentally, under the FCPA's former so-called Eckhardt amendment, the lack of FCPA anti-bribery charges against Siemens would have precluded the FCPA anti-bribery charges the individuals now face. See U.S. v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[B]oth the language of the Act and its legislative history reveal a clear intent to impose criminal sanctions against the employee who acts at the behest of and for the benefit of his employer only where his employer has been convicted of similar FCPA violations. [...] We hold that in order to convict an employee under the FCPA for acts committed for the benefit of his employer, the government must first convict the employer.”]

Second, even with last week’s development, the fact remains that the DOJ and SEC have addressed - through individual enforcement actions - only a sliver of the conduct at issue in the 2008 enforcement action. As alleged by the enforcement agencies, the corruption at Siemens involved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. As alleged (see here) “among the transactions on which Siemens paid bribes were those to design and build metro transit lines in Venezuela; metro trains and signaling devices in China; power plants in Israel; high voltage transmission lines in China; mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh; telecommunications projects in Nigeria; national identity cards in Argentina; medical devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia; traffic control systems in Russia; refineries in Mexico; and mobile communications networks in Vietnam.”

Some individual or individuals presumably paid or authorized these numerous non-Argentina bribes. If last week’s development is the only individual enforcement actions resulting from the 2008 Siemens enforcement action, continued scrutiny and asking of the why questions is warranted.

What other egregious corporate FCPA enforcement action might yield future individual enforcement actions? Based on the DOJ’s allegations, Daimler would seem like a good bet. See here for the prior post.

In Depth On The Siemens Argentina Enforcement Action

Wednesday, December 14th, 2011

Yesterday’s post (here) covered the DOJ indictment and SEC civil complaint against former Siemens’ executives and agents. This post provides a more in-depth analysis of the allegations. Every enforcement action needs a name, so let’s call this large case the Siemens Argentina Enforcement Action, recognizing that Siemens itself resolved its exposure for the conduct described below in 2008 and is not a part of the current matter.

DOJ Indictment

As noted in the previous post, the DOJ indictment (here) charges the following individuals. Uriel Sharef, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer, Eberhard Reichert, Carlos Sergi and Miguel Czysch.

The below defendants are described as “officers, directors, employees and agents” of an “issuer” (Siemens AG).

According to the indictment, Sharef (a dual citizen of Israel and Germany) was employed by Siemens from 1978 to December 31, 2007. The indictment alleges that from 2000 until his departure from Siemens, Sharef was a member of Siemens AG’s Managing Board and Corporate Executive Committee (“CEC”), with oversight responsibilities for Siemens AG’s power operations group, including Siemens Power Transmission and Distribution (“Siemens PTD”), and Siemens AG’s operations in the Americas region, including Siemens Argentina.

According to the indictment, Steffen (a German citizen) was a long-time Siemens employee who left the company in 2003. The indictment alleges that Steffen, at various times, was: group president of Siemens AG’s transportation systems operating division; group president of Siemens PTD; CEO of Siemens Argentina; and chairman of the Supervisory Board of Siemens Argentina.

According to the indictment, Truppel (a dual citizen of Germany and Argentina) was employed by Siemens until 2002 when he then became a consultant to Siemens until 2004. The indictment alleges that until his “shift to consultant status” Truppel was CFO of Siemens Argentina.

According to the indictment, Bock (a German citizen) was a long-time employee of Siemens until 2001 when he then became a paid consultant to Siemens until 2007. While a Siemens employee, Bock was commercial head of Siemens Business Services (“SBS” – a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens AG and a unit in Siemens information and communications operating group).

According to the indictment, Reichert (a German citizen) was a long-time Siemens employee until 2001. He was the technical head of SBS’s Major Projects subdivision.

According to the indictment, Signer (a German citizen) was a long-time Siemens employee until 2011. The indictment alleges that from 2000 to 2007, Signer worked for SBS as a commercial director in various capacities.

The below defendants are described as “agents” of Siemens AG who served as “intermediaries between Siemens and officials of the Government of Argentina” – the so-called “Intermediary Defendants.”

According to the indictment, Sergi (a citizen of Argentina) “was a prominent businessman in Latin America with extensive high-level government contacts in Argentina.” The indictment states that Sergi was for a 15 year period ending in 2003 a member of the Supervisory Board of Siemens Argentina along with Sharef.

According to the indictment, Czysch (a German citizen and resident of Switzerland) was a business associate of Sergi.

For both set of defendants, the indictment invokes 78dd-1 of the FCPA. The jurisdictional hook under 78dd-1 for non-U.S. “issuers” is “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” in furtherance of a bribery scheme. As described below, the indictment alleges certain conduct in the U.S. as well as wire transfers of money through U.S. bank accounts in furtherance of the bribery scheme.

The indictment also refers to six unindicted co-conspirators (two individuals described an attorneys in Argentina and former senior officials in the Argentine Ministry of Justice; a former CEO of Siemens Argentina; a former deputy general counsel in the Legal Services office at Siemens AG headquarters; a business partner of Sergi; and a business partner of Czysch).

Under the heading “Overview of the Conspiracy” the indictment alleges as follows. “In or about August 1994, the Government of Argentina issued a tender for bids to replace an existing system of manually created national identity booklets with state-of-the-art national identity cards” – the so-called DNI (Documento Nacional de Identidad) project. According to the indictment, the “total estimated value of the DNI project was approximately $1 billion.” In 1998, the President of Argentina issued a decree awarding the DNI project to Siemens IT Services S.A. (“SITS”), a special-purpose subsidiary created by SBS for the purpose of bidding on the DNI project. According to the indictment, from 1996 to 2009, the defendants and others “engaged in a conspiracy on behalf of Siemens to obtain the lucrative proceeds of the DNI project, and to foster future business, by means of bribery, fraud, and other forms of corruption.”

The indictment specifically alleges as follows. “Members of the conspiracy won the DNI project for Siemens by bribing Argentine government officials. They paid more bribes in the hope of reviving the project when, in or about 2001, the DNI project was stalled. Ultimately [...] the DNI project was terminated altogether. Even after this point, members of the conspiracy continued to pursue the profits that Siemens had expected to gain from the project. They did so through additional bribes and corrupt conduct, including the pursuit of a fraudulent arbitration in Washington, D.C. against the Argentine government, demanding nearly $500 million while actively hiding the corruption from the tribunal.”

According to the indictment, “some of conspirators were employed by Siemens as executives, lawyers, and managers working on DNI project matters; others served as agents and conduits for the payment of bribes to Argentine government officials who were in a position to influence the direction of the DNI project.” The indictment alleges as follows. “Integral to the conspiracy, and to the concealment of the illegal objects of the conspiracy, was the conspirators’ use of at least 17 conduit entities (collectively, the ‘Conduit Entities’) controlled or otherwise affiliated with the Intermediary Defendants and with various Argentine government officials and candidates for office who were the recipients or intended recipients of bribe payments (the ‘Argentine Officials’).

The conduct alleged in the indictment starts with “initial bribe commitments and payments.” The indictment alleges that various co-conspirators “committed Siemens to paying nearly $100 million in bribes to sitting officials of the Argentine government, members of the opposition party, and candidates for office who were likely to come to power during the performance of the project.” According to the indictment, many of these payments were made pursuant to “black contracts, that is unwritten contracts” with third-parties who later sought reimbursement from Siemens.

Argentine officials described in the indictment are “Argentine Official A” (a senior official in the Office of the President and thereafter a candidate for office and member of the Argentine Congress), “Argentine Official B” (a senior official in the Ministry of Interior and thereafter a member of the Argentine Congress); and “Argentine Official C” (a senior official in the Ministry of Migration and the Office of Internal Security and thereafter a member of the Argentine Congress). The indictment alleges that certain defendants “caused SBS to transfer two wires in the aggregate amount of approximately $7.4 million to a bank account in Manhattan, New York” in furtherance of the bribe scheme.

The indictment next alleges that in 1999 “with work on the DNI project underway, the Government of Argentina suspended the project, as the country faced a mounting economic crisis and a presidential election” and that a “new administration, which came to power [...] maintained the suspended status of the DNI project.” The indictment alleges that Sharef and Steffen “led a campaign on Siemens’s part to restart the DNI project” and that “renegotiation of the contract governing the DNI project was a part of the campaign.” The indictment charges that various defendants “lobbied Argentine government officials” and that Sharef met with a “Argentine Official D” (a senior official in the office of the Argentine President). According to the indictment, “the meeting engendered optimism at Siemens that the President of Argentina would soon issue a decree authorizing the resumption of the DNI project” and that “continuing the payment of bribes was part of the conspirators’ effort to revive the DNI project.”

According to the indictment, the conspirators committed to pay additional bribes to Argentine Officials A, B, C, D, as well as “Argentine Official E” (a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior and thereafter a member of Congress), “Argentine Official F” (a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior and thereafter a candidate for office in the Argentine Congress), and “Argentine Official G” (a senior official in the Ministry of Interior). According to the indictment, conspirators “agreed to funnel payments on all existing and new bribe obligations through the Intermediary Defendants” and “also agreed to conceal the bribe payments under a ‘white contract’ – that is, a contract that appeared legitimate on its face, but which did not reflect an actual transaction of business.”

The indictment next alleges that in 2001 “the anticipated decree authorizing the resumption of the DNI project still was not issued.” According to the indictment, “the Argentine government was instead conducting an assessment of the merits of continuing the DNI project through a body” called the General Accounting Agency of the Nation (“SIGEN”) and that “in a further effort to prevent termination of the DNI project, members of the conspiracy determined to influence SIGEN’s assessment in Siemens’s favor by bribing a SIGEN board member (“Argentine Official H”).

According to the indictment, “despite Siemens’s efforts and bribe payments intended for various foreign officials, the Government of Argentina officially terminated the DNI project” in 2001. Nevertheless, the indictment alleges that certain defendants and conspirators assembled a Crisis Management Team (“CMT”) continued a bribe scheme to “(i) ensure that Siemens recognized the economic benefits of the contract for the DNI project, notwithstanding its termination and the corrupt manner by which it had been procured, (ii) prevent public disclosure of the bribery associated with the DNI project, and (iii) ensure Siemens’s ability to secure future government contracts in Argentina and elsewhere in the region.” According to the indictment “the conspirators sought to achieve these related goals by paying down outstanding bribe obligations to Argentine Officials through a complex series of transactions, paying down bribe obligations through a sham arbitration in Switzerland, and seeking to recoup the anticipated financial benefits of the DNI project through a fraudulent arbitration in Washington D.C.”

Specifically, the indictment charges that certain defendants met with Sergi and Czysch in Miami, Florida to “re-negotiate the amount of outstanding bribe commitments to the Argentine Officials.” The indictment further alleges certain “wire transfer instructions for payment through a bank account in Manhattan, New York” and payments through a New York-based account. The indictment further alleges that one of the Conduit Entities had Miami, Florida addresses. The indictment further alleges that certain defendants also met in Manhattan, New York “to discuss the outstanding bribe obligations.”

Thereafter, the indictment alleges that Sergi (the prominent businessman in Latin America with extensive high-level government contracts in Argentina who served as an agent of Siemens AG) filed a formal claim against SBS in a Swiss arbitral tribunal in 2005 to recover under a sham contract used to make certain bribe payments. The indictment states that “although the members of the conspiracy knew that none of the services described in the contract were performed and were not expected to be performed, and that the contract was a sham used to disguise illegal bribe obligations, none of the conspirators acknowledged as much before the Swiss tribunal.” According to the indictment, SBS settled the claim for approximately $8.8 million, but that the “settlement was actually a mechanism to disguise a partial payment of bribe obligations to the Argentine Officials.” According to the indictment, certain of the settlement money passed through bank accounts in Manhattan, New York.

As to the Washington D.C. arbitration, the indictment alleges that certain of the defendants and co-conspirators “orchestrated the filing of a fraudulent arbitration claim in Washington D.C. in 2002 to cause the Argentine government to pay Siemens AG damages in an amount equivalent to incurred expenses and the total profits the company would have earned from the DNI project had it not been terminated.” According to the indictment, “exposure of the bribery associated with the DNI project would have likely rendered the arbitration claim futile because the contract would have been procured through illegal corruption.” The indictment alleges that certain defendants and co-conspirators “successfully kept evidence of bribery out of the arbitration in Washington D.C.” by filing witness statements containing “material misrepresentations and omissions relating to the DNI’s project origins, among other matters.” According to the indictment, despite later claims by Argentina that the DNI project bidding was corrupted – claims Siemens denied, the arbitral tribunal sided with Siemens AG and on February 2007 it awarded Siemens AG approximately $218 million in loss of investment, plus interest. However, the factual portion of the indictment ends with the following statement – in August 2009 “Siemens AG personnel who were not members of the conspiracy caused the company to waive its right to the award.”

Based on the above conduct, the indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records and internal control provisions; conspiracy to commit wire fraud; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and substantive wire fraud.

SEC Complaint

The SEC’s complaint (here) is based on the same core conduct alleged above. Reichert and Czysch are not named as defendants in the SEC action, but the SEC complaint includes as a defendant Bernd Regendantz (the CFO of SBS who allegedly authorized certain bribe payments). Each of the SEC defendants are charged with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; aiding and abetting Siemens’ FCPA violations – both anti-bribery violations and books and records and internal controls; and violating other securities laws by falsifying documents, including invoices and sham consulting contracts in furtherance of the bribery scheme.

According to the SEC, “over the course of the bribery scheme, Siemens paid an estimated total of over $100 million in bribes, approximately $31.3 million of which were made after [...] Siemens became subject to the U.S. securities laws.”

In addition, Regendantz is charged with violating Rule 13b2-2 by signing false internal certifications pursuant to SOX. As to Regendatz, the SEC complaint alleges that he “had no prior dealings with the DNI contract” when he became CFO of SBS in 2002 and that he had resisted other defendants pressure to authorize additional bribe payments. According to the complaint, “Regendantz sought guidance from Siemens’ Head of Compliance, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Executive Officer, and two members of the Managing Board.” The complaint alleges that “in each instance, Regendantz explained that the payment demands lacked any legitimate commercial basis and that he was reluctant to authorize them.” The complaint then states as follows. “In each instance, Regendantz explained that the payment demands lacked any legitimate commercial basis and that he was reluctant to authorize them. In each instance, Regendantz’s superiors gave every indication that they were familiar with the DNI Contract and with the nature of the payment demands. And in each instance, his superiors told Regendantz that it was his responsibility to find a solution to the problem. Regendantz understood these responses from his superiors to be an instruction that he authorize the bribe payments.”

The SEC’s release noted that Regendantz settled the SEC charges without admitting or denying the allegations and consented to entry of a final judgment that enjoins him from future violations. The release states that Regendantz previously paid a $40,000 administrative fine ordered by the Munich prosecutor.