Archive for the ‘Related Civil Litigation’ Category

An FCPA Enforcement Action With Many Interesting Wrinkles

Wednesday, August 27th, 2014

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding "old" FCPA enforcement actions]

The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Saybolt Inc., Saybolt North America Inc. and related individuals had many interesting wrinkles:  a unique origin; a rare FCPA trial; a fugitive still living openly in his native land; and case law in a related civil claim.

As to the unique origin, Saybolt Inc. was a U.S. company whose primary business was conducting quantitative and qualitative testing of bulk commodities, such as oil, gasoline, and other petrochemicals, as well as grains, vegetable oils and other commodities.  The Environmental Protection Agency, Criminal Investigation Division (“EPA-CID”) was investigating the company for allegedly submitting false statements to the EPA about the oxygen content of reformulated gasoline blended in accordance with the requirements of the Clean Air Act.  The investigation was initiated by reports of data falsification at Saybolt’s Massachusetts facility.

During the course of the investigation EPA-CID interviewed Steven Dunlop (the general manager for Latin American operations for Saybolt) who provided the following information.

During a trip to Panama in 1994, Dunlop was advised of new business opportunities that were being offered to Saybolt Panama through the Panamanian Ministry of Commerce and Industries.  Specifically, the DOJ’s criminal complaint alleged that Hugo Tovar (the General Director of the Hydrocarbon Directorate, a division of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries) and Audo Escudero (the Sub-Director of the Hydrocarbon Directorate), offered to Saybolt Panama an opportunity to: (1) receive a substantial reduction in Saybolt Panama’s tax payments to the government of Panama; (2) obtain lucrative new contracts from the government of Panama; and (3) secure a more permanent facility for Saybolt Panama’s operations on highly coveted land near the Panama Canal.  According to the criminal complaint, this parcel of land was coveted because Saybolt Panama “only had a tenuous legal claim on its existing facility” and as a result its operations were continually at risk.

The complaint details various communications between Dunlop and David Mead (the President and CEO of Saybolt) in which Dunlop informed Mead of a $50,000 “fee” that would be needed to accomplish the above opportunities.

The complaint details a 1995 board of directors meeting at Saybolt during which discussion concerned the “$50,000 payoff demanded by the Panamanian officials with whom Saybolt was negotiating.  According to the complaint, present at this meeting were Board members Frerik Pluimers and Philippe Schreiber as well as Mead and Saybolt’s Chief Financial Officer Robert Petoia.  According to the complaint, Dunlop received instructions from Mead that he was to “take the necessary steps to ensure that the $50,000 was paid to the Panamanian officials in order to secure the deal” and that Schreiber was to be his primary contact on all issues concerning the Panamanian transaction.

According to the complaint, “in the minutes leading up to the time he was scheduled to leave his house for the airport” to travel to Panama,” Dunlop had a telephone conversation with Schreiber who advised him “that the action [he] was about to take would constitute a violation of the FCPA.”

According to the complaint, while in Panama Dunlop “learned that the Saybolt funds needed to make” the payment had not yet been received and that Dunlop then tried to contact Mead.  According to the complaint, Mead sent Dunlop an e-mail which stated: “Per telecon undersigned and capo grande Holanda the back-up software can be supplied from the Netherlands.  As previously agreed, you to detail directly to NL attn FP.” According to the complaint, “capo grande Holanda” was a reference to Pluimers (the President of the Dutch holding company that controlled Saybolt, Inc.” and the “back-up software” was a reference to the $50,000 payment.”

The complaint alleged that the funds never arrived in Panama and that Dunlop was receiving pressure from the Panamanian officials “to make the $50,000 payment prior to the upcoming Christmas holidays.”  According to the complaint, Mead told Dunlop on a telephone call to make the $50,000 payment using funds that were in the operating account of Saybolt Panama.

According to the complaint, the $50,000 in cash was obtained by laundering a check through a local construction company and that a “sack full of currency” was handed over to Escudero at a bar in Panama City by the individual who was serving as Saybolt Panama’s liaison with Escudero.  Further, according to the complaint, “shortly after this payment was made, the Ministry of Commerce and Industries and other necessary government agencies acted favorably on Saybolt’s proposal.”

In April 1998, the DOJ filed this indictment against Mead (a citizen of the U.K. and resident of the U.S. and Pluimers (a national and resident of the Netherlands) based on the above conduct.  The indictment charged Mead and Pluimers with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and the Travel Act, two substantive violations of the FCPA, and two substantive violations of the Travel Act.

According to the indictment, the purposes and objectives of the conspiracy were:

  • To obtain contracts for Saybolt de Panama and its affiliates to perform import control and inventory inspections for the Ministry of Hydrocarbons, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, both departments of the Government of the Republic of Panama;
  • To obtain and to expedite tax benefits for Saybolt de Panama and its affiliates from the Government of the Republic of Panama, including exemptions from import taxes on materials and equipment and reductions in annual profit taxes;
  • To obtain from an agency of the Government of the Republic of Panama a secure and commercially attractive operating location for an inspection facility in Panama; and
  • To “lock out” Saybolt’s competitors by retaining possession and control of Saybolt de Panama’s existing location in Panama.

In September 1998, the DOJ filed this superseding indictment substantially similar to the first and including the same charges.

Mead moved to strike the indictment of allegations that he violated the FCPA and for dismissal of the indictment for failure to state an offense under the Travel Act, and for a Bill of Particulars.   In a one page order, U.S. District Court Judge Ann Thompson denied the motions. Dunlop was given full immunity as was the American attorney present at the board meeting and involved in several conversations with Pluimers, Mead, and Dunlop concerning the alleged payments.

Mead argued that the FCPA only prohibited payments to assist a domestic concern in obtaining and retaining business” and he used Saybolt’s rather complex corporate structure to argue that the business sought to be obtained or retained was for a different Saybolt entity, not a domestic concern.  In his motion, Mead stated “because the government ignores the corporate legal structure and does violence to the FCPA by attempting to end-run congressional policy, the Court must justifiably refuse.”  Elsewhere, the motion stated:

“Whether the government labels foreign corporations as ‘agents of a domestic concern’ or members of an ‘unincorporated organization,’ the government still may not manipulate the Act’s broad language to end-run this congressional policy (of deliberately excluding both foreign subsidiaries and non-subsidiary foreign corporations from FCPA liability).”

The motion also argued that the indictment was devoid of any allegation that Mead acted “willfully” (i.e. with the specific intent to violate the law) because he followed the legal advice of counsel in making the alleged payments.

In response, the DOJ stated that the indictment “describes in detail how Mead – himself a U.S. resident, and also the President of one U.S. corporation (Saybolt Inc.), Executive Vice-President of a second U.S. corporation (Saybolt North America Inc.), and Chief Executive Officer of an unincorporated association (Saybolt Western Hemisphere) – and others decided to send a Saybolt Inc. employee to Panama City, Panama, to oversee the payment of a $50,000 bride, which they believed would be provided to high level government officials, in exchange for favorable treatment of Saybolt’s business interests in Panama.  The Indictment charges that Mead gave the order to go forward with the bribe and it details the contents of the e-mail message that Mead sent from his office in New Jersey to the Saybolt employee in Panama City.”

At trial, Mead argued that the Government failed to meet its burden of proof and that he acted in good faith belief that the payment to the Panamanian officials was lawful.  The relevant jury instructions stated as follows.

“If the evidence shows you that the defendant actually believed that the transaction was legal, he cannot be convicted.  Nor can he be convicted for being stupid or negligent or mistaken.  More is required than that.  But a defendant’s knowledge of a fact may be inferred from “willful blindness” to the knowledge or information indicating there was a high probability that there was something forbidden or illegal about the contemplated transaction and payment.  It is the jury’s function to determine whether or not the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to the inferences and the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence here.”

According to this docket sheet, Mead’s trial occurred in October 1998 and he was found guilty of all charges.  According to the docket, Mead was sentenced to four months imprisonment, to be followed by four months of home confinement, to be followed by three years of supervised release.  According to the docket, he was also ordered to pay a $20,000 criminal fine. After sentencing, US Attorney Donald Stern of Boston, stated: ”This sentence puts American executives on notice there will be a price to pay, far more than the monetary cost of the birbe, when they buy off foreign officials.”  For additional reading on Mead’s case, see this transcript of an in-depth CNN story about Mead that aired in 1999.

What about Pluimers?

As indicated by this docket sheet, there has been no substantive activity in the case since 1999 and Pluimers remains a fugitive – albeit living openly in his native Netherlands.  According to this 2011 New York Times article citing a Wikileaks cable, “Pluimers simply has too much influence with high-ranking Dutch officials to be handed over to U.S. authorities.”

What about Saybolt?

In August 1998, the DOJ the filed two separate criminal informations against Saybolt Inc. and its parent corporation Saybolt North American Inc. The first information charged Saybolt with conspiracy and wire fraud related to the company’s “two year conspiracy to submit false statements to the EPA about results of lab analyses. The second information charged Saybolt and Saybolt North America with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one substantive charge of violating the FCPA.

As noted in this plea agreement, Saybolt agreed to plead guilty to all charges in the informations and agreed to pay a total fine of $4.9 million allocated as follows:  $3.4 million for the data falsification violations and $1.5 million for the FCPA violation. Saybolt also agreed to a five year term of probation.

The conduct at issue in the Saybolt and related enforcement actions also spawned a related civil malpractice action alleging erroneous legal advice by counsel regarding the above-described payments to Panamanian officials.  In Stichting v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit analyzed whether a company, in pleading guilty to FCPA anti-bribery violations, acknowledged acting with intent thus undermining its claims that the erroneous legal advice was the basis for its legal exposure.

The court stated:

“Knowledge by a defendant that it is violating the FCPA – that it is committing all the elements of an FCPA violation – is not itself an element of the FCPA crime.  Federal statutes in which the defendant’s knowledge that he or she is violating the statute is an element of the violation are rare; the FCPA is plainly not such a statute.”

The court also stated concerning “corruptly” in the FCPA:

“It signifies, in addition to the element of ‘general intent’ present in most criminal statutes, a bad or wrongful purpose and an intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official position.  But there is nothing in that word or anything else in the FCPA that indicates that the government must establish that the defendant in fact knew that his conduct violated the FCPA to be guilty of such a violation.”

Wal-Mart Delaware Action – Much To Do About Little

Monday, July 28th, 2014

There are certain topics in the FCPA space that are over-hyped.

The document request dispute in connection with a Wal-Mart derivative action is certainly one example.

By way of background, in the aftermath of Wal-Mart’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act scrutiny, shareholders (as is fairly typical in instances of FCPA scrutiny) filed derivative actions against the company and various current or former officers and directors alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties.  Derivative actions are subject to specific pleading rules and in connection with its filed complaint the Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund (“Plaintiff”) made certain demands on Wal-Mart under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.  Titled ”Inspection of Books and Records,,” Section 220 governs a stockholder’s right to inspect certain corporate books and records.

In response to Plaintiff’s Section 220 Demand, Wal-Mart agreed to make certain documents available, but declined to provide documents that it determined were not necessary and essential to the stated purposes in the Demand or that were protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.  To resolve the disputed document request issues, the Delaware Court of Chancery (a trial court) ordered Wal-Mart to produce certain additional documents.

Wal-Mart disagreed with the Court of Chancery’s order and filed an appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court arguing that the trial court erred in ordering Wal-Mart to produce documents that far exceeded the proper scope of Section 220 requests.

Despite the rather pedestrian nature of the document request dispute, some saw (or perhaps were hoping to see) monumental issues.

This FCPA Blog post sought to explain “why the issues before the Delaware Supreme Court are important to all compliance officers and corporate stakeholders, and how the outcome could influence compliance programs globally for decades to come.” Why was the Wal-Mart dispute, according to the FCPA Blog commentator, so important?

“Because at the heart of the appeal is the question of what misconduct by directors so taints them that shareholders are allowed to proceed with a civil complaint. When can directors be absolved from directing an internal FCPA investigation? And when can they ignore red flags of overseas misconduct and conduct business as usual?”

As highlighted below, none of these issues were on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.

Further, this FCPA Blog post stated that Wal-Mart’s appeal “could be the right forum for landmark changes to guide executives, directors, and compliance professionals for decades” and the commentator was hoping for the Delaware Supreme Court to “seize the opportunity to paint on the largest canvas possible, to illuminate new roles for those we’ve put in charge of compliance.”

As highlighted below, this did not happen either.

Hype aside, as framed by the Delaware Supreme Court in its decision, ”the sole issue presented for judicial determination was whether Wal-Mart produced all of the documents that were responsive to [Plaintiff's] Demand.”  Under the “necessary and essential” test applicable to Section 220 proceedings, and reviewing the Court of Chancery’s order under the abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court determined that all issues on appeal (both issues raised by Wal-Mart as well as Plaintiffs) were without merit and therefore affirmed the Court of Chancery order.

Specifically, as to the Plaintiff’s demand for officer-level documents, the court concluded that “officer-level documents are necessary and essential to determining whether and to what extent mismanagement occurred and what information was transmitted to Wal-Mart’s directors and officers.”

In its decision, the Supreme Court also addressed certain pedestrian issues such as the relevant dates of production, disaster recovery tapes for two document custodians, and the precision and specificity of certain document requests.

The Delaware Supreme Court also addressed an issue on appeal not presented to the Court of Chancery concerning the so-called Garner doctrine (a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in which stockholders are allowed to invade the corporation’s attorney-client privilege in order to prove fiduciary breaches by those in control of the corporation upon showing good cause).

In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged its previous dicta statements in which it endorsed the Garner doctrine in a Section 220 proceeding and agreed with previous Court of Chancery decisions applying the Garner doctrine in a Section 220 proceeding.

Applying the Garner doctrine to the Plaintiffs’ Section 220 demand, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that the Plaintiffs established good cause to order the privileged documents be produced because the Plaintiffs “had demonstrated a colorable claim against Wal-Mart” and that the information sought was not available via other means.  In short, the Supreme Court stated:

“The record supports the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the documentary information sought in the Demand should be produced by Wal-Mart pursuant to the Garner fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.”

The Supreme Court further found that the Court of Chancery properly ruled that Plaintiffs’ demands for certain work-product documents were legitimate under a relevant Court of Chancery rule because the relevant Garner factors overlapped with the required showings necessary under the rule.

In short, the issues presented to the Delaware Supreme Court, and the Court’s decision, merely concerned document issues relevant to pre-trial pleading requirements in a derivative action – hardly the momentous issues some had reported or predicted.

Moreover, although the Delaware Supreme Court appeal was viewed as Wal-Mart’s appeal, as a matter of fact, the Plaintiff also filed cross-appeals which the Supreme Court also deemed to be without merit.  The Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs request that Wal-Mart should collect documents from additional custodians and also denied the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Court of Chancery’s order requiring it to return to Wal-Mart certain privileged documents that were delivered to its counsel by an anonymous source.

For oral argument of the Delaware Supreme Court hearing, see here.

Stemming Shareholder Litigation – Including In The FCPA Context – Through A Bylaw Provision

Tuesday, May 27th, 2014

In this era of FCPA enforcement plaintiffs’ lawyers representing shareholders often target directors and executive officers of companies subject to FCPA scrutiny with civil suits alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty or securities fraud. Indeed, as noted in this Forbes column “plaintiff lawyers have joined the bribery racket.”

Numerous previous posts (see here for instance) have highlighted how, within days of FCPA scrutiny or an enforcement action, plaintiffs’ firms launch so-called “investigations” and FCPA-related civil suits begin to pour in.

When a company’s FCPA violations are the result of board of director or executive officer conduct, or the condoning or encouraging of such conduct by those with fiduciary duties, such civil suits or investigations would seem to be warranted and in the public interest.  While there have been a few such FCPA enforcement actions (Siemens and BizJet come to mind), in the vast majority of FCPA enforcement actions the enforcement agencies do not allege any knowledge, participation or acquiescence in the conduct at issue by the board of directors or executive officers.

Given the frequency in which shareholder litigation follows an FCPA enforcement action or instance of FCPA scrutiny, and given the largely unsuccessful track record of such cases surviving the motion to dismiss stage, the question ought to be asked – does the majority of shareholder litigation in the FCPA context serve a purpose or are such actions merely parasitic attempts to feed-off of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement in this new era?

Indeed, as highlighted in this previous post, FCPA-related civil litigation was identified as a area of litigation abuse in House testimony.  Among other things, it was noted:

“[Shareholder class actions]serve no purpose but to take money from current shareholders and transfer it to former (or other) shareholders – with a hefty slice cut out for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.”

“Derivative shareholder suits are equally problematic in this arena. These suits tend to target senior officers and directors, not the employees who actually paid any bribes or condoned others paying them. The reason is simple enough: directors and officers are backed by the deep pockets of the company’s D&O insurer; culpable employees have little money to pay in private civil damages, especially if they themselves have been the target of an individual enforcement proceeding.”

As with many things in this new era of FCPA enforcement, FCPA related shareholder litigation seems to have spiraled out of control and FCPA practitioners rightly observed:

“Setbacks in court do not appear to have slowed the pace of new cases filed against corporations and their directors after FCPA disclosures. As the DOJ and SEC bring more cases, and as more companies voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations, the trend of related civil litigation is likely to continue. In attempting to satisfy the expectations of the DOJ and SEC, a company’s thorough internal investigation may also serve as the roadmap for a civil litigant. Companies negotiating with the DOJ and SEC must therefore balance the government’s requests for the results of internal investigations with the risk of waiver of privilege and subsequent production to civil litigants. As a result of these practical considerations, reputational risk, and expenses involved in litigation, companies targeted by civil suits will feel pressure to settle, potentially even before the DOJ or SEC takes action.”

The above is all necessary background in highlighting an important decision from the Delaware Supreme Court.  In this recent decision, the court addressed the validity of a fee-shifting provision (which shifted attorneys’ fees and costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation) in a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaws.

Although the court’s opinion arose in the context of a non-stock corporation, the decision discussed the validity of such a bylaw provision under Delaware General Corporate Law – the law of choice for many corporations.

The Delaware Supreme Court stated:

“Under Delaware law, a corporation’s bylaws are “presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the bylaws.” To be facially valid, a bylaw must be authorized by the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), consistent with the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, and its enactment must not be otherwise prohibited.

That, under some circumstances, a bylaw might conflict with a statute, or operate unlawfully, is not a ground for finding it facially invalid.

A fee-shifting bylaw, like the one described in the first certified question, is facially valid. Neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute forbids the enactment of fee-shifting bylaws. A bylaw that allocates risk among parties in intra-corporate litigation would also appear to satisfy the DGCL’s requirement that bylaws must “relat[e] to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The corporate charter could permit fee-shifting provisions, either explicitly or implicitly by silence.  Moreover, no principle of common law prohibits directors from enacting fee-shifting bylaws.

Delaware follows the American Rule, under which parties to litigation generally must pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs. But it is settled that contracting parties may agree to modify the American Rule and obligate the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees. Because corporate bylaws are “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,” a fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation’s validly-enacted bylaw would fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule. Therefore, a fee-shifting bylaw would not be prohibited under Delaware common law.

Whether the specific … fee-shifting bylaw [at issue] is enforceable, however, depends on the manner in which it was adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. Bylaws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for an inequitable purpose. In the landmark Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries decision, for example, this Court set aside a board-adopted bylaw amendment that moved up the date of an annual stockholder meeting to a month earlier than the date originally scheduled.  The Court found that the board’s purpose in adopting the bylaw and moving the meeting was to “perpetuat[e] itself in office” and to “obstruct[] the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management.” The Schnell Court famously stated that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”

More recently, in Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, the Court of Chancery addressed bylaw amendments, enacted by a controlling shareholder, that prevented the board “from acting on any matter of significance except by unanimous vote” and “set the board’s quorum requirement at 80%,” among other changes. The Court of Chancery found, and this Court agreed, that the bylaw amendments were ineffective because they “were clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose and have an inequitable effect.” That finding was based on an extensive review of the facts surrounding the controller’s decision to amend the bylaws.

Conversely, this Court has upheld similarly restrictive bylaws that were enacted for proper purposes. In Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries, a majority stockholder amended the corporation’s bylaws by written consent in order to “limit the [] board’s anti-takeover maneuvering after [the stockholder] had gained control of the corporation.” The amended bylaws, like those invalidated in Hollinger, increased the board quorum requirement and mandated that all board actions be unanimous. The Court found that the bylaw amendments were “a permissible part of [the stockholder’s] attempt to avoid its disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder” and, thus, were “not inequitable under the circumstances.”

[...]

[W]e are able to say only that a bylaw of the type at issue here is facially valid, in the sense that it is permissible under the DGCL, and that it may be enforceable if adopted by the appropriate corporate procedures and for a proper corporate purpose.”

For additional reading on the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision, see herehere and here.

Who Did Johan Broux Sue?

Wednesday, September 11th, 2013

In all likelihood, in the mind of Johan Broux (and his lawyers at Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP) last week he sued a company and its executives in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York for securities fraud.  According to his class action complaint, the company “is one of the largest oil companies in the world” and has “American Depositary Shares (ADS) and H shares” listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 2000.  According to the complaint, the executives or former executives are:  the Chairman and President of the Company; the Chief Financial Officer of the Company; a former Chairman and acting Chief Executive Officer; and a former Chief Financial Officer.

According to the DOJ and the SEC’s FCPA unit, Broux and his lawyers last week sued the Chinese government and Chinese foreign officials for securities fraud in U.S. Court.  Obviously, the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA unit did not publicly state this, but this is the logical conclusion given the enforcement agencies Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theory that employees of alleged state-owned companies are “foreign officials” under the FCPA and thus occupy a status on par with foreign presidents, prime ministers and other heads of state.  (This interpretation is currently before the 11th Circuit – see here for the prior post).

Who did Broux sue?  PetroChina and certain of its current or former executives.

As noted in this previous post, various media recently reported that various PetroChina senior executives “are under investigation by authorities for ‘severe disciplinary violations’ and have resigned.”  The media reports noted that “while neither PetroChina nor its parent [company China National Petroleum Corp.] have released specifics of the probes, the phrase ‘severe disciplinary violations’ is typically used by Chinese officials when investigating cases of corruption.”  As noted in the prior post, the interesting thing about this of course is that PetroChina executives are – in the eyes of the enforcement agencies – “foreign officials” under the FCPA while at the same time executives of an issuer subject to the FCPA given that PetroChina’s ADRs trade on the New York Stock Exchange.

Broux’s complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.

“Defendants made false and/or misleading statement, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company’s business, operations, and financial performance.  Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Company’s senior officials were in non-compliance with the Company’s corporate governance directives and code of ethics; (2) as a result, the Company was subject to investigation and disciplinary action by various governmental and regulatory authorities; (3) the Company’s financial statements were materially false and misleading as they contained direct references to the Company’s code of ethics, and statements regarding its compliance with regulations and internal governance policies; (4) the Company lacked adequate internal and financial controls; and (5), as a result of the foregoing, the Company’s financial statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.  As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company’s securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages.”

Regardless of whether Broux sued an issuer company and its executives or the Chinese government and Chinese “foreign officials” for securities fraud, the PetroChina civil complaint once again demonstrates how FCPA-related civil suits often follow (in certain cases mere days after) instances of FCPA scrutiny.  (See here and here for prior posts).

Friday Roundup

Friday, September 6th, 2013

Interesting, hardly a smoking gun, law enforcement ought not be a competition, quotable, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Interesting

An interesting study (here) from Michael Klausner (Nancy and Charles Munger Professor of Business and Professor of Law at Stanford Law School) and Jason Hegland (Project Manager for Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics).  Using a “universe of SEC enforcement actions involving nationally listed firms for violation of disclosure-related rules—fraud, books and records and internal control rules” from 2000 to the present, the authors found, among other things, that only 7 percent of corporate SEC enforcement actions involved no individual defendants.

Such a finding stands in stark contrast to corporate SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions.  As noted in this previous post,  since 2008 approximately 80% of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.  This figure is likely to climb when I re-calculate the statistic to account for 2013 FCPA enforcement.  To date, the SEC has brought four corporate FCPA enforcement and none have resulted (at least yet) in any SEC charges against company employees.

Kudos to Klausner and Hegland for the quality of their data and using the “core” approach.  The authors state:

“We define a “case” in a specific way in order to organize the data. A case, as we use the term, is a set of one or more enforcement actions against a company and/or its executives and/or third parties such as accountants or underwriters for the same misstatement that led to a violation. Thus, if the SEC brings an action against ABC Co and one or more separate actions against ABC Co.’s executives and its outside auditor, all for a misstatement in ABC Co.’s 2012 financial statements, we consider all those separate actions as one “case.””

This is consistent with the “core” approach I use to keep my FCPA statistics.  (See here for the prior post).  The “core” approach is also what the DOJ uses (see here for the prior post).  However, many in FCPA Inc. use other creative counting methods to measure FCPA enforcement and related issues.  This is a huge quality of data issue and completely muddies the conversational waters on many FCPA issues.

Hardly a Smoking Gun

Reuters and other media outlets have carried forward Chinese state media reports as follows.  “A Chinese police investigation into drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline has discovered that alleged bribery of doctors in China was coordinated by the British company and was not the work of individual employees.”

The smoking gun?

Apparently GSK ”had set goals for annual sales growth as high as 25 percent. That rate was 7 to 8 percentage points above the average growth rate for the industry” [according to one of GSK's detained executives] and “GSK implemented salary policies based on sales volumes and such goals could not be achieved without “dubious corporate behavior.”

That is hardly a smoking gun.

Competition

At times it seems like there is a new “global arms race” to see which country can bring the most enforcement actions for the largest dollar value.  Competition is generally good, but law enforcement ought not be a competition where quantity of enforcement becomes more important than quality of enforcement.  Evidence of the former can be found in the following.

In this recent speech David Green (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) stated as follows.

“When it comes to prosecutions of corporates, the SFO’s performance is often compared unfavourably to that of US prosecutors. The key reason for this is the much higher bar that we in the SFO face in proving corporate criminal liability. Currently, in order to prove corporate liability, we have to prove that the controlling mind of the corporate was complicit in the relevant criminality.”

In other respects, Green’s speech reads like a political stump speech, not that of a high-profile law enforcement official.

This article in the South China Morning Post titled “Beijing Weighing Large Fines Against GlaxoSmithKline quotes from the China Ministry of Public Security website which states:  “We should learn from the practice of other countries in imposing astronomical fines.”

Quotable

From Jonathan Weil’s Bloomberg View column:

“In the U.S., companies hire powerful people’s children all the time for reasons beyond their obvious skill set. (Chelsea Clinton working at a hedge fund?) And they don’t just bother with the kids — they hire the powerful people themselves. (Do you think Larry Summers got a high-paying job at the hedge fund D.E. Shaw because of his skills as a trader?)

If the feds are going to target wheel-greasing in China — where it can be difficult to get business done without bribing somebody — does this mean we need a Domestic Corrupt Practices Act, too? In Colorado, JPMorgan used to employ Chris Romer as a banker. His father, Roy Romer, was the state’s governor for 12 years. Did that help Chris Romer get hired? It couldn’t have hurt. Do we need a law against this? Of course not.

There are certain facts of life that aren’t worth bringing in the FBI to check out. When rich people with teenage children give millions of dollars to elite universities, there’s a good chance they want special attention from the admissions office for their kids, if not an outright guarantee they will get in. And when owners of companies hire senators’ kids for internships, they probably would like to meet the parents someday.

Perhaps what JPMorgan did in China was worse. We don’t know yet. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The decision of whether to hire someone often has less to do with that person’s qualifications than it does with who they are. Life isn’t fair — not in the U.S. and not in China.”

Reading Stack

From Thomas Gorman (Dorsey & Whitney), “The New FCPA Guide:  A Road Map to Crafting an Effective Compliance Defense.”

A client alert from Paul Hastings, “Preparing for Shareholder Lawsuits When Dealing with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations.”

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A good weekend to all.