Archive for the ‘Jurisdiction’ Category

Other DOJ Defeats When Asserting Aggressive Enforcement Theories Against Foreign Nationals

Monday, August 31st, 2015

You be the JudgeIn the minds of some, the many recent DOJ defeats when put to its burden of proof in individual Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions are of little consequence.

Some have written off the DOJ’s struggle in the recent Sigelman action because it was the result of a key witness admitting he gave false testimony during the trial.

Others have written off the DOJ’s ultimate defeat in the enforcement action against Lindsey Manufacturing and two of its executives because it was, most directly, the result of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

To some, the DOJ’s defeat in the O’Shea enforcement action  was no big deal because it was, most directly, the result of a key witness knowing “almost nothing” in the words of the judge even though the judge admonished the DOJ that it “shouldn’t indict people on stuff you can’t prove.”

The DOJ’s defeat in the Africa Sting cases, well, where do you even begin with that one.

However, you add up these defeats of little consequence in the minds of some, and the end result is a big consequence:  the DOJ often loses when put to its burden of proof.

The most recent example occurred in a pre-trial ruling in the DOJ’s FCPA prosecution of Lawrence Hoskins. The DOJ’s defeat was not because the quality of its evidence, not because of the DOJ’s conduct in the investigation, but rather a flawed legal theory.

The same people who are likely to view the above DOJ defeats as having little consequence are also likely to view the DOJ’s pre-trial defeat in Hoskins as an anomaly.

Except that it is not.

As summarized in this post, in three prior instances federal court judges have rebuked DOJ enforcement theories in FCPA enforcement actions involving foreign national defendants.

As highlighted in this prior post, in U.S. v. Castle, both the N.D. of Texas and the 5th Circuit ruled against the DOJ as a matter of law regarding the issue of whether “foreign officials” (in the case Canadian nationals) who are excluded from prosecution under the FCPA itself, could nevertheless be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute (18 USC 371) for conspiring to violate the FCPA.  The courts held that “foreign officials”  could not be prosecuted for conspiring to violate the FCPA.  The rationale was that Congress, in passing the FCPA, only chose to punish one party to the bribe agreement and the DOJ could not therefore  ”override the Congressional intent not to prosecute foreign officials for their participation in the prohibited acts” through use of the conspiracy statute.  The court decisions were based in part on Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932), a case that also featured prominently in the recent Hoskins pre-trial ruling.

In U.S. v. Bodmer, 342 F.Supp.2d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), Judge Shira Scheindlin addressed the question “whether prior to the 1998 amendments, foreign nationals who acted as agents of domestic concerns, and who were not residents of the United States, could be criminally prosecuted under the FCPA.”  Judge Scheindlin concluded that the FCPA’s language, as it existed prior to the 1998 amendments, was ambiguous and she thus resorted to legislative history.  Judge Scheindlin further commented in dismissing the FCPA charges against Bodmer (as Swiss national) as follows.  “After consideration of the statutory language, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of the FCPA, the jurisdictional scope of the statute’s criminal penalties is still unclear.” Thus, the rule of lenity required dismissal according to Judge Scheindlin.

As highlighted in this prior post, in the Africa Sting enforcement action Judge Leon dismissed a substantive FCPA charge against Pankesh Patel (a U.K. national) based on the DOJ’s enforcement theory that Patel was subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction because he allegedly sent a DHL packing in furtherance of the bribery scheme from the U.K. to the U.S.  Although Judge Leon did not issue a formal written decision, the trial court transcript is clear that he disagreed with the DOJ’s legal theory.

Granted the DOJ’s enforcement action against Hoskins remains active, but at present the DOJ is believed to be 0-4 when asserting aggressive FCPA enforcement theories against foreign nationals.

To some, this is of little consequence.

The rule of law would disagree.

It is interesting to note that the DOJ of course asserts aggressive FCPA enforcement theories against foreign companies as well.However, no foreign company has challenged the DOJ in these enforcement actions – it is simply easier, more certain and more efficient to roll over, play dead, and agree to resolve the enforcement action.

Yet, if certain foreign companies would have challenged the DOJ, the likely result in several enforcement actions may have been DOJ defeats.

Into The FCPA’s Jurisdiction Thicket

Tuesday, April 28th, 2015

ThicketThe jurisdiction elements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are like a thicket.

It is easy to get snarled and snagged (and thus confused) as to the law’s jurisdiction elements.

Hopefully this post can clear things up a bit.

Jurisdiction under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions depends on the type of business organization or person subject to the FCPA.

 

  • As to U.S. “issuers” and “domestic concerns,” the FCPA contains both territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction.  Territorial jurisdiction refers to “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” in furtherance of an improper payment.  Nationality jurisdiction, added to the FCPA in the 1998 amendments, means that an improper payment scheme is prohibited by the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions “irrespective of whether [the U.S. person] makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance” of an improper payment.  Thus, as to U.S. “issuers” and “domestic concerns,” the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have extraterritorial jurisdiction meaning that the FCPA can be violated even if an improper payment scheme is devised and executed entirely outside of the U.S.
  • As to foreign “issuers,” the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply only to the extent there is territorial jurisdiction, in other words, “use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce” in furtherance of an improper payment scheme. (The alternative nationality jurisdiction prong added to 78dd-1 in 1998 only applies to U.S. issuers).
  • As to “persons” other than an “issuer” or “domestic concerns,” the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to the extent that, “while in the territory of the U.S.,” the person “makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or engages in “any other act in furtherance” of an improper payment scheme.

This recent post highlighted the judicial benchslapping the DOJ received in a foreign bribery case involving foreign nationals (U.S. v.  Vassilieve et al.). The prior post noted that the alleged conduct was in the same general sphere of the FCPA, but that DOJ’s indictment did not contain any U.S. jurisdictional allegations, and likely because of this, the bribery scheme was not charged as an FCPA offense.

An informed and astute reader correctly notes however that the FBI Agent Affidavit in Support of the Criminal Complaint specifically refers to “at least thirty … e-mail exchanges relevant to the bribery scheme … [that] passed through the Google server “mx.google.com” which is located in the Northern District of California.”  As stated in the affidavit, “accordingly, a significant number of e-mail communications that facilitated the commission of the crimes described herein traveled to and through the Northern District of California.”

Would such e-mail communications have provided the necessary jurisdictional hook for the DOJ to charge the foreign national defendants with FCPA anti-bribery violations?

Informed readers no doubt recall SEC v. Straub (see here for the prior post), a case of first impression concerning the jurisdictional parameters of 78dd-1 as it relates to foreign national defendants.  In Straub, a decision by the S.D. of N.Y. on a motion to dismiss (the case is still pending), the SEC alleged that the foreign national defendants were subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions because e-mails in furtherance of the bribery scheme – while sent from locations outside of the U.S. – were  routed through and/or stored on network services located within the U.S.

Judge Sullivan found the jurisdictional element of 78dd-1 (use of the “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce”) to be ambiguous and he thus consulted legislative history.  In reviewing the legislative history, Judge Sullivan concluded that the corrupt intent element of the FCPA did not apply to the jurisdictional component of the FCPA.  Accordingly, Judge Sullivan concluded that e-mails routed through and/or stored on network servers located within the U.S. are sufficient to plead the jurisdictional element of an FCPA anti-bribery violation even if the defendant did not personally know where his e-mails would be routed and/or stored.

The foreign national defendants in U.S. v. Vassilieve were not associated with an issuer (as in Straub).  Thus, to the extent the foreign national defendants could have been charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations, it would have been under the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA.

As noted above however, the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA has a more stringent jurisdictional element compared to the 78dd-1 prong relevant to foreign nationals.  The jurisdictional prong of 78dd-3 is as follows:  “while in the territory of the U.S.,” the person “makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” or engages in “any other act in furtherance” of an improper payment scheme.

The only judicial scrutiny of this prong of the FCPA occurred in the Africa Sting case during which Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) dismissed substantive FCPA charges against Pankesh Patel (a U.K. national) that were premised on him sending a DHL package in furtherance of the alleged (and manufactured) bribery scheme from the U.K. to the U.S.

As highlighted in this June 2011 post, Judge Leon benchslapped the DOJ on this jurisdictional theory.

In short, the jurisdiction elements of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions are a thicket and subtle differences exist in 78dd-1 and 78dd-3 in regards to FCPA exposure of foreign national defendants.

The DOJ Gets Benchslapped In Foreign Bribery Case

Thursday, April 23rd, 2015

Charles B.In recent FCPA year in reviews (see here for 2014 and here for 2013) topics have included judicial scrutiny of non-FCPA cases because the decisions (mostly concerning jurisdictional issues relevant to foreign actors) should cause pause as to certain Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theories against foreign actors.

The 2015 year in review is sure to include mention of U.S. v. Vassilieve et al. (a recent case highlighted here) in which U.S. District Court Judge Charles Breyer (N.D. Cal.)(pictured) delivered a major benchslap to the DOJ.

The case involved conduct in the same general sphere of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Namely, the DOJ alleged in this indictment that:

Yuri Sidorenko (a citizen of Ukraine and St. Kitts & Nevis who resided in Dubai and the Chairman of the EDAPS Consortium Advisory Counsel – a Ukrainian conglomerate of various companies that manufactured and supplied a variety of identification and security products, including passports, drivers licenses and other such products) and

Alexander Vassiliev (also a citizen of Ukraine and St. Kitts & Nevis who resided in Dubai and the Chairman of the Board of EDAPS)

provided money and other things of value to Mauricio Siciliano (an executive of the International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”),  a United Nations specialized agency, responsible for, among other things, standardizing machined-readable passports, including biometric passports) so that Siciliano would use his official position as an Executive of ICAO to benefit EDAPS’s business as well as Sidorenko and Vassiliev personally.  According to the indictment Siciliano (a Venezuelan national who primarily resided in Canada where ICAO is headquartered and had a Canadian passport) was an executive at ICAO who was specifically assigned to work in ICAO’s Machine Readable Travel Documents Programme.

Siciliano would likely be a “foreign official” under the FCPA given the “public international organization” prong of the “foreign official” element. However, as it relates to foreign nationals like Sidorenko and Vassiliev the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain the following jurisdictional element:  ”while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance” of a bribery scheme.

The DOJ’s indictment did not contain any U.S. jurisdictional allegations, and likely because of this, the bribery scheme was not charged as an FCPA offense.

Rather, the indictment alleged that the U.S. was a member of ICAO and provided support to ICAO by, among other things, annual monetary contributions.  According to the indictment, during the relevant time period, U.S. contributions to ICAO constituted approximately 25% of its annual budget.

Presumably on the basis of this allegation, the DOJ charged the defendants with: (i) conspiracy to commit honest services fraud; (ii) honest services fraud; (iii) conspiracy to solicit and to give bribes involving a federal program; (iv) soliciting bribes involving a federal program; (v) giving bribes involving a federal program; and (vi) aiding and abetting offenses.

Vassiliev and Siciliano filed similar motions to dismiss (here and here) with Vassiliev’s motion to dismiss stating in pertinent part:

“This is a most unusual indictment. It levels charges against foreign nationals and is based solely on foreign conduct. The indictment candidly states that the alleged offenses were committed in their entirety outside the United States—they were “begun and committed outside the jurisdiction” of any State or district.

All three defendants are foreign citizens and foreign residents. [...] The indictment contains no allegation that any of them committed any criminal act in the United States. In fact, the indictment contains no allegation that any of them ever entered the United States for any reason whatsoever, let alone in connection with the crime charged in the indictment. The gist of the indictment is that Vassiliev and Sidorenko sought to pay bribes and/or gratuities to Siciliano, who worked for an agency of the United Nations based in Canada, in order to influence contracts awarded by other foreign agencies. [...]

These criminal counts are fundamentally flawed. Neither statute has extraterritorial application, so the indictment fails to state an offense under United States law. Even if the statutes were found to apply extraterritorially, the alleged facts in this case fail to allege minimum contacts or sufficient nexus between the defendants and the United States, so the Due Process Clause forbids this prosecution.”

Judge Breyer granted the motion to dismiss and his comments in this transcript make for an interesting read.

“What I’m going to do is read the facts as I have gleaned them from the indictment and I’d like the Government to — if  the Government believes that I’ve misstated it, I would like you to make note.

The International Civil Aviation Organization has been a United Nations specialized agency since 1944. The United States has been a member of this agency since its formation. One of the agency’s responsibilities is standardizing machine readable passports. The standards that this agency established were used to determine which features would be utilized in passports in a variety of countries, including the United States.

The time period relevant to the indictment is 2005, 2010. And during this time, the United States made annual monetary contributions to the agencies exceeding $10,000 per year. Throughout this time period contributions from the United States constituted 25 percent of the agency’s annual budget.

Mr. Siciliano was an employee of this agency and was specifically assigned to work in the Machine Readable Travel Documents Program. Mr. Siciliano worked and resided in Canada, where the agency that we’ve just discussed is headquartered. He held a Canadian passport, but is actually a Venezuelan national.

Mr. Sidorenko and Mr. Vassiliev were chairmen of a Ukrainian conglomerate of companies that manufactured and supplied security and identity products and their consortium, how they acted, was called EDAPS. It’s called the EDAPS Consortium.

Mr. Sidorenko is a citizen of Ukraine, Switzerland and St. Kitts and Nevis. Not of the United States. But he primarily resided in Dubai during the relevant time period.

Mr. Vassiliev also resided in Dubai, but he is a citizen of Ukraine and St. Kitts and Nevis. He’s not an American citizen either.

And, of course, the company is not — I mean, the agency is not an American agency.

The indictment alleges that Mr. Sidorenko and Mr. Vassiliev provided money and other things of value to Mr. Siciliano in exchange for Mr. Siciliano using his position at this agency to benefit EDAPS, as well as Sidorenko and Vassiliev personally. That is to say, the allegation is that the — that Mr. Sidorenko and Vassiliev, Ukrainians, provided things of value to Mr. Siciliano in Canada in exchange for Mr. Siciliano using his position at a place in Canada to benefit an Ukrainian company, as well as these — Mr. Sidorenko and Mr. Vassiliev personally, these Ukrainians personally.

Mr. Siciliano sought to benefit the Ukrainian consortium by introducing and publicizing EDAPS to Government officials and entities, by arranging EDAPS to appear at the agency’s conferences, and by endorsing the Ukrainian consortium to other organizations and contacts.

The indictment also alleges that Mr. Siciliano assisted Mr. Vassiliev’s girlfriend in obtaining a visa to travel to Canada in 2007.

Around the same time Mr. Siciliano also considered arranging to obtain a visa for Mr. Sidorenko by hiring Mr. Sidorenko as a consultant for this agency.

Additionally, the three defendants arranged to have Mr. Siciliano’s son sent to Ukraine to work for Mr. Sidorenko.

During there time period, Mr. Siciliano wrote an email message to Mr. Vassiliev seeking payment of dues via wire transfer to a Swiss bank account.

A few years later, Mr. Siciliano sent an email advising Mr. Vassiliev and Mr. Sidorenko that they owed him three months payment. A few weeks after this email, Mr. Siciliano sent another email to Mr. Vassiliev referencing future projects, receiving the fruits of their marketing agreement, and inquiring about picking up his dues.

All of those activities, everything that I have said, occurred outside the United States of America between these three defendants, who, by the way, aren’t United States citizens, who never worked in the United States and whose use of the wires did not reach or pass through the United States.

[...]

[M]y first reaction in reading this indictment is that your office is to be congratulated because, apparently, you have reduced crime in the Northern District of California, and indeed in the United States of America, to such a point that you are using resources of your office to go after criminal activity that occurs in foreign countries and for that — that’s a rather interesting concept that, apparently, you thought this is a good use of assets and resources of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California.

So it occurred to me: Is this statute or statutes, the honest services statute and the bribery statute, extraterritorial? And, fortunately, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue. As recently as 2010, they have said — Justice Scalia writing the opinion for a unanimous court, I might add, said that you just look at the statute. See what Congress said. Did Congress say it should be applied extraterritorial?

And you would concede, wouldn’t you, [DOJ attorney], there is nothing in the statute that talks about extraterritorial application, is there?

DOJ: There is nothing in the text of [the charged statutes]. I would submit that the legislative history of [a relevant statute] suggests that it was meant to be applied extraterritorially.

THE COURT: But you know there are those people, like judges, who look first to the statute. There is nothing in the statute.

DOJ: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then if there is nothing in the statute, that doesn’t preclude necessarily the application of the statute extraterritorial, but we have to see whether or not that’s consistent with the general purpose of the statute.

DOJ: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And it’s your view that since the Government contributes some funds to this agency, which is involved in national security — I guess we can talk about it in open court, can’t we?

DOJ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I didn’t want to clear the Court because of this strong national security interests that apparently are at issue here. But because they give money to this agency which is engaged in activities, some of which may impact national and international security arrangements, that’s the nexus for the United States Government to apply the statute in an extraterritorial way, is that correct?

DOJ: That’s certainly one of the key –

THE COURT: That’s your first point. We’ll get to the other points, but let’s deal with this first point first.

And so it occurred to me by that logic, the United States being a very generous country, gives a lot of money to a lot of foreign countries. They give over a billion dollars to Egypt. They give vast sums of money to Mexico. They give sums of money to many, many countries all over the world.

And then I wonder by their giving some money to a foreign country, does that then give them jurisdiction to apply statutes, such as the honest services statute, to individuals who are operating in that country or outside the United States?

For example, can you prosecute — you give some money, let’s say, to Mexico and — for programs involving security in Mexico, the border. Let’s make it right down your alley. And it turns out that somebody who is running one aspect of that program in Mexico, a Mexican national, favors his brother-in-law and takes a bribe from his brother-in-law to get his brother-in-law’s children a job somewhere.

Are you suggesting that the United States of America under an honest services theory could prosecute the individual in Mexico?

DOJ: Under honest services, there would have to be the use of a mailing or wire. Under [a relevant statute] I believe those facts would support a prosecution, if the funding were made pursuant to a federal program.

THE COURT: So, in other words, if I — it’s your view, your view, that the United States of America can police foreign companies in the exercise of their operation involving foreign citizens on matters unrelated to the program which the United States gave money for — that is, for the specific purpose of the program — and that they then have jurisdiction to act in that regard.

DOJ: It is, your Honor, if it is pursuant to a federal program.

THE COURT: And do you have one case that says that?

DOJ: We have Campbell, your Honor, which was a District of Columbia case in which an Australian national was charged with bribery under 666 for conduct in Afghanistan relating to his work with a private contractor that received aid from the US AID.

THE COURT: And the program involved was a program for the benefit of the United States, is that correct, in that case?

DOJ: It was a program through which the United States policy interests were advanced, your Honor.

THE COURT: So if there is ever, ever a policy interest of the United States of America in anything a foreign country — that occurs in a foreign country, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California will vindicate the way the laws apply — the honest services law applies. You’re going to wipe out bribery and honest services throughout the world. I want to congratulate you for that.

And I never in my life, in 50 years of criminal practice, seen a more misguided prosecution as the one that you’ve brought. I just don’t even get it. I don’t get it, how you can — how you can use resources of the United States Attorney’s Office to prosecute some foreign nationals involved in a foreign company, engaged in conduct which was foreign, on doing things that weren’t directly related to the contribution of the United States to that entity.

DOJ: Your Honor –

THE COURT: Who did you get permission from to bring this prosecution? Anybody in Washington?

DOJ: We — this was a Northern District of California prosecution, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you get permission from anyone in the Department of Justice in Washington DC to bring this prosecution?

DOJ: It was not required. We coordinated –

THE COURT: It implicates foreign countries, doesn’t it?

DOJ: It does, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you didn’t choose fit to ask the Department of Justice whether in their smarter sentencing, smarter criminal law enforcement program this is a good use of your resources?

DOJ: We received office approval. We also coordinated with the State Department, your Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

DOJ: We also coordinated with the State Department.

THE COURT: In other words, it was the State Department, and that was whether or not this person had diplomatic immunity. I’m not even going to address that. That’s another issue entirely.

But you’re telling me this was a decision of the United States Attorney to bring this prosecution without the knowledge of the Department of Justice.

DOJ: It was a duly authorized decision by this office to do so.

THE COURT: My suggestion, since I’m dismissing this indictment, is that you bring an appeal, right away. I would be very interested in what the Ninth Circuit has to say about this, whether they think that there is enough of a nexus to apply statutes, such as the bribery statute and the honest services statute, to the conduct that’s alleged in this particular case.”

Elsewhere in the transcript, Judge Breyer stated:

“They actually have law enforcement in Canada. If you’re so concerned about the way some Canadians are operating with a Canadian-based company in dealing with Ukrainians, you can always phone the Mounties and they will investigate it if they think it’s appropriate.”

[...]

This program, this program — there is no allegation here that somehow the program failed or was in jeopardy by virtue of — by virtue of this purportedly allegedly corrupt person giving a contract or favoring somebody in Ukraine. That’s not — that’s not what’s alleged here.”

Judge Breyer followed up his oral decision granting the motions to dismiss with this written opinion.  In it, Judge Breyer states, among others things, as follows:

“Of course, the United States has some interest in eradicating bribery, mismanagement, and petty thuggery the world over. But under the government’s theory, there is no limit to the United States’s ability to police foreign individuals, in foreign governments or in foreign organizations, on matters completely unrelated to the United States’s investment, so long as the foreign governments or organizations receive at least $10,000 of federal funding. This is not sound foreign policy, it is not a wise use of scarce federal resources, and it is not, in the Court’s view, the law.”

[...]

“There is no allegation that even one dollar of the millions of dollars the United States presumably sent to ICAO was squandered.”

Although outside the FCPA context, Judge Breyer’s decision and reasoning is nevertheless relevant to FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors that are frequently brought on sparse jurisdictional allegations.

Moreover, Judge Breyer’s comment that there was no allegation that the alleged bribery compromised the integrity of the program at issue is relevant to causation issues discussed in prior posts (see here).

Hong Kong Court Rules on Extraterritorial Limits to the Territory’s Anti-Corruption Law

Wednesday, August 13th, 2014

Today’s post is from Philip Rohlik and Sebastian Ko (both attorneys in the Hong Kong office of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).

Hong Kong Court Rules on Extraterritorial Limits to the Territory’s Anti-Corruption Law

By Philip Rohlik and Sebastian Ko

Hong Kong has a very strict and successful anti-corruption regime that has made it one of the cleanest jurisdictions in the world.  Hong Kong serves as a model for many other jurisdictions seeking to eradicate corruption and the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption has been copied in a number of jurisdictions and provides training to anti-corruption police from dozens of countries.  Despite being an international role-model, there has long been a question as to whether and to what extent the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) extends beyond the borders of Hong Kong.  In the recent case of HKSAR v. Krieger & Anor. (06/08/2014, FAMC1/2014), the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) (the highest court in Hong Kong) confirmed that the extraterritorial reach of the law is limited.

Anti-Corruption Law in Hong Kong

The POBO dates from the 1970s, when the then-British colony was notoriously corrupt.  The ordinance defines a number of offenses including: giving bribes, receiving bribes, bribing a public servant, specific offenses relating to public tenders and the crime of “possession of unexplained property” by certain high-ranking public servants.  Section 4 prohibits bribing a “public servant.”  “Public servant” is defined to include only Hong Kong public servants.

Hong Kong is not a party to the OECD Convention and the POBO contains no explicit prohibition on bribing foreign officials.  However, bribing a foreign official could still meet the standards of Section 9(2), the offense most applicable to private bribery.  Under Section 9(2) it is an offense to offer an advantage to an “agent” with the intent of encouraging the agent to act against the interest of his or her principal’s affairs.  In the case of bribery of a foreign official, the official would be the agent and the foreign government or instrumentality would be the principal.

Section 4 contains explicit extraterritorial language, making it an offense to offer a bribe to a “public servant” “whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere.”  Section 9 contains no such explicit extraterritorial language.  The question before the court was whether a conspiracy to offer a bribe to a Macau official, in Macau, [1] violated Section 9(2) in a case in which most of the underlying acts of the conspiracy took place in Hong Kong.  The Court of Appeal held that the operative provision of a charge of conspiracy to bribe was Section 9(2) of the POBO through the “making of the offer.”  Since the offer was communicated outside of Hong Kong and the provision did not have extraterritorial application, there was no offense.  The CFA refused to grant leave to appeal against this ruling.

HKSAR v. Krieger

The defendants were two executives of a Macau waste management company that was a joint venture between Hong Kong and Macau companies.  They were also board members of the Hong Kong parent.  They were accused of conspiring with a Macau-based ex-director of the joint venture to offer a bribe to the then-Secretary of Transport and Public Works of Macau.  (The ex-Secretary and the Macau-based ex-director were convicted of bribery in Macau and are serving prison sentences.)  The evidence at trial was that the defendants and their co-conspirator came to agreement on offering the bribe while in Hong Kong.  The wife of the Macau-based co-conspirator had a Hong Kong company, into which the defendants (while in Hong Kong) transferred funds (by means of checks and wire transfers drawn on a Hong Kong bank) to be used to pay a bribe in Macau.  The District Court convicted both men and sentenced each to more than three years imprisonment.  In doing so, the District Court noted that the men could also be seen as “victims” as the ex-Secretary solicited bribes from them and “the jobs of some 500-odd employees” of their joint venture were threatened by the prospect of losing the contracts. [2]

The defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals quashed the convictions.  An important question on appeal was whether the operative act was the agreement between the conspirators to offer the bribe or the offer itself.  Defendants were charged under Section 159A of the Crimes Ordinance allowing multiple individuals to be charged where they have an agreement to commit a crime.  Section 159A does not, however, create a separate offense; Section 9(2) provided the underlying offense.  The court held that, under the POBO, an offer of advantage is not made until it is communicated to the “agent.” [3]  Although the proposal to bribe was hatched in Hong Kong and numerous steps were taken in Hong Kong after the offer was made, the offer was “made” when the then-Secretary received the proposal from the defendants’ Macau-based co-conspirator in Macau.

The court compared Section 9(2) with its public bribery equivalent provision, Section 4(1).  Section 4(1) specifically defines the bribery of a public official as offering an advantage “whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere.”  Section 9 contains no such language.  The Court of Appeal cited the English case of Cox v. Army Council [1963] AC 48, invoking the doctrine of statutory interpretation presuming that criminal offenses are not extraterritorial unless specifically provided in the offense-creating provisions (comparable with the U.S. doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality). [4] Because it lacks the extraterritorial language, the court held, Section 9(2) is limited to offers made in Hong Kong, regardless of the fact that the defendants were Hong Kong residents and acted mostly in Hong Kong, through Hong Kong companies, ultimately for the benefit of their Hong Kong employer.

The Hong Kong Government applied to the CFA for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision.  Appeal of the decision in the CFA was not as of right, and the Government and the defendants submitted arguments in an application hearing to test whether an appellate hearing before the CFA’s full bench was merited.  The Government argued that the Court of Appeal took too narrow a view of “offer” as defined in the POBO.  Section 2(2) of which provides that “a person offers an advantage if he, or any other person acting on his behalf, directly or indirectly gives, affords or holds out, or agrees, undertakes or promises to give, afford or hold out, any advantage to or for the benefit of or in trust for any other person.”  The Government, while not disputing the lack of extraterritoriality, argued that Section 2(2)’s definition of “offer” was broad enough to encompass acts short of the communication.  The CFA held that under Section 9(2), the offer had to be made “to any agent,” which can only occur upon communication, regardless of the language of Section 2(2).  The CFA held that the Government’s case was not “reasonably arguable” (the standard for a grant of appeal) and denied a full appellate hearing.

Conclusion

HKSAR v. Krieger clarified the extraterritorial reach of the private bribery offense in the POBO, which had been used to prosecute bribery of foreign officials in Hong Kong.  As the POBO lacks an explicit offense of bribing a foreign official, the use of the private bribery provisions to create one would have been a stretch where the operative conduct occurred outside of Hong Kong.  It should be noted, Section 9(2) will continue to apply to offers made to foreign officials in Hong Kong and, as the Court of Appeal took pains to point out, the prosecution had limited its arguments by focusing on a narrow set of facts at trial.  Finally, prosecutors in Hong Kong, like prosecutors elsewhere, have a number of arrows in their quiver (for example, anti-money laundering laws) to potentially criminalize much of the activity underlying bribery.

The above summary was prepared for general information purposes and does not constitute legal advice and should not be acted on as such.


[1] Hong Kong and Macau are part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although they enjoy high autonomy as special administrative regions and are separate jurisdictions.  For most practical purposes, Macau and the PRC are treated as if they were “foreign” jurisdictions under Hong Kong law.

[2] HKSAR v. Krieger & Anor. (Feb. 29, 2012, DCCC316/2010) at ¶¶ 6-7.

[3] HKSAR v. Krieger & Anor. (Dec. 18, 2012, CACC99/2012) at ¶¶ 101-102.

[4] Ibid. at ¶¶ 79 and 96.

Former Alstom Executive Lawrence Hoskins Files Motion To Dismiss

Monday, August 4th, 2014

Lawrence Hoskins is a United Kingdom citizen who lived and worked his entire life in the U.K. with the exception of a 35 month period between 2001 and 2004 during which he worked for Alstom in France.  In 2004, he resigned from his job at Alstom to resume his career in the U.K. and retired in 2010.  In April 2014 Hoskins and his wife disembarked from a ferry in the U.S. Virgin Islands en route to Dallas, Texas when he was arrested by U.S. authorities for an alleged bribery scheme dating back to his time at Alstom.

So began the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act journey of Lawrence Hoskins.

As highlighted in this previous post, Hoskins was criminally charged in connection with the same Indonesian power plant project that also resulted in criminal charges against other individuals associated with Alstom - Frederic Pierucci, David Rothschild, and William Pomponi.

Pierucci, Rothschild and Pomponi have all pleaded guilty.  However Hoskins is fighting the criminal charges filed against him and last week he filed a motion to dismiss.

The Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Resting as it does, upon an infirm foundation of aged allegations, overly expansive applications of law, and novel theories of criminal liability, the Indictment in this case suffers from numerous and fatal defects of law and logic. Among other things, it charges stale and time-barred conduct that occurred more than a decade ago; it asserts violations of U.S. law by a British citizen who never stepped foot on U.S. soil during the relevant time period; and, it distorts the definition of the time-worn legal concept of agency beyond recognition. In other words, the Indictment marks an excessive and improper exercise of executive authority. This is an Indictment that never should have been brought.

The Indictment seeks to hold Lawrence Hoskins, a retired 63-year-old British citizen, responsible for his alleged conduct that occurred—outside the United States more than ten years ago—while he was working in Paris at Alstom Holdings, SA (―Alstom‖), the parent company of the French conglomerate. The Indictment asserts that Mr. Hoskins, in his capacity as a Senior Vice-President of the Alstom parent company, approved and authorized the retention and compensation of two consultants, knowing that they would bribe Indonesian officials to help a consortium (including Alstom and one of its U.S. subsidiaries) obtain a contract to construct a power plant in Indonesia. According to the Indictment, Mr. Hoskins‘s limited, dated, and purely extraterritorial conduct subjects him to liability for two conspiracies and a total of ten substantive violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (―FCPA‖) and United States‘ money-laundering statutes. These charges all fail.

First, the Indictment is time-barred. Mr. Hoskins resigned from Alstom ten years ago, in August 2004, after 35 months of employment with the parent company and, when he did so, he withdrew from any alleged conspiracy operating therein. Second Circuit precedent makes clear that resignation from a business constitutes withdrawal from any criminal conduct operating within that entity if, following resignation, there is no promotion of or benefit received from the alleged illegal activity. Mr. Hoskins passes the Second Circuit‘s test with ease. After he resigned from Alstom, he immediately moved from Paris back to his home in England and started a new job, at a new company, in a new industry. He had no contact with, and received nothing from, any of his alleged co-conspirators. He also had no involvement with criminal conduct of any kind. To the point, the last act attributable to Mr. Hoskins in the Indictment occurred in March 2004, and the wire transfers that constitute the FCPA and money-laundering offenses all occurred long thereafter, between November 2005 and October 2009. Thus, Mr. Hoskins successfully withdrew from any alleged criminal conduct upon his resignation from Alstom. As such, all of the charges in the Indictment are time-barred and should be dismissed.

Second, the FCPA charges are facially defective. The Indictment alleges that Mr. Hoskins was an ―agent of a domestic concern,‖ to wit, an agent of Alstom‘s U.S. subsidiary. While it is black letter law that the fundamental characteristic of agency is control, the supporting factual allegations in the Indictment make plain that Mr. Hoskins was in no way under the control of the U.S. subsidiary. Indeed, much to the contrary, the Indictment demonstrates that Mr. Hoskins was ―approving‖ and ―authorizing‖ certain requests from employees of subsidiary companies ―in his capacity‖ as an executive of the Alstom parent company. Thus, because the allegations in the Indictment describe conduct bearing no semblance to an agency relationship, the FCPA-related charges are facially defective and should be dismissed.

Third, the Indictment‘s use of the term ―agent‖ is so counter-intuitive to the common understanding of that phrase that its application to Mr. Hoskins‘s relationship with the U.S. subsidiary renders the FCPA unconstitutionally vague as applied. Such a construction of the term ―agent‖ could not have provided Mr. Hoskins with fair warning that his alleged conduct—authorizing and approving matters at the request of employees of subsidiaries in his oversight capacity at the parent company—could expose him to criminal liability. As such, the FCPA charges are also constitutionally flawed and should be dismissed.

Fourth, the FCPA charges do not apply to Mr. Hoskins‘s purely extraterritorial conduct. Though Congress directed certain provisions of the FCPA to have extraterritorial effect, the subsection of the FCPA charged in the Indictment was not included in any such direction. Accordingly, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies. Thus, because all of Mr. Hoskins‘s alleged conduct occurred outside of the United States in the territory of a foreign sovereign, the substantive FCPA charges fail and should be dismissed.

Fifth, given the pronounced defects with the Indictment‘s FCPA charges, any theory of liability premised upon conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting also necessarily fail. Applicable Supreme Court precedent holds that when Congress affirmatively chooses to exclude a certain class of individuals from liability under a criminal statute, the government cannot circumvent that intent by alleging conspiracy. Moreover, federal courts have repeatedly held that ancillary offenses, including aiding and abetting and conspiracy, are only deemed to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction to the extent of the offenses underlying them. For these reasons, the conspiracy and aiding and abetting theories advanced in the Indictment cannot stand once the underlying FCPA charges fail.

Finally, the money-laundering charges are improperly venued in the District of Connecticut. The venue provision of the money-laundering statute establishes that venue lies only where the predicate money laundering transaction was ―conducted. The Indictment makes clear that the allegedly offending transfers were initiated from Maryland. As such, the District of Maryland is the only proper venue for the money-laundering charges, and they should be dismissed.

For the reasons described above and explained below, all of the charges should be dismissed. Mr. Hoskins never should have been charged on such old, infirm, and overextended allegations and legal theories. He should be freed to resume his life in England.”

*****

Hoskins is represented by Christopher Morvillo (Clifford Chance) and Brian Spears (Brian Spears LLC).  Both were previously AUSAs at the DOJ.