Archive for the ‘Individual Enforcement Action’ Category

Bribery Of A Foreign Official On U.S. Soil

Thursday, April 17th, 2014

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding "old" FCPA enforcement actions]

The core enforcement action described below highlights a rare instance of FCPA violations being charged along with violations of the U.S. domestic bribery statute.  The enforcement action is also a rare instance of the United States being the location where the foreign official was allegedly bribed.

Control Systems Specialist / Darrold Crites

In this 1998 criminal information, the DOJ alleged that Control Systems Specialist, Inc. (“Control Systems” a company engaged in the purchase, repair, and resale of surplus military equipment) and its President Darrold Crites made improper payments to a Brazilian Air Force Lt. Colonel (“Col. Z”) stationed at Wright Patterson Air Force Based in Ohio.  The information describes Col. Z  as follows.

“Col. Z was the Foreign Liaison Officer for the Air Force of the Republic of Brazil … and was authorized to make purchases of military equipment on behalf of the Brazilian Aeronautical Commission (“BAC”), the purchasing agent of the Brazilian Air Force.  The BAC was an “instrumentality” of the Government of Brazil.”

The DOJ alleged that Crites met with a civilian employee of the United States Air Force who worked at Wright Patterson Air Force Base as the Command Country Manager (“Country Manager”) for Brazil and was responsible for representing the United States Air Force in dealings with Col. Z.

According to the DOJ, “Country Manager agreed to provide Crites with surplus part numbers, model numbers, and U.S. military sources of surplus parts in exchange for the promise of payments of money, using information he would obtain through his position as a civilian employee of the United States Air Force.”

In turn, the DOJ alleged that “Crites would thereafter purchase the surplus equipment identified by the Country Manager, recondition it, and resell the same to the BAC.”  According to the DOJ, Col. Z would approve the BAC’s purchase from Control Systems in exchange for payments of money.  Specifically, the DOJ alleged that Crites paid Col. Z “a series of bribes, disguised as ‘consultant fees,’ for each bid accepted by Col. Z on behalf of the BAC.”

The DOJ also alleged that Crites formed a separate company (“Company Y”) with the assistance of an Ohio businessman (“Businessman X”) to pay bribes to Col. Z “in exchange for his approval of Company Y’s bids to sell surplus U.S. military equipment to the BAC.”

According to the DOJ, Crites and Businessman X, as officers of Company Y “arranged not less than forty-four purchases of surplus U.S. military equipment for repair and resale to the BAC.”  The DOJ alleged as follows.

“Some of the surplus equipment was obtained by the BAC through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and then provided to Control Systems for repair.  Other equipment was purchased directly by Control Systems or Company Y, repaired, and then sold to the BAC.  In all cases, after each purchase was effected, Col. Z was paid for his approval of the transactions.”

According to the DOJ, Crites, Control Systems and others “paid a total of $99,000 to the Country Manager and a total of $257,139 to Col. Z.”

Based on the above allegations, the DOJ charged Control Systems and Crites with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and a substantive violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision.  Based on the allegations involving the Country Manager, the DOJ also charged Control Systems and Crites with violating 18 USC 201, the domestic bribery statute.

Pursuant to this plea agreement, Crites pleaded guilty to the three charges described above.  In the plea agreement, Crites agreed to cooperate with the DOJ.  According to the statement of facts in the plea agreement, “Crites and Control Systems received approximately $672,298 as a result of the contracts received from the government of Brazil.”  According to a docket entry, Crites was sentenced to three years probation (with the first six months of probation to be spent in home confinement with electronic monitoring with work release privileges) and 150 hours of community service.

Pursuant to this plea agreement, Control Systems also pleaded guilty to the three charges described above.  According to a docket entry, Control Systems was ordered to pay a $1,500 fine and was sentenced to one year probation.

International Materials Solutions Corp. / Thomas Qualey

Based on the same core allegations in the Control Systems / Crites enforcement action, in 1999 the DOJ also alleged in this criminal information that International Materials Solutions Corporation (“IMS” – like Control Systems an Ohio company that engaged in the purchase, repair, and resale of surplus military equipment) and Thomas Qualey (the President of IMS) conspired to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  According to the information, IMS and Qualey paid a total of $67,563 to Col. Z to induce the approval by Col. Z of a bid by IMS for the acquisition and repair of ten fork lift trucks.

Pursuant to this plea agreement, Qualey pleaded guilty to the two charges described above.  According to the Statement of Facts in the plea agreement, Qualey and IMS “received approximately $392,250 as a result of the contracts received from the Government of Brazil.”  According to this judgment, Qualey was sentenced to three years probation ((with the first four months of probation to be spent in home confinement with electronic monitoring with work release privileges) and 150 hours of community service and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.

Pursuant to this plea agreement, IMS pleaded guilty to the two charges described above.  According to this judgment, IMS was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine plus and was sentenced to one year probation.

See this prior post for another FCPA enforcement in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.

Further To The Clustering Phenomenon

Wednesday, April 16th, 2014

Earlier this week, the DOJ announced that two additional individual defendants have been added to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (and related) enforcement action against individuals associated with broker dealer Direct Access Partners.  (See here for the original May 2013 enforcement action against Jose Hurtado and Tomas Clarke and here for an additional individual, Ernesto Lujan, being added to the enforcement action in June 2013).

Like in the previous enforcement actions, the additional defendants (Benito Chinea and Joseph DeMeneses, the Chief Executive Officer and a managing partner, respectively of Direct Access Partners) were criminally charged in connection with alleged improper payments to Maria Gonzalez (V.P. of Finance / Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration at Bandes, an alleged Venezuelan state-owned banking entity that acted as the financial agent of the state to finance economic development projects).

As noted in the DOJ’s release, Chinea and DeMeneses were each charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, five counts of violating the FCPA, and five counts of violating of the Travel Act. Chinea and DeMeneses were also charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and three counts of money laundering. DeMeneses was further charged with one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice.  (See here for the SEC’s announcement of a related enforcement action against Chinea and DeMeneses.  Like the SEC’s prior enforcement actions against the other individuals, Chinea and DeMeneses are charged with various securities law violations, but not FCPA offenses as the individuals – while associated with a broker dealer –  are not associated with an issuer).

As noted in the DOJ’s release, in August 2013 Lujan, Hurtado and Clarke each pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA, to violate the Travel Act and to commit money laundering, as well as substantive counts of these offenses.

The DOJ’s enforcement action against Chinea and DeMeneses is further to the curious clustering phenomenon clearly observable in FCPA enforcement.

As highlighted in this previous post (with statistics calculated through the end of 2013), 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just four cases and 75% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just nine cases.

Of further note (and again with statistics calculated through the end of 2013), of the 89 individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008, 61 of the individuals (69%) were employees or otherwise affiliated with private business entities (for instance – Haiti Teleco related enforcement actions, Control Components Inc. Latin Node, Nexus Technologies, BizJet, not to mention failed prosecutions against various Africa Sting defendants and individuals associated with Lindsey Manufacturing).

This is a striking statistic given that 48 of the 60 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 (80%) (again using statistics calculated through the end of 2013) were against publicly traded corporations.  In short, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action.

Thus far in 2014, the trends have been further magnified.  In addition to this week’s action:

  • 5 individuals associated with private company Group DF were charged with FCPA offenses (see here); and
  • 3 individuals associated with private company PetroTiger Ltd. were charged with FCPA offenses (see here)

DOJ Alleges Wide-Ranging Conspiracy To Bribe Indian Officials To Secure Mining Licenses

Thursday, April 3rd, 2014

Yesterday the DOJ announced the unsealing of a criminal indictment charging six individuals “with participating in an alleged international racketeering conspiracy involving bribes of state and central government officials in India to allow the mining of titanium minerals.”

According to the indictment, Dmitry Firtash, a Ukrainian businessman who was arrested in March in Austria (see here for the DOJ’s prior release), was the leader of a criminal enterprise, through his group of companies Group DF, that included:

  • Andras Knopp (a Hungarian businessman)
  • Suren Gevorgyan (of Ukraine)
  • Gajendra Lal (an Indian national and permanent resident of the U.S.)
  • Periyasamy Sunderalingam (of Sri Lanka)
  • K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao (a Member of the Parliament in India who was an official of the state government of Andra Pradesh and a close advisor to the now-deceased chief minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy)

According to the indictment, the illegal activities of the enterprise included, but were not limited to: “utilizing United States financial institutions to engage in the international transmission of dollars for the purpose of bribing Indian public officials in connection with obtaining approval of the necessary licenses for [a mining project within Andhra Pradesh], which project was forecast to generate more than $500 million in revenues per year …”

According to the indictment:

“Licenses were required for the project before mining could begin.  These licenses required the approval of both the State Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Central Government prior to their issuance.  The approval and issuance of such licenses were discretionary, non-routine governmental actions.”

The indictment charges all defendants with racketeering conspiracy; money laundering conspiracy; and two counts of interstate travel in aid of racketeering.

In addition, all defendants except Rao (the alleged Indian “foreign official”) were charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

The absence of Rao from this charge is, no doubt, a result of U.S. v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991). In that case involving Canadian “foreign officials,” the DOJ acknowledged that it could not charge the officials with direct FCPA violations since the FCPA did not criminalize the receipt of bribes by a foreign official.  However, the DOJ charged the Canadian officials with conspiring to violate the FCPA.  The court dismissed this charge and rejected the DOJ’s position that a “foreign official” could be charged with conspiring to violate the FCPA.  Based on the language and legislative history of the FCPA, the court found a “legislative policy to leave unpunished a well-defined group of persons [i.e., “foreign officials] who were necessary parties to the acts constituting a violation of the substantive law.”

As to the FCPA conspiracy charge, Lal is charged as a domestic concern and the other defendants are charged as “persons” under the 78dd-3 prong of the statute which contains the following jurisdictional element – “while in the territory of the U.S., corruptly … make[s] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any act in furtherance” of an improper payment. The indictment contains various allegations relevant to this jurisdictional prong including use of U.S. bank accounts, travel in the U.S., use of e-mail accounts hosted on computer servers located within the U.S., and use of cell phones operating on interstate networks.

Among other things, the indictment seeks forfeiture of approximately $10.6 million from the defendants.

In the DOJ’s release, Acting Assistant Attorney General David O’Neil states:

“Fighting global corruption is part of the fabric of the Department of Justice.  The charges against six foreign nationals announced today send the unmistakable message that we will root out and attack foreign bribery and bring to justice those who improperly influence foreign officials, wherever we find them.”

U.S. Attorney for the N.D. of Illinois Zachary Fardon states:

“Criminal conspiracies that extend beyond our borders are not beyond our reach.  We will use all of the tools and resources available to us to ensure the integrity of global business transactions that involve U.S. commerce.”

Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Chicago Office Robert Holley states:

“This case is another example of the FBI’s willingness to aggressively investigate corrupt conduct around the globe.  With the assistance of our law enforcement partners, both foreign and domestic, we will continue to pursue those who allegedly bribe foreign officials in return for lucrative business contracts.”

As noted in the release, other than Firtash, all other defendants remain at large.  When Firtash was arrested in March, he released this statement through Group DF.  As highlighted here, Firtash paid approximately $172 million to be released on bail.

For more on the enforcement action, see here from the Chicago Tribune, here from Reuters and here from Bloomberg.

As noted in this article, while several FCPA enforcement actions have been brought in connection with foreign license and permitting issues, the government has an overall losing record when put to its burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions outside the context of foreign government procurement.

A Focus On SEC FCPA Individual Actions

Wednesday, January 22nd, 2014

Posts earlier this week (here and here) highlighted various facts and figures from 2013 and historically concerning DOJ FCPA individual prosecutions.  This post focuses on SEC FCPA individual actions in 2013 and historically.

Like the DOJ, the SEC frequently speaks in lofty rhetoric concerning its focus on holding individuals accountable under the FCPA.  For instance, in connection with the 2012 Garth Peterson enforcement action, the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated (here) that the case “illustrates the SEC’s commitment to holding individuals accountable for FCPA violations.”  Speaking generally, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White recently stated that a “core principle of any strong enforcement program is to pursue responsible individuals wherever possible … [and that] is something our enforcement division has always done and will continue to do.”

Since 2000, the SEC has charged 59 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.  The breakdown is as follows.

  • 2000 – 0 individuals
  • 2001 – 3 individuals
  • 2002 – 3 individuals
  • 2003 – 4 individuals
  • 2004 - 0 individuals
  • 2005 – 1 individual
  • 2006 – 8 individuals
  • 2007 – 7 individuals
  • 2008 – 5 individuals
  • 2009 – 5 individuals
  • 2010 – 7 individuals
  • 2011 – 12 individuals
  • 2012 – 4 individuals
  • 2013 – 0 individuals

Similar to the prior DOJ figures, most of the individuals charged – 33 (or  56%) were charged since 2008.  Thus, on one level the SEC is correct when it states that individual prosecutions are a focus of its FCPA enforcement program at least as measured against the historical average given that between 1978 and 1999 the SEC charged 22 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.

Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 and 1999, the SEC’s statements (like the prior DOJ statements about its focus on individuals) represent hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.

Of the 33 individuals charged with civil FCPA offenses by the SEC since 2008:

  • 7 individuals were in the Siemens case;
  • 4 individuals were in the Willbros Group case;
  • 4 individuals were in the Alliance One case;
  • 3 individuals were in the Maygar Telekom case; and
  • 3 individuals were in the Noble Corp. case.

In other words, 64% of the individuals charged by the SEC with FCPA civil offenses since 2008 have been in just five cases.

Considering that there has been 65 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather remarkable statistic.  Of the 65 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions, 53 (or 82%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.  This figure is thus higher than the 73% figure highlighted earlier this week regarding the DOJ.  This is notable given that the SEC, as a civil law enforcement agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action.

The last SEC FCPA enforcement action against a company employee related to a corporate FCPA enforcement action occurred approximately two years ago in connection with the Noble Corporation matter (see here for the SEC’s enforcement action against Thomas O’Rourke, Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen - current or former employees of Noble Corporation).  Of note from this enforcement action, it is the only individual FCPA enforcement action (DOJ or SEC) in connection with the 2010 enforcement actions against Panalpina and six oil and gas companies concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.

Once again, like with the DOJ figures, one can ask the “but nobody was charged” question given the gap between corporate SEC FCPA enforcement and related individual enforcement actions.

Yet, like with the DOJ figures and as highlighted in yesterday’s post, there is an equally plausible reason why so few individuals have been charged in connection with many corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.

With the SEC, the issue is not so much NPAs or DPAs (although the SEC has used such vehicles twice to resolve an FCPA enforcement action – a DPA with Tenaris in 2011 and a NPA with Ralph Lauren in 2013 – and there has been no individual enforcement actions related to these corporate enforcement action). Rather, the issue seems to be more the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy (notwithstanding its minor tweaks in 2013).  For more on this policy and its impact of SEC enforcement actions, see pgs. 946-955 of my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”  In the article, I discuss the affidavit of Professor Joseph Grundfest (Stanford Law School and a former SEC Commissioner) in SEC v. Bank of America and how SEC enforcement actions “typically omit mention of valid defenses and of countervailing facts or mitigating circumstances that, if proven at trial, could cause the Commission to lose it case.”  In the article, I also discuss the SEC’s frank admission in the Bank of America case that a settled SEC enforcement action “does not necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s position over the other.”

Individuals in an SEC FCPA enforcement, even if only a civil action, and even if frequently allowed to settle on similar neither admit nor deny terms, have their personal reputation at stake and are thus more likely than corporate entities to challenge the SEC and force it satisfy its burden of proof at trial as to all FCPA elements.

More recently, the SEC has been keen on resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions in the absence of any judicial scrutiny.  As highlighted in this prior SEC Year in Review post, a notable statistic from 2013 is that 50% of SEC corporate enforcement actions were not subjected to one ounce of judicial scrutiny either because the action was resolved via a NPA or through an administrative order.

In other words, and like in the DOJ context, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” in connection with SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions, but rather – do SEC corporate FCPA settlements necessarily represent provable FCPA violations?

It is also interesting to analyze the 12 instances since 2008 where an SEC corporate FCPA enforcement action resulted in related charges against company employees.   With the exception of Siemens, KBR/Halliburton and Magyar Telekom, the corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions resulting in related charges against company employees occurred in what can only be described as relatively minor (at least from a settlement amount perspective) corporate enforcement actions.  These actions are:  Faro Technologies, Willbros Group, Nature’s Sunshine Products, United Industrial Corp., Pride Int’l., Noble Corp., Alliance One, Innospec, and Watts Water.

[Note - the above data was assembled using the "core" approach as well as the definition of an FCPA enforcement action described in this prior post]

DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?

Tuesday, January 21st, 2014

Yesterday’s post (here) focused on DOJ FCPA individual prosecutions and highlighted the following facts and figures.

  • Since 2008, the DOJ has charged 89 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.
  • 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just four cases and 75% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just nine cases.
  • There have been 60 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 and of these actions, 44 (or 73%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

These statistics should cause alarm, including at the DOJ as it has long recognized that a corporate-fine only enforcement program is not effective and does not adequately deter future FCPA violations.   For instance, in 1986 John Keeney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, DOJ) submitted written responses in the context of Senate hearings concerning a bill to amend the FCPA. He stated as follows:

“If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes merely monetary, the fine will simply become a cost of doing business, payable only upon being caught and in many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit acquired from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of incarceration, there may no longer be any compelling need to resist the urge to acquire business in any way possible.”

In 2010 Hank Walther (Deputy Chief Fraud Section) stated that a corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement program allows companies to calculate FCPA settlements as the cost of doing business.

Most recently, in 2013 Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy Chief of Staff, Criminal division) stated that “there is no greater deterrent to corporate crime that the prospect of prison time … if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be seen as merely the cost of doing business.”

In my 2010 Senate FCPA testimony (here), I noted that the absence of individual FCPA charges in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts.  Others have rightly asked the “but nobody was charged” question, including James Stewart in a New York Times column highlighted in this previous post.

However, as I stated in my Senate testimony, there is an equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in connection with many corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.

Readers know well of the prevalence of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements (NPA / DPA)  in the FCPA context and how these agreements, not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny, are often agreed to by companies for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not necessarily because the conduct at issue violates the FCPA.  For more on this dynamic, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”  As highlighted in this recent post, since 2010, 93% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have been resolved via NPAs or DPAs.

Individuals, on the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liberty, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.  In other words, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” but rather do NPA and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations?

I set out to test this with the following working hypothesis.

  • Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution that the corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA violations, represent a higher quality FCPA enforcement action (in the eyes of the DOJ) and is thus more likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees.
  • Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality FCPA enforcement action and is thus less likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its high burden of proof.

The below statistics provide a compelling datapoint concerning the quality and legitimacy of many corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

Since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004 (see here), there have been 76 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

  • 12 of these corporate enforcement actions were the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.  10 of these corporate enforcement actions – 83% – resulted in related criminal charges of company employees.
  • 51 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved solely with an NPA or DPA.  In only 5 instances – 9.8% – was there related criminal charges of company employees.
  • A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is what I will call a hybrid action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some entity in the corporate family – usually a foreign subsidiary – and an NPA or DPA against the parent company.  Since the introduction of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context, there have been 13 such corporate enforcement actions.  In 4 of these actions – 31% -  there was related criminal charges of company employees. This percentage is what one might expect compared to the two types of corporate FCPA enforcement actions discussed above, although it is interesting to note the following regarding 3 of these 4 instances.  The DOJ ended up dismissing the charges against Si Chan Wooh (Schnitzer Steel), John O’Shea (ABB) was not found not guilty, and Bobby Elkin (Alliance One) received a probation sentence after the sentencing judge questioned many aspects of the enforcement action (see here for the prior post).

If the above statistics do not cause you to question the quality and legitimacy of many corporate FCPA enforcement actions, no empirical data ever will.  For those who believe NPAs and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations, the ball is now in your court to offer credible explanations for following datapoints.

If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations, there is a 83% chance that related criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.  If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, there is a 9.8% chance that criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.

At a conference last May (and as highlighted in this post), I presented the above numbers and put the ball in the court of Denis McInerney (DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) and asked him to explain the gap.  He described two enforcement actions resolved via an NPA or DPA in which there were indeed related individual prosecutions, but otherwise said that he did not know where these numbers are coming from.  As I explained, it was really quite easy calculating the numbers.  One simply takes all DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2004, tracks how those enforcement actions were resolved, and then looks to see if there have been related individual actions against company employees.

[Note - the above data was assembled using the "core" approach as well as the definition of an FCPA enforcement action described in this prior post]