Archive for the ‘Guidance’ Category

Say What?

Thursday, March 14th, 2013

Recently Chuck Duross (Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, Fraud Section) spoke to the Amercian Bar Association’s Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime.  Unfortunately, his remarks were not released (see this prior post regarding the “Luncheon Law” nature of the FCPA).  Thankfully though, Caryn Lara Trombino (Perkins Coie), authored this Update regarding certain of Duross’s remarks.

The Update states as follows.

“The Resource Guide was released on November 14, 2012, following what Duross described as a year ‘dominated’ by the writing of the Guide.”

Say What?

Even though the Guidance is a meaty document, introductory material, blank pages, and a table of contents account for 35 pages; the FCPA statue itself and footnotes account for 30 pages; and a summary of previously issued guidelines (such as DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure program), or other substantive laws such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act whistleblower provisions account for 20 pages.

The portions of the Guidance that can accurately be described as guidance represent little new information to those previously knowledgeable about the FCPA and its enforcement. Indeed, in a press conference introducing the Guidance (see here for the prior post), then Assistant Attorney General Breuer said that the Guidance ‘‘does not represent a change in policy.’’

Against this backdrop, it is surprising to hear that 2012 was a year “dominated” by writing the Guidance.

The Perkins Coie Update also states as follows.

“[Duross] explained that the primary impetus for creating the Guide was the United States’ treaty obligations under the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Convention.”

Say what?

As I explain in my article, ”Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” the Government’s explanation for its motivation in issuing the Guidance(Duross was not the first to make the above comment, a similar point is made in the Guidance itself) does not appear to be genuine.

Here is why.

In 1988, Congress, as part of the FCPA’s 1988 amendments, encouraged the DOJ to issue FCPA guidance.  For instance, a relevant House report stated as follows.

‘‘In order to enhance compliance with the provisions of the FCPA [the FCPA amendment] establishes a procedure for the [DOJ] to issue guidance describing examples of activities that would or would not conform with the [DOJ’s] present enforcement policy regarding FCPA violations.’’

In 2002, the OECD in its Phase 2 report of U.S. enforcement efforts of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, encouraged the U.S. to issue such guidance. In pertinent part, the OECD report stated:

“Despite the abundance of articles and commentaries on [the FCPA], there is only limited amount of authoritative or official guidance available on compliance with the twenty five-year old statute. . . . Much of the authority or guidance regarding the Act comes from speeches from DOJ and SEC officials, DOJ opinions, DOJ and SEC complaints, settlements that have been filed, and informal discussions of issues between companies’ counsel and the DOJ or the SEC. . . . The status of these various sources of information is however not always clear: there could be merit in regrouping and consolidating them in a single guidance document.”

In 2010, the OECD again, this time in its October 2010 Phase 3 Report on the United States, stated as follows.

‘‘The evaluators recommend that the United States consider consolidating and summarizing [all relevant sources ofFCPA information] to ensure easy accessibility, especially for [companies] which face limited resources.”

The information that follows is most pertinent in assessing the government’s motivation in issuing the FCPA Guidance in November 2012.

In the November 30, 2010 Senate FCPA hearing (approximately 1.5 months after the OECD Phase 3 Report), Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) asked the DOJ the following post-hearing written question.

‘‘Do you believe companies could comply with more certainty with the FCPA if they were provided with more generally applicable guidance from the Department in regards to situations covered by the FCPA that are not clear cut or fall into gray areas?’’

DOJ’s response post-hearing response (approximately two months after the OECD Phase 3 Report) was that it  ”believes [the DOJ] provides clear guidance with respect to FCPA enforcement through a variety of means,’’ and the DOJ then listed the same general categories of information the OECD identified in 2002 as being deficient.

For a more likely government motivation for release of the FCPA Guidance in November 2012 (and indeed former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer’s announcement in November 2011 that guidance would be forthcoming in 2012), please read my article “Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance” specifically the section titled “The Timing of the Guidance.”

Secret FCPA Enforcement

Thursday, January 3rd, 2013

The DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance press release (here) states that the Guidance “is an important illustration of [the DOJ's] transparency.”  Likewise, at the Guidance press conference (see here for the prior post), Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated that the DOJ strives to be “transparent” in its FCPA enforcement.  A few days later, in a speech to an FCPA audience (see here), Breuer again stated that the FCPA Guidance was a “vivid example” of the DOJ’s committment to transparency and that the Guidance is “perhaps the boldest manifestation of [the DOJ's] transparent approach to [FCPA] enforcement.”

While reading the FCPA Guidance in November, I couldn’t help but notice two things.

First, footnote 379 of the Guidance states as follows.  “Historically, DOJ had, on occasion, agreed to DPAs with companies that were not filed with the court.  That is no longer the practice of DOJ.”

Second, page 75 of the Guidance suggests that the DOJ has used non-prosecution agreements in individual FCPA-related case (e.g., “If an individual complies with the terms of his or her NPA, namely, truthful and complete cooperation and continued law-abiding conduct, DOJ will not pursue criminal charges.”  The Guidance also states that “in circumstances where an NPA is with a company for FCPA-related offenses, it is made available to the public through DOJ’s website.” (emphasis added).  This statement suggests that when an NPA is with an individual for FCPA-related offenses, the agreement is not made public.

The Guidance statements on secret FCPA enforcement confirmed whispers I’ve heard from others on this topic.

Beginning on November 21st, I began seeking answers from the DOJ’s press office (from an individual who previously has responded to my e-mails), as to the following two questions.

As to the first issue above, I asked the DOJ to ”please list specific instances in which the DOJ ‘agreed to DPAs with companies that were not filed with the court’ and the year in which DOJ stopped this practice.”

As to the second issue above, I asked the DOJ to “please confirm that the DOJ has used NPAs to resolve [individual] FCPA-related cases and [to] provide the specific number of instances in which the DOJ has done so, including the year.”

No response.

Follow-up e-mails were sent to the DOJ press office (again to an individual who previously has responded to my e-mails) on November 28th and December 5th.

No response.

On December 12th, I e-mailed a DOJ FCPA enforcement attorney (an individual who previously has responded to my e-mails) seeking answers to my two questions.

No response.

So much for that transparency thing.

The DOJ’s secret FCPA enforcement remains a mystery.

Grading The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance

Friday, December 14th, 2012

I am pleased to share a download link (here) to my article “Grading The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance” recently published in Bloomberg / BNA’s White Collar Crime Report.

The article abstract is as follows.

This article is a critical analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance released by the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission. Issues discussed in the article include the following: (i) the enforcement agencies’ motivations in issuing the Guidance and the fact that it should have been issued years ago; (ii) the utility of the Guidance from an access-of-information perspective and how the Guidance can be used as a measuring stick for future enforcement agency activity; (iii) how the Guidance is an advocacy piece and not a well-balanced portrayal of the FCPA as it is replete with selective information, half-truths, and, worse information that is demonstratively false; (iv) how, despite the Guidance, much about FCPA enforcement remains opaque; and (v) how, despite the Guidance, FCPA reform remains a viable issue.

Interested in additional discussion and analysis of the Guidance?

Sign up for this free webinar on Monday, December 17th at 1 p.m. EST.  Joining me in analyzing the Guidance will be William Sullivan (Partner, Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman LLP); Sandra Lee Fenske (Vice President and General Counsel, Lockheed Martin) and Jason Montgonery (Director of Research, Laurel Hill Advisory Group).

Do Lanny Breuer And Robert Khuzami Actually Read FCPA Enforcement Actions?

Thursday, December 13th, 2012

In connection with the recent release of the FCPA Guidance, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated (see here) that the DOJ is “focused on bribes of consequence – ones that have a fundamentally corrosive effect on the way companies do business abroad.”

Likewise, SEC Enforcement Division Chief Robert Khuzami stated (see here) that the DOJ and SEC “hope that it [the Guidance] will clear up some myths about the type of conduct that gets prosecuted under the FCPA — that it is not the $5 cup of coffee, or the one off $50 gift to a public official, that companies need to be concerned about, but payments of real and substantial value that clearly represent an unambiguous intent to bribe a foreign official to obtain or retain business.”

At the Guidance press conference (see here) Khuzami said that he was “interested in companies spending compliance dollars in the most sensible way” and he hoped that the guidance and the hypotheticals provided would help companies as to where they can “minimize investment and where they can maximize it.”  Breuer added that the DOJ wants compliance programs “to address real matters of concern.”

Against this backdrop, the question must be asked:  do Breuer and Khuzami actually read FCPA enforcement actions?

Recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions have involved, to name just a few, allegations about a bottle of wine (see here), a Cartier watch (see here), a camera (see here), kitchen appliances and business suits (see here), television sets, laptops and appliances (see here), and tea sets and office furniture (see here).

To be sure, these were not the only allegations in the enforcement actions.  However, one must assume (unless the DOJ/SEC enforcement attorneys were merely practicing their typing skills) that such allegations were included in the enforcement actions by design and for specific reasons.

By including such cursory and non-determinative allegations in FCPA enforcement actions, the DOJ and SEC are creating conditions that run completely counter to the sensible statements described above.

From time to time, I have the pleasure of moderating business roundtables on FCPA issues.  I am always struck as to the extent of discussion and concern, and of learning of the enormous amount of compliance dollars devoted to, what can only be called minor and mundane issues – not “bribes of consequences” and not payments of “real and substantial value.”  Yet I understand why there is this concern – because FCPA Inc. uses enforcement actions (and the allegations contained therein) in marketing compliance services.  Do the DOJ and SEC not realize this?

If the DOJ and SEC are genuine in their message that they are only “focused on bribes of consequence,” on payments of “real and substantial value” and in companies spending compliance dollars in the “most sensible way,” there is something very easy and practical for the enforcement agencies to do.

Only allege conduct that actually determines the ultimate outcome of the enforcement action.

Related to the above issues, is what I’ve described as one of the most meaningful sentences in the Guidance (see here for the prior post).

In describing the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions, the Guidance (at pgs. 39-40) rightly talks about the statutory language – namely “reasonable detail” and “reasonable assurances.”  Among other things, the Guidance states that the “concept of reasonableness necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.”

Here again, it is difficult to square this sensible language with several recent FCPA enforcement actions.

Such as the Oracle enforcement action.  (See here for the prior post).  In that SEC books and records and internal controls enforcement action, the only allegations against Oracle itself is that it failed to audit distributor margins against end user prices and that it failed to audit third party payments made by distributors.  As noted in the prior post, it is common for large multi-national companies to have hundreds, if not thousands, of distributors.  Because of this, audits Oracle was held liable for not conducting are not practical or cost-effective absent red flags suggesting improper conduct.  However, the SEC did not allege any such red flag issues.  In fact, the SEC alleges that Oracle’s Indian subsidiary “concealed” and kept “secret” the conduct from Oracle.

In short, in connection with the release of the Guidance, Breuer and Khuzami made several sensible statements.  But have they read FCPA enforcement actions to realize how those sensible statements are undermined by actual FCPA enforcement actions?  Further, the Guidance contained certain sensible statement as well.  Yet here again, actual FCPA enforcement actions undermine the sensible statements.

As discussed above, if the DOJ and SEC are genuine in their Guidance related messages, there is something they can do consistent with those messages.

The question is, will they?

The Guidance And Creating The Best Positive Incentives

Wednesday, December 5th, 2012

The recently issued FCPA Guidance contains much discussion (see Chapter 5 of the Guidance) of how the enforcement agencies purport to reward pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures when making internal charging and other discretionary decisions.

However, noticeably missing from the Guidance is any acknowledgment that the enforcement agencies current position as to FCPA compliance policies and procedures is working or that it creates the best incentives for FCPA compliance.

In fact, the Guidance surprisingly acknowledges that the enforcement agencies current position is not working as the Guidance cites survey data that “64% of general counsel whose companies are subject to the FCPA say there is room for improvement in their FCPA training and compliance programs.”  This statistic is in accord with numerous other statistics (see here at pg. 655 for several examples, and  here for Howard Sklar’s recent discussion of survey data at a recent FCPA conference) that all point to the same conclusion: despite the general increase in FCPA enforcement, despite the incentives currently in place, a meaningful percentage of business organizations are not doing what the enforcement agencies want them to do.

The DOJ and SEC recognize in the Guidance that “positive incentives” can drive compliant behavior.  The enforcement agencies current incentive – that such compliance policies and procedures can only lessen the impact of legal exposure – is not the right positive incentive.

An FCPA compliance defense, along the lines I’ve outlined in the below-linked article, is the best positive incentive to more robust corporate compliance and it can help reduce improper conduct and best advance the FCPA’s objective of reducing bribery.   However, instead of addressing a potential compliance defense with even a modicum of sophistication, the enforcement agencies dismiss it with simple sound-bites.  In the latest example, at the Guidance press conference (see here for the prior post), Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer repeated the DOJ’s opposition to such a defense calling it “dangerous” and a “race to the bottom.”

The DOJ’s opposition to a compliance defense stands in contrast to several former Attorney Generals and other former high-ranking DOJ officials who have publicly supported a compliance defense.  The DOJ’s opposition is further contrasted with the fact that several countries, like the U.S., that are signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have compliance-like defense in their domestic FCPA-like laws.

A compliance defense is not a “race to the bottom” but a “race to the top” and such a defense can, among other things, allow the enforcement agencies to better allocate limited prosecutorial resources to cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper conduct thereby increasing the deterrent effect of FCPA enforcement actions.

For additional reading, see my recent scholarship “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense.”