Archive for the ‘Guest Posts’ Category

“The Most Corrupt Health System Globally Is That in the US. Unfortunately It is Also the Most Influential Medical System”

Tuesday, July 21st, 2015

PillsIn response to this recent post, I received the following from an individual who prefers to be called “a fraud investigator from the United Kingdom.”


I was interested to read your points and observations about health care and the foreign official issue. Notwithstanding whether or not employees and physicians connected to state owned or controlled hospitals etc are foreign officials, there is a very real concern, certainly in the UK, that financial interests undermine medical decision making. Indeed there are various studies which appear to prove the effect.

I know from experience there is a resultant detriment to state funds here, so in this context and in the absence of other meaningful regulation of health care corruption, the broad use of “foreign officials” is welcome.

Many people working in my industry recognise that health care presents unique issues with corruption. This may be explained by market forces. For example, if you ‘marketize’ an essential service where the purchasers are entirely reliant on people with financial interests (Physicians) to decide what is best for them, and at the same time patients cannot challenge those people without potentially jeopardizing their own care, it is arguable that such a market cannot ever function effectively, particularly when huge amounts of money are involved.

Health care is also unique in how and why it is utilized. You can walk away from your lawyer, accountant etc if you feel uncomfortable, but you can’t so easily walk away from a Physician who may hold the key to curing you. It follows that you are very unlikely to question or care about their financial interests, particularly when your insurer or the government is paying most of the costs.

Ultimately though, patients not only trust Physicians based on them being people of high public standing, but they also have to trust Physicians if they are to be confident of getting well. It is this inherent trust which is exploited and undermined by financial interests. I think everyone knows fundamentally how wrong it is for payments to be made to Physicians and other health care professionals, the question is how to stop the practices and to cure the underlying cultural cause.

Within the US health care sector there are agencies who use well intentioned laws to prosecute wrongdoing such as under Stark or the Federal Anti-Kickback statute; HHS-OIG and the FBI publicize high profile prosecutions very frequently. However, those efforts appear never ending – presumably because the profits are so great that for many people it is considered worth taking the risk. However, I also know in some parts of the US that businesses are unable to compete for patients on a legitimate basis because all other providers are paying kickbacks to secure business.

My interest and point in contacting you, is one of culture. Health care is an essential need for everyone and the corruption of those services affects all levels of society globally. Unfortunately, the US has suffered so much misconduct in medical practices that it has become almost the norm. For example, the very idea of so called “Patient Recruiters” goes against everything I understand to be reasonable yet they form part of the structure of health care provision in the US.

If you consider – Pharma payments, medical devices such as cardiac implants, CPD coding, patient recruiting, hospital kickbacks, pathology overuse, durable medical equipment and ambulatory care as headline issues (there are many others), you will find the US system is rife with problems. Although nowhere near to the same extent here in the UK, it is clear that in India, Serbia, Greece, China, Russia and many other countries there are massive issues with corruption in health care. However, my view and I suspect that of many others, is the most corrupt health system globally is that in the US, primarily due to conflicts of interest. Unfortunately it is also the most influential medical system.

The corruption is partly explained by the lack of transparency around pricing and proven clinical benefits. For example, I travelled to the US not so long ago and required a common over the counter remedy available in the UK for about 15 dollars. In the US, the same medicine is prescription only and costs $150 dollars plus $150 dollars to see a Physician for the prescription. Fortunately, a colleague had brought some with him as on his last trip he had ended up paying the $300 dollars.

Another example is just looking at all the people wearing physiotherapy aids. I couldn’t quite believe it when I was just walking around a US city, but came to understand that there is big money in prescribing pointless wrist, knee, elbow supports and the like. The reason for these two simple examples is to show that pricing in the US is out of control and that treatments of questionable clinical benefit are routinely offered and accepted.

What I wonder is:

  • How much global health care corruption can be accounted for by large corporates which are either directly based or primarily selling in the US (Pharma and device manufacturers in particular)?
  • Is the issue in fact that financial practices designed to influence Physicians’ independent decision making have become so commonplace in the US that they are replicated overseas as a matter of course? In other words if usual business practice in the US is on a corrupt basis, and indeed is necessary just to compete with rivals, then when those corporate move into overseas markets the natural tendency must be to use the same methods. This is certainly evident in FCPA cases in China. It would be easy to make a lot more discussion around what happens when US corporate practices are applied in countries with endemic corruption issues.
  • Would it be better to have an anti-corruption focus and international agreement specifically targeting designated sectors – health in this case but also perhaps mining, energy and other areas where problems are similar on a global level, are well known about and the market is one which all people are to an extent dependent on?

One final thought/question. Should the US be policing health care overseas under the guise of the “foreign official” enforcement theory or should the US be policing it by redefining how businesses operate in the US as a starting point and then applying those standards overseas?

I will certainly continue to watch developments on your website with interest and thank you for your excellent insights – do keep up the good work.

Canadian Government Overhauls the Integrity Regime for Suppliers – Still Tough to Get Over Debar

Monday, July 13th, 2015

CanadaToday’s post is from Milos Barutciski and Matthew Kronby (partners with Bennett Jones in Toronto).

It was originally published as a Bennett Jones Client Alert and is reposted below with permission.



On July 3, the Government of Canada announced a new Integrity Regime to replace the previous rules for debarment (disqualification) from public procurement. The new Regime, which is effective immediately, responds to more than a year of steady criticism of the previous Integrity Framework first established in 2010 by Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), the principal procuring arm of the Canadian federal government. That criticism, from business, legal and anti-corruption organizations, argued that the Integrity Framework had become so inflexible, punitive and far-reaching that it would be counterproductive to its objectives, namely to deter criminal misconduct and protect the integrity of the public procurement process. Commentators argued that the actual effect of the old Integrity Framework was to make it difficult for the government to find “clean” suppliers and to discourage companies from acknowledging and remediating wrongdoing.

The Government signaled its intention to address these concerns in its April 2015 budget. The new Integrity Regime goes a considerable distance to correct many of the problems with the Integrity Framework, but falls short in some critical respects.

The Concerns Giving Rise to the New Integrity Regime

Under the former Integrity Framework, suppliers faced disqualification from PWGSC procurements for fraud or corruption offences they or their affiliates have committed. The definition of “affiliates”, which appears to have been drawn from the U.S. debarment rules, is very broad; it covers all relationships where one entity has the power to control the other or a third party has the power to control both. In 2012, the list of offences that could give rise to debarment was expanded to include the bribery of foreign public officials under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and other federal offences.

None of this provoked particular concern until March 2014, when PWGSC adopted the latest in a series of “get tough” amendments to the Integrity Framework. One of these amendments imposed a mandatory 10-year ineligibility period for suppliers, with no scope for reduction due either to the gravity of the offending conduct or the remediation efforts of the business involved. In contrast with the U.S. and similar regimes elsewhere, which give credit for mitigating circumstances and remediation efforts in determining or subsequently reducing debarment penalties, companies doing significant business with the Canadian government have had little incentive to admit to and redress corrupt conduct and potentially a strong disincentive to do so.

The 2014 amendments also expanded the ineligibility conditions to include foreign offences “similar” to the listed domestic offences. Since the Integrity Framework already extended to the conduct of far-flung affiliates, this meant that Canadian businesses could face automatic 10-year debarments from most federal procurement not only for their own corrupt conduct but for the foreign conduct of remotely related entities over which they exercised no oversight or control. Increasing international enforcement of regulatory laws, such as anti-corruption, economic sanctions, antitrust and competition offences, meant that Canadian companies could face automatic debarment in ever expanding circumstances with no connection to Canada.

Key Elements of the New Integrity Regime

The new Integrity Regime remains under the primary authority of PWGSC and its Minister. The elements of the Regime are set out in a new PWGSC Ineligibility and Suspension Policy. The new Regime introduces key changes in relation to (i) the potential to reduce the length of debarment through remediation in certain circumstances; (ii) interim debarment prior to conviction; (iii) the consequences of “affiliate” conduct, (iv) the impact of conviction for foreign offences, and (v) new administrative and review process within PWGSC.

Potential Reduction of 10-year Debarment

The Regime maintains the 10-year ineligibility period for participation in procurements, which will apply for any convictions for covered offences within the previous three years. However, suppliers, other than those convicted of fraudulent conduct in a government procurement, will have the opportunity to reduce their ineligibility by up to five years by co-operating with law enforcement authorities or implementing appropriate remediation to address the causes of the misconduct. To restore their eligibility, suppliers also will need to obtain independent third-party certification that they have successfully addressed the causes of the misconduct. Suppliers convicted of fraud in connection with Canadian government procurement will remain ineligible indefinitely until they have received a pardon.

Ineligibility extends to sub-contractors as well. Suppliers who without prior Ministerial approval perform government contracts using sub-contractors deemed ineligible under the Integrity Regime will themselves face five-year debarments.

Interim Debarment

In addition to the 10-year ineligibility period, suppliers that have been charged with or admitted to any of the covered offences may be suspended from participating in procurement processes pending completion of the criminal proceedings.

PWGSC will maintain a list of ineligible and suspended companies and individuals.


The actions of an affiliate no longer render the supplier automatically ineligible. Instead, a supplier will be ineligible for the conduct of an affiliate only where the supplier can be shown to have “directed, influenced, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in” the conduct that would give rise to ineligibility. The Integrity Regime also establishes a review process under which suppliers will have 30 days to contest determinations of ineligibility based on the conduct of affiliates.

Foreign Offences

“Similar” foreign offences remain a basis for ineligibility or suspension under the Integrity Regime. The regime now explicitly contemplates an assessment of that similarity as well as the fairness and legitimacy of the proceedings that produced the foreign conviction. However, it is unclear who will be charged with making those assessments; the Ineligibility and Suspension Policy contemplates suppliers hiring independent third parties to provide information about foreign conviction but states rather vaguely that the “opinion of Canada” will be determinative.

Administrative Process

As under the Integrity Framework, the Government will be able to enter into a contract with an otherwise ineligible supplier where doing so is deemed necessary to the public interest, such as where no other suppliers can perform the contract or where failure to enter into the contract would pose risks to national security or public health.

The Regime contemplates the use of administrative agreements imposing conditions and compliance measures that an ineligible supplier must take to have its 10-year ineligibility period reduced or suspension following charges lifted, or when the Government invokes the public interest exemption or maintains an existing contract with a supplier who has become non-compliant. Supplier compliance with these agreements will be subject to independent third-party monitoring.

Impact Assessment

The new Integrity Regime addresses the overreach and potential unfairness that were inherent in the Integrity Framework’s application to foreign convictions of supplier affiliates. More generally, it adds transparency to the process by which ineligibility decisions will be made.

The elimination of automatic 10-year ineligibility is also a welcome development as it, to some degree, recognizes and encourages cooperation and remediation efforts by suppliers who have committed listed offences.

However, the revised policy fails to make a clear distinction between punishment and deterrence of misconduct (the domain of criminal law) and protecting the integrity of federal procurement and taxpayer dollars (the domain of procurement rules). The growing severity of corporate fines and the risk of individual imprisonment in corporate criminal cases, together with the reputational harm suffered by companies found guilty of white collar crimes, are a very strong deterrent for repeat offences and a general deterrent for other companies. It is unlikely that an automatic five-year debarment from Canadian public procurement will contribute significantly further to deterrence. It will, however, have a detrimental impact on Canadian companies (and their employees) even when they have substantially overhauled their management and practices. The automatic debarment will also harm Canadian taxpayers by eliminating potential suppliers and reducing the number of competitors bidding on public contracts (with the consequential pricing impact of reduced competition).

PWGSC’s claim that the new Regime will encourage suppliers to proactively disclose misconduct seems similarly misguided. Unlike the U.S., which can offer deferred or non-prosecution agreements to enable companies that voluntarily confess their sins to avoid debarment, the only benefit the Regime will offer such companies is that their ineligibility period can begin sooner. Those companies will still face a minimum ineligibility period of five years, more than long enough to have serious or even existential consequences if they are heavily dependent on federal procurement contracts. Companies facing legal exposure in Canada or abroad that include potential ineligibility under the Integrity Regime therefore will want to consider their options carefully, with the assistance of expert legal counsel.

Silly DOJ Press Release Belies Government’s Failure in Joseph Sigelman FCPA Prosecution

Wednesday, July 1st, 2015

Laurel and HardyToday’s post is from Paul Calli and Chas Short of Calli Law LLC.


As readers of FCPA Professor well know ( see herehere and here for prior posts), in mid-June, the FCPA prosecution of Joseph Sigelman came to an abrupt halt after DOJ’s star witness admitted to giving false testimony on the stand. The case ended in a plea to one conspiracy count and a sentence of probation.  DOJ nonetheless issued a press release crowing as though this were a prosecution victory.

Make no mistake: this is a loss for the government and a win for Mr. Sigelman.

Trial had gone badly for the government. The government’s star witness lied on the stand and admitted to it, prompting the trial judge to ask, “Did you have a hallucination?” The FBI agent (the only other witness who had testified) admitted that the alleged Colombian “foreign official” at the center of the government’s case was allowed to travel from the United States to Colombia without facing arrest. It was a debacle, as many of the government’s prior FCPA prosecutions have been.

DOJ nonetheless issued a press release trumpeting Mr. Sigelman’s plea and the pending related cases.  The press release, and the government’s decision to spin an embarrassing loss, is silly.

By contrast, Mr. Sigelman’s defense team issued their own press release, which actually discussed the events at trial, and is well worth reading.

The government’s approach is even sillier when its collapse at trial is compared to the pomposity in its initial press release (still on the DOJ’s website). When the complaint was unsealed back in early 2014, DOJ’s press release ‘warned,’ “[W]e are not going away.”

This type of overheated press release rhetoric is not new for DOJ, unfortunately. When the Government made arrests in its FCPA Gabon “sting” case, then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated, “[T]hese actions are a turning point.” And he quipped at a press conference, “This is one case where what happens in Vegas didn’t stay in Vegas.” It turns out that the turning point was trial: that case ended in a complete victory for the accused individuals.

Government exaggeration is not limited to FCPA cases of course. Back in 2013, U.S. District Judge Richard Sullivan mockingly read a press release from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York at a conference on white collar crime. Judge Sullivan commented that the press release “sounds like the theme from Mighty Mouse,” and said that the release “seems to be designed for tabloid consumption.” The press release in the government’s failed prosecution of Mr. Sigelman is part of a trend.

But it’s not just that the DOJ release is silly.

It is also offensive to the spirit of justice. The release is written as though all the things that went badly at trial for DOJ never happened. It fails to mention the lies of the cooperator whom the government had decided to embrace. In doing so, it is a clear demonstration that the DOJ press office does not exist to inform the public, but to serve as the propaganda arm of DOJ.

Moreover, consider this: if a publicly traded company issued a press release that contained a material omission, the company may be the subject of criminal prosecution. The release in the Sigelman prosecution unapologetically embraces selective disclosure and deliberate omissions. If we accept the premise that the DOJ ought to do justice (as opposed to simply trying to win), then the DOJ ought to have a duty to keep the public informed about all aspects of its enforcement program.

Just because DOJ alleges it, doesn’t mean it’s true. Reciting it again in a press release doesn’t mean it’s true. Finally, just because the DOJ secures a plea agreement does not necessarily represent a success.  Stated differently, if it smells like a loss, looks like a loss and everyone who followed the case knows it is a loss, it is still a loss.

So why has the DOJ struggled when put to its burden in individual enforcement actions while racking up numerous corporate enforcement actions?

It is one thing for the DOJ to process a corporate voluntary disclosure of an investigation conducted by mid-level associates at FCPA, Inc. As Judge Irenas commented to the DOJ at Mr. Sigelman’s sentencing, “You had PetroTiger through the investigation done by Sidley & Austin, basically dumped – dumped the case in your lap.”

It’s another thing entirely for the DOJ to actually prove up its case against an adversary.

The DOJ’s track record in FCPA cases when held to its burden of proof is poor.  Conversely, the defense’s track record is excellent.

The lesson to be drawn from Sigelman, despite the DOJ’s silly press release, is the reminder that trial is the great equalizer.

Let’s Pause Before We Dole Out Dollars

Thursday, May 14th, 2015

Out of thin airPrevious posts here and here addressed the calls of some that settlement amounts in an FCPA enforcement action be, at least in part, returned to the so-called victims of the underlying bribery.

Today’s post is from Joe Murphy.

Murphy is the author of 501 Ideas for Your Compliance and Ethics Program (SCCE; 2008) and a frequent commentator on compliance issues.


There was recently an online posting championing the idea of the Department of Justice using some of the $9 billion criminal penalty imposed on one company for violations of sanctions against Sudan, Iran and Cuba to compensate victims of the regimes in those countries.  The Department would explore who those victims were and determine how to compensate them.

As a student of political science, I find this worrisome.  Any figure with that many zeros behind it is real money.  And, it can fairly be said, that money is a form of power.  Here we would have unelected enforcement officials making policy decisions about how to spend large pools of funds. Determining exactly who were the victims of such systemic violations is not simply an administrative task; there will be important policy decisions to be made, including matters of foreign policy.

When the fines were small this could be considered an incidental function. But when the amounts are in the billions, this is cause for much more consideration. Sure, we are often frustrated by the slow process of legislative deliberation, but that is the governmental system we have chosen. The raising and allocation of funds is subject to a system of checks and balances.  We live in a democracy, not a government of selected elites who choose to spend money as they think best. Enforcement officials should be enforcing the law and taking steps to prevent violations. Courts should be hearing disputes and resolving conflicts. But they are not legislatures and should not be selecting where to dole out billions of dollars in funds.

As the size of criminal fines has ballooned we have passed the point where this issue can be ignored.  There are serious policy issues.  If, on the one hand, the funds were simply added to the general funds of the government we would also have the troublesome issue of law enforcement being converted into a revenue-raising operation.  This specter is seen in Europe, where the EU’s competition law enforcers sometimes seem more like revenue agents than public servants dedicated to preventing violations. Consider the institutional bias this would introduce if an enforcement agency is a funding source for government operations.  Instead of having an incentive to stamp out violations, there would at least appear to be an opposite interest:  let the violations ripen into large cases so there is more revenue to harvest.

On the other hand, if the proceeds go elsewhere, then what is done with the money and who decides?  In the US at the federal level the proceeds go to victim reimbursement.  But as the cases deal with systematic violations or ones where victims are not clearly defined, this is not so easy.  When the violations are not simply theft, how do we determine who the victims are?  Who makes those decisions?  Is there a process in place capable of handling this?  And in a system where the victims are capable of pursuing their own compensation through litigation, what happens to the penalty funds generated by government?

If enforcers are allocating billions of dollars, can lobbying for that money be far behind?  What alert non-profit would pass up the opportunity to have access to those funds? And, as the enforcers should know well, dealing in those sums eventually invites fraud.  Will the enforcers require reports on how the funds were spent?  Will they audit or investigate this?  Will they then be allocating resources to monitor their grants to the victims and those who purport to benefit the victims?  Is this a business we want enforcers conducting?

Giving this level of power to enforcement officials should at least cause us to stop and think more about the process. They were not trained in how to do this, they were not selected for this, and they are not accountable to the public for what they do. Up until now, this question has not only not been answered, but for the most part it is not even being asked.  I find this at least a cause for concern.

Book Review – “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act In A New Era”

Tuesday, May 12th, 2015

New EraToday’s post is a book review by Professor Peter Reilly (Texas A&M University School of Law and author of several FCPA articles) of my book “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act In A New Era.”  The review originally appeared in a recent volume of International Trade Law and Regulation.


The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New Era, by law professor Mike Koehler, provides a fascinating and thorough analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).  But the book does far more than that; this volume attempts to educate readers in such a manner that they understand not only the motivation and thought processes behind the initial passage of the Act, but also the ongoing policy debates surrounding this important and controversial piece of legislation.

While some books on the FCPA appear to target a particular audience, such as academics for example, this volume will prove useful to anyone, in whatever field, who wants to thoroughly understand the past, present, and future of the FCPA, whether that person is engaged in business, law, government, academia, public policy, or any other pursuit or profession.

Professor Koehler’s insightful presentation and analysis of material on the FCPA likely comes from his unique background in the field.  Prior to academia, Koehler was an FCPA attorney in private practice where he advised clients on FCPA compliance matters, conducted FCPA investigations around the globe, and negotiated resolutions to FCPA enforcement actions with government agencies including the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  Professor Koehler explains how his work in private practice led to an intense interest in “asking the why questions” regarding the FCPA and “injecting a candid and informed scholarly voice into the issues.”

This, in turn, led to a career in academia with a near-singular focus on mastering the complex and fascinating topics surrounding the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws and initiatives.  In this capacity, Koehler has testified before the U.S. Congress on the FCPA, published articles on the topic in leading law reviews and journals, been cited in legal briefs, judicial decisions, policy papers, and Congressional testimony, and been a featured source in various national and international media.  In short, Professor Koehler has become one of the most knowledgeable and influential thinkers in the field, both domestically and internationally, and this volume represents the fruit of a number of years of thoughtful research, writing, and teaching on the subject.

The depth and breadth of material covered in the book is ambitious, including the FCPA’s legislative history; enforcement agency policies and practices, including various alternative dispute resolution vehicles commonly used by enforcement agencies; FCPA legal authority, as well as administrative and other sources of guidance concerning the law; the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, as well as its books and records and internal controls provisions; reasons for the increase in FCPA enforcement during the past decade; compliance and best practices information; and suggested FCPA reform measures.

At the beginning of the book, Professor Koehler sets forth numerous questions, many of which could take an entire law review article to answer.   These questions include: (1) Who decides what bribery is? (2) Are business organizations that are subject to FCPA scrutiny ‘bad’ or ‘unethical’? (3) Is it still ‘bribery’ if the conduct in question was supported by the highest levels of the U.S. government? (4) If bribery is ‘bad,’ does that mean that all attempts to punish bribery and deter future misconduct are ‘good’? (5) Why has FCPA enforcement increased to the point that it is now a top legal and compliance concern for companies doing business in the global marketplace? (6) Has the quantity of FCPA enforcement actions become a higher priority for enforcement agencies than the quality of those actions? (7) Why does FCPA compliance remain difficult for even the most well-managed and well-intentioned companies? (8) Has this ‘new era’ of FCPA enforcement actually resulted in wasteful over compliance, with companies viewing every foreign business partner with irrational suspicion? (9) Is this ‘new era’ of FCPA enforcement—along with the ‘thriving and lucrative anti-bribery complex’ that has emerged simultaneously—desirable from a legal or policy perspective? (10) Has this ‘new era’ of FCPA enforcement been successful in actually reducing bribery?  And if not, could the FCPA be amended, or could certain enforcement agency policies and procedures be revised, in order to better achieve the original aims of the FCPA?

The book addresses the issues surrounding these questions at a surprisingly detailed and in-depth level, especially with respect to those questions requiring answers that are more subtle and complex in nature.  The fact is there can be strong disagreement regarding the answers to many of these questions.  One of the more interesting aspects of studying the FCPA is to consider how much a person’s political or economic interests can influence his or her reasoning in answering the various questions posed by Koehler.  The key is that Professor Koehler, ever the law school teacher who is more fond of questioning, probing, and analyzing an issue than of trying to force feed his own conclusions in the matter, concentrates on building knowledge and skill-level within readers so they themselves can successfully grapple with the questions presented in the book, as well as their own questions involving the FCPA.

Specifically, Professor Koehler relies on numerous vehicles and texts to build what he calls “FCPA goggles” for readers, enabling them to understand the FCPA to the extent necessary to make their own assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the law, and to be able to pinpoint areas where the FCPA might be changed for improvement.  Readers are introduced to the FCPA’s statutory text, legislative history, judicial decisions, enforcement agency guidance, and various enforcement actions.  Koehler believes that analyzing these various authorities, and figuring out their impact upon how the FCPA is understood and enforced, are key aspects of providing readers with the knowledge they need to continue their own questioning, probing, and analyzing of this controversial law.  As Professor Koehler says to the reader, “[W]ith your FCPA goggles you now have a sharper focus to critically analyze various aspects of this new era, including whether the current FCPA and its enforcement best advance the laudable objectives of the FCPA.”

It is these ‘FCPA goggles’ that allow readers to judge the two suggestions for reform put forth by Professor Koehler toward the end of the volume:  a compliance defense, as well as the abolition of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (NPAs and DPAs) within the context of FCPA enforcement.  I will leave it to readers of the book to determine for themselves, through their own ‘FCPA goggles,’ whether Koehler has made a strong case for either suggested reform measure.  I will say, however, that Professor Koehler seems to be aware that he has well-equipped readers to subject his ideas to deep and knowledgeable scrutiny based upon what he has taught them to that point in the book.  With that in mind, Koehler has to carefully explain why, for example, a compliance defense is neither a new nor novel idea; how in some respects the Department of Justice already recognizes a ‘de facto’ compliance defense; how numerous former high-ranking government officials support such a defense; and which important policy objectives would be advanced through an FCPA compliance defense.  Koehler builds and bolsters his argument by relying upon various testimony and legal and policy authority.  It almost feels like an academic ‘capstone’ exercise for the book, where the Professor puts forth his arguments and then turns to the reader/student and asks, “Have I done what I set out to do in this project?  Are you now able to thoroughly question, analyze, and criticize my arguments based upon what you have learned through this book?”

The answer is unequivocally yes; and the contribution this new volume makes to the field is unequivocally substantial.


For additional reviews of the book, see here.

To order a hard copy of the book, see here and here; to order an e-copy of the book, see here and here.