Simply Inexcusable

The government holds those subject to the FCPA to high standards.  If the proverbial “right hand” in a company doesn’t know what the “left hand” is doing, the government is likely to call that an internal control failure.

In this post earlier this week regarding Ralph Lauren Corp.’s (RLC) FCPA enforcement action, it was noted that the RLC enforcement action was a rare instance of an issuer not previously disclosing its FCPA scrutiny.  Thus, the first instance of public scrutiny appears to have been announcement of the enforcement action on Monday morning.  RLC’s stock dipped approximately 2% on the news and closed at $165.93.  The “FCPA dip” lasted only a day, as Tuesday the stock rebounded and then some and closed yesterday at $175.38.

Reading Stack

A good weekend to all.

First, what to make of this month’s enforcement activity?  Quite frankly, not much as I told Samuel Rubenfeld (Wall Street Journal) last week in this article.  Much of this “new” enforcement activity is really not ”new.”  For instance, the BizJet individual enforcement actions were filed in 2011 and in 2012, but recently unsealed.  Parker Drilling disclosed last year its settlement and the amount, it just took a while for resolution documents to be finalized.  It was publicly reported last year that former Siemens executive Uriel Sharef was going to settle the SEC enforcement action, it just took a while for the resolution documents to be finalized.  And finally, the charges against Rothschild and Pierucci discussed below were filed last year, but recently unsealed.

This post summarizes the Rothschild information (dated November 2, 2012) and plea agreement (dated November 2, 2012) and then the Pierucci indictment (dated November 27, 2012).

Pierucci, a French national, has been identified as a current executive of Alstom and he was arrested on April 14th at JFK airport in New York City.  Rothschild is a former vice president of sales for Alstom Power Inc., a Connecticut-based subsidiary of Alstom.

According to this report, Alstom said in a statement that it “has been working  constructively with the Justice Department for the last two years to address allegations of past misconduct.” It went on to say that Pierucci, its current executive, is entitled to the presumption of innocence.  “We urge everyone to respect the judicial process, which will provide a full  and fair opportunity for the facts to be adjudicated,” the statement read.

Rothschild Information

The conduct at issue concerned the Tarahan coal-fired steam power plant project in Indonesia.  According to the charging documents Perusahaan Listrik Negara (“PLN”) “the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Indonesia and an ‘agency’ and ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government [...] was responsible for sourcing the Tarahan Project.

The officials allegedly involved were.

“Official 1  … a member of Parliament in Indonesia [who] had influence over the award of contracts by PLN, including on the Tarahan Project”

“Official 2 … a high-ranking official at PLN [who] had broad decision-making authority and influence over the award of contracts by PLN, including on the Tarahan Project”

“Official 3 … an official at PLN [who] was a high-ranking member of the evaluation committee for the Tarahan Project.  Official 3 had broad decision-making authority and influence over the award of the Tarahan contract.”

The information charges one count of conspiracy and alleges that Rothschild and others, between 2002 through 2009, conspired to make “corrupt payments to a member of Parliament in Indonesia, officials at PLN, and others in order to obtain and retain business related to the Tarahan Project on behalf of the following entities and in violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Alstom

Alstom Power Inc.

Power Company Switzerland – an indirect subsidiary of Alstom.

Power Company Indonesia – an indirect subsidiary of Alstom.

Consortium Partner – “a trading company … headquartered in Japan, incorporated in Japan, an in the business of providing power generation related services around the world.”  According to the information, this entity “acted as the partner” of the above Alstom entities “in the bidding and carrying out of the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”  Consortium Partner would sure seem to be Marubeni Corp. of Japan.  (See here for its 2004 press release concerning the Tarahan Project).  This will be interesting to follow as Marubeni in 2012 resolved an FCPA enforcement action concerning conduct at Bonny Island, Nigeria (see here for the prior post) and is currently under a two year DPA.

Specifically the information alleges various telephone and e-mail communications between Rothschild and others concerning the alleged bribe payments and efforts to “conceal the payments to foreign officials by entering into consulting agreements with Consultant A (described as a “consultant who purportedly provided consulting related services [for the above companies] in connection with the Tarahan Project in Indonesia”) and Consultant B (same description) in order to disguise the bribe payment to the foreign officials.”

All of the alleged overt acts in the information allegedly occurred between 2002 and 2004, although the information does allege the following wire transfers:

In 2005 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.'s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2006 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.'s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2007 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.'s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2009, “66,688″ from [Alstom Power Inc.'s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

Other individuals generically identifed in the information include the following.

“Executive A – Senior Vice President for the Asia Region at [Alstom].  Executive A’s responsibilities at [Alstom] included oversight of [Alstom's] and [Alstom's] subsidiaries’ efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers in Asia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Executive B – who held executive level positions at [Alstom Power Inc.] and [Alstom], including Vice President of Global Sales [this is Pierucci].  Executive B’s responsibilities at [Alstom Power Inc.] included oversight of [Alstom Power Inc.] efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers around the world, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee A - Vice President of Regional Sale at [Alstom Power Inc.]  Employee’s A’s responsibilities at [Alstom Power Inc.] included obtaining contracts with new customers retaining contracts with existing customers in various countries, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee B – the General Manager of Power Company Indonesia.  Employee B’s responsibilities at Power Company Indonesia including obtaining contracts with new customers and retaining contracts with existing customers in Indonesia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee C – Director of Sales at Power Company Indonesia. Employee C’s responsibilities at Power Company Indonesia including obtaining contracts with new customers and retaining contracts with existing customers in Indonesia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

In the plea agreement, Rothschild pleaded guilty to the one count information charging him with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  According to the plea agreement, the offense carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.  Other than setting forth the DOJ’s recommendation that the court reduce by two levels Rothschild’s offense level “based on the defendant’s prompt recognition and affirmative acceptance of person responsibility,” the plea agreement does not set forth any further specifics concerning sentencing.

Pierucci Indictment

The indictment is based on the same core set of facts alleged above in the Rothschild information.  Because it is an indictment, and not an information, the Pierucci indictment is more detailed and indeed contains additional charges beyond the one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  In addition, Pierucci is charged with four substantive counts of FCPA anti-bribery violations, money laundering conspiracy and four substantive counts of money laundering.

In the indictment, the DOJ alleges that “Pierucci was one of the people responsible for approving the selection of, and authorizing payments to, Consultants A and B, knowing that a portion of the payments to Consultants A and B was intended for Indonesian officials in exchange for their influence and assistance in awarding the Tarahan Project contract to [Alstom] and its subsidiaries.”

The indictment further alleges that Pierucci and others “came to the conclusion that Consultant A was not effectively bribing key Indonesian officials” and accordingly in 2003 Pierucci and others concluded “that Consultant A would be responsible only for paying bribes to Official 1, a member of the Indonesian Parliament” and that Alstom and its subsidiaries would retain another consultant to pay bribes to PLN officials.”

In this release, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman stated as follows.

“Frederic Pierucci and David Rothschild allegedly used outside consultants to bribe foreign officials in Indonesia in exchange for lucrative power contracts.  Stamping out foreign bribery is a Justice Department priority, and we are determined to continue our vigorous enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

The year was 1982 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was nearing five years old.  Up to this point, enforcement was sparse and focused on single-actor type cases.  See here, here, here, here and here for FCPA enforcement actions up to this point.

In 1982, the first FCPA mega-case was brought and it involved five corporate defendants and twelve individual defendants.

Specifically, in October 1982, the DOJ brought an indictment (here) against:

• Crawford Enterprises Inc. (“CEI”) (a Houston based private company that sold compression equipment systems to oil and gas companies);
• Donald Crawford (CEI’s Chairman and sole shareholder and, at certain relevant times, CEI’s President);
• William Hall (CEI’s Executive Vice President and, at certain relevant times, CEI’s President);
• Ricardo Beltran (President and majority shareholder of Grupo Industrial Delta, a Mexican corporation);
• Mario Gonzalez (a U.S. citizen who assisted Grupo Delta and CEI communicate with certain alleged foreign officials);
• Andres Garcia (a U.S. citizen who assisted Grupo Delta and CEI communicate with certain alleged foreign officials);
• George McLean (Vice President of Solar Turbines International (“Solar”), a division of International Harvester Company);
• Luis Uriarte (the Latin American Regional Manager of Solar);
• Al Eyester (President of Ruston Gas Turbines “Ruston”);and
• James Smith (Vice President of Ruston).

The indictment charged a conspiracy between the defendants and others to pay money to Mexican foreign officials and Grupo Delta “knowing that all or a portion of such money would be offered, given or promised directly or indirectly” to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing the acts and decisions of the officials “in their official capacity, and inducing them to use their influence with Pemex so as to affect and influence the acts and decisions of Pemex in order to assist” Crawford, the other defendants, and others in “obtaining or retaining business with Pemex.”

The indictment alleges that Petroleos Mexicanos (“Pemex”) was the “national oil company wholly owned by the Government of the Republic of Mexico and was responsible for the exploration and production of all of the oil and natural gas resources of Mexico and for acquiring the equipment, including compression equipment systems, necessary for such exploration and production.”

The indictment alleged that “Pemex was an instrumentality of a foreign government” and that two individuals (Ignacio de Leon and Jesus Chavarria) were “foreign officials” based on their positions of “subdirector of Pemex responsible for the purchase of goods and equipment on behalf of Pemex” and “subdirector of Pemex responsible for the exploration and production of Mexican oil and natural gas.”

[As an aside, it should be noted that in the recent "foreign official" challenges, the DOJ has argued that its charging decision in the Crawford cases as to Pemex demonstrated the validity of its position that employees of SOEs are "foreign officials" under the FCPA.  For instance, the recent FCPA Guidance states that the SEC and DOJ ‘‘have pursued cases involving instrumentalities since the time of the FCPA’s enactment’’ and that the ‘‘second-ever FCPA case charged by the DOJ’’ involved bribes to executives of the Mexican national oil company.  

However being consistently wrong, does not make one right and, as noted in my article "Grading the FCPA Guidance," missing from the Guidance discussion or associated citations on this issue, is any reference to the fact that George McLean, the only defendant in the series of related cases to put DOJ to its burden of proof at trial, was found not guilty by the jury.]

The conspiracy charge alleged that CEI and Crawford agreed to pay and paid the “foreign officials” “bribes equalling approximately 4.5% of each Pemex purchase order for compression equipment systems in which” CEI participated and that “it was further a part of the conspiracy” that CEI and Crawford arranged with defendants Beltran, Gonzalez and Garcia that Grupo Delta would: “(a) hold itself out as the Mexican agent of CEI, while in truth acting primarily as the conduit for the bribe payments; (b) disguise the bribe payments as ‘commissions’ due by providing to CEI false and fictitious invoice for each payment received; and (c) provide Gonzalez and Garcia with a base of operations from which to perform their function as middlemen and channels of communications between the co-conspirators” and the foreign officials.”

The indictment further alleged that the defendants used the term “folks” as a code word for the “foreign officials” “in order to conceal from others their true identities as Pemex officials and the existence of the bribe scheme.”  The indictment alleged that “in order to create a pool of money with which to pay bribes” CEI along with Solar and Ruston “submitted to Pemex bids which were inflated to include a 4.5% markup for the “folks.”

The indictment alleged that CEI, along with Solar and Ruston received purchase orders from Pemex for compression equipment systems in the approximate amount of $225 million and that approximately $10 million in bribe payments were made to the “foreign officials” as part of the bribery scheme.

In addition to the conspiracy charge, the indictment also alleged approximately fifty substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations against various combinations of the defendants.  The indictment also charged CEI, Crawford and Hall with an obstruction charge based on allegations that the defendants destroyed certain documents relevant to a grand jury subpoena.

Media reports described the action as the first major criminal investigation under the FCPA.  According to the reports, in November 1982, CEI, Crawford, Hall, Garcia, McLean, Uriate, and Eyster pleaded not guilty.  Crawford and Hall stated that while commission payments were made to Grupo, no such bribes were paid to Pemex officials.

CEI released a statement which said that “despite vigorous and repeated denials by Crawford Enterprises of any wrongdoing in connection with these allegations, the investigation has continued for nearly 3.5 years.”  The company said that Pemex and the Mexican government had looked into similar charges and found no wrongdoing in the award of Pemex contracts to Crawford.  The company’s statement further indicated as follows.  “Four factors accounted for CEI’s success in becoming one of Pemex’s principal gas compression contractors:  its proven experience in the industry; its aggressive delivery schedules that other firms simply could not match; its maintenance and repair of equipment installed in Mexico; and the lower costs to Pemex as a result of all the above.”

Prior to the above-reference October 1982 indictment, in September 1982 the DOJ charged Ruston Gas Turbines Inc., C.E. Miller Corporation and Charles Miller based on the same core set of allegations.  The DOJ charged Ruston Gas Turbines in a one count criminal information (see here) with a substantive FCPA violation and the company pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a $750,000 fine (see here).  The DOJ charged C.E. Miller Corporation and Miller (President, Chairman of the Board, and majority shareholder of the company) in a one count criminal information charging substantive FCPA violations and aiding and abetting FCPA violations. (See here).  C.E. Miller Corporation and Miller both pleaded guilty and the company was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine and placed on probation for three years (see here) and Miller was sentenced to three years probation (see here).

Prior to the above-referenced September 1982 charges, in May 1981 the DOJ charged Gary Bateman (an International Sales Manager for CEI and also Chairman of the Board, President and sole shareholder of Applied Process Products Overseas, Inc.) in a multi-count information (see here) charging various misdemeanor violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act concerning the transportation of money to Mexico in connection with the bribery scheme.  Bateman pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a civil penalty of approximately $330,000.  In January 1983, the DOJ also charged Applied Process Products Overseas, Inc. in a one-count information (here) charging a substantive FCPA violation based on the same core set of allegations.  The company pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.  (See here).

After the above-referenced October 1982 charges, in November 1982 the DOJ also filed a criminal information against International Harvester (see here).  The information was based on the same core set of allegations as set forth above and based on the conduct of its employees McLean and Uriarte.  International Harvester pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA (see here) and was ordered to pay a $10,000 fine and agreed to also pay $40,000 civil cost reimbursement.

The DOJ’s offer of proof in the International Harvester case (see here) contained the following statement.

“After Solar had agreed to participate and to cooperate with CEI, and pursuant to the 1977 enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [International Harvester's long-standing Policy on Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Business Conduct] was revised and supplemented to affirm that improper payments prohibited by the Act were also prohibited as a matter of company policy.  In 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980, through an annual audit process, each International Harvester managerial employee was required to certify his or her compliance and to report any action that might conflict with company policy for review by the Office of the General Counsel and corrective action, if warranted.  During those years, Uriarte and McLean each reported in the annual audit process that he was aware of International Harvester policy and had taken no action in violation thereof.  Insofar as each of them participated in the conspiracy described herein, he accordingly concealed from International Harvester his participation and the participation of the Solar Turbine Division.  Neither Solar employee held a position which required him to report to International Harvester management.  There has been no evidence that any officers, directors or management of International Harvester knew of or participated in the conspiracy charged.”

In January 1983, the DOJ charged Marquis King (an officer and director of C.E. Miller) in a one-count information charging a misdemeanor violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act concerning the transportation of money to Mexico in connection with the bribery scheme. (See here).  King pleaded guilty and he was sentenced to 14 months probation and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.  (See here).

In June 1985, CEI pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations.  (See here).  CEI agreed to pay a $10,000 criminal fine as to the conspiracy charge and $75,000 as to each of the 46 substantive charges for a total fine amount of $3,460,000.  At the same time, the following defendants pleaded nolo contendere:  Donald Crawford, Al Eyster, James Smith, Andres Garcia, and William Hall.  Crawford pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $309,000 (see here); Eyster pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 41 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $5,000 (see here); Smith pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 44 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $5,000 (see here); Garcia pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $75,000 (see here); and Hall pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 32 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $150,000 (see here).

That leaves McLean and Uriarte.  Stay tuned for the rest of the story.

Of further note from this enforcement action, Pemex filed a civil suit in U.S. District Court in Houston against Crawford, CEI, the two foreign officials, and twelve others in a bid to recover monies allegedly extracted from Pemex.  In its complaint, Pemex sought several million dollars in both compensatory and punitive damages from Crawford and the other entities based upon the same conduct that was alleged in the DOJ enforcement actions.  Pemex’s suit was based upon alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,  the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  Pemex also asserted causes of actions based upon commercial bribery and common law fraud.  Various of the defendants in the civil action sought relevant documents from Pemex and it was ultimately held in contempt for not producing the documents.  For additional background on this case, see 643 F.Supp. 370; 826 F.2d 392.

Two years ago today, for the first time in FCPA history a motion to dismiss was filed, with the benefit of a detailed and complete overview of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history on the “foreign official” element (see here for my declaration) ,challenging the DOJ’s interpretation that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.

The Carson ”foreign official” challenge lead to other “foreign official” challenges in the Lindsey Manufacturing and John O’Shea matters, as well as the 11th Circuit appeal pending in the Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez matter – the first time in FCPA history that “foreign official” will be directly before an appeals court.  You of course are entitled to your own opinion as to the end results in the Carson, Lindsey Manufacturing and O’Shea matters, including whether “foreign official” impacted the results.  (See prior posts here and here).

It is interesting to note that since the Carson ”foreign official” challenge two years ago, there has been no new case in which an individual has been charged with an FCPA anti-bribery violation based on the theory that SOE employees are “foreign officials.”

February 21, 2012

One year ago today, the DOJ moved to dismiss the Africa Sting cases after suffering several losses in the first two sets of trials.   (See here for the prior post).  The dismissal occurred shortly after the jury foreman in the second trial wrote this guest post published on FCPA Professor.

In granting the DOJ’s motion, Judge Richard Leon stated as follows.

“This appears to be the end of a long and sad chapter in the annals of white collar criminal enforcement.  Unlike takedown day in Las Vegas, however, there will be no front page story in the New York Times or the Post for that matter tomorrow reflecting the government’s decision today to move to dismiss the charges against the remaining defendants in this case.  Funny isn’t it what sells newspapers.

The good news, however, is that for these defendants, agents, prosecutors, defense counsel and the Court we can get on with our professional and personal lives without the constant strain and burden of three to four more eight week trials hanging over our heads.

I for one hope this very long, and I’m sure very expensive, ordeal will be a true learning experience for both the Department and the FBI as they regroup to investigate and prosecute FCPA cases against individuals in the future.

Two years ago, at the very outset of this case I expressed more than my fair share of concerns on the record regarding the way this case has been charged and was being prosecuted.  Later, during the two trials that I presided over I specifically commented again on the record regarding the government’s very, very aggressive conspiracy theory that was pushing its already generous elasticity to its outer limits.  Of course, in the second trial that elastic snapped in the absence of the necessary evidence to sustain it.

In addition, in that same trial, I expressed on a number of occasions my concerns regarding the way this case had been investigated and was conducted especially vis-a-vis the handling of Mr. Bistrong.  I even had an occasion, sadly, to chastise the government in a situation where the government’s handling of the discovery process constituted sharp practices that have no place in a federal courtroom.

Notwithstanding all of this water over the dam, and there has been a lot of water, I’m happy to see and I applaud the Department for having the wisdom and courage of its convictions to face up to the limitations of its case as revealed in the past 26 weeks of trial and the courage to do the right thing under the circumstances.

Having served at the higher levels of the Department, I know that that was not an easy decision.  They never are, when so much has been invested, and the agents and the prosecutors are so convinced of the righteousness of their position.  I for one however am confident this will be in the end a positive, if not painful, lesson that results in better prosecutions of individuals in the future under the FCPA.  As for the defendants, I hope the healing process is a swift one and that they get back to their normal lives in the very near future.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the tireless and spirited effort by the defense counsel from all over the country who came here to try these very lengthy and complicated cases under difficult circumstances and some even pro bono.  Their hard work and effective advocacy are a testament to how strong our criminal defense bar is nationwide.

As so without further adieu I grant the government’s motion to dismiss.  The defendants are excused.”

From the SEC Chairman

SEC Chairman Elisse Walter stated as follows earlier this week (see here) in opening a Foreign Bribery and Corruption Training Conference for law enforcement officials from around the world.

“[W]e have found that corrupt practices by a registered company are generally indicators of larger problems within the business – problems with the potential to harm that business’s shareholder-owners.  Bribery and other corrupt practices may result in accounting fraud and falsified disclosures where shareholders are not getting an accurate picture of a company’s finances in their regulatory filings.  Bribery means losing control of – or deliberately falsifying – books and records.  Often, key executives or board members are kept in the dark, limiting their ability to make informed decisions about the company’s business. Obviously, engaging in corrupt practices means weakening or circumventing internal control mechanisms, leaving a company less able to detect and end not just corruption but other questionable practices. A company that has lost its moral compass is in grave danger of losing its competitive roadmap, as well – while shareholders are kept in the dark.”

Congress Is Capable

Well, at least as to certain issues.

Such as introducing and passing laws that expressly describe state-owned entities (“SOEs”).  In reading my historical account of the FCPA’s legislative history, “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” or my “foreign official” declaration here, you will learn that despite being aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting a capability for drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, and despite being provided a more precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose not to include such definitions or concepts in S. 305, the bill that ultimately became the FCPA in December 1977.

This prior post highlighted Congress’s capability in capturing SOEs in Dodd-Frank Section 1504 and along comes another example which demonstrates that Congress is capable of legislating as to SOEs.  Recently, H.R.491 - the Global Online Freedom Act of 2013 was introduced in the House.  The purpose of the bill is “To prevent United States businesses from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance, to fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of United States businesses, and for other purposes.”

The bill defines “foreign official” as follows.

The term ‘foreign official’ means– (A) any officer or employee of a foreign government or of any department; and (B) any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of, or acting under color of law with the knowledge of, any such government or such department, agency, state-owned enterprise, or instrumentality.” (emphasis added).

It is a basic premise of statutory construction that Congress is presumed not to use redundant or superfluous language.  Granted, H.R.491 is not yet law, but let’s assume it becomes law as introduced.   If instrumentality includes SOEs (as the enforcement agencies maintain), then Congress will violate this legislative maxim by using redundant or superfluous language in H.R. 491.

Adding To The List

The Heritage Foundation recently published (here) a speech by Peter Hansen titled “Unleashing the U.S. Investor in Africa: A Critique of U.S. Policy Toward the Continent.”  Hansen critiqued U.S. government thinking about African development, including Ambassador statements that it is important to raise incentives for overly “cautious” U.S. companies to invest in Africa.  Hansen stated that this “mistaken assumption” assumed that ”mainstream U.S. companies will be motivated more by the prospect of higher rewards than by the diminishment of risks.”  He noted that this view is not just wrong, but counterproductive and stated as follows.

“The problem with Africa is not a lack of attractive prospects, but rather Africa’s risk profile. With few exceptions, sensible U.S. direct investors (that is, those who run projects, not just take portfolio positions) have steered clear of Africa for the simple reason that Africa’s risks often exceed their risk tolerance. The African market has been left largely to non-Americans, to the unsophisticated seekers of El Dorado, and to a legion of “chancers” who seek sweetheart deals with no money down. The resulting tales of woe coming out of Africa, due largely to poor investment planning or thwarted get-rich-quick schemes, serve wrongly to tarnish Africa’s reputation.  By exclusively raising incentives and failing to reduce risks, Ambassador Carson’s approach simply encourages those already prone to failure, without inspiring broad-spectrum investment by serious U.S. companies. Such bedrock U.S. firms do not need higher incentives. Africa already presents high-return opportunities. What serious U.S. firms need instead is for Africa’s risks to be reduced. Rewards that cannot be obtained are, after all, just mirages. The easiest way for the U.S. government to reduce risks for U.S. investors in Africa is to provide them with legal protection.  The basic legal tools for protecting U.S. investors are double tax treaties (DTTs), often called double tax agreements (DTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).”

Query whether an FCPA compliance defense should be added to this list?  See here to download my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense.”

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

This previous post highlighted the scrutiny Brookfield Asset Management (a Toronto based global asset management company with shares traded on the NYSE) was facing in Brazil concerning allegations that its subsidiary paid bribes to win construction permits.  As the Wall Street Journal recently reported (here), Sao Paulo, Brazil prosecutors filed civil charges against the company’s Brazilian subsidiary, two of its top executives and a former employee.  The prosecutor is quoted in the WSJ as saying that “Brookfield has created a high system of bribery in order to obtain approval for its projects quickly and with irregularities.”  A spokesman for the company stated as follows.  “These are unproven allegations made by a former employee.  We don’t believe Brookfield did anything wrong and we are cooperating with authorities.”

This previous post highlighted scrutiny of EADS subsidiary, GPT Special Management Systems in the U.K.  The Financial Times recently reported here that the FBI is also probing corruption allegations against GPT ”relating to a contract in Saudi Arabia.”  The article states as follows.  “The FBI has interviewed a witness and taken possession of documents in connection with allegations that GPT bribed Saudi military officials with luxury cars and made £11.5m of unexplained payments – some via the US – to bank accounts in the Cayman Islands.”

This recent Reuters article reports that Italian police arrested the head of defense group Finmeccanica SpA (Giuseppe Orsi) on a warrant alleging that he paid bribes to win an Indian contract.  According to the report, Prosecutors accuse Orsi of paying bribes to intermediaries to secure the sale of 12 helicopters in a 560 million euro ($749 million) deal when he was head of the group’s AgustaWestland unit.  Finmeccanica, which is approximately 30% owned by the Italian government, has ADRs registered with the SEC and AgustaWestland does extensive business in the U.S. (see here), including with the U.S. government.  According to this Wall Street Journal article, Italian prosecutors are also “investigating [Finmeccanica] on suspicion that it engaged in corrupt activities to win various types of contracts in Latin America, Asia, and at home.”

This recent Bloomberg article reports that “Eni SpA Chief Executive Officer Paolo Scaroni is being investigated for alleged corruption in an Italian probe of contracts obtained by its oil services company, Saipem SpA, in Algeria.”  Eni has ADRs registered with the SEC.  In 2010, Eni resolved (see here) an SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct.  In resolving the action, Eni consented to the entry of a court order permanently enjoining it from violating the FCPA’s books and record and internal controls provisions.

NCR Corporation stated in a recent release here, in pertinent part, as follows concerning its FCPA scrutiny.

“Update regarding OFAC and FCPA Investigations

The Company and the Special Committee of the  Company’s Board of Directors have each completed their respective internal investigations regarding the anonymous allegations received from a purported whistleblower regarding certain aspects of the Company’s business practices in China, the Middle East and Africa. The principal allegations relate to the Company’s compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and federal regulations that prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in certain activities in Syria.

[...]

The Company has made a presentation to the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission(“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) providing the facts known to the Company related to the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations, and advising the government that many of these allegations were unsubstantiated.  The Company’s investigations of the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations identified a few opportunities to strengthen the Company’s comprehensive FCPA compliance program, and      remediation measures were proposed and are being implemented.  As previously disclosed, the Company is responding to a subpoena of the SEC and requests of the DOJ for documents and information related to the FCPA, including matters related to the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations.”

Investigating the purported whistleblower’s allegations has been a costly exercise for NCR.  In a recent earnings conference call, company CFO Bob Fishman stated that the “overall cost” has been approximately $4.8 million.

Reading Stack

See here for the New York Times DealBook writeup of oral arguments in SEC v. Citigroup - an appeal which focuses of Judge Jed Rakoff’s concerns about common SEC settlements terms, including neither admith nor deny.

FCPA enforcement statistics are over-hyped for compliance assessments says Ryan McConnell (Morgan Lewis) in this Corporate Counsel article.  In this Corporate Counsel article, McConnell and his co-author compare 2012 to 2011 numbers in terms of facilitation payments data found in corporate policies.

The three types of employees one encounters when conducting FCPA training – here from Alexandra Wrage (President, Trace International).

If for no other reason, because of the picture associated with this recent post on thebriberyact.com.

*****

A good weekend to all.

In terms of the number of individual criminal defendants (9), the Haiti Teleco enforcement actions are the largest in FCPA history (minus the manufactured Africa Sting case).  The FCPA charges in the enforcement actions were based on the theory that Haiti Teleco was a “instrumentality ” of the Haitian government, such that Haiti Teleco employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  Seven of the defendants pleaded guilty and two of the defendants, Esquenazi and Rodriguez, exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial and were found guilty of FCPA and related charges.  As noted above, both defendants have appealed their convictions to the Eleventh Circuit.  [Disclosure - I am providing pro bono expert services to defendants' counsel, including my former law firm Foley & Lardner, relevant to the "foreign official" issue].

In addition to the FCPA (and related) charges brought against the above category of defendants, the DOJ also criminally charged three “foreign officials” in connection with the matter (see this prior post titled “Haiti Teleco Roundup” for additional details).  Two of the individuals pleaded guilty to non-FCPA offenses, and one “foreign official,” Jean Rene Duperval, was found guilty by a jury on various money laundering charges.

In short, 12 individuals were criminally charged, pleaded guilty, and/or were found guilty based, in whole or in part, on the theory that Haiti Teleco was an “instrumentality” of the Haitian government.

This prosecution theory of course is a main focus of the Esquenazi and Rodriguez appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.  As noted in this prior post, shortly after their convictions and before their current appeal, a stunning development occurred in the case as the Haitian Prime Minister (Jean Max Bellerive) authored a declaration, on behalf of the Haitian Ministry of Justice, concerning the “Legal Status of Teleco.”  (See here for the declaration).   The declaration asserted, among other things, that “Teleco has never been and until now is not a state enterprise.”  The declaration was dated ten days before the jury reached its verdict in the Esquenazi and Rodriguez trial and subsequent filings in the cases suggest that the origins of the declaration was in response to a letter sent by Paul Calli (Carlton Fields - then an attorney for Patrick Joseph (one of the “foreign officials” who pleaded guilty in the case)) inquiring about the status of Haiti Teleco and whether it was a private company or a government owned company.

In a further stunning development, and as noted in this prior post, after the Bellerive declaration surfaced, the DOJ contacted the Prime Minister and he filed a revised declaration (here), in which he backtracked from many of his prior declaration statements, and stated that he did not know his original declaration  “was going to be used in criminal legal proceedings in the United States or that it was going to be used in support of the argument that [...] Teleco was not part of the Public Administration of Haiti.”

The trial court judge in the Esquenazi and Rodriguez case denied defendants’ request for a new trial and this denial is among the issues on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.

And now for the interesting and notable recent development alluded to in this Main Justice story.

Duperval, the key “foreign official” at the center of the Haiti Teleco prosecutions, filed an appeal (here) in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this week challenging his convictions.  One issue on appeal is stated as follows.  “The evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Haiti Teleco was a government instrumentality and that Jean Rene Duperval was a foreign official as required to prove that a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act generated proceeds of a specified unlawful activity – a necessary predicate for the convictions on the money laundering conspiracy and substantive money laundering charges.”

Separately, Duperval’s brief discusses the Bellerive declarations in connection with his due process challenges.  Among other things, the brief notes that the DOJ’s “explanation and Bellerive’s statements in his second declaration, are nothing short of disingenuous, border on the nonsensical, and are expressly contradicted by the previous correspondence, which established that Bellerive signed the first declaration in response to an inquiry from an attorney representing Patrick Joseph …”.    The brief then asserts that “but for the government’s unjustified interference with Prime Minister Bellerive, Mr. Duperval could have availed himself of a favorable witness to demonstrate quite simply that Teleco was not a government instrumentality and he was not a foreign official.”

Duperval’s brief also challenges the sufficiency of the trial court evidence regarding “foreign official” and whether Duperval was a “foreign official as required to prove a charge of money laundering related to the proceeds of a violation of the FCPA.”  The substantive arguments on this issue largely mirror previous defense arguments in the Lindsey Manufacturing and Carson “foreign official” challenges as well as Esquenazi’s and Rodriguez’s arguments on appeal.  Duperval’s argument includes discussion and several citations to my “foreign official” declaration (see here).

Another interesting aspect of Duperval’s appeal is his challenge that the “trial court erred in not charging the jury in accordance with Duperval’s proffered theory of defense instruction.”  Specifically, Duperval argues that the trial court denied Duperval’s FCPA facilitation payments exception instruction.  The brief asserts that the “language in the instruction was extracted verbatim” from the FCPA and that there was “ample evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction.”

In this regard, it is interesting to note that in Judge Keith Ellison’s (S.D. Tex.) December 2012 Jackson / Ruehlen decision (see here for the prior post regarding the SEC enforcement action) he concluded, in what is believed to be an issue of first impression, that the SEC must bear the burden of negating the facilitation payments exception.

Without one, there can be no FCPA anti-bribery violation (civil or criminal).  Who were the “foreign officials” of 2012 (at least from an enforcement perspective – recognizing of course that the meaning of this key FCPA element is the subject of much on-going dispute including a historic appellate court challenge – see here for links to the briefing).

This post, describes the “foreign officials” from 2012 corporate DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions.

There were 12 core corporate enforcement actions in 2012.  Of the 12 enforcement actions, 5 (42%) involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities (“SOEs”).  These entities ranged from oil and gas companies, nuclear power plants, and airlines.  In 2011, 81% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 29-41).  In 2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 108-119).  In 2009, 66% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 410-44).  As to whether Congress intended employees of SOEs to be “foreign officials” under the FCPA, see here for my “foreign official” declaration.

Even though 42% of 2012 corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs, the bigger “foreign official” story from 2012 was the number of enforcement actions based, in whole or in part, on the enforcement theory that various foreign health care providers (such as physicians, nurses, mid-wives, lab personnel, etc.) are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  Of the 12 corporate enforcement actions in 2012, 6 (50%) involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers.  See here for a prior post on the origins and prominence of this enforcement theory.

Combining enforcement actions that involved, in whole or in part, SOE employees with enforcement actions that involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers, the result is 10 of 12 enforcement actions (83%).  The two exceptions are BizJet/Lufthansa and perhaps Oracle (although the SEC’s allegations as to “foreign officials” are general and vague).

The remainder of this post describes (as per DOJ/SEC allegations) the “foreign officials” of 2012.  As is apparent from the specific descriptions below, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other instances with virtually no specificity.

[Note:  certain of the enforcement actions below technically only involved FCPA books and records and internal control charges.  As most readers know, actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues.  Thus, even if an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, the actions remain very much about the "foreign officials" involved.  As I've said before, if an employee of a U.S. company consistently entertains his brother-in-law in the corporate suite and seeks reimbursement for "client entertainment" you will not be reading about this FCPA books and records and internal controls enforcement action]

Marubeni

DOJ

As in prior Bonny Island bribery enforcement actions, the “foreign officials”  were Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) officers and employees,  NLNG is majority owned by multinational oil companies and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) owns 49% of NLNG and “through the NLNG board members appointed by NNPC, among other means, the Nigerian government exercised control over NLNG, including but not limited to the ability to block the award of EPC contracts.”  In addition, the Marubeni enforcement action (like the prior enforcement actions) generically refer to the other Nigerian government officials.

Smith & Nephew

DOJ

“Greece has a national healthcare system wherein most Greek hospitals are publicly owned and operated.  Health care providers who work at publicly-owned hospitals (“HCPs”) are government employees, providing health care services in their officials capacities.  Therefore, such HCPs in Greece are “foreign officials” as that term in defined in the FCPA …”.

SEC

“Greece has a national health care system wherein most Greek hospitals are publicly-owned and operated.  Healthcare providers, including doctors, who work at publicly-owned hospitals are government employees, providing healthcare services in their official capacities. The public doctors in Greece are “foreign officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA”

BizJet / Lufthansa

DOJ

Foreign government customers, including the Mexican Federal Police, the Mexican President’s Fleet [the air fleet for the President of Mexico], Sinaola [the air fleet for the Governor of the Mexican State of Sinaloa], the Panama Aviation Authority, and other customers

The foreign officials are identified as follows:  Official 1 – “a Captain in the Mexican Federal Police,”  Official 2 – “a Colonel in the Mexican President’s Fleet,” Official 3 – “a Captain in the Mexican President’s Fleet,” Official 4 – “employed by the Mexican President’s Fleet,” Official 5 – “a Director of Air Services at Sinaloa,” and Official 6 – “a chief mechanic at the Panama Aviation Authority.”

Biomet

DOJ

“Argentina has a public healthcare system wherein approximately half of hospitals are publicly owned and operated.  Health care providers (“HCPs”) who work in the public sector are government employees, providing health care services in their official capacities.  Therefore, such HCPs in Argentina are ‘foreign officials’ as that term is defined in the FCPA.”  “Brazil has a socialized public healthcare system that provides universal health care to all Brazilian citizens, and the majority of hospitals are publicly-controlled.  HCPs who work in the public sector are government employees, providing health care services in their official capacities.  Therefore, such HCPs in Brazil are ‘foreign officials’ as that term is defined in the FCPA.”  “China has a national healthcare system wherein most Chinese hospitals are publicly owned and operated.  HCPs who work at publicly-owned hospitals are government employees, providing health care services in their official capacities.”

SEC

“public doctors employed by public hospitals and agencies in Argentina, Brazil, and China”

Data Systems and Solutions

DOJ

Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (“INPP”) is described as a “state-owned nuclear power plant in Lithuania and an ‘agency’ and ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government

The INPP employees are described as follows.  Official 1 (the Deputy Head of the Instrumentation & Controls Department at INPP with influence over the award of contracts); Official 2 (the Head of Instrumentation & Controls Department at INPP with influence over the award of contracts); Official 3 (the Director General at INPP with influence over the award of contracts); Official 4 (the Head of International Projects Department at INPP with influence over the award of contracts); and Official A (the lead software engineer at INPP with influence over the award of contracts).

Orthofix

DOJ

“Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (“IMSS”) was a social-service agency of the Mexican government that provided public services to Mexican workers and their families. IMSS was created in 1943 by order of the Mexican president, who continued to select IMSS’s head, and subsequent changes to IMSS programs were made by acts of Mexico’s legislature. IMSS provided health care services to tens of millions of people, including workers, their families, and pensioners, at hospitals that IMSS owned and operated throughout Mexico. Mexico’s government funded IMSS through taxation and compulsory contributions.”

“Mexican Official 1 – a deputy administrator of Magdelena de las Salinas (a hospital in Mexico City that IMSS owned and controlled)”

“Mexican Official 2 – the purchasing director of Magdelena de las Salinas”

“Mexican Official 3  – the purchasing director of Lomas Verdes (a hospital in the State of Mexico that IMSS owned and controlled)”

“Mexican Official 4 – a sub-director of IMSS”

SEC

“IMSS hospital employees”  [IMSS, the Mexican government-0wned medical care and social services provider], “certain IMSS officials”

NORDAM Group

DOJ

NPA refers to “customers in China including state-owned and -controlled entities, including airlines created, controlled, and exclusively owned by the People’s Republic of China.”

Pfizer

DOJ

“The manufacture, registration, distribution, sale, and prescription of pharmaceuticals were highly-regulated activities throughout the world. While there were multinational regulatory schemes, it was typical that each country established its own regulatory structure at a local, regional, and/or national level. These regulatory structures generally required the registration of pharmaceuticals and regulated labeling and advertising. Additionally, in certain countries, the government established lists of pharmaceuticals. that were approved for government reimbursement or otherwise determined those pharmaceuticals that might be purchased by government institutions. Moreover, countries often regulated the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals, pharmacies, and healthcare professionals. In those countries with national healthcare system, hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were generally agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments, and, thus, many of the healthcare professionals employed by these agencies and instrumentalities were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA.”

Croatian Official (a citizen of the Republic of Croatia who held official positions on government committees in Croatia and had influence over decisions concerning the registration and reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).

Russian Official 1 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a medical doctor employed by a public hospital who had influence over the Russian government’s purchase and prescription of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).

Russian Official 2 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a high-ranking government official who held official positions on government committees in Russia and had influence over decisions concerning the reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).

Russian Official 3 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who had influence over decisions concerning the treatment algorithms involving Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).

In addition to the above “foreign officials,” the information refers to “numerous [other] government officials, including physicians, pharmacologists and senior government officials, who were employed by foreign governments or instrumentalities of foreign governments, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia.”

SEC

“foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments” in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia.

 “foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments” in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia.

Tyco

DOJ

The information alleges: that Saudi Aramco (“Aramco”) was a Saudi Arabian oil and gas company that was wholly-owned, controlled, and managed by the government, and an ”agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Emirates National Oil Company (“ENOC”) was a state-owned entity in Dubai and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Vopak Horizon Fujairah (“Vopak”) was a subsidiary of ENOC based in the U.A.E. and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; and that the National Iranian Gas Company (“NIGC”) was a state-owned entity in Iran and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government.

“employees of end-customers in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Iran, including to employees at Aramco, ENOC, Vopak, and NIGC”

General references to payments customers, including government customers, in China, India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iran, Saudia Arabia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritania, Congo, Niger, Madagascar, and Turkey.

“designers at design institutes owned or controlled by the Chinese government”

“publicly-employed healthcare professionals” in China

“a former employee of Banjarmasin provincial level public water company (PDAM) [Indonesia] and two payments to the project manager for PDAM Banjarmasin in connection with the Banjarmasin Project”, employees of PLN [a state-owned electricity company in Indonesia],

“employees of a public utility owned by the Government of Vietnam”

“a security officer employed by a government-owned mining company in Mauritania”

publicly employed health care providers in Saudi Arabia

SEC

Similar to the DOJ’s allegations above.  In addition, the SEC complaint alleges the following additional “foreign officials”

an employee of an instrumentality of the Turkish government

an employee of a government-controlled entity in Malaysia

representatives of a company majority-owned by the Egyptian government

public health care providers in Poland

Oracle

SEC

General reference in the complaint to “Indian government end-users,” Indian “government customers” and a contract with India’s Ministry of Information Technology and Communication

Allianz

SEC

“employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia”

Eli Lilly

SEC

Chinese  ”government-employed physicians”

“government health officials in a Brazilian state”

payments to “a small charitable foundation that was founded and administered by the head of one of the regional [Poland] government health authorities”

Russia “government officials or others with influence in the government,”  ”the Cypriot entities were owned by an individual associated with the distributor controlled by the member of the upper house of Russia Parliament,” “the beneficial owner of [the relevant] entity was the General Director of the government-owned distributor.”

This previous guest post highlighted last week’s oral argument on the motion.

Yesterday, Judge Keith Ellison (S.D. Tex.) issued a lengthy 61 page decision (see here).

This post goes long and deep as to Judge Ellison’s decision.

Judge Ellison granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SEC’s claims that seek monetary damages while denying the motion to dismiss as to claims seeking injunctive relief.  Even though Judge Ellison granted the motion as to SEC monetary damage claims, the dismissal is without prejudice meaning that the SEC will be allowed to file an amended complaint within 30 days.  Presumably after the SEC does this, a new round of briefing will begin again.

In short, Judge Ellison’s decision was based on statute of limitations grounds (specifically that the SEC failed to plead any facts to support an inference that it acted diligently in bringing the complaint) as well as the SEC’s failure to adequately plead discretionary functions relevant to the facilitation payments exception.  As to the first issue, see this post from February 2011 in which I imagined a world in which FCPA defendants mounted legal defenses based on black-letter legal principles such as statute of limitations.  As to the second issue, Judge Ellison concluded, in what is believed to be an issue of first impression, that the SEC must bear the burden of negating the facilitation payments exception.

In addition, Judge Ellison’s decision also touches upon whether the SEC needs to specifically identify the alleged ”foreign officials” as well as corrupt intent.  As to the first issue, Judge Ellison concluded that the identity of the foreign official need not be pled with specificity nor does the FCPA mandate a bright-line rule of detailed pleadings about a foreign official’s particular duties.  In so concluding, Judge Ellison acknowledged his disagreement with Judge Lynn Hughes (also in the S.D. of Texas) who stated the opposite in the DOJ’s unsuccessful prosecution of John O’Shea.

All issues are discussed below in the order discussed in Judge Ellison’s decision.

By way of background, the SEC’s complaint (see here for the prior post) alleges that Jackson and Ruehlen violated “the FCPA by participating in a bribery scheme to obtain illicit permits [Temporary Import Permits - "TIPs"] for oil rigs  in Nigeria in order to retain business under lucrative drilling contracts.”  The SEC’s complaint is based on the same core set of facts as the November 2010 DOJ/SEC enforcement action against the Defendants employer, Noble Corporation (see here for the prior post).  As Judge Ellison stated (his recitation of the facts takes up 15 pages) ”the SEC charges Jackson and Ruehlen with multiple violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other federal securities law in connection with actions they allegedly took to obtain TIPs and TIP extensions in order to avoid paying permanent import duties.”

As Judge Ellison observed in setting forth the legal standard in ruling on a motion to dismiss, “the question for the court to decide is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and the “court should not evaluate the merits of the allegation, but must satisfy itself only that plaintiff has adequately pled a legally cognizable claim.”

Judge Ellison next addressed Defendants claims which contended that the SEC’s complaint failed to adequately plead:  (1) the involvement of a foreign official; (2) that the payments were not facilitating payments, (3) that the Defendants acted corruptly, and (4) whether the facilitating payments exception is unconstitutionally vague.

“Foreign Official”

As to the involvement of a “foreign official,” Judge Ellison summarized the position of the parties as follows.

“Defendants contend that the FCPA requires a plaintiff to allege the identity of the foreign official whose authority a defendant sought to misuse.  They suggest that the SEC must allege by name, or at a minimum by role and job responsibility, the foreign official who was sought to be influenced.  The SEC contends that there is nothing in the FCPA that requires pleading the identity of the foreign official involved with the level of detail Defendants advocate.  Furthermore, it [the SEC] argues that Defendants’ interpretation of the FCPA would run counter to congressional intent.”

Judge Ellison stated, in pertinent part, a follows.

“The language of the statute does not appear to require that the identity of the foreign official involved be pled with specificity. Indeed, the terms of the FCPA make it unlawful corruptly to authorize payments to any person, knowing that any portion of those payments would be offered to any foreign official.  It is possible that the requirement that the payment be made or authorized with the purpose of “influencing any act or decision of such foreign official . . . in his . . . official capacity . . . , (ii) inducing such foreign official . . . to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official . . . , or (iii) securing any improper advantage . . . ”, would, at times, require the government to plead details about the foreign official’s identity, duties and responsibilities. For instance, the Court can imagine cases where, in order to show that the payment was intended to influence the official to neglect some particular duty, the government would have to plead that the official had that duty in the first place. However, the Court can similarly imagine situations where the purpose element could be satisfied without pleading details about a foreign official’s particular duties. Where the government alleges that payments made were intended to influence a foreign official to violate the very laws he is charged with implementing, it hardly seems necessary to require the government to identify the day-to-day duties of that foreign official; that foreign official, irrespective of whether he is the most junior staff member or the official who name appears at the top of the organizational chart, surely has a duty, like every government official, not to violate the laws he is charged with implementing. Furthermore, [the FCPA] provides that the purpose element can be satisfied by factual allegations that a payment was made with the purpose that some foreign official would be paid money to secure some improper advantage, which also does not appear to require allegations about that individual’s job responsibilities. The Court cannot see why the purpose requirement in [the FCPA] should mandate a bright-line rule of detailed pleadings about a foreign official’s particular duties.

Nothing in the legislative history of the FCPA suggests that Congress intended to limit the application of [the FCPA] to those cases where the government could show that a defendant knew, either by name or job description, precisely which foreign officials would be receiving the illicit payments he had authorized. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that, subject to the narrow exception for facilitation payments, Congress intended, with the FCPA, to “cast an otherwise wide net over foreign bribery.”  Kay I, 359 F.3d at 749.  Indeed, in explaining the requirement that a defendant act knowingly, Congress specified that the statute is intended to cover “both prohibited actions that are taken with ‘actual knowledge’ of intended results as well as other actions that, while falling short of what the law terms ‘positive knowledge,’ nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the Act.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 100-576 (1988).

In light of this legislative history, it would be perverse to read into the statute a requirement that a defendant know precisely which government official, or which level of government official, would be targeted by his agent; a defendant could simply avoid liability by ensuring that his agent never told him which official was being targeted and what precise action the official took in exchange for the bribe. Yet, Defendants contend that the Complaint must allege this level of detail. [...] The Court seriously doubts that Congress intended to hold an individual liable under [the FCPA] only if he took great care to know exactly whom his agent would be bribing and what precise steps that official would be taking. Congress intended to address the problem of domestic entities bribing foreign officials to accomplish certain proscribed ends, see Kay I, 359 F.3d at 747, not domestic entities carefully monitoring the execution of that bribery.  And, if the FCPA does not require a defendant to know precisely which government official was being bribed, a plaintiff bears no burden to allege such facts.

[T]he limitations set out in [the FCPA] do not require the government in every case to plead details about the particular duties of the government official involved; sometimes, the nature of the benefit sought would inherently fall into the class of prohibited acts. Similarly, as discussed infra, pleading the non-applicability of the “facilitating” payments exception will not always require pleading details about the foreign official’s duties. Finally, that the offer or payment must be made in order to assist a defendant in obtaining or retaining business also does not require pleading anything about the foreign officials’ particular responsibilities.  Accordingly, the Court’s conclusion is bolstered by the fact that interpretations of the domestic bribery statutes have not required the level of specificity Defendants seek.

The authorities cited by the Defendants do not convince this Court. It is true that, in Kay I, the Fifth Circuit noted, in a parenthetical, that among the elements of a violation of the FCPA are “the identity of the foreign country and of the officials to whom the suspect payments were made, and the sought-after unlawful actions taken or not taken by the foreign officials in consideration of the bribes.”  Kay I, 359 F.3d at 760.  This, of course, says nothing about the level of detail with which these elements must be alleged. It is telling that, in Kay I itself, the government alleged only that payments were made to “customs officials in the Republic of Haiti” and “officials of other Haitian agencies” to accept documents that understated the true amount of rice being imported by the defendants in that case.  Kay I, 359 F.3d at 762.  The indictment does not specify the job responsibilities of the customs officials and entirely unidentified “other” officials, or what precise actions they took to accept the false documents at issue in Kay I.  If the Fifth Circuit intended for the foreign officials’ identities and specific  misdeeds to be alleged in the great level of detail that Defendants propose, the Court thinks it would have made mention of the woefully inadequate allegations in the case before it. The SEC here has alleged that payments were made to “Nigerian government officials” to “process eleven illegitimate TIPs with false paperwork” and “to obtain discretionary or unlawful extensions of these TIPs.”  The SEC also specifically alleges that among the agencies that received such payments were the NMA and NPA. The Court finds that these allegations are no less detailed than the allegations in Kay I’s indictment.

[...]

In a footnote, Judge Ellison stated as follows.

“[T]he Court must disagree with Judge Hughes’s oral statements in a recent criminal FCPA prosecution. [U.S. v. O'Shea] (“You can’t convict a man promising to pay unless you have a particular promise to a particular person for a particular benefit. If you call up the Basurtos and say, look, I’m going to send you 50 grand, bribe somebody, that does not meet the statute.”). This Court holds that asking a third party to bribe a government official, in order to induce that official to act in one of the proscribed ways detailed in [the FCPA], would meet the statute. The government does not have to “connect the payment to a particular official.”

“Facilitating” Payments and “Corruptly”

Judge Ellison summarized the position of the parties as follows.

“Defendants argue that the FCPA charges must be dismissed because the SEC bears the burden of pleading the inapplicability of the “facilitating” payments exception, [...]   and it has failed to do so. Defendants also argue that the SEC has failed to plead sufficient facts that would support the inference that Defendants acted “corruptly” because the facts pled by the SEC are equally consistent with Defendants’ belief that the payments were permissible facilitating payments, and because, in any event, the SEC has not alleged sufficient facts to indicate that the payments were made with the requisite intent.  Finally, Ruehlen argues that the “facilitating” payments exception is unconstitutionally vague.

The SEC contends that Defendants bear the burden of pleading the inapplicability of the “facilitating” payments exception, but claims that, in any event, it has negated the “facilitating” payments exception.  The SEC further argues that it has adequately pled corrupt intent because it has pled sufficient facts to support the inference that Defendants knew their actions did not fall under the “facilitating” payments exception and were, in fact, taken with the requisite evil motive.  Finally, the SEC argues that the “facilitating” payments exemption is not unconstitutionally vague because a man of common intelligence would have understood what would constitute a permissible payment under the exception and what would not.”

As to the issues, Judge Ellison stated as follows.

“[T]he Court cannot, in every instance, divine, from the sheer fact that Congress chose to exempt “facilitating” payments from liability through an exception instead of an affirmative defense, that it intended for plaintiffs to bear the burden of pleading and proving the exception.  Instead the Court starts from the presumption that  Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the applicability of an affirmative defense.  The Court then considers whether this statute is on of those rare instances where the true definition of the offense cannot be discerned unless the exception is negated.”

Judge Ellison next turns to the “particular circumstances that led to the addition of the “facilitating” payments exception, which neither party addresses” and stated as follows.

“When the FCPA was first enacted in 1977, there was no such explicit exception, but the legislative history indicated that by using the word “corruptly,” Congress intended to exempt such payments from the purview of the statute. For instance, the House Committee on interstate and foreign commerce provided as follows in its report: The language of the bill is deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between such payments and facilitating payments, sometimes referred to as “grease payments.” In using the word “corruptly,” the committee intends to distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing and act or decision and those payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). Similarly, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs wrote: “The statute does not . . . cover so-called ‘grease payments’ such as payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.” S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977). In adding an explicit exception for “facilitating” payments in 1988, both houses explained that the amendment was meant “only to clarify ambiguities ‘without changing the basic intent . . . of the law.’” [...]  The legislative history reveals that Congress intended, by using the word “corruptly,” to except facilitating payments from the ambit of the FCPA, and the addition of the “facilitating” payments exception into the language of the statute was intended only to clarify that intent. No one disputes that the SEC must bear the burden of proving that Defendants acted corruptly. Accordingly, the Court finds that the evolution of the statute in this case strongly supports the conclusion that the SEC must bear the burden of negating the “facilitating” payments exception.  The facilitating payments exception is best understood as a threshold requirement to pleading that a defendant acted “corruptly.”

The “facilitating” payments exception was intended to provide a “very limited exception[] to the kinds of bribes to which the FCPA does not apply.”  Kay I, 359 F.3d at 750.  The exception allows for payments to foreign officials the purpose of which is to “expedite or secure the performance of a routine government action,” [...], which refers to a “very narrow categor[y] of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.” Kay I, 359 F.3d at 751.  While the statute specifically includes “obtaining permits” as an example of the type of action that typically qualifies as routine, the Court interprets the example to refer to obtaining permits to which one is properly entitled.  See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8 (explaining that Congress intended to exclude from the FCPA’s reach “those payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action”).

The SEC alleges that Defendants authorized payments to foreign officials in order to obtain TIPs based on false paperwork, in contravention of what Defendants knew was the proper process for obtaining TIPs. As discussed supra,the SEC pled sufficient facts to support the allegation that Defendants knew these payments would be going to Nigerian government officials to obtain TIPs in a manner that violated Nigerian law. The grant of permits by government officials that have no authority to grant permits on the basis sought is in no way a ministerial act nor can it be characterized as “speeding the proper performance of a foreign official’s duties.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8. Similarly, if payments were made to induce officials to validate the paperwork while knowing it to be false, that too would not qualify as simply expediting a ministerial act. Accordingly, the SEC’s pleadings easily negate the “facilitating” payments exception with regard to payments made to acquire false paperwork TIPs.

The SEC also alleges that Defendants authorized payments to foreign officials in order to obtain discretionary TIP extensions. Although the Court found that the SEC has alleged sufficient facts to support the inference that Ruehlen, and for the most part Jackson as well, knew that the payments they authorized would be going to bribe foreign officials, the Court cannot conclude that the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to support the allegation that Ruehlen or Jackson knew that these payments would be used to influence a discretionary decision of a foreign official. In fact, the SEC fails to plead sufficient facts to support the allegation that granting of TIP extensions is a discretionary action. The SEC repeatedly alleges that the granting of extensions is a discretionary action.  However, repeated incantations that NCS may grant an extension in its discretion do not satisfy the SEC’s obligations under Iqbal and Twombly to plead facts that render plausible such conclusory allegations.  The SEC alleges sufficient facts to support the conclusion that fourth extensions were illegal, including that grants of third extensions routinely indicated that the extension was the final extension that would be granted for that rig, as well as Noble’s own failed attempt to obtain a fourth extension.  It also alleges that NCS had previously denied a third extension because the rig was operating under a different drilling contract. However, these allegations are insufficient to make plausible the conclusion that granting TIP extensions is discretionary. These allegations are just as consistent with a regime where up to three TIP extensions are granted as a matter of routine for rigs that continue to operate on the same contract as they were operating when the initial TIP was granted. And if NCS does grant up to three TIPs routinely, any bribes offered to speed along or assure that action would fall squarely into the “facilitating” payments exception.

[...]

[T]he SEC has leave to amend the Complaint to allege facts that would support the allegation that granting TIP extensions is a matter of discretion. The SEC can satisfy this burden in a number of ways. The simplest way to do so would be to plead the Nigerian law or policy that so provides. However, the Court does not discount other means. After all, the SEC has plausibly pled that granting TIPs based on false paperwork is a violation of Nigerian law by relying on the fact of a prior Nigerian prosecution and the opinion of a legal expert.  Therefore, the Court does not rule out the possibility that the SEC may be able adequately to plead facts that would support the conclusion that grants of TIP extensions are a matter of discretion without pleading the provisions of Nigerian law. However, should the SEC not rely on Nigerian law, it must do more than just plead facts tat would be equally consistent with a protocol under which where TIP extensions are routinely granted if they satisfy certain threshold requirements.

After reviewing the FCPA’s legislative history, Judge Ellison interpreted the word “corruptly” as an act done with an evil motive or wrongful purpose of influencing a foreign official to misuse his position.”

He further stated as follows.

“In pleading that Defendants acted corruptly, the SEC need not proffer facts that would show that they knew their actions would constitute a violation of the FCPA [...] (noting that nothing about the word “corruptly” suggests that the government must prove that a defendant knew he was violating the FCPA);  Kay II, 513 F.3d at 450-451 (holding that even the willfulness requirement in a criminal prosecution does not require the government to prove that a defendant knew he was violating a particular statute).  Indeed, this court seriously doubts that the SEC even needs to prove that Defendants knew that their actions violated any specific law. Because Kay II interpreted the willfulness requirement as requiring only a showing that a defendant knew that his actions were in some way unlawful, [...] to interpret the word “corruptly” to require such knowledge would eliminate the distinction between a criminal and civil violation of the FCPA.  [...]

Defendants argue that the SEC has not pled that they acted corruptly because it had failed to plead any violations of Nigerian law, and because both defendants had a good faith belief that they were acting lawfully.   Specifically, Jackson argues that he had a good faith belief in the legality of the payments as facilitating payments, and Ruehlen argues that he relied in good faith on the approval of the payments by supervisors, including Jackson.

As the Court has already discussed, the SEC has alleged sufficient facts that support the inference that obtaining TIPs through the use of false paperwork violated Nigerian law. However, as explained, the SEC has no obligation to plead that Defendants knew that they were violating a law, or even that they were seeking an illegal result to state a civil FCPA violation. Instead, it must plead only that Defendants acted with the wrongful purpose of influencing a foreign official to misuse his official position. As explained the SEC has adequately alleged that Defendants authorized payments to foreign officials to obtain TIPs based on false paperwork, in contravention of what Defendants knew to be the proper protocol. Seeking to obtain governmentally-issued benefits through payments intended to ensure Nigerian officials ignore the proper protocols plainly satisfies the requirement of having the wrongful purpose of influencing a foreign official to misuse his position. Defendants’ representations of their good-faith belief that the payments were “facilitating” payments, and therefore legal, are unavailing. First, as explained, the SEC’s allegations support the inference that Defendants knew they were seeking to obtain TIPs in an illegal manner, thereby pleading facts that, if true, would negative any claim of good faith belief that the payments were made to ensure routine government actions. At the motion to dismiss stage, representations to the contrary are irrelevant. Second, the Court is not certain that the SEC is obliged to plead that Defendants did not have a good-faith belief that their payments fell under the “facilitating” payments exception. As a practical matter, the Court has difficulty imagining how the SEC could plead that Defendants acted “corruptly” without, at the same time, pleading facts that, if true, would render implausible any claim that Defendants had a good-faith belief that the payments fell into the “facilitating” payments exception. After all, it is hard to see how one could have the evil motive or wrongful purpose of influencing an official to misuse his official position while, at the same time, believing, in good faith, that he was simply ensuring or expediting a routine government action. The Court need not resolve the question, however, because, in any event, the facts alleged by the SEC support the inference that Defendants knew use of false paperwork to obtain TIPs was illegal.

Finally, Ruehlen argues that the SEC has not pled adequate facts that he acted corruptly because he authorized payments with the knowledge and consent of Noble’s senior management.  [...]  The factfinder may certainly consider whether Jackson’s approval of the payments negates corrupt intent. However, for the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that the facts pled regarding Ruehlen’s intimate involvement with the West Africa Audit make plausible the allegation that he did act “corruptly.”

Because the Court finds that the SEC has failed adequately to plead that the payments to obtain TIP extensions were not facilitating payments, it does not address whether the SEC has adequately pled that Defendants acted corruptly in making those payments. However, the Court notes, that should the SEC amend its complaint to plead sufficient facts to support the inference that the grant of TIP extensions is a discretionary act, it will need also to plead facts that support the inference that, in making these payments, Jackson and Ruehlen had the evil motive or wrongful purpose of influencing an official to misuse his position.”

In a footnote Judge Ellison then stated as follows.

[W]hile the Court finds no explicit statutory obligation to plead facts that would tend to show that Defendants did not have a good faith belief that their payments fell within the “facilitating” payments exception, the Court has difficulty imagining that the SEC will be able to plead that Defendants had the bad purpose of influencing an official to misuse his position if it does not first plead that Defendants knew they were not entitled to extensions as a matter of right upon satisfying certain basic threshold requirements.

As to the unconstitutional vagueness issue, Judge Ellison stated as follows.

“Here, a person of common intelligence should have no difficulty understanding that routine government actions do not include the granting of permits based on fraudulent documents. He would not fail to understand that the statutory example of “obtaining permits” as a routine governmental action presupposes that those permits are obtained based on some valid entitlement. Furthermore, even if a man of common intelligence might be somewhat uncertain about whether payments to secure TIPs through a known illegal method would be covered by the “facilitating” payments exception, the exception is but one of numerous elements of a civil FCPA violation; some ambiguity in the scope of this one part of the statute does not draw an impermissibly vague line.  [...]

Similarly, should the SEC amend its Complaint adequately to plead that the granting of TIP extensions is a discretionary action, any argument that enforcement actions could not be initiated on the basis of payments to obtain favorable exercises of discretion in obtaining permits would also fail. In analyzing the FCPA, the Fifth Circuit made it unambiguously clear that the FCPA was enacted in substantial part to “prohibit the type of bribery that . . . prompts officials to misuse their discretionary authority.”  [...} Even if the language of the “facilitating” payments exception failed adequately to put persons of common intelligence on alert that bribery to influence discretionary decisions was prohibited under the FCPA, Kay I, a  decision from February 2004, established the point as a matter of law. It is, of course, a “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.” [...]“

Statute of Limitations

Judge Ellison summarized the positions of the parties as follows.

“Jackson and Ruehlen argue that the SEC’s Complaint should be dismissed because all of the events giving rise to the claims occurred outside of the limitations period and the SEC’s Complaint has failed to raise any basis for tolling.  The SEC does not dispute that the Complaint, on its face, raises no basis for tolling, but it argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because of tolling agreements between the parties, because the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies, and because the continuing violations doctrine applies. Additionally, the SEC contends that the statute of limitations does not apply to equitable relief such as injunctions.  Finally, the SEC requests leave to amend its Complaint to plead any additional facts necessary for statute of limitations purposes.”

After discussing the applicable five year statute of limitations, he stated as follows.

The Complaint in this case was filed on February 24, 2012. Accordingly, absent some reason the statute of limitations should not apply, claims that accrued before February 24, 2007 should be barred. Here, the vast majority of the misconduct alleged occurred before February 24, 2007.  Although the Complaint does not plead any basis for tolling, the Court examines the  arguments as to why the statute of limitations should be tolled or is inapplicable, to determine whether any of the claims predicated on conduct prior to February 24, 2007 survive, and also to determine whether leave to amend would be futile.

[...]

Defendants do not dispute that they each signed tolling agreements with the SEC that would suspend the running of the statute of limitations for a total of 290 days.  These tolling agreements would make timely any claims based on conduct occurring after May 10, 2006.  [...] Thus, although the SEC should have pled the existence of these tolling agreements, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the SEC leave to amend.”

As to fraudulent concealment as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations, Judge Ellison stated as follows.

Defendants also argue that the Complaint has failed to raise any basis for tolling. They argue that the SEC has failed to plead facts that would give rise to tolling based on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The SEC contends that it has pled the elements of fraudulent concealment that it is required to plead, and that Defendants actually bear some of the burden because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense.

[...]

The Court rejects the SEC’s contention that it is Defendants who must bear the burden of proving that the Commission should have discovered the fraud earlier.

[...]

Under the applicable Fifth Circuit standard, the SEC has pled enough facts to suggest that Defendants concealed their wrongdoing. Specifically, the SEC has pled that each time a payment for false paperwork TIPs was approved, it was logged as a legitimate operating expense, as Defendants knew and intended. Furthermore, the SEC has alleged that Jackson signed personal certifications as CFO and CEO that were attached to Noble’s public quarterly and annual filings, dated from August 8, 2005 to May 9, 2007, stating that he had disclosed to Noble’s auditors and Audit Committee all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls and any fraud. These acts are pled with adequate specificity and can, theoretically, be enough to support a claim of concealment. However, the Court notes that, if these assertions by Defendants that their actions are legal are to be the sole basis of the fraudulent concealment allegations, the SEC will eventually have to show that its reliance on these representations was reasonable. This is because “generally speaking, denial of wrongdoing is no more an act of concealment than is silence” and such a denial may constitute concealment only “where the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, or where the circumstances indicate that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on defendant’s denial.”

However, the SEC has not pled any facts that support the inference that it acted diligently in bringing this Complaint. The SEC argues that, because it did not learn of the misconduct until June 2007, and because it brought its complaint within five years of that date, it has pled all it needs to plead.  However, as explained above, the SEC must plead facts that show that it acted diligently in gathering the facts that form the basis of its claims. It concedes that, by June 2007, when Noble disclosed its internal investigation to the SEC, it had inquiry notice of potential misconduct. The SEC has leave to amend its Complaint to plead facts that would support the inference that it acted diligently in gathering the facts that form the basis of this Complaint.

As to the SEC seeking the equitable remedy of injunction, the court noted that the “parties have cited no cases that suggest that dismissal of claims for injunctive relief is appropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.  [...] The SEC, of course, ultimately will bear the burden of showing that an injunction is warranted.

*****

By Sarah Frazier

Pleased with the quality of the briefing by all parties on Defendants’ motions to dismiss and ready with questions, Judge Ellison heard arguments for two-and-a-half hours on Friday.  The motions presented a rare challenge to the SEC’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement powers and raised issues surrounding pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2) with regard to intent, the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception, and the identity and role of the alleged “foreign officials” in the case.

The Court made it clear early in the hearing that he was inclined to ask the SEC to supplement its pleadings in one or more of these areas without dismissing the case, which may or may not make much difference in the end.  Kenneth Donnelly, arguing for the SEC, stated that he had much more to plead if need be.  Whether that includes specifics on the Nigerian “foreign officials” who received the alleged payments, who are unnamed in the complaint, remains to be seen, should Judge Ellison require it.

Regardless, the hearing proved a valuable opportunity for the Defendants, in pointing out what they saw as pleading inadequacies, to tell their own story.  The SEC alleges that Jackson and Ruehlen repeatedly paid Noble’s customs agent in Nigeria to pass on bribes to (unidentified) Nigerian officials in order to extend temporary drilling permits for Noble’s offshore rigs.  Further, the SEC alleges that Defendants submitted permit applications that falsely asserted that the rigs had been moved outside of Nigerian waters, a necessary falsehood in order to render the rigs eligible for the permits.  David Krakoff and Nicola Hannah, for Defendants Jackson and Ruehlen respectively, explained that Noble had in fact approved the “special handling fees” according to its written policy for allowing facilitating payments allowed by the FCPA, in reliance on counsel.  Hannah also did a fine job of making sure the Court knew that his client was a high school graduate whose work had been on rigs until shortly before his first involvement with the payments, and whose middle manager role excluded him from Board of Directors’ reports on the subject.

The SEC’s complaint refers multiple times to the permit applications as “false paperwork,” urging implicitly that the paperwork itself evidences corrupt knowledge.  Defense counsel argued vigorously that this “falsity” was a red herring because it is not itself prohibited under the FCPA, and would not in their view render the facilitating payment defense unavailable.  Judge Ellison was keen, given such arguments, to understand the FCPA’s intent requirement in a civil versus a criminal case – posing that question to both sides.  Donnelly (SEC) took the position that the term “corruptly” in the statute applies whenever a payment is made to an official for misuse of his or her duties, while the defendants argued that the FCPA is a specific intent law and the SEC must show intent to violate the FCPA.

The parties and the Court spent much of the hearing grappling with how intent under the FCPA works when applying the FCPA’s “facilitating payment” or “routine government action” exception.  If Jackson and Ruehlen understood that the bribe was illegal under Nigerian law, but qualified as a facilitating payment under the FCPA, then is corrupt intent present?  If so, would not the whole facilitating payment exception be swallowed up?  After all, as Krakoff, Hannah, and David Gerger (also representing Ruehlen) pointed out, aren’t facilitating payments essentially all bribes?  And aren’t bribes generally illegal under local law?  If it were otherwise, and facilitating payments were required to be legal locally, there would be no need for the separate affirmative FCPA defense allowing conduct that is legal under written local law.

But, the Court asked several times using various hypotheticals, what about where, independent of the bribe, the deed being paid for is discretionary or improper or even illegal?  Is that a qualifying facilitating payment?  Donnelly on behalf of the SEC took the position that it was not in those instances, but, interestingly, in doing so acknowledged that this issue makes Nigerian law potentially relevant in the case.

Hannah and Krakoff countered that a discretionary governmental act still qualifies as facilitating if it relates to issuance of a permit, as here, because the language in the FCPA specifically enumerates “permit,” but does not use the word “discretionary” except in a different context, and thus dicta in the Kay case is incorrect.  Further, defense counsel argued,  if Nigerian law is pertinent, then it must be pled, and the SEC’s bare notice of intent to rely on foreign law under Rule 44.1 is insufficient under Rule 8a.

Judge Ellison inquired whether the written law of Nigeria was sufficient to determine whether a government act was discretionary – wouldn’t it be necessary to put on evidence of actual practice?  Defense counsel agreed, unsurprisingly, while Donnelly disagreed but raised the possibility of expert evidence on the point.

The Court probably need not decide all of these novel questions in ruling on the Defendants’ motions, but the questions will surely be relevant should the case proceed to trial.  In the meantime, the parties gained insight into possible initial reluctance to apply the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception to situations involving governmental acts that seem improper or are merely discretionary.

Prosecutorial Common Law Defeat

One of the best guest posts in FCPA Professor history was this 2011 post from Michael Levy in which he described the concept of prosecutorial common law.  Prosecutorial common law is all around us.  Take a look at the footnotes of the recent FCPA Guidance - most of the “authority” cited for “legal” propositions is DOJ or SEC settlements.

For obvious reasons, prosecutorial common law does not sit well with federal court judges.  For instance, in U.S. v. Bodmer, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, in rejecting the DOJ’s position that the FCPA’s criminal penalty provisions applied to a foreign national prior to the 1998 FCPA amendments, noted as follows – “the Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.”  Likewise as noted in this previous post about the Giffen enforcement action, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York stated that prosecutorial common law ”is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”

Prosecutorial common law recently suffered a major defeat when the Second Circuit, in a non-FCPA case, rejected (see here for the opinion)  a DOJ theory of prosecution concerning off-label promotion of drugs that it has previously used to secure billions (yes that is a “b”) in recent settlements with pharmaceutical companies.

Commenting on this recent development, Levy stated as follows.  “It is amazing to me how consistently this pattern seems to repeat but, given the incentives on both sides, I don’t really see any structural solutions that would change it.”

For additional reading, see this client alert from Debevoise & Plimpton, this client alert from Arnold & Porter, and this client alert from Gibson Dunn.

SEC Responds to Magyar Telekom Execs Motion to Dismiss

Given the SEC’s positions in its recent response to Herbert Steffen’s motion to dismiss (see here for the prior post), it comes as little surprise that the SEC is taking the same positions in its response to the motion to dismiss filed by former Magyar Telecom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai.

In its response brief (here), the SEC states, in summary form, as follows.

“The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction; (2) the SEC’s claims are time-barred; (3) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s anti-bribery claims; and (4) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s lying to auditors claims. The Court should deny the motion on all four grounds.

First, the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction because their conduct caused foreseeable consequences in the United States. The complaint alleges that the defendants orchestrated a bribery scheme in Macedonia; that they concealed their bribes through the use of sham contracts and falsified books and records; that they lied to Magyar’s auditors by signing false annual and quarterly certifications; and that their actions caused Magyar to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC in the United States that misrepresented the company’s financial statements and included false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.

Second, the complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2462. That provision expressly states that the limitations period does not begin to run until the defendants are “found within the United States.” The defendants acknowledge in their brief that they have remained outside of the United States since their commission of this scheme. Thus, the statute of limitations period has not begun to run as to them. In any event, claims for equitable relief are not subject to the limitations period of Section 2462, which by its terms applies only to “penalties.”

Third, the complaint pleads all facts necessary to support every element of every claim against the defendants.  The defendants met the “interstate commerce” prong of Exchange Act Section 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, by sending, in furtherance of their bribery scheme, electronic mail messages that were routed through servers located in the United States. Because the use of interstate commerce is a jurisdictional element, the Exchange Act does not require that defendants know, let alone “corruptly” intend, that their messages would reach the United States. The complaint sufficiently identifies the foreign officials whom the defendants bribed; Section 30A does not require that the officials be expressly named. And the complaint sufficiently identifies the specific false statements made by each defendant to Magyar’s auditors and why those statements were material.”

Of particular note as to “foreign official,” the SEC makes the sweeping statement that “there is no requirement under the FCPA or in the case law interpreting it that the SEC’s complaint [needs to] identify bribed foreign officials by name.”  The SEC then states in a footnote as follows.  “Any such requirement would be completely at odds with the FCPA’s statutory scheme. [...]  By its very structure, [the anti-bribery provisions were] drafted to prohibit corrupt transactions in which the precise identity of a government official might not be known even to the payor.”

As noted in this previous post, the SEC is asserting the same “foreign official” position in the Mark Jackson / James Ruehlen challenge.  Oral arguments are to take place today on that motion in Houston.

It should be noted that in the DOJ’s unsuccessful prosecution of John O’Shea, Judge Hughes stated as follows.  “[W]hile the Government does not have to trace a particular dollar to a particular pocket of a particular official, it has to connect the payment to a particular official, that the funds made under his authority to a foreign official, who can be identified in some reasonable way, that is, with no reasonable doubt.” Judge Hughes also stated as follows.  “You can’t convict a man promising to pay unless you have a particular promise to a particular person for a particular benefit. If you call up the [intermediary] and say, look, I’m going to send you 50 grand, bribe somebody, that does not meet the statute.”

Corruption Perception Index

Transparency International (“TI”) recently released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”) (see here).  The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be and is a composite index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions and reflecting the views of observers from around the world including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.

The top three (very clean) countries in the CPI were Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. The bottom three (highly corrupt) countries were Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia.

The United States placed 19th on the list of 176 countries.  While this is better than last year’s 24th place finish, as noted in this prior post it’s a bit ironic that as the U.S. aggressively expands its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theories, the U.S. remains far from the top of the CPI.

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently spoke of the U.S. FCPA enforcement effort in religious terms (“we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws more vigorously than we do”), yet CPI’s rankings should again cause pause as to our claimed moral superiority.

Document Issues

I am not one to usually highlight FCPA Inc. marketing material, but I thought this video clip from e-discovery firm H5 was instructive as to many of the document issues involved in an FCPA investigation.  The enforcement agencies have commented from time to time that FCPA Inc. has a tendency to sometimes over do it in this area, but be that as it may – data collection, data storage, data analysis, etc. are among the reasons why FCPA investigations often soar into the millions.

Recent Scrutiny News

Rolls-Royce

Reuters reports (here) that Rolls-Royce, the world’s second-largest maker of aircraft engines “said the [U.K. Serious Fraud Office] had asked it to conduct an internal inquiry into dealings involving intermediaries in China, Indonesia and other overseas markets.”  According to the report, ”a source close to the investigation said the allegations relate to events in the “distant past” and Rolls-Royce had told the U.S. Department of Justice about the inquiry.”

As noted in this previous post, in June, Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rolls-Royce Holdings, resolved an FCPA enforcement action.

Barclays

Reuters also reports (here) that a previously disclosed DOJ and SEC “investigation into whether Barclays Plc paid bribes to win a banking license in Saudi Arabia has spread to other banks that operate in the region.”

Net 1

Earlier this week, Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc. disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows.

“On November 30, 2012, we received a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (the “DOJ”) informing us that the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have begun an investigation into whether Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries, including their officers, directors, employees, and agents (collectively, “Net 1”) and other persons and entities possibly affiliated with Net 1 violated provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S. federal criminal laws by engaging in a scheme to make corrupt payments to officials of the Government of South Africa in connection with securing a contract with the South African Social Security Agency to provide social welfare and benefits payments and also engaged in violations of the federal securities laws in connection with statements made by Net 1 in its SEC filings regarding this contract. On the same date, we received a letter from the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) advising us that it is also conducting an investigation concerning our company. The SEC letter states that the investigation is a non-public, fact-finding inquiry.”

In this additional release, the company states as follows.

“These investigations appear to be directed at matters which are similar to those that were the subject of articles which appeared in various South African newspapers after AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Limited (“AllPay”) instituted legal proceeding in the South African courts to set aside the contract awarded to us in January 2012 by SASSA. AllPay was an unsuccessful bidder for the SASSA contract.”

News of the company’s FCPA scrutiny caused the company’s U.S. listed shares to plunge approximately 58%.  This of course caused several plaintiff law firms to announce investigations of their own.  See here, here, and here.  In the meantime, the company’s shares have risen 46%.

It’s an FCPA world.

*****

A good weekend to all.