Archive for the ‘Foreign Official’ Category

Friday Roundup

Friday, March 14th, 2014

Guilty plea in FCPA obstruction case, SEC trims a pending case, across the pond, turnabout is fair play, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Cilins Pleads Guilty

Earlier this week, the DOJ announced that Frederic Cilins pleaded guilty “to obstructing a federal criminal investigation into whether a mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.”  The DOJ release further states:

“Cilins pleaded guilty to a one-count superseding information …, which alleges that Cilins agreed to pay money to induce a witness to destroy, or provide to him for destruction, documents sought by the FBI.   According to the superseding information, those documents related to allegations concerning the payment of bribes to obtain mining concessions in the Simandou region of the Republic of Guinea.”

Cilins was originally charged in April 2013 (see this prior post for a summary of the criminal complaint) and there was much activity leading up to Cilins’s March 31st trial date.  For instance, on February 18th the DOJ filed a superseding indictment and on March 4th Cilins filed this motion to dismiss.  In pertinent part, the motion stated:

“For almost a year, the government has proceeded against Mr. Cilins under the theory that he criminally obstructed an investigation conducted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after he first learned of that investigation in the spring of 2013. Now, on the eve of trial, the government has charged Mr. Cilins with conspiracy to commit criminal obstruction. The supposed conspiracy began in 2012, when, as the government admits, he had no intent to obstruct an American investigation—indeed, well before any such investigation had even been contemplated. The charge is instead based on a radical new theory: that Mr. Cilins interfered with a Guinean civil licensing investigation, which somehow amounts to a violation of U.S. obstruction law under 18 U.S.C. § 1519.

The government’s unprecedented and breathtaking attempt to federalize protection for investigations spread far and wide throughout the world has no basis in the text of the obstruction statute itself and no support in the case law. It also runs up against the well-established presumption that, absent strong evidence to the contrary, Congress did not intend to give federal statutes extraterritorial reach. Not only does § 1519 contain no textual evidence that Congress meant to give the law a worldwide sweep, the statute’s legislative history also confirms the obvious: that Congress wrote a federal obstruction statute in order to criminalize intentional interference with American investigations. The government’s new conspiracy count is fatally defective and must be dismissed.”

Cilins has been widely reported to be linked to Guernsey-based BSG Resources Ltd.  As reported here from 100 Reporters:

“The U.S. Justice Department has formally notified the Franco-Israeli billionaire Beny Steinmetz [the founder of BSG Resources] that he is the target of a federal probe of allegations of bribery in the Republic of Guinea, according to a source with knowledge of the matter. The disclosure places Steinmetz … personally at the center of a broad-based multinational corruption investigation involving some of the largest remaining untapped iron ore deposits in the world.  [...] According to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, attorneys for Steinmetz have received a so-called “target letter” from federal prosecutors investigating allegations that Steinmetz’s mining company offered millions of dollars in bribes to win and keep the multi-billion dollar concession first awarded by the Guinean government in 2008.  The letter went to Steinmetz’s lawyers in January, the source said.”

For additional coverage of Cilins’s plea, see here from Reuters (noting that the plea agreement does not require any cooperation with the government’s investigation) and here from Bloomberg.

SEC Trims a Pending Case

This recent post highlighted how the SEC has never prevailed in an FCPA enforcement action when put to its ultimate burden of proof.

Against this backdrop, it is notable, as reported by the Wall Street Journal here and citing an SEC official, that the SEC is dropping its claims that former Magyar Telekom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tomas Morval bribed Montenegro officials.  (The SEC’s claims that the former executives bribed Macedonian officials remains active).

See this prior post summarizing the SEC’s original 2011 complaint.

Across the Pond

More from the U.K. trial of former News Corp. executive Rebekah Brooks.  From the Guardian:

“Rebekah Brooks has admitted rubber stamping payments to military sources while she was editor at the Sun at the Old Bailey phone hacking trial. Brooks also admitted on Monday that she did not question whether the source of a series of stories that came from a reporter’s “ace military source” was a public official who could not be paid without the law being broken. Crown prosecutor Andrew Edis, QC, quizzed her about a series of emails from the reporter requesting tens of thousands of pounds for his military source. She responded to one request for payment in under a minute and to another within two minutes, the phone hacking trial heard. ”You really were just acting as a rubber stamp weren’t you,” Edis asked. Brooks replied: “Yes.”

As noted in previous posts here and here:

“What happens in these trials concerning the bribery offenses will not determine the outcome of any potential News Corp. FCPA enforcement action. But you can bet that the DOJ and SEC will be interested in the ultimate outcome. In short, if there is a judicial finding that Brooks and/or Coulson or other high-level executives in London authorized or otherwise knew of the alleged improper payments, this will likely be a factor in how the DOJ and SEC ultimately resolve any potential enforcement action and how News Corp.’s overall culpability score may be calculated under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.”

Turnabout Is Fair Play

Last week’s Friday Roundup (here) highlighted how Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) called out Koch Industries on the Senate floor and accused the company of violating the FCPA.  The previous post noted that it was not just executives or companies that support Republican causes that have come under FCPA scrutiny (several Democratic examples could be cited as well).

Indeed, that is just what the Washington Examiner did in this article which states as follows.

“Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., has received campaign contributions from people and political action committees linked to multiple companies suspected of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  [...]  [R]ecords reveal that Reid has accepted campaign money from individuals and political action committees associated with 10 companies linked to FCPA investigations.  The contributions total $515,100 between 2009 and 2013.”

The inference from both Senator Reid’s initial volley and the Washington Examiner report would seem to be that companies that resolve FCPA enforcement actions or companies under FCPA scrutiny are bad or unethical companies and that politicians who accept support from such companies are thus tainted as well.

Such an inference is naive in the extreme.

Yes, certain FCPA enforcement actions are based on allegations that executive management or the board was involved in or condoned the improper conduct at issue. However, this type of FCPA enforcement action is not typical.

A typical FCPA enforcement action involves allegations that a small group of people (or perhaps even a single individual) within a subsidiary or business unit of a business organization engaged in conduct in violation of the FCPA. Yet because of respondeat superior principles, the company is exposed to FCPA liability even if the employee’s conduct is contrary to the company’s pre-existing FCPA policies and procedures.

Also relevant to the question of whether companies that resolve FCPA enforcement actions are “bad” or “unethical” is the fact that most FCPA enforcement actions are based on the conduct of third-parties under the FCPA’s third-party payment provisions. Further, certain FCPA enforcement actions are based on successor liability theories whereby an acquiring company is held liable for the acquired company’s FCPA liability.

Finally, given the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve an FCPA enforcement – such as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements – companies subject to FCPA scrutiny often decide it is quicker, more cost efficient, and more certain to agree to such a resolution vehicle than engage in long-protracted litigation with the DOJ or SEC. These resolution vehicles do not require the company to plead guilty to anything (or typically admit the allegations in the SEC context), are not subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny, and do not necessarily represent the triumph of one party’s legal position over the other. Rather resolution via such a vehicle often reflects a risk-based decision often grounded in issues other than facts or the law. Indeed, a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA enforcement official has stated that given the availability of such alternative resolution vehicles, “it is tempting for the [DOJ], or the SEC since it too now has these options available, to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.”

Last, but certainly not least, many corporate FCPA enforcement actions concern conduct that allegedly took place 5, 7, 10 or even 15 years ago.

Reading Stack

An informative read from Catherine Palmer and Daiske Yoshida (Latham & Watkins) titled “Deemed Public Officials:  A Potential Risk For U.S. Companies in Japan.”  The article states:

“Deemed public officials are officers and employees of entities that are not government owned but serve public functions. This concept is somewhat analogous to state-owned enterprises, but rather than being government owned/controlled entities that participate in commercial activities, these are commercial entities that play quasi-government roles.  [...] The statutes that authorized the establishment of these companies stipulate that their officers and  employees are “deemed to be an employee engaged in public service” for the purposes of the Penal Code of Japan.”

Another informative read from Wendy Wysong (Clifford Chance) titled “Why, Whether, and When the FCPA Matters in Capital Market Transactions: The Asian Perspective.”  The article, in part, covers the FCPA’s tricky “issuer” concept and explores FCPA liability in Rule 144A and Regulation S offerings.

*****

A good weekend to all.

66 North

Thursday, March 13th, 2014

When pondering the future locus of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions, one has to ask where are companies likely to be doing business in the future?

Although all companies doing business in the global marketplace have FCPA risk, resource extraction companies face greater risk in that they are often, pursuant to local law, forced into a marriage with foreign governments.

Thus, the more precise question when pondering the future locus of FCPA enforcement actions is where are the resource extraction companies likely to be doing business in the future?

There are only so many spots on the globe, but the future of the resource extraction industry – because of advances in technology and global warming – frequently points north.

Way north.  As in 66 North – the Arctic Circle.

For instance, this recent Wall Street Journal article (“Mining for Gold at Minus 45 Celsius”) notes:

“As the world warms, miners dream of unlocking trillions of dollars in diamonds, gold, nickel and other metals in the Arctic, a treeless cap that spans northern parts of Canada, Alaska, Russia and Scandinavian countries.”

“For … arctic miners, the biggest problem is the lack of ports, road and rail links.”

It is really a recipe for FCPA risk.  Difficult and harsh working conditions, narrow windows of opportunity to get things accomplished, heavy reliance on public infrastructure, etc.

Same issue with this additional Wall Street Journal article “Energy Companies Try Arctic Shipping Shortcut Between Europe and Asia” which states:

“Japanese and South Korean energy companies have begun shipping oil products through the Arctic’s melting ice—adding credibility to a route that could slash costs while avoiding risks associated with ferrying cargo through the Suez Canal.  The ships are taking the so-called Northern Sea Route, traders and shipbrokers in Singapore said, a shortcut between Asia and Europe along Russia’s Arctic Ocean coast. This marks the first time oil-derived products have been moved in such large volume through what maritime explorers of centuries past dubbed the Northeast Passage.”

“Using the Northern Sea Route could shave as much as 10 days, creating savings to offset such costs as additional insurance and the hiring of ice breakers, ships often needed to clear the path for vessels.”

Travel through the Northern Route is subject to the approval of the Russian Northern Sea Route Administration (“NSR”), established in 2013 by written order of the Russian Government to – among other things –  issue required permits to shippers to travel the Northern Route.

Given the enforcement agencies’ theories on licenses and permitting issues, the FCPA risk is rather obvious.

FCPA enforcement actions often follow business trends (think China).

Thus, it is possible that the locus of FCPA enforcement actions in the future may move north and possibly 66 North.

Much of the territory in the Arctic is owned or controlled, at least in part, by First Nation tribes and other non-traditional government bodies.  Thus, while awaiting firm approval to open up that branch office in Yellowknife, you might want to read this article by Perkins Coie attorneys Barak Cohen and Markus Funk titled “Assessing the Ambiguous Status of Tribal Leaders and Other Traditional Authorities under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

Chevron Decision Touches Upon FCPA Issues

Thursday, March 6th, 2014

This 2009 post flagged the “War of Words in Ecuador” between Chevron and plaintiff lawyers representing Ecuadorian villagers alleging environmental contamination at oil fields in the Amazon for its potential FCPA implications.

Earlier this week, as noted in this Wall Street Journal article:

“A federal judge ruled in favor of Chevron … in a civil racketeering case [against New York lawyer Steven Donziger, the plaintiffs' lawyer], saying a record $9.5 billion environmental judgment in Ecuador against the oil giant was “obtained by corrupt means.”  U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan [S.D.N.Y.] found that … Donziger and his litigation team engaged in coercion, bribery, money laundering and other criminal conduct in pursuit of the 2011 verdict.”

As stated by Judge Kaplan:

“This case is extraordinary. The facts are many and sometimes complex. They include things that normally come only out of Hollywood – coded emails among Donziger and his colleagues describing their private interactions with and machinations directed at judges and a court appointed expert, their payments to a supposedly neutral expert out of a secret account, a lawyer who invited a film crew to innumerable private strategy meetings and even to ex parte meetings with judges, an Ecuadorian judge who claims to have written the multibillion dollar decision but who was so inexperienced and uncomfortable with civil cases that he had someone else (a former judge who had been removed from the bench) draft some civil decisions for him, an 18-year old typist who supposedly did Internet research in American, English, and French law for the same judge, who knew only Spanish, and much more. The evidence is voluminous. The transnational elements of the case make it sensitive and challenging. Nevertheless, the Court has had the benefit of a lengthy trial. It has heard 31 witnesses in person and considered deposition and/or other sworn or, in one instance, stipulated testimony of 37 others. It has considered thousands of exhibits. It has made its findings, which of necessity are lengthy and detailed.”

As relevant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and any potential FCPA liability of Donziger, Judge Kaplan, beginning at pg. 392 of his mammoth 485-page opinion, addressed Chevron’s assertion that “Donziger violated the Travel Act through the use of facilities of interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to facilitate violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).”

Judge Kaplan concluded that ”[Donziger] did so by using email and by causing money to be wired to Ecuador to further the payment of money to Cabrera, a court appointee [of the Ecuadorian judicial system].”

Judge Kaplan’s decision most squarely addressed the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business” element.  Judge Kaplan stated as follows.

“The SEC and the Department of Justice interpret the FCPA to prohibit payments to court officials and regularly find that such payments satisfy the business purpose test.  [citing to DOJ FCPA enforcement actions against Pride International and Jim Bob Brown].   This court agrees.”

“Here, the payments increased the likelihood that Donziger’s business – that of contingency litigation – would benefit from a favorable judgment. Roughly 30 percent of the 20 percent contingency fee owed to the litigation team accrues to Donziger. He stood to benefit directly from any judgment and, accordingly, from any act that improved the likelihood that such a judgment would issue and its amount. The improper payments to Cabrera were intended to do, and did, exactly that.”

As to “foreign official,” Judge Kaplan stated: “as an expert appointed by the Lago Agrio court, Cabrera was an officer or official of the Ecuadorian court” (citing to an exhibit which stated:  “The Expert [Cabrera] is hereby reminded that he is an auxiliary to the Court for purposes of providing to the process and to the Court scientific elements for determining the truth.”).

As to the “knowledge” component of the FCPA’s third-party payment provisions, Judge Kaplan stated:  “The Court … finds that Donziger was “aware” that it was “substantially certain” that Cabrera would be paid from the funds he wired to the secret account.”

A judicial finding that Donziger engaged in conduct sufficient to establish an FCPA violation is – to state the obvious – a troubling event for him.

In response to Judge Kaplan’s decision, Donziger issued this statement.  In the above-referenced Wall Street Journal article, Donziger is quoted as follows.  “I am a zealous advocate for my clients.  I woud never bribe a judge or perpetrate a fraud … Ultimately I think the Court of Appeals will reverse this decision and whatever damage caused to my reputation will be restored.”

In this press release, Chevron stated, in pertinent part:

“[Judge Kaplan's decision] finds that Steven Donziger, the lead American lawyer behind the Ecuadorian lawsuit against the company, violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), committing extortion, money laundering, wire fraud, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, witness tampering and obstruction of justice in obtaining the Ecuadorian judgment and in trying to cover up his and his associates’ crimes.  [...]  Chevron’s reputation was taken hostage and held for a multibillion-dollar ransom. Rather than give in and pay these criminals off, Chevron exposed the truth. Chevron is pleased with today’s judgment. We are confident that any court that respects the rule of law will likewise find the Ecuadorian judgment to be illegitimate and unenforceable.”

For additional coverage of Judge Kaplan’s decision, see here from the New York Times and here from Reuters.  In addition, this 2013 Wall Street Journal article goes in-depth as to Donziger and the case.

FCPA Reform And The Olympics

Tuesday, February 11th, 2014

The DOJ may think that my “foreign official” declaration ”selectively reviews the [FCPA's] legislative history.”  However, the truth is the 152 page declaration is the most comprehensive document ever written on the FCPA’s legislative history relevant to “foreign official” issues.  So comprehensive in fact that it highlights Foreign Corrupt Practices Act reform efforts and the Olympics.

You may be asking in your best Gary Coleman voice “whatcha talkin bout.”

This is what I am talking about.

In April 1999, Representative Henry Waxman introduced H.R. 1370, Senator John McCain introduced S. 803, and Senator John Ashcroft introduced S. 797.  These bills sought to amend the FCPA by restricting American corporate sponsorship of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”).

Specifically, H.R. 1370 sought to ”amend the FCPA to prevent persons doing business in interstate commerce from providing financial support to the International Olympic Committee until the International Olympic Committee adopts institutional reforms.”

Specifically, S. 803 sought “to make the International Olympic Committee subject to the FCPA” by amending the “foreign official” definition – specifically the “public international organization” prong to include the International Olympic Committee.

Specifically, S. 797 sought ”to apply the FCPA to the International Olympic Committee” by amending the term “‘foreign official’ [to] include[] any member of, employee of, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of, the International Olympic Committee.’”.

None of these bills made it out of committee.

You may be thinking, what about the “public international organization” prong of the FCPA’s “foreign official” definition which states that a “public international organization” is

an organization that is designated by Executive Order pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. § 288); or

any other international organization that is designated by the President by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register

The list of “public international organizations” is here.  For more, see here.

And now back to the Games.

From Healthcare Providers To Customs Officials To SOE Employees – The “Foreign Officials” Of 2013

Monday, January 13th, 2014

A “foreign official.”

Without one, there can be no FCPA anti-bribery violation (civil or criminal).  Who were the “foreign officials” of 2013 (at least from an enforcement perspective – recognizing of course that the meaning of this key FCPA element is the subject of on-going dispute including a historic appellate court challenge – see here for links to the briefing).

This post, describes the alleged “foreign officials” from 2013 corporate DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions.

There were 9 core corporate enforcement actions in 2013.  Of the 9 enforcement actions, 5 (55%) involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities (“SOEs”).  These entities ranged from oil and gas companies to banks .

In 2012, 42% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 348-353).  In 2011, 81% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 29-41).  In 2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 108-119).  In 2009, 66% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 410-44).  As to whether Congress intended employees of SOEs to be “foreign officials” under the FCPA, see here for my “foreign official” declaration.

Another notable “foreign official” enforcement theory from 2013 was that various foreign health care providers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  Of the 9 core corporate enforcement actions in 2012, 2 (22%) involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers.  In 2012, 50% of corporate enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, this enforcement theory.  See here for a prior post on the origins and prominence of this enforcement theory.

Combining enforcement actions that involved, in whole or in part, SOE employees with enforcement actions that involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers, the result is 7 of 9 corporate enforcement actions (78%).   Last year, this figure was 10 of 12 (83%).

The remainder of this post describes (as per DOJ/SEC allegations) the “foreign officials” of 2013.  As is apparent from the specific descriptions below, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other instances with virtually no specificity.

[Note:  certain of the enforcement actions below technically only involved FCPA books and records and internal control charges.  As most readers know, actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues.  Thus, even if an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, the actions remain very much about the "foreign officials" involved.  As I've said before, if an employee of a U.S. company consistently entertains his brother-in-law in the corporate suite and seeks reimbursement for "client entertainment" you will not be reading about this FCPA books and records and internal controls violation]

Philips Electronics

SEC

“public officials of Polish healthcare facilities”

Parker Drilling

DOJ

Employees of the Nigerian Customs Service (“NCS”)

Employees of the “Panel of Inquiry for the Investigation of All Cases of Temporary Import Permits Issued Between 1984 to Year 2000 (the “TI Panel”) (a board empanelled for the purpose of examining certain duties and tariffs that the NCS collected or failed to collect; the TI Panel was presidentially appointed, operated under the auspices of the Nigerian President’s office, and possessed the power to issue subpoenas and levy fines)”

Employees of “Nigeria’s State Security Service, a Nigerian intelligence and law enforcement agency that operated as a department within the Nigerian government’s executive”

SEC

Employees of the Nigerian Customs Service (“NCS”)

Employees of the “Panel of Inquiry for the Investigation of All Cases of Temporary Import Permits Issued Between 1984 to Year 2000 (the “TI Panel”) (a board empanelled for the purpose of examining certain duties and tariffs that the NCS collected or failed to collect; the TI Panel was presidentially appointed, operated under the auspices of the Nigerian President’s office, and possessed the power to issue subpoenas and levy fines)”

Employees of “Nigeria’s State Security Service, a Nigerian intelligence and law enforcement agency that operated as a department within the Nigerian government’s executive”

Ralph Lauren

DOJ

“customs and other government officials [in Argentina] to assist in improperly obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid inspection”

SEC

 ”Argentine customs officials to secure the importation of RLC’s products into Argentina”

 ”Argentine government officials to improperly secure the importation of RLC’s products into Argentina”

Total

DOJ

An Iranian Official described as “the Chairman of an Iranian engineering company that was more than 90% owned by the Government of Iran and substantially controlled by the Government of Iran” and also described as follows.  “The Iranian Official was [also] the head of an Iranian organization concerned with fuel consumption, which was a wholly  owned subsidiary of NIOC, and was a government advisor to a high-ranking Iranian  official.”  NIOC is described as a “government-owned corporation operating under the direction and control of the Ministry of Petroleum of Iran.”

SEC

An Iranian Official described as follows. ”Between 1995 and 2004 the Iranian Official was first the head of one wholly owned subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”) and later the head of another NIOC wholly owned subsidiary. The Iranian Official was also a government advisor to a high-ranking Iranian official.”

Diebold

DOJ

Employees of Bank 1 and Bank 2 described as follows.  “[The Banks] were controlled and approximately 70% owned by the [Chinese government] … and were [two] of several state-owned banks in [China] that together maintained a monopoly over the banking system in [China] and provided core support for the government’s projects and economic goals.  The government retained a controlling right in [the Banks], including appointing or nominating a majority of board of directors and top managers at the bank.  [The Banks] were an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government [under the FCPA].”

Inferences to employees of banks owned or controlled by the government of Indonesia

SEC

Employees of banks owned or controlled by the government of China

Employees of banks owned or controlled by the government of Indonesia

Stryker

SEC

“various government employees including public health care professionals in Mexico, Poland, Romania, Argentina, and Greece”

“foreign officials employed by a Mexican governmental agency responsible for providing social security for government employees”

“foreign official then employed as the director of a public hospital in Poland,” “a state-employed healthcare professional” in Poland

a person “waiting to be confirmed as chief physician” at a public hospital in Romania

“physicians employed in the public healthcare system” of Argentina

“a foreign official who served as a prominent professor at the Greek University, and was the director of medical clinics at two public hospitals affiliated with the Greek University”

Weatherford

DOJ

Employees of Sonangol, a company wholly owned, controlled, and managed by the Angolan government

Angolan Officials 1, 2, and 3 (described as “high-level, senior officials of Sonangol” with influence over contracts), a “relative of Angolan Official 4 (described as a “high-level, senior official of Angola’s Ministry of Petroleum” with influence over contracts entered into by the Angolan government), Angolan Official 5 (described as “a Sonangol official with decision-making authority in Angola’s Cabinda region”), Angolan Official 3′s wife, Angolan Official 4′s daughter and son-in-law.”

“Decision makers at the national oil company” in the Middle East

SEC

A Sonangol Drilling Manager, Sonangol officials

“Decision makers at the national oil company” in the Middle East

Employees of Sonatrach, an Algerian state-owned company

Albanian tax auditors

the tax director and two members of Albania’s National Petroleum Agency

Bilfinger

DOJ

Employees of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), employees of National Petroleum Investment Management Services (a subsidiary of NNPC), the dominant political party in Nigeria, and an official in the executive branch of the Government of Nigeria

ADM

DOJ

Ukrainian government officials in exchange for those officials’ assistance in obtaining VAT refunds

An employee of Industrias Diana (an oil company headquartered in Venezuela that was wholly owned by Petroleos de Venezuela, Venezuela’s state-owned and controlled national oil company)

SEC

Ukrainian government officials in exchange for obtaining VAT refunds