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The Impact Of Kiobel On FCPA Enforcement

Thursday, April 18th, 2013

Yesterday, the Supreme Court released its long-awaited opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum.

The precise issue before the court was “whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”

The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, holds that “the presumption against exterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”

Accordingly, the court in a unanimous opinion (several justices authored concurring opinions) affirmed the Second Circuit’s dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the United State who filed suit in federal court against certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.

This post analyzes the impact of Kiobel on FCPA enforcement.

While the ATS and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are separated by 188 years in terms of enactment, the statutes have often being viewed by some as siblings, or at least distant cousins within the same family.

However, it is important to grasp that the ATS and FCPA are very different statutes in very material ways.

The jurisdictional issue the Supreme Court addressed in Kiobel - whether the canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against extraterritorial application - was necessitated because the ATS was silent on the jurisdiction issue. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the canon “provides that when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application it has none” (emphasis added).

In contrast, the FCPA is explicit as to its jurisdictional scope and provides as follows depending on the category of person (legal or natural) subject to the law’s anti-bribery provisions.

As to U.S. persons (legal or natural) the FCPA provides for two types of jurisdictional. The original statutory standard was (and is still part of the law) “use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance” of a bribery scheme. However, in 1998 Congress amended the FCPA to also provide for so-called nationality jurisdiction as to U.S. persons. 15 USC 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) specifically state, in pertinent part, as follows: “It shall also be unlawful for [any issuer organized under the laws of the United States or for any United States person] to corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance [of a bribery scheme] irrespective of whether such [U.S. person] makes uses of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance [of the bribery scheme]. In short, as to U.S. persons, in 1998 Congress explicitly amended the FCPA to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction thus negating the need for reference to the canon of statutory interpretation at issue in Kiobel.

As to foreign issuers subject to 78dd-1 of the FCPA (i.e. foreign companies with shares registered on U.S. exchanges or otherwise required to file periodic reports with the SEC), the 1998 amendment found in 78dd-1(g) did not apply to such companies. It can thus be inferred that Congress did not intend for the extraterritorial provisions of the 1998 amendments to apply to such entities. Here again, the need for the canon of statutory interpretation at issue in Kiobel is negated. For such foreign issuers, the FCPA explicitly provides only territorial jurisdiction as stated above.

As to persons other than U.S. persons (legal or natural) or foreign issuers, the FCPA was also amended in 1998 to create an entire new category of “person” subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. See 78dd-3. This category applies to non-U.S. actors and non-foreign issuers such as foreign private companies and foreign nationals. This FCPA prong has explicit jurisdictional provisions. 78dd-3(a) states, in pertinent part, that it shall be unlawful for “any person” other than an issuer or domestic concern (that is a U.S. “person”) ”while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance [of a bribery scheme." Here again, because the FCPA is explicit, the need for the canon of statutory interpretation at issue in Kiobel is negated.

Just because the canon of statutory interpretation at issue in Kiobel is not directly applicable to the FCPA, it does not follow that Kiobel will not have an impact on FCPA enforcement. To the contrary, the logic and rationale of many justices in Kiobel has direct bearing on certain aspects of FCPA enforcement, and indeed can be viewed as Supreme Court disapproval of certain aspects of FCPA enforcement.

Despite the above jurisdictional provisions clearly set forth in the FCPA, in recent years the DOJ has advanced broad jurisdictional theories in enforcement actions against foreign entities and foreign nationals.

For instance in 2006, the DOJ brought its first criminal FCPA enforcement action a foreign company, Norway-based Statoil (see here for the information), for engaging in a bribery scheme in Iran. The sole jurisdictional allegation the DOJ hung its hat on was the notion that Statoil received an invoice from a U.K. consulting company instructing that money "be routed through a U.S. bank account in New York to a bank account in Switzerland" which the company paid.

In announcing this action, which resulted in $21 million flowing into the U.S. Treasury, the DOJ stated (here) as follows.

"Although Statoil is a foreign issuer, the FCPA applies to foreign and domestic public companies alike, where the companies stock trades on American exchanges. This prosecution demonstrates the [DOJ's] commitment vigorously to enforce the FCPA against all international businesses whose conduct falls within its scope.”

Many similar DOJ enforcement actions against foreign companies have been brought since. In fact, the majority of cases in the FCPA’s “Top Ten” in terms of fine and penalty amounts are against foreign companies including the Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement actions in which the DOJ (and SEC) alleged that Dutch, French, and Japanese companies bribed Nigerian foreign officials. The jurisdictional allegations in these cases, which resulted in approximately $1.1 billion flowing into the U.S. Treasury, all hinged on wire transfers through New York based accounts and faxes and e-mails to the U.S. FCPA enforcement against foreign companies has been so prominent as to gain the attention of main-stream media such as the New York Times in this story.

In short, while the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors (and several other examples could also be cited) did not rely on extraterritorial jurisdiction – because indeed there is none under the FCPA as to foreign actors – they did rely on what I’ve called de facto extraterritorial jurisdiction given the scant connection the bribery schemes had to the U.S.

It is here where the logic and rationale of many justices in Kiobel has direct bearing on this aspect of FCPA enforcement, and indeed can be viewed as Supreme Court disapproval of this aspect of FCPA enforcement.

For starters, Chief Justice Roberts recognized the delicate foreign policy consequences of the issue before the court – an issue that is present when the U.S. government alleges that foreign companies are bribing foreign officials on foreign lands.

It was also refreshing to see Chief Justice Roberts reference the “historical background against which the ATS was enacted” in giving meaning to the statute and how these historical events provided no support to the petitioner’s position. I have long argued (see here for “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement“) that certain aspects of FCPA enforcement are inconsistent with Congressional intent – a notion that becomes all the more apparent when reading “The Story of the FCPA” – the most extensive piece ever written on the FCPA’s history that I published this past December upon the FCPA’s 35th anniversary.

The concurring opinion of Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, is also instructive in that it states when the ATS “claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.” Applying this to the FCPA context, can it truly be said that the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with “sufficient force”?

Even the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, is instructive. This opinion did not invoke the presumption against exterritoriality in concluding that the claims should be dismissed, but rather found that jurisdiction was lacking for another reason. Namely that the foreign corporations, while having shares traded on U.S. exchanges, had an insufficient presence in the U.S. such that it would be “farfetched to believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal and indirect American presence, that this legal action helps to vindicate a distinct American interest.” The parallels to FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors for alleging bribing foreign officials in foreign lands are obvious.

If FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors are based on aggressive and dubious territorial jurisdictional theories – why don’t the companies aggressively litigate?

This highlights the second key difference between the ATS and the FCPA. The only reason the Kiobel case made it to the Supreme Court is because the plaintiffs in ATS cases have little leverage against the corporate defendants. ATS actions are civil actions brought by private plaintiffs and are thus actually litigated. I know, it seems a bit old-fashioned doesn’t it.

In contrast, certain courts have held (although by no means is the argument that the FCPA ought to have a private right of action a fait accompli) that the FCPA does not have a private right. The FCPA is thus only enforced by the DOJ (or the SEC as to issuers). These government enforcement agencies, unlike ATS plaintiffs, have big and sharp sticks that corporate defendants (and individuals as well) are mindful of in deciding how to proceed when subject to FCPA scrutiny.

Indeed, as explained in this prior post, when the above referenced Japanese company charged for making bribe payments to Nigerian officials raised jurisdictional issues, the DOJ stated that the company was not cooperating. Specifically the resolution document states as follows. “After initially declining to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments, [the company] began to cooperate.” A company doesn’t cooperate with the DOJ in an FCPA enforcement, the chances are higher that the company will be indicted as opposed to being offered one of the resolution vehicles discussed below.

In short, to challenge a “plaintiff” in an FCPA enforcement action first requires a company to be criminally indicted by the DOJ or in the SEC context to be charged by the company’s primary government regulator. The impact on the company’s market capitalization upon indictment or civil charging is likely to be much greater than the FCPA fines or penalties the DOJ and/or SEC are seeking.

Indeed, in the FCPA’s 35 year history only two companies have put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial and both companies ultimately prevailed. The first instance, involving an issuer occurred in 1991, and the second instance, involving a private company, occurred in 2011.

To make matters worse, per DOJ policy, all FCPA enforcement shall originate from Main Justice in Washington, D.C. This means from a discretion and supervision standpoint that a very small group of individuals are in the charge of an entire area of law. Contrast this with DOJ insider trading cases, financial fraud cases, etc. that can originate from any U.S. Attorneys office in the country

To make matters even worse, in 2004 the DOJ introduced non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to the FCPA context. These agreements have the practical effect of insulating DOJ FCPA enforcement theories in corporate enforcement actions from any judicial scrutiny.

These dynamics of FCPA enforcement are simply not present in ATS cases and for this very simple reason the ATS, unlike the FCPA, has been the subject of much litigation over the past decade. Imagine if the ATS was only enforced by the government, consolidated entirely in one office in Washington D.C., and that the government used NPAs and DPAs to resolve the cases.

The Supreme Court would have never heard the Kiobel case, nor would the Supreme Court have heard the Sosa ATS case in 2004, nor would various appellate courts have heard ATS cases over the past decade or so.

Returning to the original question – will Kiobel have an impact on FCPA enforcement? The logic and rationale of many justices in Kiobel would sure seem to have direct bearing on certain aspects of FCPA enforcement, and indeed can be viewed as Supreme Court disapproval of certain aspects of FCPA enforcement.

However, in order for judicial logic and rationale to be triggered, the judiciary needs to play a role, and in the FCPA context the judiciary rarely gets to play a role because of government enforcement policies.

Philips Resolves First Corporate FCPA Enforcement Action Of The Year

Wednesday, April 10th, 2013

A Netherlands-based company with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange is the parent of a group of companies including a Polish subsidiary that sells medical equipment to Polish healthcare facilities. Between six and fourteen years ago “in at least 30 transactions” employees of the Polish subsidiary, without any mention of parent company knowledge or approval, ”made improper payments to public officials of Polish healthcare facilities to increase the likelihood that public tenders for the sale of medical equipment would be awarded” to the subsidiary.

The end result?

Why of course $4,515,178 to the U.S. treasury.

Recently the SEC issued (here) an administrative cease and desist order against Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”). The action is the first corporate FCPA enforcement action of 2013.

The SEC Order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“This matter concerns violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Philips. The violations took place through Philips’s operations in Poland from at least 1999 through 2007. The violations relate to improper payments made by employees of Philips’s Polish subsidiary, Philips Polska sp. z o.o. (“Philips Poland”) to healthcare officials in Poland regarding public tenders proffered by Polish healthcare facilities to purchase medical equipment.”

[...]

“Since at least 1999, Philips has participated in public tenders to sell medical equipment to Polish healthcare facilities. From 1999 through 2007, in at least 30 transactions, employees of Philips Poland made improper payments to public officials of Polish healthcare facilities to increase the likelihood that public tenders for the sale of medical equipment would be awarded to Philips.”

“Representatives of Philips Poland entered into arrangements with officials of various Polish healthcare facilities whereby Philips submitted the technical specifications of its medical equipment to officials drafting the tenders who incorporated the specifications of Philips’ equipment into the contracts. Incorporating the specifications of Philips’ equipment in the tenders’ requirements greatly increased the likelihood that Philips would be awarded the bids.”

“Certain of the healthcare officials involved in the arrangements with Philips also decided whom to award the tenders, and when Philips was awarded the contracts, the officials were paid the improper payments by employees of Philips Poland.”

“The improper payments made by employees of Philips Poland to the Polish healthcare officials usually amounted to 3% to 8% of the contracts’ net value.”

“At times, Philips Poland employees also kept a portion of the improper payments as a “commission.” The Philips Poland employees involved in the improper payments often utilized a third party agent to assist with the improper arrangements and payments to Polish healthcare officials.”

“The improper payments made by employees of Philips Poland to Polish healthcare officials were falsely characterized and accounted for in Philips’s books and records as legitimate expenses. At times those expenses were supported by false documentation created by Philips Poland employees and/or third parties. Philips Poland’s financial statements are consolidated into Philips’ books and records.”

Under the heading “Discovery, Internal Investigation and Self Report,” the Order states as follows.

“Philips became aware of misconduct by Philips Poland employees in August 2007, when Polish officials conducted searches of three of Philips’ offices in Poland and arrested two Philips Poland employees.”

“In response to the search of Philips’ offices and arrests of its employees, Philips conducted an internal audit in 2007. Philips failed to discover the improper payments to Polish healthcare officials in its internal audit, but terminated and disciplined several Philips Poland employees and made substantial changes to Philips Poland’s management and significant revisions to the company’s internal controls.”

“In December 2009, the Prosecutor’s Office in Poznan, Poland, indicted 23 individuals, including three former Philips Poland employees and 16 healthcare officials, for violating laws related to public tenders for the purchase of medical equipment. That indictment described the improper payments discussed in this Order.”

“In response to the Polish authorities’ indictment, Philips conducted an internal investigation. The findings of the investigation supported the allegations of the 2009 indictment and revealed that Philips Poland employees had made unlawful payments to Polish healthcare officials, that its books, records and accounts failed to accurately account for the improper payments and that its internal controls failed to ensure that transactions were properly recorded by Philips in its books and records.”

“In early 2010, Philips self-reported its internal investigation to the staff of the Commission and to the Department of Justice. As the internal investigation progressed, Philips shared the results of the investigation with the staff and undertook significant remedial measures.”

Under the heading “Remedial Measures,” the Order states as follows.

“In response to its internal audit and investigation, Philips terminated and disciplined several Philips Poland employees and installed new management at Philips Poland, as stated above. Philips also retained three law firms and two auditing firms to conduct the investigation and design remedial measures to address weaknesses in its internal controls. Included in changes to internal controls, Philips established strict due diligence procedures related to the retention of third parties, formalized and centralized its contract administration system and enhanced its contract review process, and established a broad-based verification process related to contract payments. In addition, Philips has made significant revisions to its Global Business Principles policies and continually revises the policies to keep them current and relevant. Philips also established and enhanced an anti-corruption training program that includes a certification process and a variety of training applications to ensure broad-based reach and effectiveness.”

Based on the above conduct, the SEC found that Philips violated the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions. The Order states as follows.

“Employees of Philips Poland made improper payments to healthcare officials in Poland to increase the likelihood that Philips would be awarded public tenders to sell medical equipment to Polish healthcare facilities. The payments were improperly recorded in Philip’s books and records as legitimate expenses. Philips Poland employees also utilized falsified records to support the false accounting entries. Accordingly, as a result of its misconduct, Philips failed to make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflected its transactions and the disposition of its assets …”

“Philips Poland’s improper payments to healthcare officials in Poland related to at least 30 public tenders over a period of eight years. Philips’s internal controls failed to detect or prevent the improper payments and false recordings of those transactions during that time. As a result, Philips failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were properly recorded by Philips in its books and records. Philips also failed to implement an FCPA compliance and training program commensurate with the extent of its international operations. Accordingly, Philips violated [the internal control provisions].”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Philips consented to entry of the Order prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay disgorgement of $3,120,597 and prejudgment interest of $1,394,581. The Order further states that Philips “acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty based upon its cooperation in a Commission investigation and related enforcement action.”

A few random comments regarding the Philips FCPA enforcement action.

As noted in the SEC Order, Philips retained “three law firms and two auditing firms to conduct the investigation and design remedial measures.” Wow. There is a reason I call it FCPA Inc. and the business of bribery.

Just what does the SEC mean when it says that Philips failed to implement an FCPA compliance and training program “commensurate with the extent of its international operations.” As noted in this prior post discussing how the November 2012 FCPA Guidance can be used as a useful measuring stick for future enforcement activity, I highlighted the following statements from the Guidance.

“The ‘in reasonable detail’ qualification [of the FCPA’s books and records provisions] was adopted by Congress ‘in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic.’ [...] The term ‘reasonable detail’ is defined in the statute as the level of detail that would ‘satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.’ Thus, as Congress noted when it adopted this definition, ‘[t]he concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.’” (Pg. 39)

“Like the ‘reasonable detail’ requirement in the books and records provision, the [FCPA’s internal control provisions] defines ‘reasonable assurances’ as ‘such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.’ The Act does not specify a particular set of controls that companies are required to implement. Rather, the internal controls provisions gives companies the flexibility to develop and maintain a system of controls that is appropriate to their particular needs and circumstances.” (Pg. 40)

The Philips enforcement action involved Polish healthcare officials. As noted in this prior post, in 2012, 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers.

The Philips enforcement action is similar to prior SEC administrative actions against foreign issuers Allianz and Diageo (see here and here for prior posts). As noted in the previous posts, contrary to popular misperception, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to foreign issuers only to the extent “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” are used in connection with the improper payments. The SEC’s Order in the Philips action does not contain any findings concerning any U.S. nexus in regards to the payments at issue.

Despite the absence of FCPA anti-bribery charges or findings, the SEC still sought a disgorgement remedy. The Philips enforcement action is thus another example of “no-charged bribery disgorgement.” See here for criticism of such actions by various Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys, including Paul Berger (here) a former Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement. The article concluded that “settlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its complaint.” The article noted that such “no-charged bribery disgorgement settlements appear designed to inflict punishment rather than achieve the goals of equity.”

Because the conduct at issue in the Philips enforcement action occurred between six to fourteen years ago, you may be wondering about statute of limitations issues given the Supreme Court’s recent Gabelli decision. As noted in this prior post, from the perspective of SEC FCPA enforcement against corporations, the Gabelli case is, unfortunately, unlikely to have much impact. Cooperation will continue to be the name of the game and corporations facing FCPA scrutiny will likely continue to waive statute of limitations arguments or otherwise toll statute of limitations as evidence of their cooperation.

Friday Roundup

Friday, December 21st, 2012

Better late than never, Judge Leon pulls a Judge Rakoff, Edmonds sentenced, it’s official, whistleblower statistics, it ought to stop marketing, China related issues, ICE melted quickly, and a U.K. enforcement action. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope

Academic publishing is seldom quick. Yet before the calendar flips into another year, I am pleased to share my article concerning 2011 FCPA enforcement. The abstract of ”The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope” (see here to download) recently published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law is as follows. Information in the article is current as of January 16, 2012.

For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s history, key decisions concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind closed doors around conference room tables in Washington, D.C. The FCPA took on a life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to mean whatever the DOJ or SEC could get putative corporate FCPA defendants (mindful of the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to agree to behind those closed doors. However, as the enforcement agencies continued to push the envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and as the DOJ brought more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including through manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals alike began to openly fight back. While many FCPA enforcement decisions and procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. This Article (i) provides an overview of 2011 FCPA enforcement and discusses certain problematic enforcement trends, and (ii) highlights how in 2011 the FCPA was subjected to the most meaningful public scrutiny in its history. FCPA enforcement trends and scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the FCPA.

Start your collection of FCPA Year in Reviews. For my 2011 (short version), see here. For 2010, see here (short version), here (long version). For 2009, see here (long version).

Judge Leon Pulls a Judge Rakoff

My post concerning the SEC’s March 2011 enforcement action against IBM was titled “Questions Abound in IBM Enforcement Action.” (See here). Among the issues I discussed were the following. That in December 2000, IBM resolved an FCPA enforcement action and consented, as part of the settlement, to the entry of an Order that requires IBM to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violation of [the FCPA's books and records provisions]. I noted that because the March 2011 enforcement action alleged FCPA books and records charges, that IBM was thus in clear violation of the 2000 court order.

The case was assigned to Judge Richard Leon (of Africa Sting fame) and lingered for a long time. This Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post and this Bloomberg article report that Judge Leon has refused to approve the settlement.

As stated by Bloomberg – “The heart of the dispute is that Leon, who has had the case under review for 22 months, wants reporting on a broader range of possible wrongdoing than the company is willing to turn over. Leon, who spoke loudly and angrily, asked why the regulator would agree to limit such requirements for a company with a history of books-and-records violations. [...] “I guess you want that $10 million judgment on your list of achievements this year,” Leon told [the SEC lawyer]. “Well, it’s not going to happen.” He scheduled a hearing for Feb. 4.”

As stated by Wall Street Journal Corruption Current – “Leon also questioned broader SEC settlement policies and warned that he was among “a growing number of district judges who are increasingly concerned” by those policies.”

In not ”rubber stamping” the SEC – IBM settlement, Judge Leon pulled a Judge Rakoff. Judge Rakoff of the S.D. of N.Y. has been a frequent focus on this site – see here, here, here and here. See also, the discussion of Judge Rakoff in my 2010 article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”

Edmonds Sentence

This past June, David Edmonds, a defendant in the long-running “Carson” enforcement action involving former employees of Control Components Inc., agreed to plead guilty on the eve of trial to substantially reduced charges. (See here for the prior post). Earlier this week, Judge James Selna sentenced Edmonds to four months in prison and four months of home confinement. (See here for Judge Selna’s sentencing memo). As noted in the DOJ’s sentencing memo (here), the DOJ sought a 14 month prison sentence.

Other defendants previously sentenced in the case are Stuart Carson (4 months in prison followed by 8 months of home detention), Hong Carson (3 years probation to include 6 months of home detention) and Paul Cosgrove (13 months home detention).

It’s Official

Imagine a foreign country in which the president is actively seeking and accepting corporate money to fund inaugural festivities. All sorts of red flags right?

But wait, this describes the United States and President Obama’s upcoming inauguration. As detailed in this prior post, President Obama’s fundraising advisers “have urged the White House to accept corporate donations for his January 2013 inaugural celebration rather than rely exclusively on weary donors who underwrote his $1 billion re-election effort.”

It’s now official. As noted by this recent New York Times article “President Obama’s finance team is offering corporations and other institutions that contribute $1 million exclusive access to an array of inaugural festivities.” As noted in the article, Obama’s finance team is offering four different packages “with differing levels of access depending on the level of contribution.”

Our FCPA enforcement agencies are bringing enforcement actions against companies for conduct that includes providing $600 bottles of wine, Cartier watches, cameras, kitchen appliances, business suits, and executive education classes to individuals employed by foreign companies that are allegedly state-owned or state-controlled. (These are all allegations found in recent FCPA enforcement actions).

But remember, as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently declared (see here), “we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.”

Whistleblower Statistics

The Dodd-Frank Act enacted in July 2010 contained whistleblower provisions applicable to all securities law violations including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In this prior post from July 2010, I predicted that the new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA enforcement. As noted in this prior post, my prediction was an outlier (so it seemed) compared to the flurry of law firm client alerts that predicted that the whistleblower provisions would have a significant impact on FCPA enforcement.

So far, there have not been any whistleblower awards in connection with FCPA enforcement actions. Given that enforcement actions (from point of first disclosure to resolution) typically take between 2-4 years, it still may be too early to effectively analyze the impact of the whistleblower provisions on FCPA enforcement.

Whatever your view, I previously noted that the best part of the new whistleblower provisions were that its impact on FCPA enforcement can be monitored and analyzed because the SEC is required to submit annual reports to Congress. Last month, the SEC released (here) its annual report for FY2012.

Of the 3,001 whisteblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the FCPA. As noted in this similar post from last year, in FY2011 (a partial reporting year) 3.9% of the 334 tips received by the SEC related to the FCPA.

It Ought to Stop Marketing

In this previous post titled “It Ought to Stop” I focused on the FCPA conference industry and how conference firms drive attendance to their events by touting the public servants who will speak at the event.

Here is how conference firm C5 touts its upcoming conference in a press release (here).

Ask the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC directly how your company can remain compliant

Hear the latest on the newly released FCPA guidance. Along with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission’s, Charles E. Cain, the Deputy Chief of the FCPA Unit, Enforcement Division, we will have Matthew S. Queler, from the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, presenting comprehensive, insightful and practical details of the U.S. government’s interpretation of the guidance, and highlight recent examples designed to help prevent future violations. Their session at 14:00 on Day 1, will help you navigate the ever evolving markets and recognize the current enforcement trends; giving you the tools to reanalyse risk profiles and minimize areas of exposure. Finally, to top off the hour you will be given an exclusive opportunity to have your FCPA questions answered. The only way to obtain answers directly from the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC is to register for this forum!

The event, depending when you register and which package you select, costs between €4341 – €1795.

It ought to stop.

China Related Issues

An occassional topic of discussion on this site is Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and how such companies are frequently doing business outside its borders, including here in the U.S. (See here, here, and here for prior posts).

Wall Street Journal Columnist Dennis Berman “hit the nail on the head” in his recent column when he noted that one of “the most intriguing business stories of the past month has been taking place in San Francisco, where a group of U.S. developers is planning the biggest real-estate expansion there since the 1906 earthquake. The group—which includes Lennar Corp., Ross Perot Jr. and others —isn’t getting financing from an American bank or pension fund. No, the money, some $1.7 billion of it, is coming from the China Development Bank, a policy arm of the Chinese state. As Berman further notes, a financing contingency is that China Railway Construction Corp. – a state-owned infrastructure builder with roots in the People’s Liberation Army—take part in the projects, which will develop up to 20,000 new homes.

Another occasional topic of discussion on this site is how Chinese companies are listing shares on U.S. exchanges and thus becoming “issuers” for purposes of the FCPA. (See here for a prior post). A core FCPA enforcement action of a Chinese issues has never occurred, but I predict it will some day – diplomatic and foreign policy issues aside. Only now, the universe of potential targets is shrinking. As noted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, several Chinese companies have delisted from U.S. exchanges. The article provides the following information. “At the peak, at year-end 2010, 167 Chinese companies were listed on Nasdaq and 99 on the NYSE. That compares with 84 China-based companies on NYSE and 129 on Nasdaq as of Nov. 30, 2012, according to the exchanges.” For more, see this recent article from the New York Times.

ICE Melted Quickly

This recent post highlighted the cert petition of Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica (“ICE”) to the Supreme Court related to victim issues in connection with the December 2010 Alcatel-Lucent FCPA enforcement action. After several unsuccessful 11th Circuit appeals, ICE petitioned the Supreme Court to hears it case (see here). The question presented for review is as follows. “Whether a crime victim who is denied rights conferred by the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act has a right to directly appeal the denial of those rights.”

The ice melted quickly as recently the Supreme Court denied ICE’s petition.

U.K. Enforcement Action

Earlier this week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced (here) charges against former employees of Swift Group (an oil and gas services provider) following “a two-year investigation into allegations of corruption in relation to the tax affairs of Swift Technical Energy Solutions Ltd, a Nigerian subsidiary of the Swift Group of companies.” According to the SFO release, ”the value of the bribes alleged to have been paid is approximately£180,000.”

The SFO release notes that Paul Jacobs (the former Chief Financial Officer of Swift), Bharat Sodha (the former Tax Manager of Swift), Nidhi Vyas (the former Financial Controller of Swift), and Trevor Bruce (the former Area Director for Nigeria of Swift) were charged in relation to “bribes to tax officials to avoid, reduce or delay paying tax on behalf of workers placed by Swift. The charges relate to payments said to have been made to agents of the Rivers State Board of Internal Revenue and the Lagos State Board of Internal Revenue, both in Nigeria. The payments were made in 2008 and 2009.”

*****

A happy holiday season to all.

Analyzing Allianz

Wednesday, December 19th, 2012

Earlier this week, $12.3 million flowed into the U.S. treasury.

Why?

Because a German company used to have shares and bonds registered with the SEC. The German company had a German subsidiary that invested in an Indonesian joint venture. The Indonesian joint venture made, without any apparent knowledge or approval of the German company, alleged improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia between seven to eleven years ago. When the German company learned of suspicious account activity at the Indonesian joint venture seven years ago, it directed the joint venture to close the suspicious account. The joint venture agreed to close the account and stop making the payments, even though it continued to make the payments through 2008.

The above paragraph pretty much explains the SEC’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action earlier this week against Allianz SE , a German company engaged in property and casualty insurance, life and health insurance, and asset management businesses around the world.

From November 2000 to October 2009, Allianz’s American Depositary Shares and bonds were registered with the SEC and it was thus an “issuer” under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In 1989 PT Asuransi Allianz Utama Indonesia (“Utama”) was formed as a joint venture. JV members included Allianz of Asia-Pacific and Africa GmbH (AZAP - a German company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allianz), PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (“Jasindo”) (“an Indonesian state-owned entity) and PT Asuransi Wuwungan. According to the SEC, during the relevant time period, AZAP owned 75% of Utama.

In the administrative cease and desist order (here) announced (here) earlier this week, the SEC found improper payments by Utama to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain or retain business. The order also found that the payments were improperly recorded and that Allianz failed to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal controls.

The SEC order states, in summary, as follows.

“These proceedings arise out of violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Allianz SE (“Allianz” or the “Company”), through its Indonesian majority-owned subsidiary, PT Asuransi Allianz Utama (“Utama”). Between 2001 and 2008, Utama managers made improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain and retain business. Allianz learned of the improper payments from two complaints made several years apart. The first complaint was submitted in 2005 alleging significant misconduct, including unsupported payments to agents. A subsequent audit of Utama’s accounting records uncovered that managers at Utama were using “special purpose accounts” to make illicit payments, many to government officials, in order to secure business in Indonesia. Despite the audit, the conduct continued. The second complaint was lodged in 2009 to Allianz’s external auditors and alleged that Allianz created illicit off-the-books accounts. In response, Allianz began an internal investigation. The Commission staff opened an investigation in April 2010 after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The investigation determined that from at least 2001 through December 2008, the Utama managers, with the assistance of others in the Indonesian office, made payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia to procure or retain insurance contracts related to large government projects in Indonesia. As a result of improper payments of approximately $650,626 to agents and employees of state-owned entities and others, Allianz realized $5,315,649 in profits. The payments were improperly recorded as legitimate transaction costs, thereby causing Allianz’s books and records to be inaccurate. Allianz failed to devise and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances to detect and prevent such payments.”

The order contains the following additional facts.

“In 1989, Allianz established Utama and continued the practice of using special purpose accounts for paying commissions to agents that generated business for Allianz. However, in February 2001, Indonesian Agent, an agent for Utama, Utama CEO 1 [a German citizen who was the Utama CEO from 1998 to 2001] and Utama’s Chief Financial Officer opened a separate, off-the-books account in the Indonesian Agent’s name (the “Agent special purpose account”). The Agent special purpose account was used to make improper payments to employees of Indonesian state-owned entities and others for the purpose of obtaining and retaining insurance contracts. In February 2001, Indonesian Agent and Utama CEO 1 executed a “Paying Agency Agreement” that set up the scheme to make the payments to employees of state-owned entities. This agreement established the off-the-books account that served as a slush fund to make bribe payments to foreign officials and others as instructed by Utama.”

Under the heading “Utama’s 2001-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“During the period 2001 to 2005, Utama Marketing Manager [an Indonesian citizen] made payments from the Agent special purpose account to account introducers employed by state-owned entities to secure insurance contracts on large government projects in Indonesia. Utama Marketing Manager received approval from Utama management to use the Agent special purpose account for improper purposes. Utama CEO 2, the CEO from 2003-2006, was aware of the Agent special purpose account and the improper payments to foreign officials. [...] The improper payments made to foreign officials were disguised in the Utama insurance contracts as “overriding commissions.” Despite the fact that Allianz has a majority share of Utama and consolidated the subsidiary’s accounts into its own books and records, Utama’s accounting system was maintained in Indonesia and Allianz did not have effective controls over the accounting. Allianz did not have the ability to access Utama’s accounting system and, therefore, did not detect the movement of funds to the Agent special purpose account. In addition, the Agent special purpose account was maintained in the name of the Indonesian Agent to make it appear that all movement of funds to this account was for legitimate commission payments. Likewise, Allianz did not have effective controls over the commission payment request process, which allowed payments to go to the Agent special purpose account without supporting documentation. [...] On December 1, 2005, a whistleblower complaint concerning the special purpose account was submitted to both the Allianz whistleblower hotline and Utama’s joint venture partner Jasindo, and then forwarded to the head of AZAP. The complaint itemized a number of control weaknesses, most notably, the existence of the Agent special purpose account and its lack of transparency. On December 8, 2005, Allianz Group Audit initiated an audit of the Indonesian office; however, the review was limited to embezzlement from the Company. [...] However, no additional steps were taken to determine the nature and purpose of the accounts or to identify the recipients of payments from the accounts. On December 12, 2005, based on the audit findings Allianz directed the Utama management to close the Agent special purpose account. Although the Utama management agreed to close the account and to stop making the payments, it continued making improper payments to secure business for Allianz through 2008.”

Under the heading “Utama’s Post-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Despite the directive to close the account and to stop making payments, Utama Marketing Manager continued to use the Agent special purpose account to make improper payments to foreign officials from 2005 to 2008. [...] Utama CEO 2 approved the continued use of the Agent special purpose account to make payments on the two government insurance contracts at issue. Later, Utama Marketing Manager and his staff expanded the improper payments to numerous other foreign officials on government insurance contracts. From 2005 to 2008, Utama Marketing Manager employed various methods to make payments to foreign officials. In addition to booking payments through the Agent special purpose account, Utama Marketing Manager made payments by either: 1) booking commissions to an agent that was not associated with the account for the government insurance contract and then withdrawing the funds booked to the agent’s account as cash to pay the foreign official; or 2) overstating the amount of a client’s insurance premium, booking the excess amount to an unallocated account and then “reimbursing” the excess funds to the foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Similar to the Agent special purpose account, Allianz did not have effective controls over the Utama accounting system or the commission payment process, which allowed payments to be made to an agent’s account without supporting documentation. Allianz did not have any controls over the use of the unallocated account that was maintained at Utama. As a result, Utama Marketing Manager was able to take funds from Utama to pay foreign officials without detection. In March 2009, Allianz’s outside auditor received an anonymous complaint alleging that an Allianz executive created or initiated slush funds during his tenure with AZAP. Between December 2005, when the Allianz Executive Vice-President of the Asia-Pacific Division directed Utama to close the Agent special purpose account and the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz took no steps to ensure that the Agent special purpose account was closed and that similar improper payments were not being made.”

Under the heading “Investigation and Remediation” the order states, in full, as follows.

“In response to the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz convened a Whistleblower Committee to do an internal investigation and retained counsel to conduct an internal investigation of Utama’s payment practices in Indonesia. Allianz did not report the conduct to the Commission staff. In April 2010, the staff opened an investigation after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The staff contacted Allianz concerning the allegations. Allianz’s cooperation in the staff’s investigation and the timeliness of its response to the Commission’s requests for documents and information improved over time. Allianz hired new counsel and took steps to further its cooperation and remedial efforts. The staff’s investigation uncovered 295 government insurance contracts that were obtained or retained by improper payments of approximately $650,626 to Indonesian government officials and others from 2001 through 2008. As stated above, in some instances the nature of the improper payments was disguised in invoices as an “overriding commission” or as a commission for an agent that was not associated with the government insurance contract. In other instances the improper payments were structured as an overpayment by the government insurance contract holder, who was later “reimbursed” for the overpayment. The excess funds were then paid to foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Allianz took various remedial measures, including employment action against several individuals who were involved in the conduct or failed to stop the conduct. Allianz issued new or enhanced FCPA compliance and internal accounting control policies and procedures, including mandating strict scrutiny of payments to third party intermediaries. Allianz also updated the anti-corruption clause in its third-party contracts to specifically refer to the FCPA. Allianz provided enhanced FCPA compliance training to its employees and improved its current global anti-corruption compliance program.”

Under the heading, “FCPA Violations” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Utama, a majority-owned subsidiary of Allianz, made improper payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain government insurance contracts. Utama improperly recorded the payments as legitimate transaction costs. Utama’s financial statements were consolidated into Allianz’s financial statements. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to keep accurate books, records and accounts. Further, as evidenced by the extent and duration of Utama’s improper payments and their improper recordation, and the fact that Allianz was not aware that Utama’s commission payment request process allowed funds to be diverted for improper payments, Allianz failed to recognize the compliance risks posed by Utama. Allianz also failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that improper payments were not being made by its subsidiary. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls. [...] Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act does not require that the amounts involved be “material,” nor is it necessary to prove “scienter” under its provisions. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749-51 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Similarly, there is no scienter requirement for establishing a violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B).

According to the SEC release, “without admitting or denying the findings, Allianz agreed to cease and desist from further violations and pay disgorgement of $5,315,649, prejudgment interest of $1,765,125, and a penalty of $5,315,649 for a total of $12,396,423.”

See here for a prior guest post discussing the Dodd-Frank provision granting the SEC authority to impose civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings such as the Allianz matter.

There is much to analyze in the nine-page cease and desist order.

For starters, the SEC required disgorgement even though no FCPA anti-bribery violations were alleged or asserted. This prior post highlighted an article concerning ”no-charged bribery disgorgement” by various Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys, including Paul Berger (here) a former Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement. The article concluded that “settlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its complaint.” The article noted that such “no-charged bribery disgorgement settlements appear designed to inflict punishment rather than achieve the goals of equity.”

Your first reaction might be – the SEC could have charged Allianz with FCPA anti-bribery violations given the findings of the cease and desist order, but choose not to. If that is your reaction, based on the information in the cease and desist order, you are wrong.

Contrary to popular misperception, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to foreign issuers only to the extent “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” are used in connection with the improper payments. The SEC’s order does not contain any findings concerning any U.S. nexus in regards to the payments at issue.

The above paragraph, in addition to the notion that the SEC’s order does not contain any findings to suggest willful violations of the FCPA’s books and records or internal control provisions, helps explain the lack of DOJ involvement in the matter. Nevertheless, some (see here) used the “d” word (as in declination) in describing the DOJ’s decision not to bring charges against Allianz. However, for the reasons explained above, there appears to have been no criminal charges to bring against Allianz. This is not a declination.

In this regard, the Allianz enforcement action is similar to the 2011 enforcement action against Diageo (see here for the prior post).

According to this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, “Claudius Sokenu of Arnold & Porter LLP conducted the company’s internal investigation and Joel Cohen of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP was brought in subsequently to assist as the company neared a resolution.”

Friday Roundup

Friday, December 7th, 2012

A prosecutorial common law defeat, the SEC repeats its prior positions, better but not good, document issues, and recent scrutiny news.

Prosecutorial Common Law Defeat

One of the best guest posts in FCPA Professor history was this 2011 post from Michael Levy in which he described the concept of prosecutorial common law. Prosecutorial common law is all around us. Take a look at the footnotes of the recent FCPA Guidance - most of the “authority” cited for “legal” propositions is DOJ or SEC settlements.

For obvious reasons, prosecutorial common law does not sit well with federal court judges. For instance, in U.S. v. Bodmer, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, in rejecting the DOJ’s position that the FCPA’s criminal penalty provisions applied to a foreign national prior to the 1998 FCPA amendments, noted as follows – “the Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.” Likewise as noted in this previous post about the Giffen enforcement action, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York stated that prosecutorial common law ”is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”

Prosecutorial common law recently suffered a major defeat when the Second Circuit, in a non-FCPA case, rejected (see here for the opinion) a DOJ theory of prosecution concerning off-label promotion of drugs that it has previously used to secure billions (yes that is a “b”) in recent settlements with pharmaceutical companies.

Commenting on this recent development, Levy stated as follows. “It is amazing to me how consistently this pattern seems to repeat but, given the incentives on both sides, I don’t really see any structural solutions that would change it.”

For additional reading, see this client alert from Debevoise & Plimpton, this client alert from Arnold & Porter, and this client alert from Gibson Dunn.

SEC Responds to Magyar Telekom Execs Motion to Dismiss

Given the SEC’s positions in its recent response to Herbert Steffen’s motion to dismiss (see here for the prior post), it comes as little surprise that the SEC is taking the same positions in its response to the motion to dismiss filed by former Magyar Telecom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai.

In its response brief (here), the SEC states, in summary form, as follows.

“The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction; (2) the SEC’s claims are time-barred; (3) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s anti-bribery claims; and (4) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s lying to auditors claims. The Court should deny the motion on all four grounds.

First, the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction because their conduct caused foreseeable consequences in the United States. The complaint alleges that the defendants orchestrated a bribery scheme in Macedonia; that they concealed their bribes through the use of sham contracts and falsified books and records; that they lied to Magyar’s auditors by signing false annual and quarterly certifications; and that their actions caused Magyar to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC in the United States that misrepresented the company’s financial statements and included false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.

Second, the complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2462. That provision expressly states that the limitations period does not begin to run until the defendants are “found within the United States.” The defendants acknowledge in their brief that they have remained outside of the United States since their commission of this scheme. Thus, the statute of limitations period has not begun to run as to them. In any event, claims for equitable relief are not subject to the limitations period of Section 2462, which by its terms applies only to “penalties.”

Third, the complaint pleads all facts necessary to support every element of every claim against the defendants. The defendants met the “interstate commerce” prong of Exchange Act Section 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, by sending, in furtherance of their bribery scheme, electronic mail messages that were routed through servers located in the United States. Because the use of interstate commerce is a jurisdictional element, the Exchange Act does not require that defendants know, let alone “corruptly” intend, that their messages would reach the United States. The complaint sufficiently identifies the foreign officials whom the defendants bribed; Section 30A does not require that the officials be expressly named. And the complaint sufficiently identifies the specific false statements made by each defendant to Magyar’s auditors and why those statements were material.”

Of particular note as to “foreign official,” the SEC makes the sweeping statement that “there is no requirement under the FCPA or in the case law interpreting it that the SEC’s complaint [needs to] identify bribed foreign officials by name.” The SEC then states in a footnote as follows. “Any such requirement would be completely at odds with the FCPA’s statutory scheme. [...] By its very structure, [the anti-bribery provisions were] drafted to prohibit corrupt transactions in which the precise identity of a government official might not be known even to the payor.”

As noted in this previous post, the SEC is asserting the same “foreign official” position in the Mark Jackson / James Ruehlen challenge. Oral arguments are to take place today on that motion in Houston.

It should be noted that in the DOJ’s unsuccessful prosecution of John O’Shea, Judge Hughes stated as follows. “[W]hile the Government does not have to trace a particular dollar to a particular pocket of a particular official, it has to connect the payment to a particular official, that the funds made under his authority to a foreign official, who can be identified in some reasonable way, that is, with no reasonable doubt.” Judge Hughes also stated as follows. “You can’t convict a man promising to pay unless you have a particular promise to a particular person for a particular benefit. If you call up the [intermediary] and say, look, I’m going to send you 50 grand, bribe somebody, that does not meet the statute.”

Corruption Perception Index

Transparency International (“TI”) recently released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”) (see here). The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be and is a composite index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions and reflecting the views of observers from around the world including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.

The top three (very clean) countries in the CPI were Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. The bottom three (highly corrupt) countries were Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia.

The United States placed 19th on the list of 176 countries. While this is better than last year’s 24th place finish, as noted in this prior post it’s a bit ironic that as the U.S. aggressively expands its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theories, the U.S. remains far from the top of the CPI.

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently spoke of the U.S. FCPA enforcement effort in religious terms (“we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws more vigorously than we do”), yet CPI’s rankings should again cause pause as to our claimed moral superiority.

Document Issues

I am not one to usually highlight FCPA Inc. marketing material, but I thought this video clip from e-discovery firm H5 was instructive as to many of the document issues involved in an FCPA investigation. The enforcement agencies have commented from time to time that FCPA Inc. has a tendency to sometimes over do it in this area, but be that as it may – data collection, data storage, data analysis, etc. are among the reasons why FCPA investigations often soar into the millions.

Recent Scrutiny News

Rolls-Royce

Reuters reports (here) that Rolls-Royce, the world’s second-largest maker of aircraft engines “said the [U.K. Serious Fraud Office] had asked it to conduct an internal inquiry into dealings involving intermediaries in China, Indonesia and other overseas markets.” According to the report, ”a source close to the investigation said the allegations relate to events in the “distant past” and Rolls-Royce had told the U.S. Department of Justice about the inquiry.”

As noted in this previous post, in June, Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rolls-Royce Holdings, resolved an FCPA enforcement action.

Barclays

Reuters also reports (here) that a previously disclosed DOJ and SEC “investigation into whether Barclays Plc paid bribes to win a banking license in Saudi Arabia has spread to other banks that operate in the region.”

Net 1

Earlier this week, Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc. disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows.

“On November 30, 2012, we received a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (the “DOJ”) informing us that the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have begun an investigation into whether Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries, including their officers, directors, employees, and agents (collectively, “Net 1”) and other persons and entities possibly affiliated with Net 1 violated provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S. federal criminal laws by engaging in a scheme to make corrupt payments to officials of the Government of South Africa in connection with securing a contract with the South African Social Security Agency to provide social welfare and benefits payments and also engaged in violations of the federal securities laws in connection with statements made by Net 1 in its SEC filings regarding this contract. On the same date, we received a letter from the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) advising us that it is also conducting an investigation concerning our company. The SEC letter states that the investigation is a non-public, fact-finding inquiry.”

In this additional release, the company states as follows.

“These investigations appear to be directed at matters which are similar to those that were the subject of articles which appeared in various South African newspapers after AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Limited (“AllPay”) instituted legal proceeding in the South African courts to set aside the contract awarded to us in January 2012 by SASSA. AllPay was an unsuccessful bidder for the SASSA contract.”

News of the company’s FCPA scrutiny caused the company’s U.S. listed shares to plunge approximately 58%. This of course caused several plaintiff law firms to announce investigations of their own. See here, here, and here. In the meantime, the company’s shares have risen 46%.

It’s an FCPA world.

*****

A good weekend to all.