Archive for the ‘FCPA Statistics’ Category

Comparing DOJ FCPA Enforcement To SEC FCPA Enforcement Is Not A Valid Comparison

Thursday, July 17th, 2014

This recent Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance Journal headline stated “SEC Stays on the FCPA Sidelines” and states in relevant part:

“The Securities and Exchange Commission has largely stayed on the sidelines of anti-bribery enforcement so far this year … The agency has brought just two enforcement actions tied to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the first six months of the year, compared to 13 brought by the Justice Department.”

For starters, there have not been 13 FCPA enforcement brought by the DOJ this year and, once again, it is only through creative counting methods that some industry participants are able to reach numbers.  As noted in this recent post, thus far this year the DOJ has brought 3 corporate enforcement actions (HP related entities, Alcoa and Marubeni) and 3 core individual enforcement actions (5 individuals in connection with Indian mining licenses, 3 individuals associated with PetroTiger and 2 individuals added to the 2013 case involving individuals associated with broker-dealer Direct Access Partners).  As highlighted several times on these pages, the most reliable way to keep FCPA statistics is using the “core” approach (i.e. the Indian mining licenses case is one “core” action, etc.), an approach endorsed by the DOJ and an approach that is a commonly accepted method used in other areas.

Regardless of counting method, comparing DOJ FCPA enforcement to SEC FCPA enforcement is not a valid comparison because – sticking with the “sidelines” reference – the DOJ and SEC “play” on different fields.

As demonstrated visually below, the SEC has FCPA jurisdiction over only issuers and associated person (78dd-1 – a relatively narrow slice of the range of “persons” subject to the FCPA).

The DOJ, by contrast, has FCPA jurisdiction over issuers and associated persons (78dd-1), as well as domestic concerns (78dd-2 – all U.S. companies regardless of form of business organization and U.S. persons) and persons other than issuers or domestic concerns (78dd-3 – literally any company in the world or any person in the world to the extent certain jurisdictional requirements are met).

Jurisdiction

In 2014, when the DOJ and SEC are playing on the same field – that is issuer FCPA enforcement actions – there is perfect 2 for 2 overlap as the SEC also brought enforcement actions against HP and Alcoa.  (Marubeni is not an issuer).  Even if it wanted to, the SEC could not bring FCPA charges against individuals in the Indian mining license enforcement action, individuals associated with PetroTiger or individuals associated with Direct Access Partners (although the SEC did bring non-FCPA charges against certain of the Direct Access Partners individuals because the entity was a broker-dealer).

In short, it is not that the SEC is staying on the “sidelines,” rather it is not allowed under the FCPA to step onto the same “playing field” as the DOJ.

In case you are wondering, in 2013 the DOJ brought 6 issuer FCPA enforcement actions (ADM, Weatherford, Diebold, Total, Ralph Lauren and Parker Drilling) and in all 6 of those DOJ issuer actions there were also related SEC enforcement actions against those same issuers.  In 2013, the SEC brought an additional 2 issuer enforcement actions (Stryker and Philips) that the DOJ theoretically could have joined, but here, it is not surprising that the SEC, a civil law enforcement agency, brought more issuer cases than the DOJ, a criminal law enforcement agency.  To complete the analysis from 2013, there was 1 DOJ enforcement action (Bilfinger) involving a non-issuer and thus the SEC was not allowed on that “playing field”).

Why Do Most Of The Top FCPA Settlements Involve Foreign Companies?

Wednesday, July 9th, 2014

[There is still time to register for the FCPA Institute in Milwaukee next week (July 16-17th).  The FCPA Institute is a unique two-day learning experience ideal for a diverse group of professionals seeking to elevate their FCPA knowledge and practical skills. To register see here]

Over the past several months, I’ve been asked the same general question several times:  why are so many foreign companies found in the top ten list of FCPA enforcement actions?

This post explains why and the answers are fairly straight-forward when one understands the factors under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines that impact fine amounts.

Below is the current top ten list of corporate FCPA enforcement actions in terms of settlement amount.

Company

Amount

              Year 
  1.  Siemens $800   million(DOJ – $450 million)(SEC – $350 million) 2008
  2.  KBR / Halliburton $579   million(DOJ – $402 million)(SEC – $177 million) 2009
  3.  Total $398   million(DOJ – $245 million)(SEC – $153 million) 2013
  4.  Alcoa $384   million(DOJ – $209 million)(SEC – $175 million) 2014
  5.  Snamprogetti / ENI $365   million(DOJ – $240 million)(SEC – $125 million) 2010
  6.  Technnip $338   million(DOJ – $240 million)(SEC – $ 98 million) 2010
  7.  JGC $219   million(DOJ – $219 million) 2011
  8.  Daimler $185   million(DOJ – $94 million)(SEC – $91 million) 2010
  9.  Weatherford   Int’l $153   million(DOJ – $87 million)(SEC – $66 million) 2013
  10.  Alcatel-Lucent $137   million(DOJ – $92 million)(SEC – $45 million) 2010

All but KBR/Halliburton and Alcoa are enforcement actions against foreign companies.

In analyzing the top ten enforcement actions, it is important to first recognize the following salient fact:  4 of the enforcement actions (KBR/Halliburton, Snamprogetti/ENI, Technip and JGC) are the same core enforcement action as the companies were all consortium partners pursuing through the same agents the same $6 billion Bonny Island, Nigeria liquified natural gas project.

The most important factor in determining fine amounts in FCPA enforcement actions under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines is net final benefit allegedly received from the improper payments.  Same is true when it comes to SEC disgorgement amounts.  Not surprisingly, given the Bonny Island project at issue, the net final benefits alleged in the enforcement actions were large.  As detailed here, in KBR/Halliburton the figure was alleged to be approximately $236 million; in Technip approximately $199 million; in Snamprogetti/ENI approximately $214 million; and in JGC approximately $195 million.

Thus, net final benefit allegedly received from the improper payments (and disgorgement amounts related thereto) easily explains 4 of the enforcement actions (the same core enforcement action) in the top 10.

It also explains large settlement amounts in other actions involving foreign companies as well.

Siemens of course was in a league by itself as the enforcement agencies stated that “for much of its operations across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure for Siemens.”  According to the enforcement agencies, the “pattern of bribery by Siemens was unprecedented in scale and geographic scope” and the “corruption involved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.”  The DOJ’s sentencing memorandum states that calculating a traditional loss figure under the Sentencing Guidelines “would be overly burdensome, if not impossible” given the “literally thousands of contracts over many years.”

Like the Bonny Island enforcement actions, the Total enforcement action also involved alleged improper payments in connection with large oil and gas projects in Iran.  According to the DOJ, the alleged value of the benefit received from the improper payments was approximately $147 million.

Large financial benefits received from alleged improper payments in connection with large projects or contracts are a major reason why so many foreign companies are found in the FCPA’s top 10 list of settlements.

However, it is not the only reason as other factors under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines can also increase fine amounts in FCPA enforcement actions.

Three such factors are the involvement of high-level personnel in the alleged improper conduct, the failure to voluntary disclose, and lack of cooperation. Application of these factors (which result in a company’s so-called “culpability score” under the Guidelines) to foreign companies has also contributed to large settlement amounts.

For instance, as noted in this prior post, the Daimler action, like Siemens, involved allegations regarding a “corporate culture that tolerated and/or encouraged bribery,” the involvement of various high-level executives, and allegations of improper conduct at the highest levels of the company including the boardroom.  Not surprisingly, as noted in the DOJ’s sentencing memorandum, Daimler’s culpability score was increased based on these allegations which then increased the fine range.

Moreover, few, if any, of the enforcement actions involving foreign companies were the result of voluntary disclosures – a practice that is “foreign” to most legal regimes outside of the U.S.

As to cooperation, as noted in this prior post, JGC Corp. was dinged by the DOJ for “initially declining to cooperate” with the DOJ. This factor, among others, increased the company’s “culpability score” under the Guidelines.

Each FCPA enforcement action is of course unique, involving specific projects or contracts, specific actors, and specific responses to alleged wrongdoing.  Yet common factors in all of the enforcement actions involving foreign companies in the top 10 list are some combination of very large projects or contracts, involvement of high level executives or board members in the alleged improper payments, lack of voluntary disclosure and lack of, or delayed, cooperation in the enforcement agencies’ investigation.

Few enforcement actions against U.S. companies have involved a combination of more than one of these factors – hence the few U.S. companies in the FCPA’s top ten list.

So there you have it – an answer to the often asked question – why do most of the top FCPA settlements involve foreign companies?

So is the conclusion to be drawn that foreign companies in the FCPA’s top 10 list are less ethical and less committed to corporate governance best practices?  Perhaps, but it is important to note that the majority of foreign company enforcement actions in the top 10 involved conduct that allegedly took place in the 1990′s or early 2000′s.

“Friday” Roundup

Thursday, July 3rd, 2014

On the brink of trial, statistics of note, the over-hyped U.K. Bribery Act turns 3, say what?, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in a special Thursday edition of the Friday roundup.

On The Brink of Trial

This February 2012 post highlighting the SEC’s enforcement action against Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen (a former and current executive of Noble Corp. respectively) asked – “will the SEC be put to its burden of proof.”  Among other things, the post noted that the SEC has never prevailed in an FCPA enforcement action when put to its burden of proof.

With the passage of time, the SEC’s case against the defendants was consistently trimmed as the SEC attempted to meet its burden (see this post as well as here).  Among other things, a portion of the SEC’s claims were dismissed or abandoned on statute of limitations grounds and the trial court judge ruled, in an issue of first impression, that the SEC has the burden of negating the FCPA’s facilitation payments exception.

On the brink of the SEC’s first-ever FCPA trial (trial was scheduled to begin next week), the parties have agreed to settle.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Jackson consented to a final judgment permanently restraining and enjoining him from violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions.  Jackson was represented by, among others, David Krakoff (Buckley Sandler).  In a release, Krakoff stated:

“We are very pleased with today’s settlement.  It resolves allegations that have hung over Mr. Jackson for many years without any admission of liability, without any payment of money and without any restriction on Mr. Jackson’s future employment opportunities.  Mr. Jackson can now move forward with his life and career.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Ruehlen consented to a final judgment permanently restraining and enjoining him from aiding and abetting FCPA books and records violations.  Ruehlen was represented by, among others, Joseph Warin and Nicola Hanna (Gibson Dunn).  In a release, Warin stated:

“We are very pleased with yesterday’s settlement.  Mr. Ruehlen is an exemplary and dedicated employee who first brought the allegations to light and fully cooperated with the SEC’s investigation.  While we were looking forward to presenting our case to a jury, the settlement of one record-keeping claim – without any admission of liability or wrongdoing, monetary penalty, or restriction on Mr. Ruehlen’s employment – satisfactorily ends the matter and allows Jim to focus his energies on his work for Noble.”

In neither consent is Jackson or Ruehlen required to pay any civil fine.

Score this one as you see fit, but my take is that this case represents yet another SEC failure in an FCPA enforcement action when put to its burden of proof.  As the Second Circuit recently recognized, SEC neither admit nor deny settlements are not about the truth, but pragmatism.

Statistics of Note

EY recently released its 13th annual Global Fraud survey (the results were based on interviews with more than 2,700 executives across 59 countries).  Statistics of note include the following.

“Despite the aggressive enforcement environment, our research suggests that the percentage of companies that have anti-bribery/anticorruption (ABAC) policies has increased by only 1% over the past two years, and a persistent minority has yet to take even the basic steps toward an effective compliance program.  One in five businesses still does not have an ABAC policy.  Less than 50% of respondents have attended ABAC training.  There has been a reduction in the level of reporting on compliance issues to boards.”

“The survey results show that executives in different roles have a differing view of the level of risk.  27% of chief compliance officers (CCOs) believe bribery and corrupt practices happen widely in their country versus 38% of all respondents — so they appear to have a more optimistic view than their colleagues.  18% of sales and marketing executives believe it is common practice to use bribery to win contracts in their sector versus 12% of all respondents — so they appear to have a more pessimistic view than their colleagues.”

“Additionally, the survey results suggest that compliance efforts may not always be targeting the right risks in the most effective way.  Less than a third of businesses are always or very frequently conducting anti-corruption due diligence as part of their mergers and acquisitions process.  45% of organizations are not mitigating risks by introducing a whistleblower hotline.  ABAC training is less likely to occur in jurisdictions where there is a higher perceived risk of bribery. Sales and marketing executives are the least likely of all our respondents to be included in risk assessments — despite being exposed to and aware of significant risks.  ABAC training, for example, is more likely to be attended by executives in mature markets, where corruption is perceived to be lower, than in higher-risk emerging markets. Of the survey population, 58% of respondents in developed markets had received ABAC training, compared with just 40% in emerging markets.”

Consistent with the observation in this recent post, these survey results again ought to prompt questions whether the current approach to enforcement – as well as enforcement policy – are effective.

Bribery Act Turns 3

The U.K. Bribery Act, a massively over-hyped law when it was being proposed and went live, has turned three.  On the day it went live, I offered the following two cents.

“As with any new law, there is likely to be a learning phase for both the enforcement agencies and those subject to the law. That was certainly the case in the U.S. in the years following passage of the FCPA in 1977. Thus, it very well may be the case that there are no enforcement actions for some time (recognizing that it often takes a few years from beginning of an inquiry to resolution of an action). Thus the greatest immediate impact of the Bribery Act is sure to be the compliance ethic it inspires. I expect that the enforcement actions that may develop over time to focus on egregious instances of corporate conduct on which no reasonable minds would disagree. I do not get the sense, based on public comments of the Ministry of Justice and the Serious Fraud Office, that the envelope will be pushed too far in the early years of the Bribery Act.”

Indeed, there has yet to be an “FCPA-like” Bribery Act enforcement action.  This troubles Transparency International – see here.

Say What?

Speaking of the Bribery Act, this is from “The Lawyer” regarding corruption allegations at FIFA and the ability of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office to bring an enforcement action against FIFA sponsors.

“Section 7 [of the U.K. Bribery Act] is entitled “Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery”. Its reach is as global as the World Cup. The fact that Fifa is a Zurich-based NGO does not mean it’s offside. Similarly for the sponsors so long as some aspect of their business is carried out in the UK. A single sale of an Adidas football boot via a Visa credit card is sufficient for David Green [Director of the SFO] to apply to the courts for search warrants in order to unleash dawn raids on their UK HQs.”

Regarding the italicized portion … say what?

For the Reading Stack

See here for the always informative Debevoise & Plimpton FCPA Update.  Regarding the Second Circuit’s recent decision in SEC v. Citigroup, the Update states:

“For companies subject to the SEC’s authority to enforce the FCPA, the Second Circuit’s decision in the Citi matter provides some comfort that a corporate resolution requiring judicial approval, once achieved, should be subject to appropriate deference when it comes before a district court for review. At the same time, however, the decision also reinforces the understanding that resolutions achieved by settlement, even if approved by a court, do not constitute legal precedent.”

An interesting read here from the BBC regarding “contemporary business culture” in China.

“Chinese workplaces are just as political as those anywhere else in the world, some would argue more so because the value placed on outward harmony in Chinese culture drives the rivalry underground. [...]  The politics in a multinational’s China operation can be especially insidious when there’s a thin layer of western management attempting to operate according to principles which have limited purchase in the Chinese business culture beneath.”

Aboard the “bribery express” – from Eurasianet.

****

A Happy Independence Day to U.S. readers and a good weekend to all.

DOJ’s Knox Follows The Same Tired Script

Wednesday, June 25th, 2014

Department of Justice enforcement officials frequently speak about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  However, most of these events are private in which the public has to fork over a couple thousand of dollars to a private company who markets the public officials to drive attendance at the event (see here for the prior post).  The end result is that there is seldom the opportunity to analyze FCPA statements by DOJ officials.

That is what makes video clips (here and here) of Jeffrey Knox (DOJ Fraud Section Chief) at a recent CFO Network event sponsored by the Wall Street Journal valuable.

In the video clips, Knox follows the DOJ’s same tired script when it comes to voluntary disclosure and other issues when it comes to the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program.

Moreover, as highlighted below, Knox’s statements on voluntary disclosure are contradicted by previous statements by former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer – as well as numerous statements by former DOJ FCPA enforcement officials.

Most problematic, Knox’s statements on voluntary disclosure and the source of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions are contradicted by the facts.

In the first video clip, Dennis Berman (Business Editor, WSJ) returns to a topic previously explored by Forbes in 2010 (see here for the “Bribery Racket”) as well as the WSJ in 2012 (see here for “FCPA Inc. and the Business of Bribery”) and calls the relationship between FCPA law firms, companies, and the DOJ a “protection racket all around” and that the “three party relationship might bring some good, but in a way it doesn’t feel like justice, it feels like a business arrangement.”

Knox of course disagreed and stated that it is “just not true” that the DOJ outsources its FCPA investigations to law firms.  Knox stated:  ”we don’t outsource, internal investigations are a tool, an important tool in many cases for us that is used throughout law enforcement, there is nothing exceptional about the FCPA, but we are not relying on it [internal investigations].”

Knox’s statement that the DOJ does not rely on law firm investigations in bringing FCPA enforcement action is contradicted by previous statements by former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer.  While at the DOJ, Breuer stated that the DOJ “absolutely need[s] companies through their firms to provide us with their investigations.”  (See here).

Moreover, Knox’s statement is contradicted by the facts.

As highlighted here, in 2013, 57% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the direct result of voluntary disclosures.  As highlighted here, in 2012, 56% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the direct result of voluntary disclosures.  As highlighted here, in 2011, 73% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the direct result of voluntary disclosures.

As to voluntary disclosures, Knox stated that the “earlier that the company engages with us the better position it is going to be in” regarding various aspects of its FCPA scrutiny.

For obvious reasons, the DOJ favors voluntary disclosure as it makes its job easier and is the fuel that feeds its FCPA enforcement program.  However, in contrast to Knox’s statement about voluntary disclosure, several former DOJ enforcement officials have questioned the need for  FCPA voluntary disclosures in many instances.

Indeed, the former Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section stated (obviously after he left that position) as follows.

“It often will not be in a company’s best interest to disclose if, for example, the allegations prove not to be credible or if it is unclear whether the conduct even amounts to a violation of law. Under those circumstances, a disclosure could unnecessarily embroil the company in a lengthy and costly government investigation and result in other repercussions such as triggering civil litigation and harm to a company’s reputation that could otherwise be avoided. It’s a challenging calculus. […] However, the fact that a company doesn’t disclose a problem that ultimately comes to DOJ’s attention is not necessarily going to damage the company’s credibility with DOJ. Regulators recognize that not every allegation should be of interest to them – and, frankly, having counsel that knows when they’ll be interested and when they won’t is really important.”

Similarly, as noted by a former SEC enforcement attorney and a former DOJ enforcement attorney:

“Not all potential [FCPA] problems, however, are appropriate for disclosure. After investigation, allegations of misconduct may not result in a determination that illicit activity has occurred. […] Prematurely attracting the government’s attention may, as a practical matter, shift the burden to the company to prove the absence of a corruption problem. Enforcement officials may feel the need as a matter of basic human nature to seek some type of resolution to a case where they have invested significant time and effort. Companies need to weigh the potential benefits of cooperation against the significant costs of initiating a potentially unwarranted government investigation.”

As evident from the above video clips, Alexandra Wrage (President of Trace International) joined Knox in the discussion of FCPA issues.  Wrage rightly shot back at Knox’s voluntary disclosure comments and noted that early voluntary disclosure “is terrifying to companies before they have their arms around the scope of the problem.”  Wrage noted that the “idea that a company is going to go in first without knowing the full extent of the problem, I don’t think any general counsel is going to sign off on this.”

In the second video clip, the WSJ’s Berman asks Knox, using various examples of FCPA scrutiny that have resulted in tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses, “is the cure worst than the disease.”

To his credit, Knox rightly noted that “in some instances companies are spending too much money on investigations.”  His statement is similar to the one Chuck Duross (then the DOJ FCPA’s Unit Chief) made at an ABA conference in September 2013.  As highlighted here, Duross suggested that often company lawyers are seeking to over do it through a global search of operations for FCPA issues.  He discussed a case in which a company and its professional advisors came to a meeting with a global search plan and he said “no, no, no, that is not what I want.”  He indicated that the lawyers and other professional advisors in the room “looked unhappy,” but that the general counsel of the company was happy.  (For more on this dynamic, see this prior post).

For her part, Wrage agreed with Knox that there is “lots of scare tactics by law firms” when it comes to the FCPA.

One final comment.

During the discussion, Knox stated that there is ”massive corruption going on around the world.”  Similar to the issues discussed in this recent post, this statement alone ought to cause the enforcement agencies to pause and reflect whether – 37 years after passage of the FCPA – enforcement agency policies and positions (which are frequently modeled by other nations) are most effective in accomplishing the objectives of the FCPA.

Survey Results Should Cause Concern

Monday, June 2nd, 2014

Senator Frank Church, Senator William Proxmire and Representative Robert Eckhardt were the main Congressional leaders when it came to passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  None are with us today, but if they were, it would be interesting to hear their reaction to the plethora of FCPA related survey information in the public domain 37 years after passage of the FCPA.

My hunch is that these Congressional leaders would be flabbergasted.

For instance, Kroll and Compliance Week recently released a joint “2014 Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report” (see here to download).  The self-reported survey produced 197 responses from a range of industries and respondents were employed by companies with a median worldwide employee headcount of approximately 9.600.

The survey result that most caught my eye is the following:  81% of respondents anticipate the bribery and corruption risks to their company over the next 2-3 years to increase (51%) or remain the same (30%).

This response ought to prompt questions whether the current approach to enforcement – as well as enforcement policy – are effective.

I’ve long maintained that while ad hoc enforcement of alleged bribe payers is an important aspect of reducing bribery and corruption, the singular focus on actual enforcement statistics and the “pound the pavement” for more enforcement mantra of many does little to address the root causes of bribery and corruption in many instances.  Foreign trade barriers and distortions are often the root causes of bribery and a reduction in bribery will not be achieved without a reduction in trade barriers and distortions.

Moreover, enforcement policy ought to be focused on creating the best positive incentives.  The DOJ and SEC recognized this basic point in the FCPA Guidance, yet recent survey responses also ought to prompt many questions whether current enforcement policy is indeed creating the best positive incentives.

The vast majority of FCPA enforcement actions are based, in whole or in part, on the conduct of various third parties.  Yet, the Kroll / Compliance Week survey reports that 58% of respondents said they never train third parties on anti-corruption efforts. (Survey respondents reported an average of 3,868 third parties).

This Grant Thorton General Counsel survey also contained survey results that should cause concern as to the effectiveness of current enforcement policy.  According to the survey:

“Even with the movement towards the codification of compliance plans by the DOJ and the SEC over a year ago, only 29% of survey respondents state that they have implemented all of the guidelines, while 47% are “not sufficiently familiar” with the guidelines to reply. Among organizations that have not fully implemented the DOJ and SEC guidelines, 65% responded that a “lack of compliance staff and budgets” was the primary reason.”

Ditto for the recent LRN “2014 Ethics & Compliance Program Effectiveness Report” which found:

“Fewer than half of all programs average at least substantial progress on the critical hallmarks identified in the DOJ/SEC guidance on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

So what would the best positive incentive be to achieve greater adoption of best practices and thus FCPA compliance?

I have long submitted that an FCPA compliance defense (along the lines outlined in my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense“) is an appropriate answer. So have several former high-ranking DOJ enforcement officials (see here among other posts).

I am not suggesting that an FCPA compliance defense is a panacea, but what I am suggesting and what I hoped to demonstrate in this post is that a compliance defense is the best positive incentive to achieve greater FCPA compliance.

While I can only speculate what various survey responses would be if there was an FCPA compliance defense, I am confident in predicting that more than 42% of companies would train third-parties on anti-corruption efforts, more than 29% of companies would be acting fully consistent with widely accepted best practices, and that more compliance staff and budgets would result.

And I further submit that these would all be good developments as an FCPA compliance defense is not a race to the bottom (as has been suggested) but rather a race to the top.