Archive for the ‘FCPA Statistics’ Category

A Summary Of FCPA Enforcement Statistics

Wednesday, January 28th, 2015

Survey ResultsFCPA Professor was the place to visit in January for in-depth Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement statistics from 2014 as well as comparisons to historical statistics.

If you missed the daily posts, no worries, this post consolidates in one place the statistics published on FCPA Professor in January.

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This post highlighted SEC enforcement of the FCPA in 2014.  Take-away points: (i) of the 7 corporate enforcement actions from 2014, 6 enforcement actions (all but the Avon action) were administrative actions; and (ii) of the 7 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions from 2014, 0 (0%) have thus far resulted in related SEC charges against company employees.

This post highlighted DOJ enforcement of the FCPA in 2014.  Take-away points: (i) in the 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2014, the DOJ collected approximately $1.25 billion in criminal fines, an all-time record in terms of yearly FCPA settlement amounts; and (ii) of the 7 corporate DOJ enforcement actions in 2014, 1 (14%) has thus far resulted in related DOJ prosecutions of company employees.

This post compared corporate FCPA enforcement in 2014 to prior years. Take-away point: while settlement amounts the DOJ and SEC collected in 2014 (approximately $1.6 billion set an all-time high), the number of core corporate enforcement actions in 2014 was below historical averages.  (Note:  many FCPA Inc. participants are calling 2014 settlement amounts the second-highest of all-time behind 2010.  Not true, as such 2010 figures include the $400 million BAE settlement, an enforcement action in which the company was not even charged with FCPA violations).

This post highlighted the alleged “foreign officials” in 2014 corporate enforcement actions.  Take-away point: 60% of enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities (ranging from power and electric companies, hospitals and labs, an oil and gas company, and an aluminium smelter).

This post highlighted certain facts and figures concerning the DOJ’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2014 and historically.  Take-away points: (i) 75% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees; and (ii) since 2008, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action.

This post explored why so few corporate DOJ enforcement actions result in related DOJ prosecutions of company employees. Take-away point: (i) the reason may be the quality of the corporate enforcement action as there is only a 9% chance (since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in 2004) that a corporate enforcement action resolved solely with an NPA or DPA will result in related criminal charges of company employees compared to a 71% chance of related criminal charges of company employees if the corporate enforcement action was the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.

Finally as it relates to DOJ prosecution of individuals, this post highlighted how approximately 90% of criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions between 1977 and 2004 resulted in related charges against company employees compared to this new era of FCPA enforcement when approximately 75% of DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions have not resulted (at least yet) in related charges against company employees.

This post highlighted certain facts and figures concerning the SEC’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2014 and historically.  Take-away points:  (i) since 2008, 83% of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees; (ii) compare that statistic to the following:  between 1977 and 2004, 61% of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in related charges against company employees.

DOJ Prosecution of Individuals – Then vs. Now

Thursday, January 22nd, 2015

Thenvs.Yesterday’s post highlighted the following statistics concerning Foreign Corrupt Practices Act individual criminal prosecutions by the DOJ.

Since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004 (see here), there have been 83 corporate DOJ FCPA criminal enforcement actions. 53 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved solely with an NPA or DPA. In only 5 of these actions – 9% – was there related criminal charges of company employees.

More broadly, other statistics recently published on this site highlighted how in this new era of FCPA enforcement approximately 75% of corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

Prior posts proposed, based on these statistics, that instead of asking the “but why was nobody charged” question in connection with most corporate DOJ FCPA criminal enforcement actions, the more appropriate question is asking whether NPAs and DPAs necessarily represent provable FCPA violations.

To best highlight how NPAs and DPAs have transformed the nature and quality of FCPA enforcement, it is useful to analyze FCPA enforcement statistics prior to the introduction of NPAs and DPAs to the FCPA context in 2004.

For starters, it must be recognized that few meaningful conclusions can be drawn when comparing early FCPA enforcement (lets say 1977 – 2004) to FCPA enforcement 2005 to the present.

Growing pains associated with a new law, and a pioneering one at that, were understandable as both business organizations and enforcement agencies alike were absorbing the law and its new expectations and challenges.  More substantively, for much of the FCPA’s history there were material differences in the law, enforcement agency policies, and the global business environment that all impacted early FCPA enforcement.  

Nor can any meaningful conclusions be drawn from comparing fine and penalty amounts in early FCPA enforcement actions to fine and penalty amounts in this new era.  For starters, the FCPA’s statutory fine and penalty amounts have changed over time.  Perhaps more significantly, criminal fine amounts in FCPA enforcement actions are rarely based on the statutory amounts, but rather based on the Alternative Fines Act, a statute passed in 2006, which can result in a fine amount up to twice the benefit the payer sought to obtain through the improper payment. Moreover, for much of the FCPA’s history, the SEC did not have authority to assess civil monetary penalties in a wide variety of securities law enforcement actions including FCPA enforcement actions, and disgorgement, a central feature of most SEC FCPA enforcement actions in this new era, was not used for most of the FCPA’s history.

Although certain historical comparisons of FCPA enforcement lack meaningful value, other comparisons are noteworthy.

For instances, while one can question how the DOJ held individuals accountable (i.e whether the criminal fines and sentences were too lenient) for most of the FCPA’s history, the DOJ did frequently hold individuals accountable when a company resolved an FCPA enforcement action.

Indeed, from 1977 to 2004, approximately 90% of DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions RESULTED in related charges against company employees.

Compare that to FCPA enforcement in this new era when approximately 75% of DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions HAVE NOT RESULTED (at least yet) in related charges against company employees. 

Consider also that when a DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, approximatley 90% of such actions HAVE NOT RESULTED (at least yet) in related charges against company employees.

In other words, NPAs and DPAs have significantly distorted the nature and quality of FCPA enforcement and if the statistics recently published on this site do not convince you of this, no statistics ever will.

DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?

Wednesday, January 21st, 2015

What woudl you doYesterday’s post (here) focused on DOJ FCPA individual prosecutions and highlighted the following facts and figures.

  • Since 2008, the DOJ has charged 99 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.
  • 58% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just five cases and 78% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just eleven cases.
  • There have been 67 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 and of these actions, 50 (or 75%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

These statistics should cause alarm, including at the DOJ as it has long recognized that a corporate-fine only enforcement program is not effective and does not adequately deter future FCPA violations.   For instance, in 1986 John Keeney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, DOJ) submitted written responses in the context of Senate hearings concerning a bill to amend the FCPA. He stated as follows:

“If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes merely monetary, the fine will simply become a cost of doing business, payable only upon being caught and in many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit acquired from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of incarceration, there may no longer be any compelling need to resist the urge to acquire business in any way possible.”

In 2010 Hank Walther (Deputy Chief Fraud Section) stated that a corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement program allows companies to calculate FCPA settlements as the cost of doing business.

In 2013 Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy Chief of Staff, Criminal division) stated that “there is no greater deterrent to corporate crime that the prospect of prison time … if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be seen as merely the cost of doing business.”

More recently, Patrick Stokes (DOJ FCPA Unit Chief) stated that DOJ is “very focused” on prosecuting individuals as well as companies and that “going after one or the other is not sufficient for deterrence purposes.”

Earlier this week, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sung-Hee Suh rightly acknowledged that “corporations do not act criminally, but for the actions of individuals.”

In my 2010 Senate FCPA testimony (here), I noted that the absence of individual FCPA charges in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts.

Others have rightly asked the “but nobody was charged” question, including James Stewart in a New York Times column highlighted in this previous post.

However, as I stated in my Senate testimony, there is an equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in connection with many corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.

Readers know well of the prevalence of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements (NPAs / DPAs)  in the FCPA context. As highlighted in this recent post, since 2010, 86% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have involved either an NPA or DPA.

Informed observers also understand how NPAs and DPAs, not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny, are often agreed to by companies for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not necessarily because the conduct at issue violates the FCPA.

Indeed, prior to becoming SEC Chair, Mary Jo White stated a “fear [that] the deferred prosecution [agreement] is becoming a vehicle to show results” (here) and former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has stated as follows.

“It is “easy, much easier quite frankly” for the DOJ to resolve FCPA inquiries with NPAs and DPAs; such resolution vehicles have “less of a toll” on the DOJ’s budget and such agreements “provide revenue” to the DOJ.  It is all “unfortunate”

“In an ironic twist, the more that American companies elect to settle and not force the DOJ to defend its aggressive interpretation of the [FCPA], the more aggressive DOJ has become in its interpretation of the law and its prosecution decisions.”

Moreover, Mark Mendelsohn (former chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit), has talked about the “danger” of NPAs and DPAs and how “it is tempting for the [Justice Department] or the SEC…to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.” (See “Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement,” 24 Corporate Crime Reporter 35, September 10, 2010).

For more on the above dynamics, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”

Individuals, on the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liberty, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.

In other words, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” but rather do corporate NPAs and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations?  For a recent excellent article asking the same general question, see here.

I set out to test this with the following working hypothesis.

  • Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution that the corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA violations, represent a higher quality FCPA enforcement action (in the eyes of the DOJ) and is thus more likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees.
  • Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality FCPA enforcement action and is thus less likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its high burden of proof.

The below statistics provide a compelling datapoint concerning the quality and legitimacy of many corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

Since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004 (see here), there have been 83 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

  • 14 of these corporate enforcement actions were the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.  10 of these corporate enforcement actions – 71% – resulted in related criminal charges of company employees.
  • 53 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved solely with an NPA or DPA.  In only 5 instances – 9% – was there related criminal charges of company employees.
  • A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is what I will call a hybrid action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some entity in the corporate family – usually a foreign subsidiary – and an NPA or DPA against the parent company.  Since the introduction of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context, there have been 16 such corporate enforcement actions.  In 5 of these actions – 31% -  there was related criminal charges of company employees. This percentage is what one might expect compared to the two types of corporate FCPA enforcement actions discussed above, although it is interesting to note the following regarding 3 of these 5 instances.  The DOJ ended up dismissing the charges against Si Chan Wooh (Schnitzer Steel), John O’Shea (ABB) was not found not guilty, and Bobby Elkin (Alliance One) received a probation sentence after the sentencing judge questioned many aspects of the enforcement action (see here for the prior post).

Although NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in 2004, their use by the DOJ was sporadic at first and such alternative resolution vehicles did not become a fixture of FCPA enforcement until approximately 2007.

Thus, in testing the above hypothesis, 2007 is perhaps the best starting point.  Since 2007, there have been 77 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

  • 12 of these corporate enforcement actions were the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.  9 of these corporate enforcement actions – 75% – resulted in related criminal charges of company employees.
  • 50 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved solely with an NPA or DPA.  In only 5 instances – 10% – was there related criminal charges of company employees.
  • A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is what I will call a hybrid action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some entity in the corporate family – usually a foreign subsidiary – and an NPA or DPA against the parent company.  Since 2007, there have been 15 such corporate enforcement actions.  In 4 of these actions – 26% -  there was related criminal charges of company employees. This percentage is what one might expect compared to the two types of corporate FCPA enforcement actions discussed above.

If the above statistics do not cause one to question the quality and legitimacy of many corporate FCPA enforcement actions, no empirical data ever will.  For those who believe NPAs and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations, the ball is now in your court to offer credible explanations for following datapoints.

Since NPAs and DPAs were introduced to the FCPA context in 2004, if a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations, there is a 71% chance that related criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.  If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, there is a 9% chance that criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.

Since 2007, when NPAs and DPAs become a fixture of DOJ FCPA enforcement, if a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations, there is a 75% chance that related criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.  If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, there is a 10% chance that criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.

[Note – the above data was assembled using the “core” approach as well as the definition of an FCPA enforcement action described in this prior post]

A Focus On DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions

Tuesday, January 20th, 2015

Criminal LawThis post highlights certain facts and figures concerning the DOJ’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2014 and historically.

As highlighted in recent posts herehere, and here, the DOJ frequently talks about the importance of individual FCPA prosecutions. Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell has stated that “certainly…there has been an increased emphasis on, let’s get some individuals” and that it is “very important for [the DOJ] to hold accountable individuals who engage in criminal misconduct in white-collar (cases), as we do in every other kind of crime.” DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Patrick Stokes has said that the DOJ is “very focused” on prosecuting individuals as well as companies and that “going after one or the other is not sufficient for deterrence purposes.”

Against this backdrop, what do the facts actually show?

Since 2000, the DOJ has charged 133 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.  The breakdown is as follows.

  • 2000 – 0 individuals
  • 2001 – 8 individuals
  • 2002 – 4 individuals
  • 2003 – 4 individuals
  • 2004 – 2 individuals
  • 2005 – 3 individuals
  • 2006 – 6 individuals
  • 2007 – 7 individuals
  • 2008 – 14 individuals
  • 2009 – 18 individuals
  • 2010 – 33 individuals (including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
  • 2011 – 10 individuals
  • 2012 – 2 individuals
  • 2013 – 12 individuals
  • 2014 – 10 individuals

An analysis of the numbers reveals some interesting points.

Most of the individuals – 99 (or 74%) were charged since 2008.  Thus, on one level the DOJ is correct when it states that there has been an “increased emphasis” on individual prosecutions – at least as measured against the historical average given that between 1978 and 1999, the DOJ charged 38 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.

Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 and 1999, the DOJ’s statements about its focus on individuals represents hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.

Of the 99 individuals criminally charged with FCPA offenses by the DOJ since 2008:

  • 22 individuals were in the Africa Sting case;
  • 9 individuals (minus the “foreign officials” charged) were in the Haiti Teleco case;
  • 8 individuals were in connection with the Control Components case;
  • 8 individuals were in connection with the Siemens case;
  • 5 individuals were associated with DF Group in the Indian mining licenses case;
  • 5 individuals were associated with Direct Access Partners;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Lindsey Manufacturing case;
  • 4 individuals were  in connection with the LatinNode / Hondutel case;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Nexus Technologies case;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the BizJet case; and
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Alstom case.

In other words, 58% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just five cases and 78% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just eleven cases.

Considering that there has been 67 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather remarkable statistic.  Of the 67 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions, 50 (or 75%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.  (See here for the chart with details – current when published in October 2014).

In short, and as demonstrated by the statistics, DOJ FCPA individual enforcement actions are significantly skewed by a small handful of enforcement actions and the reality is that 75% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

Another very interesting and significant picture emerges when analyzing DOJ individual prosecution data based on whether the corporate entity employing or otherwise involved with the individual charged was a public or private entity.

Of the 99 individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008, 71 of the individuals (72%) were employees or otherwise affiliated with private business entities.  This is a striking statistic given that 53 of the 67 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 (79%) were against publicly traded corporations.

In the 14 private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, individuals were charged in connection with 7 of those actions (50%).  In contrast, in the 53 public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, individuals were charged in connection with 10 of those cases (19%).  In short, and based on the data, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action.

Are other factors at play when it comes to the fact that 75% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees?  A future post will highlight a relevant datapoint.

[Notes – the above data was assembled using the “core” approach – see this prior post for an explanation.  The term “public entity”  is not limited to “issuers” under the FCPA, but rather a public entity regardless of which market it shares trade on.  Thus, for instance, JGC Corp. of Japan and Bridgestone are both public entities even though its shares are not traded on a U.S. exchange.]

Corporate FCPA Enforcement In 2014 Compared To Prior Years

Tuesday, January 13th, 2015

Survey ResultsI am no different from the other Foreign Corrupt Practices Act aficionados.

I maintain and publish yearly FCPA statistics even though I fully acknowledge that year-to-year enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated with such statistics, may be of marginal value given that many non-substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual FCPA enforcement action.

For instance, if the Alcoa enforcement action happened 10 days earlier (instead of January 9, 2014) or if the Alstom enforcement action happened 10 days later (instead of December 22, 2014), 2014 FCPA enforcement settlement amounts would be materially different.

Nevertheless and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for what they are, the issue remains:  how does one best analyze and interpret these statistics over time?

Here is how I see it through reference to another example.  In year 1, a city issues 100 speeding tickets and collects $20,000 in fines associated with those tickets.  In year 2, a city issues 90 speeding tickets, but because certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects $25,000 in fines associated with those tickets.  Was there less enforcement in year 2 compared to year 1?  Depends on what you are measuring – the number of infractions or amount of fines.

The some logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistical data and I believe that the best way to track yearly enforcement is through the number of “core” enforcement actions.

By this measure, although 2014 witnessed two very large settlement amounts, FCPA enforcement in 2014 was below historical averages.

Previous posts (here and here) provided various facts and figures from 2014 DOJ FCPA enforcement and SEC FCPA enforcement.   Viewing FCPA enforcement statistics this way is useful and informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions.

As indicated by the below charts and by using the “core” approach to FCPA enforcement statistics (an approach the DOJ endorses), both DOJ and SEC corporate enforcement in 2014 was down from recent historical averages

Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions

Year

Core Actions

2014 7

2013

7

2012

9

2011

11

2010

17

Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions

Year

Core Actions

2014 7

2013

8

2012

8

2011

13

2010

19

However, if one analyzes corporate FCPA enforcement statistics based on settlement amounts, corporate FCPA enforcement was up in 2014 compared to recent historical averages.

Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts

Year

Settlement Amounts

2014 $1.25 billion

2013

$420 million

2012

$142 million

2011

$355 million

2010

$870 million

Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts

Year

Settlement Amounts

2014 $327 million

2013

$300 million

2012

$118 million

2011

$148 million

2010

$530 million

Viewing FCPA enforcement in the aggregate (DOJ and SEC combined) is of course also useful and informative and in 2014 the DOJ and SEC combined collected approximately $1.6 billion in 10 corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  The below chart provides a summary of corporate FCPA enforcement data (DOJ and SEC combined) for the years 2007-2014, as well as notable circumstances that significantly skewed enforcement data statistics for a particular year (an occurrence that happens in most years including 2014).

Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007-2014)

Year

Core Actions

Settlement Amounts

Of Note

2007

15

$149 million

Six enforcement actions involved Iraq   Oil for Food conduct and these enforcement actions comprised 40% of all   enforcement actions and approximately 50% of the $149 million amount.

2008

10

$885 million

The $800 million Siemens enforcement   action comprised approximately 90% of the $885 million amount.

2009

11

$645 million

The $579 million KBR / Halliburton   Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised approximately 90% of the   $645 million amount.

2010

21

$1.4 billion

Six enforcement actions, all resolved   on the same day, centered on various oil and gas companies use Panalpina in   Nigeria. Panalpina also resolved an enforcement action on the same day.Two   enforcement actions (Technip and Eni / Snamprogetti) involved Bonny Island   conduct. In other words, there were 14 unique corporate enforcement actions   in 2010. Of further note, the two Bonny Island enforcement actions,   Technip($338 million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 million) comprised   approximately 50% of the $1.4 billion amount.

2011

16

$503 million

The $219 million JGC Corp. Bonny   Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised approximately 44% of the $503   million amount

2012

12

$260 million

None that significantly skewed the   statistics

2013

9

$720 million

The $398 million Total enforcement   action comprised approximately 55% of the $720 million amount

2014 10  $1.6 billion Two enforcement actions (Alstom – $772 million and Alcoa – $384 million) comprised approximately 72% of the $1.6 billion amount.
  TOTALS

104

$6.23 billion

In short, the number of core corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2014 was tied for the second lowest in seven years.

In closing, have it your way.

However, the way I believe is the more accurate and reliable way to keep and analyze FCPA enforcement statistics is by focusing on unique instances of FCPA scrutiny (not settlement amounts) and tracking enforcement actions using the “core” approach.