Archive for the ‘FCPA Statistics’ Category

Friday Roundup

Friday, April 25th, 2014

FCPA scrutiny equals a raise, Qualcomm declines to cave, industry specific risks, survey says, gaps in the narrative, a pulse on FCPA Inc., quotable and not quotable, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday Roundup

FCPA Scrutiny Equals A Raise

There are some things that happen in the FCPA space that cause one to scratch their head.

Such as a company being under FCPA scrutiny paying audit committee members more money because of the time devoted to the FCPA scrutiny.  In its recent proxy statement, Wal-Mart disclosed as follows.

“Since November 2011, the Audit Committee has been conducting an internal investigation into, among other things, alleged violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”) and other alleged crimes or misconduct in connection with foreign subsidiaries, and whether prior allegations of such violations and/or misconduct were appropriately handled by Walmart. The Audit Committee and Walmart have engaged outside counsel from a number of law firms and other advisors who are assisting in the ongoing investigation of these matters. This investigation has resulted in a significant increase in the workload of the Audit Committee members since the commencement of this investigation, and during fiscal 2014, the Audit Committee conducted 13 additional meetings related to the investigation and compliance matters, and Audit Committee members received frequent updates via conference calls and other means of communication with outside counsel and other advisors related to the investigation. As it had done in November 2012 in recognition of the significantly increased commitment of time required of the Audit Committee to conduct this investigation, in November 2013, the CNGC (Compensation, Nomination, and Governance Committee) and the Board approved an additional annual fee in the amount of $75,000 payable to each Audit Committee member other than the Audit Committee Chair for fiscal 2014, and an additional annual fee in the amount of $100,000 payable to the Audit Committee Chair for fiscal 2014. These amounts were prorated for directors who served on the Audit Committee during a portion of fiscal 2014. The CNGC determined the amounts of these additional fees based on (1) the CNGC’s and the Board’s review of the significant additional time and effort that had been required of the Audit Committee members during the previous Board term in connection with these matters, which were in addition to the time spent by the Audit Committee with respect to the Audit Committee’s other duties and its regularly scheduled meetings, and (2) the expectation that the Audit Committee members would continue to expend approximately the same amount of time and effort in discharging their responsibilities as Audit Committee members at least through the remainder of fiscal 2014.”

Qualcomm Declines to Cave

Rare are so-called Wells Notices in the FCPA context for the simple reason that few issuers actually publicly push back against the SEC.  Thus, the below disclosure by Qualcomm earlier this week stands out:

“Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Formal Order of Private Investigation and Department of Justice Investigation : On September 8, 2010, the Company was notified by the SEC’s Los Angeles Regional office of a formal order of private investigation. The Company understands that the investigation arose from a “whistleblower’s” allegations made in December 2009 to the audit committee of the Company’s Board of Directors and to the SEC. In 2010, the audit committee completed an internal review of the allegations with the assistance of independent counsel and independent forensic accountants. This internal review into the whistleblower’s allegations and related accounting practices did not identify any errors in the Company’s financial statements. On January 27, 2012, the Company learned that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California/Department of Justice (collectively, DOJ) had begun an investigation regarding the Company’s compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). As previously disclosed, the audit committee conducted an internal review of the Company’s compliance with the FCPA and its related policies and procedures with the assistance of independent counsel and independent forensic accountants. The audit committee has completed this comprehensive review, made findings consistent with the Company’s findings described below and suggested enhancements to the Company’s overall FCPA compliance program. In part as a result of the audit committee’s review, the Company has made and continues to make enhancements to its FCPA compliance program, including implementation of the audit committee’s recommendations.

As previously disclosed, the Company discovered, and as a part of its cooperation with these investigations informed the SEC and the DOJ of, instances in which special hiring consideration, gifts or other benefits (collectively, benefits) were provided to several individuals associated with Chinese state-owned companies or agencies. Based on the facts currently known, the Company believes the aggregate monetary value of the benefits in question to be less than $250,000, excluding employment compensation.

On March 13, 2014, the Company received a Wells Notice from the SEC’s Los Angeles Regional Office indicating that the staff has made a preliminary determination to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Company for violations of the anti-bribery, books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA. The bribery allegations relate to benefits offered or provided to individuals associated with Chinese state-owned companies or agencies. The Wells Notice indicated that the recommendation could involve a civil injunctive action and could seek remedies that include disgorgement of profits, the retention of an independent compliance monitor to review the Company’s FCPA policies and procedures, an injunction, civil monetary penalties and prejudgment interest.

A Wells Notice is not a formal allegation or finding by the SEC of wrongdoing or violation of law. Rather, the purpose of a Wells Notice is to give the recipient an opportunity to make a “Wells submission” setting forth reasons why the proposed enforcement action should not be filed and/or bringing additional facts to the SEC’s attention before any decision is made by the SEC as to whether to commence a proceeding. On April 4, 2014, the Company made a Wells submission to the staff of the Los Angeles Regional Office explaining why the Company believes it has not violated the FCPA and therefore enforcement action is not warranted.

The Company is continuing to cooperate with the SEC and the DOJ, but is unable to predict the outcome of their investigations or any action that the SEC may decide to file.”

Needless to say, this instance of FCPA scrutiny will be interesting to follow.

Industry Specific Risk

The reasons why companies become the subject of FCPA scrutiny are often unique to the industry the company is in.  This is why FCPA compliance is best tailored to a company’s unique risk profile as informed by a risk assessment.

This recent Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance post from the Dow Jones Global Compliance Symposium is informative in collecting industry insight.

“Technology. Melissa Lea, Chief Global Compliance Officer, SAP AG. Profit margins for distributors are flexible in tech as so much of the cost is related to labor. And that flexibility offers room for partners to try to pad expenses to pay bribes. “Any time you hear about flexibility it opens the door for corruption,” said Ms. Lea, who noted that authorities have recently cracked down on bribery in the technology sector, once thought to be amongst the cleanest industries.

Pharmaceuticals. Rady A. Johnson, Chief Compliance & Risk Officer, Pfizer Inc. Drug companies pay doctors for a variety of consulting services and often invite them to attend events to promote their products. But since it’s these same doctors that prescribe drugs, pharmaceutical companies need to ensure that fancy conferences and payments for services are not cover for bribes. “We can’t do our job without interacting with health care professionals,” Mr. Johnson said. But companies need to ensure those interactions are appropriate and well defined, he said. In 2012, Pfizer agreed to pay more than $60 million to settle investigations into improper payments made to doctors and foreign officials.

Banks. W.C. Turner Herbert, Director of Anti-Corruption, Bank of America Corp.  Lately in the banking sector, corruption concerns have centered on hiring the relatives of foreign officials in exchange for business. In the past few years, U.S. authorities have investigated a number of banks over allegations of the practice, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. “Its a new area of enforcement without much precedence,” Mr. Herbert said. While hiring well-connected people shouldn’t, by itself, be a red flag, compliance officers need to ensure the selection is done on “merit and the business objectives” of the job, he said. “What draws red flags is if he’s not qualified,” Mr. Herbert said.

Survey Says

In connection with the above-mentioned Dow Jones Global Compliance Symposium, Dow Jones released this “Anti-Corruption Survey Results 2014.”  The survey was conducted on-line “among compliance professionals worldwide” and 383 responses “were completed among companies with anti-corruption programs.”  It is difficult to assess survey results without knowing the precise questions asked, but the Dow Jones survey does contain some interesting nuggets.

Such as “approximately 30% of companies spend $1 million or more on anti-corruption staff and policies.”

In “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,” I suggest that the current FCPA enforcement environment does not adequately recognize a company’s good faith commitment to FCPA compliance and does not provide good corporate citizens a sufficient return on their compliance investments.

Compliance defense opponents (such as the DOJ) like to point out that such a defense will result in “paper compliance” and “check-a-box” exercises.  Such clichés, however, ignore the reality of the situation – this many companies are making substantial investments of time and money in pro-active compliance policies and procedures.

One irony of course is that several former DOJ FCPA enforcement attorneys who have criticized a compliance defense as resulting in “paper compliance” and “check-a-box” exercises now devote a substantial portion of their private practice advising companies on FCPA compliance.

Gaps in the Narrative

You know the narrative.

In 2002, an accounting partnership (Arthur Anderson) was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding documents related to its audit of Enron.  Even though the Supreme Court ultimately tossed the conviction, Arthur Anderson essentially went out of business.  Because of this, in the minds of some, the DOJ can’t criminally charge business organizations with crimes and thus the DOJ has crafted alternative resolution vehicles such as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements to avoid the perceived collateral consequences of a criminal indictment or conviction.

Never mind that the narrative is based on a false premise.  (See here for the guest post and article by Gabriel Markoff titled “Arthur Anderson and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty).

Nevertheless, the narrative persists and is accepted by some as gospel truth.

However, perhaps you have heard that in early April Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (PG&E – a public company) was criminally charged with multiple violations of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act.

The company’s stock is still trading (in fact it is up since the criminal charges were announced), it is still employing people, and it is still operating its business.

Recognizing the fallacy of the narrative is important for corporate leaders of businesses subject to DOJ scrutiny in the FCPA context or otherwise.  Defenses can be mounted and the DOJ can and should be put to its burden of proof more often.

A Pulse on FCPA Inc.

Law360 highlights “Four Practices Areas Generating Big Billable Hours.”  As to the FCPA the article notes:

“The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which mandates certain accounting transparency requirements and gives the U.S. government the power to pursue businesses that bribe foreign officials, is creating long workdays for attorneys throughout the world.  ”If Foreign Corrupt Practices Act were a stock, I wish I would have held it,” said William Devaney, co-chair of  Venable LLP’s FCPA and anti-corruption practice group. “We’ve seen huge growth in the practice area since 2004, and with the government’s current focus on FCPA, it’s safe to say anti-corruption enforcement will be around for a long time.”  After the FCPA was amended in 1998 to include additional anti-bribery provisions, the U.S. government began actively applying the FCPA to not only large companies but also their smaller counterparts.  As a result, Devaney says, a lot of midmarket and smaller companies are now coming into the FCPA compliance fold after acknowledging their obligations under the law, resulting in a surge in demand.
And according to Aaron G. Murphy, a partner with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, foreign countries passing legislation similar to the FCPA will create an explosion of fraud investigations that begin abroad but later will involve the U.S. Department of Justice.  Murphy said the FCPA stood as one of the lone anti-corruption laws in the world for 20 years, then in the mid-1990s, numerous foreign governments adopted similar rules to punish local and international corruption. ”No politician has ever been elected on a ‘get softer on corruption’ ticket,” Murphy said. “If anti-corruption laws get modified, they will probably get stronger, not weaker. So we likely won’t see, 20 years from now, attorneys reminiscing about when companies had to deal with corruption laws. This practice area is here to stay.”

That the FCPA practice is here to stay is all the more reason to elevate your FCPA knowledge and practical skills at the FCPA Institute.

The three other practice areas highlighted in the article were:  export controls and trade sanctions; civil false claims act; and patent litigation and patent trolls.

Quotable

The White House recently announced that President Obama named Kirkland & Ellis partner W. Neil Eggleston to be White House Counsel (see here).  FCPA Professor has highlighted in the past (see here and here) certain of Eggleston’s spot-on comments regarding the FCPA or related issues.

In this interview Eggleston stated: “I worry that [NPAs and DPAs] will become a substitute for a prosecutor deciding – this is not an appropriate case to bring – there is no reason to subject this corporation to corporate criminal liability. In the old days, they would have dropped the case. Now, they have the back up of seeking a deferred or non prosecution agreement, when in fact the case should not have been pursued at all. That’s what I’m worried about – an easy out.”

In another interview, Eggleston was asked “what is an important issue or case relevant to your practice area and why” and stated: “We are beginning to see the development of case law in the FCPA area, which I believe is good for the process. Most of these cases have been settled. When that occurs, defendants have little incentive to refuse to agree to novel Department of Justice theories of prosecution or jurisdiction, so long as the penalty is acceptable. The department then cites its prior settlement as precedent when settling later ones. But no court approved the earlier settlement, and the prior settlement should have no precedential value in favor of the DOJ in later settlements. As the DOJ increases its prosecution of individuals, we will see many more trials, which will give rise to courts, not the DOJ, interpreting the statute.”

Not Quotable

DOJ Deputy Attorney General James Cole was a keynote speaker earlier this week at the Dow Jones Global Compliance Symposium.   According to the event agenda, the title was “What the Justice Department Has in Its Sights” and described as follows.

“From foreign bribery to insider trading, the U.S. Department of Justice has been at the forefront of rigorous enforcement that has forced companies to treat compliance seriously. We interview James Cole, deputy attorney general, about where the department is focusing its efforts now.”

I reached out to the DOJ Press Office for a transcript of Mr. Cole’s remarks and was told “we don’t have one.”

It is unfortunate that public officials speak about matters of public interest at private conferences that charge thousands of dollars to attend.

Reading Stack

The FCPA Guidance was sort of interesting to read, but as noted in my article “Grading the FCPA Guidance” it lacks any legal authority or effect.  A hat tip to the Tax Law Prof Blog for highlighting a recent U.S. Tax Court decision finding that IRS Guidance is “not binding precedent” nor “substantial authority” for a tax position.

The New York Times here goes in-depth on Dmitry Firtash, the Ukrainian businessman recently criminally charged in connection with an alleged bribery scheme involving Indian licenses (see here for the prior post).

An informative three-part series (here, here and here) by Tom Fox (FCPA Compliance & Ethics Blog) regarding gifts, travel and entertainment.

Miller & Chevalier’s FCPA Spring 2014 Review is here.

Further To The Clustering Phenomenon

Wednesday, April 16th, 2014

Earlier this week, the DOJ announced that two additional individual defendants have been added to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (and related) enforcement action against individuals associated with broker dealer Direct Access Partners.  (See here for the original May 2013 enforcement action against Jose Hurtado and Tomas Clarke and here for an additional individual, Ernesto Lujan, being added to the enforcement action in June 2013).

Like in the previous enforcement actions, the additional defendants (Benito Chinea and Joseph DeMeneses, the Chief Executive Officer and a managing partner, respectively of Direct Access Partners) were criminally charged in connection with alleged improper payments to Maria Gonzalez (V.P. of Finance / Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration at Bandes, an alleged Venezuelan state-owned banking entity that acted as the financial agent of the state to finance economic development projects).

As noted in the DOJ’s release, Chinea and DeMeneses were each charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, five counts of violating the FCPA, and five counts of violating of the Travel Act. Chinea and DeMeneses were also charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and three counts of money laundering. DeMeneses was further charged with one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice.  (See here for the SEC’s announcement of a related enforcement action against Chinea and DeMeneses.  Like the SEC’s prior enforcement actions against the other individuals, Chinea and DeMeneses are charged with various securities law violations, but not FCPA offenses as the individuals – while associated with a broker dealer –  are not associated with an issuer).

As noted in the DOJ’s release, in August 2013 Lujan, Hurtado and Clarke each pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA, to violate the Travel Act and to commit money laundering, as well as substantive counts of these offenses.

The DOJ’s enforcement action against Chinea and DeMeneses is further to the curious clustering phenomenon clearly observable in FCPA enforcement.

As highlighted in this previous post (with statistics calculated through the end of 2013), 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just four cases and 75% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just nine cases.

Of further note (and again with statistics calculated through the end of 2013), of the 89 individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008, 61 of the individuals (69%) were employees or otherwise affiliated with private business entities (for instance – Haiti Teleco related enforcement actions, Control Components Inc. Latin Node, Nexus Technologies, BizJet, not to mention failed prosecutions against various Africa Sting defendants and individuals associated with Lindsey Manufacturing).

This is a striking statistic given that 48 of the 60 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 (80%) (again using statistics calculated through the end of 2013) were against publicly traded corporations.  In short, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action.

Thus far in 2014, the trends have been further magnified.  In addition to this week’s action:

  • 5 individuals associated with private company Group DF were charged with FCPA offenses (see here); and
  • 3 individuals associated with private company PetroTiger Ltd. were charged with FCPA offenses (see here)

Friday Roundup

Friday, March 28th, 2014

Further trimmed, scrutiny alerts and updates, facts and figures, quotable, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Further Trimmed

When the SEC announced its enforcement action against James Ruehlen and Mark Jackson  (a current and former executive of Noble Corp.) in February 2012, I said that this would be an interesting case to follow because the SEC is rarely put to its burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions – and when it has been put to its ultimate burden of proof – the SEC has never prevailed in an FCPA enforcement action.

Over the past two years, the SEC’s case has been repeatedly trimmed.  (See this recent post containing a summary).  In the latest cut, the SEC filed an unopposed motion for partial voluntary dismissal with prejudice on March 25th.  In pertinent part, the motion states as follows.

“To narrow this case and streamline the presentation of evidence to the jury, the SEC hereby moves for leave to voluntarily dismiss with prejudice all portions of its claims … predicated upon Noble Corporation’s violation of [the FCPA's internal controls provisions".

For additional specifics, see the filing.

As highlighted in this previous post, in 2010 the SEC charged Noble Corporation with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions based on the same core conduct alleged in the Jackson/Ruehlen action. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Noble agreed to agreed to an injunction and payment of disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $5,576,998.

In short, the SEC's enforcement action against Ruehlen and Jackson is a shell of its former self.   Interesting, isn't it, what happens when the government is put to its burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions.

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Alstom

Bloomberg reports speculation that a future FCPA enforcement action against Alstom could top the charts in terms of overall fine and penalty amounts.  (See here for the current Top 10).

The article states:

"The Justice Department is building a bribery case against Alstom SA , the French maker of trains and power equipment, that is likely to result in one of the largest U.S. anticorruption enforcement actions, according to two people with knowledge of the probe. Alstom, which has a history checkered with corruption allegations, has hindered the U.S. investigation of possible bribery in Indonesia and now faces an expanded probe including power projects in China and India, according to court documents in a related case. Settlement talks haven’t begun, the company said."

In response to the Bloomberg article, Alston released this statement.

"Robert Luskin of Patton Boggs, Alstom’s principal outside legal advisor in the USA, states that the Bloomberg article published on 27 March 2014, regarding the investigation of Alstom by the US Department of Justice, does not accurately reflect the current situation: “Alstom is cooperating closely, actively, and in good faith with the DOJ investigation. In the course of our regular consultations, the DOJ has not identified any on-going shortcomings with the scope, level, or sincerity of the company’s effort”.

“The discussions with the DOJ have not evolved to the point of negotiating a potential resolution of any claims. Any effort to estimate the size of any possible fine is sheer speculation, as would be any comparison with other cases that have recently been resolved. Alstom has agreed to focus its efforts on investigating a limited number of projects that we and the DOJ have identified in our discussions. We are working diligently with the DOJ to answer questions and produce documents associated with these specific projects so that we can address any possible improper conduct”.

VimpelCom

Netherlands-based and NASDAQ traded telecommunications company VimpelCom recently disclosed:

"[T]hat in addition to the previously disclosed investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Dutch public prosecutor office, the Company has been notified that it is also the focus of an investigation by the United States Department of Justice. This investigation also appears to be concerned with the Company’s operations in Uzbekistan. The Company intends to continue to fully cooperate with these investigations.”

On March 12, 2014, VimpelCom disclosed:

“The Company received from the staff of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission a letter stating that they are conducting an investigation related to VimpelCom and requesting documents. Also, on March 11, 2014, the Company’s headquarter in Amsterdam was visited by representatives of the Dutch authorities, including the Dutch public prosecutor office, who obtained documents and informed the Company that it was the focus of a criminal investigation in the Netherlands. The investigations appear to be concerned with the Company’s operations in Uzbekistan. The Company intends to fully cooperate with these investigations.”

Orthofix International

As noted in this Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance post, Orthofix International recently disclosed:

“We are investigating allegations involving potential improper payments with respect to our subsidiary in Brazil.

In August 2013, the Company’s internal legal department was notified of certain allegations involving potential improper payments with respect to our Brazilian subsidiary, Orthofix do Brasil. The Company engaged outside counsel to assist in the review of these matters, focusing on compliance with applicable anti-bribery laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”). This review remains ongoing.”

As noted in this previous post, in July 2012 Orthofix International resolved a DOJ/SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged conduct by a Mexican subsidiary.  In resolving that action, the company agreed to a three year deferred prosecution agreement.  As is typical in FCPA DPAs, in the Orthofix DPA the DOJ agreed not continue the criminal prosecution of Orthofix for the Mexican conduct so long as the company complied with all of its obligations under the DPA, including not committing any felony under U.S. federal law subsequent to the signing of the agreement.

See this prior post for a similar situation involving Willbros Group (i.e. while the company while under a DPA it was investigating potential additional improper conduct).  As noted here, Willbros was released from its DPA in April 2012, the original criminal charges were dismissed and no additional action was taken.

Besso Limited

Across the pond, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) recently issued this final notice to Besso Limited imposing a financial penalty of £315,000 for failing “to take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective systems and controls for countering the risks of bribery and corruption associated with making payments to parties who entered into commission sharing agreements with Besso or assisted Besso in winning and retaining business (“Third Parties”).”

Specifically, the FCA stated:

“The failings at Besso continued throughout the Relevant Period [2005-2011] and contributed to a weak control environment surrounding the making of payments to Third Parties. This gave rise to an unacceptable risk that payments made by Besso to Third Parties could be used for corrupt purposes, including paying bribes to persons connected with the insured or public officials. In particular Besso:  (1) had limited bribery and corruption policies and procedures in place between January 2005 and October 2009. It introduced written bribery and corruption policies and procedures in November 2009, but these were not adequate in their content or implementation; (2) failed to conduct an adequate risk assessment of Third Parties before entering into business relationships; (3) did not carry out adequate due diligence on Third Parties to evaluate the risks involved in doing business with them; (4) failed to establish and record an adequate commercial rationale to support payments to Third Parties; (5) failed to review its relationships with Third Parties, in sufficient detail and on a regular basis, to confirm that it was still appropriate to continue with the business relationship; (6) did not adequately monitor its staff to ensure that each time it engaged a Third Party an adequate commercial rationale had been recorded and that sufficient due diligence had been carried out; and (7) failed to maintain adequate records of the anti-bribery and corruption measures taken on its Third Party account files.”

The FCA has previously brought similar enforcement actions against Aon Limited (see here), Willis Limited (see here), and JLT Speciality Limited (see here).    For more on the U.K. FCA and its focus on adequate procedures to prevent bribery , see this guest post.

Facts and Figures

Trace International recently released its Global Enforcement Report (GER) 2013 – see here to download.  Given my own focus on FCPA enforcement statistics and the various counting methods used by others (see here for a recent post), I particularly like the Introduction of the GER in which Trace articulates a similar “core” approach that I use in keeping my enforcement statistics.  The GER states:

“[W]hen a company and its employees or representatives face multiple investigations or cases in one country involving substantially the same conduct, only one enforcement action is counted in the GER 2013.  An enforcement action in a country with multiple investigating authorities, such as the U.S., is also counted as one enforcement action in the GER 2013.”

The Conference Board recently released summary statistics regarding anti-bribery policies.  It found as follows.

39% of companies in the S&P Global 1200; 23% of companies in the S&P 500; and 14% of companies in the Russell 1000 reported having a policy specifically against bribery.

Given the results of other prior surveys which reported materially higher numbers, these results are very surprising.

Quotable

This recent Wall Street Journal article “Global Bribery Crackdown Gains Steam” notes as follows.

“Cash-strapped countries are seeing the financial appeal of passing antibribery laws because of the large settlements collected by the U.S., according to Nathaniel Edmonds, a former assistant chief at the U.S. Department of Justice’s FCPA division.  ”Countries as a whole are recognizing that being on the anticorruption train is a very good train to be on,” said Mr. Edmonds, a partner at Paul Hastings law firm.”

The train analogy is similar to the horse comment former DOJ FCPA enforcement attorney William Jacobson made in 2010 in an American Lawyer article that “[t]he government sees a profitable program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”  For additional comments related to the general topic, see this prior post.

Reading Stack

This recent Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance Journal post contains a Q&A with former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Chuck Duross.  Contrary to the inference / suggestion in the post, Duross did not bring “tougher tactics” such as wires and sting operations to the FCPA Unit.  As detailed in prior posts here and here, undercover tactics and even sting operations had been used in FCPA enforcement actions prior to the Africa Sting case.

Speaking of the Africa Sting case, the Q&A mentions reasons for why the Africa Sting case was dropped.  Not mentioned, and perhaps relevant, is that the jury foreman of the second Africa Sting trial published this guest post on FCPA Professor after the DOJ failed in the second trial.  Two weeks later, the DOJ dismissed all charges against all Africa Sting defendants.

Further relevant to the Africa Sting case, the Wall Street Journal recently ran this article highlighting the role of Richard Bistrong, the “undercover cooperator” in the case.  Bistrong has recently launched an FCPA Blog – see here.

*****

A good weekend to all.

Of Note From The Marubeni Enforcement Action

Tuesday, March 25th, 2014

This previous post highlighted specifics from the recent Marubeni Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action and this post continues the coverage by discussing various items of note.

Do Legal Principles Even Matter?

Forgive me for being the law guy, but in the aftermath of the Marubeni enforcement action, like so many others, one can legitimately ask – do legal principles even matter?

As highlighted in the previous post, the most recent alleged overt act in support of Marubeni’s conspiracy charge allegedly occurred in November 2008.  In other words, all of the alleged conduct supporting the conspiracy charge was beyond the five year statute of limitations applicable to FCPA offenses.

In addition, the information also charged 7 substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations.  One charge concerned a 2005 wire transfer, three charges concerned 2006 wire transfers, one charge concerned a 2007 wire transfer, and one charge concerned a 2008 wire transfer.  In other words, 6 of the 7 substantive FCPA anti-bribery charges concerned alleged conduct beyond the five year limitations period applicable to FCPA offenses.  (Note:  the final substantive FCPA charge was based on an October 2009 wire transfer made, not by any Marubeni employee, but Alstom employees).

In corporate FCPA enforcement actions, companies often enter into tolling agreements and statute of limitations can also otherwise be extended in other ways, but the DOJ’s criminal information and plea agreement are silent as to any of these issues relevant to statute of limitations.

Is Marubeni A Recidivist?

As noted in the original Marubeni post, last week’s $88 million FCPA enforcement action followed closely on the heels of Marubeni exiting a deferred prosecution agreement from its 2012 FCPA enforcement action based on conduct at Bonny Island, Nigeria.  (See here for the prior post).

Against this backdrop, it is tempting to call Marubeni an FCPA recidivist.

However, as noted in Marubeni’s release (a release that the DOJ needed to approve per the plea agreement) “the Tarahan conduct pre-dates the execution of Marubeni’s 2012 Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the DOJ.”

At the very least, Marubeni is a repeat FCPA offender and joins a category that also includes IBM, Tyco, Aibel Group, General Electric, Diebold (at least as to books and records and internal controls issues) and Ashland Oil (at least in theory given that the first enforcement action occurred prior to passage of the FCPA in 1977).

The distinction Marubeni has among the group though is the shortest gap between enforcement actions.

More Details Please As to Lack of Cooperation

As noted in the previous post, the $88 million Marubeni enforcement action was a relatively rare instance of a company paying a criminal fine within the advisory guidelines range.  The plea agreement includes the DOJ’s justification as to why, including Marubeni’s lack of cooperation.  However, the plea agreement merely states that Marubeni refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigation when given the opportunity to do so.

It sure would have been nice for the DOJ to provide some additional details regarding Marubeni’s apparent lack of cooperation.

For instance, in the Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action against JGC Corp. (also a Japanese company), the DOJ stated that the company declined “to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments?”

The DOJ’s statement motivated this prior post, “Does the DOJ Except FCPA Counsel to Roll Over and Play Dead?

While the DOJ declined to provide specifics as to Marubeni’s lack of cooperation, it would be truly frightening if the DOJ’s position is that a company is not cooperating if it raises purely legal issues such as jurisdiction or statute of limitations.

FCPA Enforcement Statistics

FCPA enforcement statistics are literally all over the map given the creative and unique ways in which many FCPA Inc. participants keep such statistics.  (For instance, see this prior post for visual proof).

As I have long maintained, the most reliable and accurate way to keep FCPA enforcement statistics is by using the “core” approach, an approach to tracking FCPA enforcement endorsed by the DOJ and a commonly accepted method used in other areas.

Consider the stark difference in approaches using just the Marubeni enforcement action and the April 2013 FCPA enforcement action against current and former employees of Alstom.  The enforcement actions were virtual carbon copies of each other involving the same project in Indonesia, involving the same alleged “foreign officials,” the same consultants, Marubeni was a central actor in the Alstom related action and the Alstom employees were central actors in the Marubeni enforcement action.

In short, the Marubeni and Alstom related action were the same “core” action.

However, many in FCPA Inc. will no doubt count these actions as five enforcement actions:  Marubeni and Alstom employees Frederic Pierucci, David Rothschild, Lawrence Hoskins and William Pomponi.  Make that six enforcement actions when – in all likelihood – Alstom resolves an enforcement action based, in whole or in part, on the same conduct.   In short, by tracking FCPA enforcement statistics this way the statistics will be distorted.

The Need For An FCPA Lingua Franca – Visual Proof

Monday, March 10th, 2014

I have frequently highlighted (here and here among other posts) the need for a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act lingua franca.

The absence of a lingua franca has all sorts of negative effects including an impact on the quality of FCPA enforcement and related statistics.  Nearly every FCPA enforcement statistic one would want to track from:

  • “how many FCPA enforcement actions are there,” to
  • “what country is the site of the most FCPA enforcement actions,” to
  • “what percentage of FCPA enforcement actions are resolved via non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements,” to
  • “what percentage of FCPA enforcement actions involve related individual enforcement actions,” to
  • “what is the average fine/penalty amount in an FCPA enforcement action” and many, many more

is infected by the lack of an FCPA lingua franca.

As I have stated before, the most reliable and accurate way to keep FCPA statistics is by using the “core” approach which focuses on unique instances of FCPA scrutiny.  In other words, Africa Sting was not 22 enforcement actions, but rather 1 core enforcement action.  Siemens was not 20 enforcement actions, but rather 1 core enforcement action.  Just using these two examples is the difference between 2 core enforcement actions vs. 42 enforcement actions – a massive difference.

The “core” approach to tracking FCPA enforcement has been endorsed by the DOJ, and the “core” approach is a commonly accepted method used in other areas.

Yet, few in FCPA Inc. use the “core” approach.

Moreover, counting methods among FCPA Inc. participants vary widely and the numbers are literally all over the map.

It’s been said that a picture is worth 1,000 words.

Thus, this post concludes with 4,000 words – visual proof for the need for an FCPA lingua franca.

HoganLovells

BakerHostetler

WilmerHaleGibson Dunn FCPA Enforcement Actions