In November 2010, the SEC conducted a periodic examination of Direct Access Partners LLC (“DAP”), a broker-dealer registered with the SEC.  DAP’s Global Markets Group (“DAP Global”) primarily executed fixed income trades for customers in foreign sovereign debt.  One of its customers was Bandes, an alleged Venezuelan state-owned banking entity that acts as the financial agent of the state to finance economic development projects.

According to the DOJ and SEC, the SEC examination lead to the discovery of a “fraud that was staggering in audacity and scope” (see here for the SEC release).  A component of the alleged fraud included payments by Tomas Clarke (a DAP Executive Vice President who worked out of the company’s Miami office) and Alejandro Hurtado (a back-office employee of DAP in Miami) to Maria Gonzalez (V.P. of Finance / Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration at Bandes).  According to this DOJ criminal complaint, Gonzalez oversaw Bande’s trading by DAP.

According to the criminal complaint, Clarke, Hurtado and others “directed kickback payments” to Gonzalez “in exchange for Gonzalez steering Bandes business to [DAP] and authorizing Bandes to execute bond trades with [DAP].  According to the complaint, between 2008 and 2010 “Gonzalez received at least $3.6 million in payments through insiders and affiliates of [DAP].  According to the complaint, during this time period, “with Gonzalez both acting as the authorized trading contact in regard to [DAP] and managing the relationship between Bandes and [DAP], Bandes directed substantial business to [DAP] and carried out bond transactions that resulted in [DAP] generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue.”  The criminal complaint alleges various payments made or authorized by Clarke and Hurtado to an account in Switzerland held in the name of Gonzalez and/or a company owned in part by Gonzalez.

Based on the above core set of conduct, the criminal complaint charges Clarke and Hurtado with the following offenses:  conspiracy to violate the FCPA, substantive FCPA violations, conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, substantive Travel Act violations, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and substantive money laundering violations.

Gonzalez, the alleged “foreign official,” was charged with conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, substantive Travel Act violations, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and substantive money laundering violations.  (For other examples of “foreign officials” being criminally charged with non-FCPA offenses in connection with an FCPA enforcement action, see here and here).

In this DOJ release, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman stated as follows.  “Today’s announcement is a wake-up call to anyone in the financial services industry who thinks bribery is the way to get ahead.  The defendants in this case allegedly paid huge bribes so that foreign business would flow to their firm.  Their return on investment now comes in the form of criminal charges carrying the prospect of prison time.  We will not stand by while brokers or others try rig the system to line their pockets, and will continue to vigorously enforce the FCPA and money laundering statutes across all industries.”

As noted in the DOJ release, “the government [also] filed a civil forfeiture action … seeking the forfeiture of assets held in a number of bank accounts associated with the scheme, including several bank accounts located in Switzerland.  The forfeiture complaint also seeks the forfeiture of several properties in the Miami area related to Hurtado that were purchased with his proceeds from the scheme.”

The above core conduct also resulted in this SEC civil complaint against Clarke and Hurtado (and others) charging a variety of non-FCPA securities law violations.

SEC v. Jackson & Ruehlen

My first post concerning the SEC’s enforcement action against Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen asked – will the SEC be put to its burden of proof?   I noted that the case would be most interesting to follow as the SEC is rarely put to its burden of proof in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions and I highlighted, at the time, how the last time that happened (in 2002) the SEC lost.

As time would demonstrate, Jackson and Ruehlen indeed did put the SEC to its burden of proof and in December 2012 Judge Keith Ellison (S.D. of Tex.) granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SEC’s claims that sought monetary damages while denying the motion to dismiss as to claims seeking injunctive relief.  (See here for the prior post).  Even though Judge Ellison granted the motion as to SEC monetary damage claims, the dismissal was without prejudice meaning that the SEC was allowed to file an amended complaint.  As noted in this prior post, that is indeed what happened next, and as noted here a second round of briefing began anew.

In the Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss (filed Feb. 22nd) they argued that the SEC could not rely on the fraudulent concealment or continuing violations doctrine to extend the limitations period to cover certain claims that accrued before May 12, 2006.  A week later the Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in SEC v. Gabelli (see here for the prior post) and soon thereafter on March 11th the Defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority with the court arguing that Gabelli “bolstered” their position.

On March 22nd, the same day the SEC’s opposition brief was due, the parties jointly notified the court “that in lieu of opposing the [motion to dismiss] the SEC intends to file a Second Amended Complaint.”  The filing noted that the then proposed Second Amended Complaint “moots the relief sought in the [the motion to dismiss] because it clarifies that, among the violations alleged, the SEC seeks civil penalties … only to the extent such violations accrued on or before May 12, 2006.

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Speaking of statute of limitations, a recent article highlights how the DOJ is “testing a novel argument” to extend statute of limitations in certain cases.  The theory.  We are at war … in Afghanistan … and regardless of whether the conduct at issue has anything to do with that war in Afghanistan, the 1948 Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act gives prosecutors unlimited time to go after alleged fraud during times of war.

No this article was not in the Onion, it was in the Wall Street Journal (see here).

Former Siemens Executive Sharef Settles 2011 SEC Enforcement Action

The SEC announced earlier this week (here) that Uriel Sharef, ”a former officer and board member of Siemens” agreed to settle – as had long been expected – the SEC’s action against him.  As noted in this previous post, Sharef, along with others was charged (both by the DOJ and SEC) in December 2011 in connection with an Argentine bribery scheme that was also the focus, in part, of the 2008 Siemens corporate enforcement action.

As noted in the SEC’s release, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Sharef consented to entry of a final judgment prohibiting future FCPA violations and he agreed to pay a $275,000 civil penalty – a penalty the SEC called “the second highest penalty assessed against an individual in an FCPA case.”

[In connection with the Innospec FCPA enforcement action, in August 2010, Ousama Naaman resolved an SEC enforcement action by agreeing to disgorge $810,076, pay prejudgment interest of $67,020 and pay a civil penalty of $438,038.  See here for the prior post].

The burning question of course is whether the SEC would have prevailed against Sharef if he put the SEC to its burden of proof.  As highlighted in this previous post, Sharef’s co-defendant, Herbert Steffen, did just that and in February Judge Shira Scheindlin dismissed the SEC’s complaint against Steffen finding that personal jurisdiction over Steffen exceeded the limits of due process.

The SEC’s allegations against Sharef mention the phone call Sharef placed in the U.S. to Steffen.  As to this call, Judge Scheindlin stated as follows in the Steffen decision.

“Neither Sharef’s call to Steffen from the United States nor the fact that a portion of the bribery payments were deposited in a New York bank provide sufficient evidence of conduct directed towards the United States to establish minimum contacts.  First, Steffen did not place the calls to Sharef.  Further, Steffen did not direct that the funds be routed through a New York bank.  [...]  His conduct was focused solely on ensuring the continuation of the Siemens contract in Argentina.”

The SEC complaint did however state the following additional as to Sharef.

“Sharef met in New York, NY [in January 2003] with payment intermediaries and agreed to pay $27 million in bribes to Argentine officials in connection with the [contract at issue].

Obstruction Charges Filed Against French Citizen in Connection With FCPA Investigation

The DOJ announced (here) earlier this week that “Frederic Cilins a French citizen, has been arrested and accused of attempting to obstruct an ongoing investigation into whether a mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.”

The Criminal Complaint charges Cilins with one count of tampering with a witness, victim, or informant; one count of obstruction of a criminal investigation; and one count of destruction, alteration, and falsification of records in a federal investigation.

Under the heading “Overview of the Defendant’s Crimes” the complaint states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Cilins … has made repeated efforts to obstruct an ongoing federal grand jury investigation … concerning potential money laundering violations and potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, including such violations by a domestic concern as defined by the FCPA, relating to bribes to officials of a former government of the country of Guinea for the purpose of obtaining valuable mining concessions in Guinea.  During monitored and recorded phone calls and face-to-face meetings with a cooperating witness “CW” [identified as the former wife of a now deceased high-ranking official in the Government of Guinea who is cooperating with the government "in the hopes of obtaining immunity for her own potential criminal conduct"] assisting in this investigation, Cilins, among other things, agreed to pay large sums of money to the cooperating witness to induce the cooperating witness to: (1) provide to Cilins, for destruction, documents Cilins knew had been requested from the cooperating witness by special agents of the FBI and which were to be produced before a federal grand jury; and (2) sign an affidavit containing numerous false statements regarding matters within the scope of the grand jury investigation.  Cilins repeatedly told the cooperating witness that the documents needed to be destroyed ‘urgently’ and that Cilins needed to be present to personally witness the documents being burned.”

Various reports (see here for instance) have linked Cilins to Guernsey-based BSG Resources Ltd and the Criminal Complaint would seem to reference this company as a “particular business entity not based in the United States engaged in the mining industry” (the “Entity”).  The Criminal Complaint sketches a bribery scheme and states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“CW was visited by several individuals including Cilins who identified themselves as representatives of the Entity.  According to the CW, these individuals told the CW, on behalf of the Entity, that they wished to invest in mines in Guinea and asked the CW for help with the Guinean Official, who was then CW’s spouse.  Cilins offered the CW $12 million, to be distributed to the CW and ministers or officials within the Government of Guinea who might be needed to secure the mining rights if all went well after their introduction to the Guinean Official.”

The Criminal Complaint further states that “some of the money paid to the CW by the Entity and its affiliates or agents was wired to a bank account in Florida controlled by the CW.”

It would appear from the Criminal Complaint that BSG Resources is not the sole focus of the U.S. investigation.   Indeed, BSG Resources does not fit the description of a “domestic concern” as referenced in the Criminal Complaint which further states that “subjects of the grand jury investigation include one or more “domestic concerns” within the meaning of the FCPA …”.

Contrary to this assertion, obstruction charges were not first used in the FCPA enforcement against Hong Carson.  Prior to Carson (in which the charge was ultimately dropped) obstruction charges have been used in several FCPA enforcement actions since the FCPA’s first-mega case in 1982 (see here for the prior post).  Although not always successful prosecuted, the following FCPA defendants were nevertheless also charged with various obstruction charges:  Gerald Green, David Kay and Douglas Murphy, Leo Winston Smith and John O’Shea

TJGEM, LLC Complaint

In another example of the noticeable trend of increasing “offensive” use of the FCPA, in late March, Missouri-based TJGEM, LLC filed this civil complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging a variety of claims, including RICO, against various Ghana officials and New Jersey-based Conti Construction Co. Inc. in connection with a sewer project.  AllAfrica reports here as follows.

 ”TJGEM is claiming that [a Ghanian official] inflated the contract sum for the construction of the sewer system, which has now been awarded to Conti Construction, also an American company, by $10 million …  According to [the complaint] because TJGEM’s representatives, who were negotiating with [the official] for the contract, were totally non-receptive and unresponsive to the [official's] corrupt practices and solicitations, and refused to neither entertain  nor accede to same, but instead, rejected said corrupt practices, the contract  was taken away from them. [TJGEM] argues that the selection of a company whose price for the reconstruction of the sewer  project was some $10,000,000 in excess of the price fixed by TJGEM, leads to a reasonable inference that the [official] inflated the price of the sewer project, in order to receive said $10,000,000 as a bribe and kickback in the award of the  sewer project contract to his own use and benefit, and to the use and benefit of other Ghanaian public officials with whom he is acting in concert in the said criminal enterprise.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

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How Should the District Court in Siriwan Interpret Thailand’s Response to the US Government’s Extradition Request?

Prosecutors in United States v. Siriwan filed a response last week (here) to address arguments raised by the Siriwans in mid-January.  Arguing against dismissal, prosecutors advanced the government’s position that Thailand’s responses to the US extradition request indicate that “Thailand has not asserted sole jurisdiction” over the Siriwans.

To recap, the Siriwan case has garnered significant attention because of the government’s novel prosecution tactic:  In 2009, prosecutors charged Juthamas Siriwan, ex-Governor of Tourism Authority of Thailand, as well as her daughter Jittisopa, with money laundering in connection with alleged bribe receipts remitted by Gerald and Patricia Green (see here for the prior FCPA Professor post).  The FCPA cannot reach Juthamas Siriwan because she is a foreign official, a limitation pronounced in United States v. Castle.  Thus, prosecutors charged Siriwan with money laundering in promotion of bribery in hopes of avoiding the FCPA’s shortcoming—a tactic the defense deemed a “novel and untested . . . theory.”

But prosecutors face a hurdle in what Judge Wu has called “a very important case in an area which is very, very difficult.”  Indeed, in a January 2012 hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Wu expressed reluctance with “the government’s position that [it] can somehow get around” the FCPA by charging defendants under the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA).  But an additional hurdle stands in the way of the court even reaching this money-laundering issue.

That hurdle is the United States’ treaty with Thailand.  In the January 2012 hearing, Judge Wu stated:

“I would not feel comfortable reaching final conclusions until I figure out or unless I am informed how the government of Thailand is viewing the situation . . . .  [I]f Thailand says it’s not going to extradite, I will find that Thailand has a dominant interest . . . because they will have expressed it to me in no uncertain terms.  If they agree to the extradition, then all of the issues are open and that means I’ll have to decide them all.”

In sum, the court suggested it might not reach a decision on whether prosecutors can proceed under an MLCA theory until the court first decides whether Thailand has a dominant interest or not.

To complicate matters, Thailand has neither agreed to, nor rejected, the government’s extradition request.  By July 2012, Thailand had made no response to US overtures. Finally, in November 2012, the Acting Thai Attorney General notified prosecutors that it was gathering evidence to charge the Siriwans and “must postpone the extradition process” pursuant to the treaty.  And in December 2012, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the US Embassy that a “criminal case will be filed” against Siriwan and therefore extradition proceedings “must be postponed . . . .”

Thus, the determinative question at this stage is how the court will interpret Thailand’s response.  On one hand, based on the court’s statements in January 2012, if the court views Thailand’s response and postponement of extradition proceedings as an expression of sole jurisdiction and a refusal to extradite, it will probably dismiss the indictment finding that Thailand has a dominant interest.  In support of dismissal, the defense argued in January that Thailand has expressed “sovereign interest,” and that Thailand’s position and “official[]” postponement “suggest[] the Thai government feels that extradition and prosecution here ‘may affect the international relation.’”

On the other hand, if the court views Thailand’s response not as a refusal, but as a mere delay, the case will likely remain on the court’s docket at least until the Thai Attorney General’s Office concludes its investigation and prosecution.  In the government’s filing last week, prosecutors argued that Thailand has “not made any . . . notification . . . nor has it otherwise signaled that international relations may be impaired . . . by the government’s prosecution.”  Of Thailand’s position, prosecutors stated “Thailand asserts no definitive position on any aspect of the government’s extradition request. . . . Thailand’s only affirmative statement is that it is postponing review of the request for the time being.”  Prosecutors accused the defense of “tr[ying] again and again to invent and interject into this case a conflict with Thailand that, in fact, does not exist,” and also of “inappropriately asserting self-serving and unfounded claims on behalf of Thailand.”

The court will need to first decide the jurisdiction question before even reaching, if at all, the legitimacy of prosecutors’ MLCA theory.  Even if the court ultimately approves the theory, however, the Siriwan proceeding portends the delays and difficulties treaties might pose for the government in seeking to prosecute foreign officials in the future.  A hearing on these issues is scheduled for February 21.

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Prosecutors Stymied by Thai Attorney General’s Office in Siriwan Case

Mike Dearington

Take a break from digesting the recently released FCPA guidance to read about happenings in a more remote region of the FCPA world.  For the second time since July, the court in United States v. Siriwan has asked the DOJ to show its cards with respect to its extradition request to Thailand.

Siriwan involves charges that Juthamas Siriwan, ex-governor of Tourism Authority of Thailand, and her daughter, Jittisopa, accepted bribes from Hollywood movie executives Gerald and Patricia Green in exchange for contracts.  Prosecutors face a substantial hurdle in convincing the court that their novel use of the money‑laundering statute (MLCA) to prosecute the Siriwans is permissible even when the defendants are foreign officials otherwise outside the reach of the FCPA.  But based on a November 15 filing (here), prosecutors apparently face a separate hurdle in convincing the court to even reach the merits.  This is because, despite the government’s request, Thailand appears unprepared to extradite the Siriwans.

In July, the government reluctantly revealed that it had “not yet received a response from Thailand regarding extradition.”  The government has finally received its response.  Prosecutors filed a status report this past Thursday updating the court about the government’s struggle to obtain extradition from the Kingdom of Thailand.  Appended to the government’s status report is a translated letter from Thavorn Panichpant, Acting Thai Attorney General, stating that Thailand is “in the process of gathering further evidences [sic] before completing the investigation in order to bring both offenders to court to be formally charged. Hence, we must postpone the extradition of both [defendants] as requested by the U.S. Government, according to the Extradition Act . . . .”

The government has interpreted “postpone” as an indication that Thailand may be willing to ultimately extradite the Siriwans.  Prosecutors appended a letter from the US Office of Law Enforcement and Intelligence, a unit of the Department of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser, interpreting the Thai Acting Attorney General’s letter, “not as a rejection, nor an assertion of jurisdiction over this matter . . . .”  And in its brief, the prosecution argued that Thailand’s response “does not constitute a denial of the government’s extradition request.”  Nonetheless, it appears that Thailand’s response poses serious problems for prosecutors.

First, after reading the letter, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the Siriwans in consideration of “the comity of nations.”  In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court in 1895 described comity, not as “a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will,” but rather as a “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation . . . .”

Second, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction based on the international-law principle of “reasonableness.”  Section 403 of The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations suggests, “[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”  One of The Restatement’s reasonableness factors is “the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,” a factor that weighs heavily in the Siriwans’ favor since the Thai Attorney General’s Office has expressed an interest in prosecuting the Siriwans domestically.

If the court decides to dismiss the action, it will probably operate as a dismissal with prejudice, even if dismissed without prejudice.  The statute of limitations for money laundering under § 1956 is five years, and the most recent act of money laundering allegedly occurred in March 2006.  Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, courts in the Central District of California have typically held that, absent a savings clause, a statute of limitations continues to run despite a dismissal without prejudice, as if the original complaint had never been filed.  See, e.g., Sperling v. White (C.D. Cal. 1998). 

The letter from the Thai Attorney General’s Office could have a substantial impact on the DOJ’s efforts to curb foreign bribery.  If the court decides to dismiss the action, not only will prosecutors lose the opportunity to prosecute the Siriwans, but the DOJ will also lose the opportunity to test its novel prosecution theory that would allow it to hold foreign officials accountable for bribery via the money-laundering statute.  If the court dismisses the action, we can expect prosecutors to appeal such a dismissal as a final order.

Courts have held – the leading case is Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) – that the FCPA does not contain a private right of action.  Yet in recent years plaintiffs attorneys have attempted to play a role in this new era of FCPA enforcement by bringing derivative claims against officers and directors, securities class action suits, unfair competition claims, and RICO claims.

If a company resolves an FCPA enforcement action or is the subject of FCPA scrutiny, it is likely that multiple plaintiffs firms will soon thereafter issue press releases announcing an “investigation.”

For instance.

In December 2011 (see here for the prior post) Aon Corporation (“Aon”), one of the largest insurance brokerage firms in the world, agreed to resolve an FCPA enforcement action.  Via a DOJ non-prosecution agreement and a settled SEC civil complaint in which the company was not required to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations, Aon agreed to pay approximately $16.3 million.  As noted in the prior post, and in this subsequent post, the conduct at issue involved Aon Limited (a subsidiary of Aon based in and organized under the laws of the U.K.) and focused on Costa Rica.  There was no fact, suggestion or implication in the resolution documents that anyone at Aon knew of,  participated in, or authorized the conduct at issue.  The only factual  mention of Aon in the resolution documents is that Aon Limited “reported financially through a series of intermediary entities into its U.S.-based issuer parent,  Aon Corporation” and elsewhere that “the books and records of Aon Limited were  consolidated into those of Aon Corporation.”

Further relevant to the question posed in this post, in resolving the enforcement action, the DOJ acknowledged Aon’s: “extraordinary cooperation” in its investigation; “timely and complete disclosure of facts” relating to the conduct at issue; and “early and extensive remedial efforts” including the “substantial improvements the company has made to its anti-corruption compliance procedures.”  Furthermore, in resolving the enforcement action, Aon agreed to a host of FCPA related compliance enhancements.

Nevertheless, along comes this release from a securities class actions firm announcing that it “is investigating the Board of Directors of Aon” and that “the investigation focuses on possible breaches of fiduciary duties by the Board of Directors in relation to allegations that the company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

The release ends of course, as they all do, with the following.  “If you own common stock in Aon and wish to obtain additional information, please visit us at [name of securities class action firm].  [Name of firm securities class action firm] also encourages anyone with information regarding Aon’s conduct to contact the firm, including whistleblowers, former employees, shareholders and others.”

When a company’s FCPA violations are found to be condoned or encouraged by the board or executive officers, such plaintiff causes of action would seem to be warranted.  But these situations are rare in FCPA enforcement actions and from the DOJ and SEC resolution documents in the Aon enforcement action, these circumstances were not present in the Aon matter.

As noted in this prior post, the Chamber of Commerce (in addition to supporting FCPA reform) has blasted FCPA-related civil litigation.  And with good reason.

The question needs to be asked – do the vast majority of these plaintiff FCPA related civil suits or “investigations” serve a purpose or are they merely parasitic?

From the Dockets

Last month when Judge Lynn Hughes dismissed, at the close of the DOJ’s case, the FCPA charges against John Joseph O’Shea (see here for the prior post), it was only a partial victory as O’Shea still faced non-FCPA charges.  Complete victory is imminent as yesterday the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss (here) the remaining charges (conspiracy, money laundering and obstruction) against O’Shea.

In July 2011, Patrick Joseph (a former general director for telecommunications at Haiti Teleco and thus a “foreign official” according to the DOJ) was added to the extensive Haiti Teleco case.  (See here for the prior post).  Because the FCPA does not apply to bribe recipients, the DOJ charged Joseph with a non-FCPA offense: one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.  Earlier this week, Joseph pleaded guilty to the charges (see here).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Joseph agreed to forfeit approximately $956,000.  It is clear from the plea agreement that Joseph was likely an early cooperator in the Haiti Teleco case as the plea agreement refers to a June 2009 proffer agreement with the DOJ.  Many of the other individual defendants in the Haiti Teleco case were charged in December 2009 (see here).  The plea agreement requires Joseph’s continued cooperation and later this month a trial is to begin as to other defendants in the wide-ranging Haiti Teleco case.

FCPA Compliance Defense – Yes or No?

That is the title of a free webcast on February 21st to be hosted by Bruce Carton’s Securities Docket (see here to sign up and for more information).  I will be discussing my  paper “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense”and will argue in favor of Congress creating an FCPA compliance defense.  On the other side of the issue, Howard Sklar (Senior Counsel, Recommind and a frequent commentator on FCPA issues at, among other places, his Open Air Blog) will argue that Congress should not include a compliance defense to violations of the FCPA.

Former Employee Alleges FCPA Issues at GE

As previously reported by Chris Matthews at Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents (see here) Khaled Asadi (a dual U.S. and Iraqi citizen) who was previously employed by G.E. Energy (USA) LLC (“GE Energy”) as its Country Executive for Iraq, located in Amman, Jordan, has filed a civil complaint (here) in the Southern District of Texas against G.E. Energy.   GE Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Electric Company (“GE”).

The complaint alleges that G.E. harassed, pressured Asadi to vacate his position, and ultimately terminated him after he informed his supervisor and G.E.’s Ombudsperson “regarding potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act committed by G.E. during negotiations for a lucractive, multi-year deal with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity.”  The substance of Asadi’s complaint is that “on or about June of 2010 Mr. Asadi was alerted by a source in the Iraqi Government that GE had hired a woman closely associated with the Senior Deputy Minister of Electricty (Iraq) to curry favor with the Ministry while in negotiation for a Sole Source Joint Venture Contract with the Ministry of Electricity. (According to the complaint, the Joint Venture Agreement between GE and the Ministry of Electricity was signed in Baghdad on December 30, 2010 and that the exclusive materials and repairs provision is estimated to be valued at $250,000,000 for the seven year agreement.)

Hiring friends, family members, etc. of a ”foreign official” at the request of the ‘foreign official” has been the basis, in part, for previous FCPA enforcement actions – particularly if the hired individual was not qualified for the position, did not engage in any meaningful work, or was paid an unreasonably high salary.  For instance, the 2011 FCPA enforcement action against Tyson Foods (see here for the prior post) involved, in part, allegations that a company subsidiary placed the wives of Mexican ”foreign officials” on its payroll and provided them with “a salary and benefits, knowing that the wives did not actually perform any
services” for the company.

In the WSJ Corruption Currents article, a GE spokesman stated as follows.  “Mr. Asadi’s termination had absolutely nothing to do with any allegations he is making.  Regarding our contracts in Iraq, GE followed all requirements and his allegations are false.”

Travel Act Readings

A few informative Travel Act readings to pass along.

In this article from Thomson Reuters News & Insight, Mike Emmick (Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton) calls the Travel Act the “FCPA’s red-haired stepchild” and says that in conducting an internal investigation “there are some additional rocks to flip over” before celebrating findings of no payments to “foreign officials.”

In this article from Bloomberg Law Reports, John Rupp and David Fink (Covington & Burling) note that a “move by U.S. authorities to target commercial bribery robustly is a distinct possibility.”  The piece discusses the laws that could be used by U.S. authorities to prosecute foreign commercial bribery.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Part conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act and part conspiracy to violate the FCPA, the FCPA portion of the criminal information (see here) alleges that Bridgestone conspired with others to “obtain and retain for Bridgestone’s IEPD [International Engineered Products Department] business million of dollars of sales of marine hose and other industrial products by making corrupt payments to foreign government officials in Latin America and elsewhere.”  Among other things, the DOJ alleged that Bridgestone: (i) ”contracted with local sales agents in many of the Latin American countries where Bridgestone sought IEPD sales;” (ii) developed relationships with employees of the state-owned entities [PEMEX in Mexico is specifically mentioned] with which Bridgestone sought to do business;” (iii) “negotiated with employees of state-owned entities who were ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA, in Mexico and other Lartin American countries, to make corrupt payments to those foreign officials to secure business for Bridgestone and BIPA [Bridgestone Industrial Products of America Inc. - Bridgestone's U.S. subsidiary];” (iv) “approved the making of corrupt payments to the foreign officials through the local sales agents to secure business for Bridgestone and BIPA;” (v) paid local sales agents commissions within which BIPA included corrupt payments to be paid to the foreign officials; (vi) “coordinated these corrupt payments in Latin America through Bridgestone’s agents in the United States located in BIPA’s offices, including in Houston, Texas; and (vii) “took steps to conceal these payments, including, in some instances writing ‘Read and Destroy’ on facsimiles that contained information related to the corrupt payments and, in other instances using verbal communication rather than written communication to avoid creating written record.”

As to jurisdiction against Bridgestone, the DOJ asserts 78dd-3 and merely alleges that e-mails or faxes were sent to or from Japan to the U.S. in connection with bribery scheme.  Interestingly, in the Africa Sting case, Judge Leon – in the first judicial test of 78dd-3 jurisdiction – seemed to reject the notion that such conduct, in and of itself, satisfied 78dd-3′s “while in the territory of the U.S.” requirement.  See here for the prior post.

According to this filing, it would appear that approximately 80% of the $28 million fine is for the FCPA conduct.  The guidelines range for the antitrust conduct was $6.7 million - $13.4 million.  The guidelines range for the FCPA conduct was $40 million – $80 million. 

In other respects, the DOJ release states as follows.  “Under the plea agreement, the department recognized Bridgestone’s cooperation with the investigations, including conducting a worldwide internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing and providing to the department voluminous evidence and information.  In addition, the plea agreement acknowledges Bridgestone’s extensive remediation, including restructuring the relevant part of its business, terminating many of its third-party agents and taking remedial actions with respect to employees responsible for many of the corrupt payments.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, Bridgestone has committed to continuing to enhance its compliance program and internal controls.  As a result of these mitigating factors, the department agreed to recommend a substantially reduced fine.”

In a press release (here), Bridgestone [BSJ] noted as follows.  “Since May 2007, the DOJ has been investigating BSJ’s involvement in international cartel activities relating to the sale of marine hose. The DOJ has also investigated improper payments to government officials through local sales agents focusing primarily on Latin America in connection with certain industrial products. BSJ has cooperated fully in this matter.  The DOJ has agreed that BSJ’s cooperation has been ‘extraordinary’.  The DOJ has also acknowledged that BSJ has engaged in extensive remediation including dismantling the International Engineered Products Department, closing its Houston office of Bridgestone Industrial Products of America, Inc., terminating many of its third party agents, and taking remedial actions with respect to its employees. BSJ has also decided to withdraw from the marine hose business.”  The release further notes that the $28 million fine is a “significant reduction from the applicable sentencing guidelines due to BSJ’s cooperation and remediation efforts.”

Ordinarily, extraordinary cooperation, remediation, etc. allow a company to settle an FCPA enforcement action via a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement.  Yet, the two-crime nature of the Bridgestone enforcement action may have prompted the DOJ to insist on a plea agreement to actual criminal charges.

As noted in the DOJ release, in 2008 Misao Hioki, the former general manager of Bridgestone’s international engineered products department, pleaded guilty to antitrust and FCPA conspiracy charges.  See here for that prior enforcement action.

Since April, Japanese companies have contributed approximately $248 million to the U.S. Treasury for violating the FCPA (recognizing that the Bridgestone action also contains an antitrust component).  See here for the prior JGC Corporation enforcement action.  Another Japanese company, Sojitz Corporation, is also reportedly the subject of an FCPA investigation in relation to conduct in Bahrain.  See here for the prior post. 

You ask, doesn’t Japan have its own “FCPA-like” law?  Yes, it does; however there is no criminal liability for corporations under the law.  To learn more see here.

Finally, the FCPA Blog reports (here) that Bridgestone has ADRs traded in the U.S. over the counter in the pink sheets.  In the past, the SEC has asserted FCPA books and records and internal controls jurisdiction over a company based on such a listing.  Given that DOJ and SEC enforcement actions are typically announced on the same day, and given nothing was announced yesterday by the SEC, it is further interesting that the SEC has apparently chosen to sit out the Bridgestone matter.

Haiti Teleco Case

Previous posts (here and here)  detailed Joe Esquenazi’s and Carlos Rodriguez’s motion for acquittal or a new trial based on statements made (and then seemingly retracted) by Jean Max Bellerive (Prime Minister of Haiti) concerning the ownership of Haiti Teleco – the entity at the middle of the bribery scheme.  In the DOJ’s response (here) to the defendants’ motion, the DOJ argues, among other things, that “the Government did not seek the first Bellerive declaration from the Republic of Haiti, and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing as to when or how the Government obtained it.”  As to the second Bellerive declaration, the DOJ stated that “the Government assisted Mr. Bellerive in preparing the declaration” in which Bellerive, as noted in the prior post, stated that the first declaration was strictly for internal purposes and he did not know it was going to be used in criminal legal proceedings in the U.S. or that it was going to be used in support of the argument that Teleco was not part of Public Administration of Haiti.

Substantively, the DOJ argues that the first Bellerive declaration does not “contain newly discovered evidence” because the jury “heard most of” the points addressed in the first Bellerive declaration from Garry Lissade, the DOJ’s expert witness, who testified as to the legal status of Haiti Teleco after “he conducted extensive research, including legal research and interviews, in reaching his conclusions.”

The DOJ’s position in many FCPA enforcement actions concerning state-owned or state-controlled entities seems to be that the ownership structure of the entity at issue should be obvious and easily ascertainable to defendants.  If so, why did Lissade (Haiti’s former Minister of Justice) have to “conduct extensive research, including legal research and interviews, in reaching his conclusion” that Teleco was a Haitian public entity?

Africa Sting Case

The second Africa Sting trial involving defendants John Mushriqui, Jeana Mushriqui, R. Patrick Caldwell, Stephen Giordanella, John Godsey, and Marc Morales is set to begin on September 22nd.  The second trial will be more narrowly focused than the first Africa Sting trial that resulted in a mistrial (as well as dismissal of certain counts including money laundering conspiracy charges).

Why?  Because the DOJ did not oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss the money laundering conspiracy charges.  In pre-trial briefing, the DOJ stated as follows.  “At the conclusion of the government’s case-in-chief in the first trial, the Court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Forty-Four of the Superseding Indictment with respect to the defendants in the first trial. The government continues to believe that the Court should not have granted the motion and that Count Forty-Four should have been submitted to the jury. But the government understands the Court’s ruling and will not object to the Defendant’s motion. The government’s position in this filing recognizes the Court’s past ruling, and in no way suggests that the government will not seek to bring similar charges in future cases.”

Siriwan “Foreign Official” Case

A previous post (here) detailed how Juthamas Siriwan and Jittisopa Siriwan (the “foreign officials” in the Green FCPA enforcement action) were fighting back against DOJ criminal charges.  As noted in the post, the Siriwans argued as follows.  “This is the first judicial challenge to a novel prosecutorial approach the Government recently developed to charge foreign officials allegedly involved in corruption.  That approach is aimed at overcoming a fundamental FCPA limitation.  The FCPA does not criminalize a foreign public official’s receipt of a bribe.  Nor can the Government employ an FCPA conspiracy charge against a foreign public official.  Accordingly, these new enforcement initiatives require expansive interpretations [of] “promotion money laundering” [under the Money Laundering Control Act].”  The Siriwans further argued as follows.  “Congress has extensively amended the FCPA, yet it deliberately has not extended FCPA liability to foreign officials.  If the Government wishes to extend U.S. criminal penalties to foreign officials accepting a bribe, it must go back to Congress, rather than employ dubious charging tactics to evade the direct and repeated congressional choice not to apply FCPA criminal liability to such officials.”

In its opposition brief (here) filed last week, the DOJ stated as follows.  “Upon analysis of defendants’ arguments, it is quickly evident that, in support of their positions, defendants routinely conflate and confuse multiple statutes, interpret and argue the elements of uncharged statutes, and ignore case law relevant to the statutes actually charged.”  Among other things, the DOJ stated as follows.  “That foreign officials cannot face liability for FCPA offenses does not give foreign officials a free pass to commit other, entirely separate, crimes.”  The DOJ noted that the Siriwans are not charged with accepting a bribe, or conspiring to violate the FCPA, but rather with “the separate, and entirely analytically distinct, crime of international transportation money laundering to promote the Greens’ violation of the FCPA.”  The DOJ noted that just because Siriwan ”was a foreign official at the time of these offenses, and therefore, not charged under the FCPA does not change the analysis.”

As reported by Samuel Rubenfeld at Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents, a hearing on Siriwans’ motion to dismiss is scheduled for Oct. 20.

For instance, in U.S. v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991), the court was called upon to consider whether “foreign officials” who are excluded from prosecution under the FCPA itself, could nevertheless be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute (18 USC 371) for conspiring to violate the FCPA.  The court held that “foreign officials”  could not be prosecuted for conspiring to violate the FCPA and adopted the rationale set forth in the trial court opinion (see 741 F.Supp. 116).   That rationale was that Congress, in passing the FCPA, only chose to punish one party to the bribe agreement and the DOJ could not therefore  ”override the Congressional intent not to prosecute foreign officials for their participation in the prohibited acts” through use of the conspiracy statute.  The trial court stated as follows.  “The drafters of the [FCPA] knew that they could, consistently with international law, reach foreign officials in certain circumstances. But they were equally well aware of, and actively considered, the ‘inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties’ raised by the application of the bill to non-citizens of the United States.”  The trial court observed that prosecution and punishment of “foreign officials” (in the Castle case alleged Canadian “foreign officials”) ”will be accomplished by the government which most directly suffered the abuses allegedly perpetrated by its own officials, and there is no need to contravene Congress’ desire to avoid such prosecutions by the United States.”  For those of you scoring at home, Castle represents a DOJ loss in a contested FCPA matter.

In recent years, however, the DOJ has used other laws in an attempt to reach “foreign officials.”  This trend has been profiled here and here.  For instance, in January 2010, in connection with the Gerald and Patricia Green FCPA enforcement action, a criminal indictment was unsealed against Juthamas Siriwan and Jittisopa Siriwan.  According to the indictment, Juthamas “was the senior government officer of the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT)” and she is the “foreign official” the Greens were convicted of bribing.  Jittisopa is the daughter of the “foreign official” and also alleged to be an “employee of Thailand Privilege Card Co. Ltd.” an entity controlled by TAT and an alleged “instrumentality of the Thai government.”  The charges against the Siriwans were not FCPA charges, but largely conspiracy to money launder and “transporting funds to promote unlawful activity.”

As detailed in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents story by Joe Palazzolo, the Siriwans are fighting back.  On behalf of the Siriwans, lawyers at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP recently field this motion to dismiss to the indictment.

In summary, the Siriwans state as follows.  “This is the first judicial challenge to a novel prosecutorial approach the Government recently developed to charge foreign officials allegedly involved in corruption.  That approach is aimed at overcoming a fundamental FCPA limitation.  The FCPA does not criminalize a foreign public official’s receipt of a bribe.  Nor can the Government employ an FCPA conspiracy charge against a foreign public official.  Accordingly, these new enforcement initiatives require expansive interpretations [of] “promotion money laundering” [under the Money Laundering Control Act].”  The Siriwans state as follows.  “Congress has extensively amended the FCPA, yet it deliberately has not extended FCPA liability to foreign officials.  If the Government wishes to extend U.S. criminal penalties to foreign officials accepting a bribe, it must go back to Congress, rather than employ dubious charging tactics to evade the direct and repeated congressional choice not to apply FCPA criminal liability to such officials.”

As noted in Palazzolo’s article, the DOJ has yet to respond to Siriwans’ motion and U.S. District Judge George Wu (C.D. of California) has scheduled a hearing on the motion for October 20th.

In a development that goes straight to a point raised by the Castle court, Thailand’s National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) has reportedly found sufficient grounds to believe that Juthamas Siriwan received money from the Greens and that Jittisopa Siriwan was an accomplice in the bribery case.  The NCCC has reportedly forwarded its conclusion to the Thai Attorney-General for legal action against the Siriwans.  For more, see here from the Bangkok Post.

The Siriwan’s challenge is the latest in “this year of FCPA judicial scrutiny.”  Previously this year, there was the first judicial challenge to the DOJ’s “foreign official” interpretation that made extensive use of the FCPA’s legislative history (see here); the first dd-3 judicial challenge (see here); the first victim petition under the FCPA (see here); and the first Travel Act judicial challenge (see here).

*****

In a related development (see here), the DOJ has dropped its appeal of Gerald and Patricia Green’s sentence.  As detailed in this prior post, in September 2009, Gerald and Patricia Green were found guilty by a federal jury of substantive FCPA violations, conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and other charges.  After several sentencing delays, in August 2010 (see here), Judge Wu rejected the DOJ’s 10 year sentencing request for both Gerald and Patricia Green and sentenced the Greens to six months in prison, followed by three years probation.  In its sentencing brief, the DOJ urged the court to “disregard defendants’ efforts to obscure the landscape of FCPA sentencing, which generally reflects significant prison terms for convicted individuals.”  I asked at the time whether the “landscape of FCPA sentencing” truly reflected “significant prison terms” as stated by the DOJ – a statement even more true now (see the FCPA Sentences tab under the Search page).

I was surprised to learn that the DOJ was appealing the Green sentences and I am thus not surprised to learn that the DOJ has dropped its appeal.  In short, do you think the DOJ wants anything FCPA related before the 9th Circuit?

The State Department action follows the March 1, 2010 guilty plea of BAE Systems plc. (see here for the prior post). BAE pleaded guilty to “conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its lawful functions, to make false statements about its FCPA compliance program, and to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” In that DOJ enforcement action, BAE Systems plc agreed to pay a $400 million criminal fine.

I previously called (here) the BAE “bribery, yet no bribery” enforcement action one that contributes to the “facade of FCPA enforcement” (see here) and was asked several questions about the enforcement action by former Senator Arlen Specter (see here).

Like the DOJ enforcement action, the State Department action specifically notes that BAE Systems, Inc. was not involved in the conduct giving rise to the enforcement actions. BAE Systems Inc. is “the U.S.-based segment of BAE Systems plc” and “is responsible for relationships with the U.S. Government…”. (See here).

The State Department action involved BAE Systems plc entering into a consent decree (see here for the relevant documents) “to settle 2,591 violations of the AECA and ITAR in connection with the unauthorized brokering of U.S. defense articles and services, failure to register as a broker, failure to file annual broker reports, causing unauthorized brokering, failure to report the payment of fees or commissions, and failure to maintain records involving ITAR-controlled transactions.”

Certain of the improper conduct identified in the State Department documents relate to the lease and lease/sale of Gripen aircraft to the Ministries of Defence in the Czech Republic and Hungary – conduct also at issue in the DOJ’s prosecution of BAE (see here for the criminal information).

The State Department documents also relate to BAE’s use of advisers for defense transactions and proposed defense transactions involving U.S. defense articles and services without obtaining authorization from the State Department.

One of the advisors identified is Alfons Mensdorff-Pouilly. As noted in this previous post, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) originally charged Alfons Mensdorff-Pouilly with “conspiracy to corrupt” and for “conspiring with others to give or agree to give corrupt payments [...] to unknown officials and other agents of certain Eastern and Central European governments, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure, or as rewards for having secured, contracts from those governments for the supply of goods to them, namely SAAB/Gripen fighter jets, by BAE Systems Plc.” Within days, the SFO dropped the charges. As noted in this previous post, the SFO explained that BAE would not agree to the SFO plea (watered down as it was) without the SFO agreeing to drop the charges against Count Mensdorff.

As to debarment, the State Department consent agreement states (at page 20) that the State “Department has determined to impose a statutory debarment of BAE Systems plc pursuant to section 127 of the ITAR [see here], based on the criminal charges [in the previous DOJ enforcement action].

Yet, the next sentence of the consent decree states as follows. “However, based on the foregoing and additional information provided by Respondent, and request for reinstatement by BAE Systems plc, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs has determined under Section 38(g)(4) of the AECA [see here] that Respondent has taken appropriate steps to address the causes of the violations and to mitigate law enforcement concerns. Accordingly, BAE Systems plc shall be reinstated.”

The consent decree did however “place under a policy of denial” BAE Systems CS&S International, Red Diamond Trading Ltd. and Poseidon Trading Investments Ltd. Per the consent decree, this means that there will be “an initial presumption of denial during the case-by-case review of all licenses and other authorizations” involving these subsidiaries even though the consent decree states that “Transaction Exceptions” may be granted by the State Department. Furthermore, the consent decree states that all licenses, agreements, and other authorizations involving these subsidiaries previously issued “are not affected and are not revoked.”

The most recent annual report on BAE’s website states as follows regarding CS&S International. “The operating group’s CS&S International business predominantly acts as prime contractor for the UK government-to government defence agreement with Saudi Arabia and has a major in-country presence. Its main activities include operational capability support to both the Royal Saudi Air Force and Royal Saudi Naval Force and, more recently, the commencement of supply of 72 Typhoon aircraft.” Neither Red Diamond Trading Ltd. nor Poseidon Trading Investments Ltd. are mentioned in the 190 page annual report.

According to this U.K. Guardian article “BAE’s Secret Money Machine,” “in February 1998 Red Diamond Trading Ltd was anonymously incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and was used to channel payments all over the world, via Red Diamond accounts in London, Switzerland and New York.” As to Poseidon Trading, the same article states as follows. “BAE set up a second front company, purely to handle the Saudi commission payments for al-Yamamah. Poseidon Trading Investments Ltd was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on June 25 1999.”

The DOJ’s criminal information contains various allegations regarding Saudi Arabia – without specifically mentioning the al-Yamamah contract. For more on the al-Yamamah contract see here -a PBS Frontline documentary titled Black Money.

The State Department’s recent $79 million enforcement action against BAE is in addition to the DOJ’s $400 million enforcement action against BAE from 2010. However, as Dru Stevenson (Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law) and Nick Wagoner (a law student at South Texas College of Law) explored in this recent post, in the 365 days that followed the 2010 DOJ enforcement action, BAE was awarded U.S. contracts in excess of $58 billion dollars.

*****

Speaking of debarment (or lack thereof) Senator Al Franken continues to lead on this issue. Earlier this month, during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Franken questioned Attorney General Eric Holder why, over the past three years, hundreds of billions of dollars have been awarded to defense contractors who have previously been convicted of fraud. See here for the video. Senator Franken similarly questioned Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer during a January Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. See here for the video.

In connection with the Senate’s November 2010 hearing “Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” the DOJ was asked whether it favored “mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery.” See here for the prior post including the DOJ’s response.