Archive for the ‘Dyncorp’ Category

Friday Roundup

Friday, October 10th, 2014

A tribute, resource alert, bureaucratic brazennessscrutiny alerts and updates, a bushel, quotable, and for the reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

James McGrath

I join Tom Fox (FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog) in paying tribute to James McGrath.  Owner of his own Ohio-based firm McGrath & Grace and founder and editor of his own Internal Investigations Blog, McGrath was a bear of a man as Fox wrote.  Yet a gentle and kind bear and I will remember Jim for his desire to learn and engage with students.  He was an occasional contributor to FCPA Professor (see here) and his candid wit resulted in this classic post.  I last communicated with Jim a few weeks ago and he was excited to share some new things in his life and I was happy and excited for him.  Moreover, Jim paid me a visit in Southern Illinois this past spring which is no small feat as one has to make a big of effort to get here.  I enjoyed our visit and discussion.

You will be missed Jim, rest in peace.

Resource Alert

The University of Houston Law Center announced:

“[Release of] a searchable database that contains the compliance codes for Fortune 500 companies.  The project was led by Houston attorney Ryan McConnell, an adjunct professor at the University of Houston Law Center. McConnell worked with a team of recent graduates and current students to develop the database, which covers 42 different topics. “The free database allows any company to conduct benchmarking on virtually every compliance area covered in a code of conduct and to spot compliance trends within their industry,” McConnell explained. “In addition to proactively building a program, when compliance failures occur, whether a foreign bribery violation or environmental issue, stakeholders – whether they are shareholders in a lawsuit or criminal investigators – frequently scrutinize the company’s compliance program.  This database provides a powerful tool for anyone to evaluate the strength of a company’s compliance program, including subject matters addressed in the code and the organization’s core values.”

Bureaucratic Brazenness

This recent Wall Street Journal column “The New Bureaucratic Brazenness” caught my eye.

“We’re all used to a certain amount of doublespeak and bureaucratese in government hearings. That’s as old as forever. But in the past year of listening to testimony from government officials, there is something different about the boredom and indifference with which government testifiers skirt, dodge and withhold the truth. They don’t seem furtive or defensive; they are not in the least afraid. They speak always with a certain carefulness—they are lawyered up—but they have no evident fear of looking evasive. They really don’t care what you think of them. They’re running the show and if you don’t like it, too bad.

[...]

Everything sounds like propaganda. That will happen when government becomes too huge, too present and all-encompassing. Everything almost every level of government says now has the terrible, insincere, lying sound of The Official Line, which no one on the inside, or outside, believes.

[...]

We are locked in some loop where the public figure knows what he must pronounce to achieve his agenda, and the public knows what he must pronounce to achieve his agenda, and we all accept what is being said while at the same time everyone sees right through it. The public figure literally says, “Prepare my talking points,” and the public says, “He’s just reading talking points.” It leaves everyone feeling compromised. Public officials gripe they can’t break through the cynicism. They cause the cynicism.”

I sort of feel this way when I hear DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement attorneys speak.  Do you?

For instance, last year I attended an event very early in tenure of a high-ranking SEC enforcement official.  This person – who came to the SEC from private practice – candidly stated something to the effect that given his very new position he did not yet know what he was supposed to say.

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Sanofi

As recently reported in this Wall Street Journal article:

“Sanofi said it has told U.S. authorities about allegations of improper payments to health-care professionals in the Mideast and East Africa, joining a lineup of pharmaceutical companies that have faced similar claims. Among the allegations are that Sanofi employees made improper payments to doctors in Kenya and other East African nations, handing out perks based on whether the doctors prescribed or planned to prescribe Sanofi drugs, according to the firm and e-mails from a tipster The Wall Street Journal viewed. The French pharmaceutical company said it hired New York law firm Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP to look into the claims and the investigation is continuing. “At this stage, it is too early to draw conclusions,” a company spokesman said. “Sanofi takes these allegations seriously.”

[...]

“The Sanofi investigation began after the firm received a series of anonymous allegations that wrongdoing occurred between 2007 and 2012 in parts of the Middle East and East Africa, the company said. One allegation was that employees of subsidiary Sanofi Kenya bribed medical professionals, a claim made via emails sent to Sanofi senior management last October and in March and viewed by the Journal. Sanofi paid for influential medical professionals to attend conferences, many of which were abroad, and gave them cash and gifts at its own events to win business, the emails allege. Copies of letters the tipster said were sent to Sanofi Kenya by medical professionals, as well as what the emails describe as other Sanofi documents, which were also reviewed by the Journal, indicate that doctors would request money from Sanofi Kenya to attend conferences and events and that Sanofi employees would take into account the applicant’s value to Sanofi’s business before deciding whether to sponsor them or not.”

As highlighted in this August 2013 post, Sanofi’s conduct in China has also been under scrutiny.

GSK

As recently reported in this Reuters article:

“GlaxoSmithKline, which was slapped with a record $489 million fine for corruption in China last month, said on Tuesday it was looking into allegations of corruption in the United Arab Emirates. Britain’s biggest pharmaceuticals group confirmed the investigation following allegations of improper payments set out in a whistleblower’s email sent to its top management on Monday. The email, purporting to be from a GSK sales manager in the Gulf state, was seen by Reuters. The company is already investigating alleged bribery in a number of Middle East countries, including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, as well as Poland. ”As we have already said, we are undertaking an investigation into our operations in the Middle East following complaints made previously. This investigation continues and these specific claims were already being investigated as part of this process,” a GSK spokesman said.”

DynCorp

The Washington Times reports here

“State Department investigators uncovered evidence that agents working for one of the largest U.S. military contractors paid tens of thousands of dollars in bribes to Pakistani officials to obtain visas and weapons licenses, but records show the government closed the case without punishing DynCorp.

[...]

But investigators closed the case after deciding they couldn’t prove or disprove the company had the “requisite corrupt” intent required to prove a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which bars U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials.

“There was no evidence to support the allegations that DynCorp or its employees had specific knowledge of bribes paid Pakistani government officials,” an investigator wrote in a memo closing out the case last year.

Still, investigators concluded there were violations of the FCPA involving both Speed-Flo and Inter-Risk, both of which are based in Islamabad.”

AgustaWestland / Finmeccanica Related

As noted in this Wall Street Journal article:

“An Italian court found Giuseppe Orsi, the former chief executive of defense firm Finmeccanica, not guilty of international corruption, absolving him of the most serious charge he faced in connection with a 560-million-euro contract won in 2010 to supply the Indian government with 12 helicopters. The three judge panel found Mr. Orsi, 68, guilty of falsifying invoices and sentenced him for that crime to two years in prison, a penalty that was immediately suspended. “A nightmare is over for me and my family,” a visibly relieved Mr. Orsi told reporters after the judge had read the verdict. Italian prosecutors had argued that Mr. Orsi, who at the time of the alleged corruption was CEO of Finmeccanica unit AgustaWestland, directed a plan to pay tens of millions of dollars to Indian officials, including the former top officer in the Indian air force, to win the helicopter-supply competition. Mr. Orsi rose to become CEO of Finmeccanica in 2011 and resigned last year when the corruption charges surfaced. The court also absolved Bruno Spagnolini, who followed Mr. Orsi as CEO of AgustaWestland, of corruption while finding him guilty of falsifying invoices. In reading the verdict, the judge said that while prosecutors had proven that fake invoices had been issued, there was no corruption. Prosecutors had argued there was a direct connection between the false invoices and the payment of kickbacks.”

A Bushel

Matthew Fishbein (Debevoise & Plimpton) was awarded an FCPA Professor Apple Award for this this recent article titled “Why Aren’t Individuals Prosecuted for Conduct Companies Admit.”  Fishbein continues with his spot-on observations in this recent Corporate Crime Reporter Q&A.  For additional reading on the same topics see:

The Facade of FCPA Enforcement“ (2010)

My 2010 Senate FCPA testimony (“The lack of individual prosecutions in the most high-profile egregious instances of corporate bribery causes one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct was engaged in by ghosts. [...]  However, a reason no individuals have been charged in [most FCPA] enforcement actions may have more to do with the quality of the corporate enforcement action than any other factor. As previously described, given the prevalence of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context and the ease in which DOJ offers these alternative resolution vehicles to companies subject to an FCPA inquiry, companies agree to enter into such resolution vehicles regardless of the DOJ’s legal theories or the existence of valid and legitimate defenses. It is simply easier, more cost efficient, and more certain for a company … to agree to a NPA or DPA than it is to be criminally indicted and mount a valid legal defense – even if the DOJ’s theory of prosecution is questionable …”.

But Nobody Was Charged” (2011)

“DOJ Prosecution of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?” (2011) (2013) (2014)

Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM Enforcement Action” (2014).

Quotable

In this recent speech, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated:

“In fiscal year 2013, we brought more than 675 enforcement actions and obtained orders for $3.4 billion in total penalties and disgorgement.  We will soon be announcing the results for our 2014 fiscal year, which ended yesterday.  It was another very productive year as those numbers will show. But numbers only tell part of the story. The quality and breadth of actions are really the more meaningful measure of an effective enforcement program. (emphasis added).”

As to international cooperation, White stated:

“International cooperation is essential to the SEC’s enforcement program, and indeed, to all of our enforcement programs.  In today’s global marketplace, fraudulent schemes and other misconduct commonly have cross-border elements, and the need for seamless cooperation among us has never been greater.

The SEC’s investigations and enforcement actions often involve witnesses and evidence in different countries around the world.  And I know that the same is true in your investigations and enforcement cases.

Faced with this simple reality, if we are to continue to conduct these investigations successfully, and prosecute the offenses and wrongdoers to the fullest extent of our laws, broad and effective use of the MMoU, and our bilateral agreements, is more important than ever.

No one knows that better than the SEC.  Virtually every week, I meet with my fellow Commissioners to decide which cases to bring.  Rarely is there a week when one or more of the cases recommended by the enforcement staff does not involve critical international assistance.  In fact, in the last fiscal year, the SEC made more than 900 requests for international assistance and, as a result, we were able to obtain critical evidence that helped us prosecute wrongdoers for a vast array of serious offenses.

In one recent FCPA case, for example, the SEC obtained valuable evidence — bank and other corporate records — from German prosecutors. [HP] And, we received great support from regulators in Australia, Guernsey, Liechtenstein, Norway, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom in another major FCPA action. [Alcoa].”

From the Houston Chronicle, a Q&A with former Deputy Attorney General – and current FCPA practitioner – George Terwilliger.

Q: How will enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) hinder U.S. energy companies from doing business abroad?

A: Notwithstanding all the good things that are happening with energy upstream production in the United States, the real growth opportunities remain overseas. And a lot of them are in places that are ethically challenged at best in terms of their business and legal cultures. Two things cause problems for companies subject to U.S. law.

One, ambiguities are in the law itself. What is a foreign official? What organizations are covered as entities of foreign governments that are state-owned enterprises three times removed?

Then there’s the uncertainty of the parameters of enforcement policy. Why is this case prosecuted and that one isn’t? Why does this case settle for this much money and that one for that much money? There’s not a lot of transparency, and it’s not apparent to the people who work at this all the time exactly where those parameters are.

Q: Why is that a problem?

A: A company subject to U.S. law that is looking at an opportunity overseas looks at what the profitability model is and then they look at the risk inherent in doing business in that environment. The least little thing that comes up in that process — there’s a piece of real estate they want us to use as a staging area that’s owned by the brother-in-law of the cousin of the oil minister — and they look at it and go, “You know what? We’re not going to do that. It’s not worth the risk.”

Q: Are companies passing up business opportunities because of those risks?

A: Yes, that happens. Companies forgo economic opportunities because the uncertainties are perceived to be too great given the potential return on the investment. The objective of the law is to have a corruption-free level playing field. Most American business people I think believe that given a level playing field they can compete very well, particularly with foreign competitors. The problem is when that playing field is knocked out of kilter by the influence of corruption. Perhaps companies from other countries don’t operate under these constraints, then the playing field isn’t level anymore.

Q: What can mitigate those risks and balance the playing field for U.S. companies abroad?

A: For some time I have advocated some kind of corporate amnesty for companies that investigate themselves, fix their problems and disclose them to the government. If companies become aware of corrupt activity, I think given an incentive to report that they would do it. And that will help the government and help the objectives of this program rather than playing a kind of gotcha game.

Q: Are there any incentives now for companies to disclose potential violations?

A: The Securities Exchange Commission and the Justice Department have articulated policies that whatever the penalty should be for some wrongdoing, it will be less if you self-report, cooperate with an investigation and so forth. I don’t think that’s widely believed in the U.S. corporate community. And it’s almost impossible to measure. I have represented companies where we have made voluntary disclosures that have not been prosecuted. And the government has said the reason they are not prosecuting is because of internal investigation and cooperation. So I’m not saying it doesn’t happen. At the end of the day, companies wrestle with the question of, “Is it really worth it?” All the heartache that’s going to flow from a voluntary disclosure, particularly on something that may be marginal as a violation, is it worth what that’s going to cost? In terms of damage to reputation, shareholder issues, management issues with the board and so forth, is that going to be worth it in terms of what a company might get in terms of some forbearance of penalty?

Reading Stack

“It’s as if the FCPA Super Bowl just ended in a tie.”  (See here from Bracewell & Giuliani attorneys Glen Kopp and Kedar Bhatia regarding the Supreme Court recently declining to hear the “foreign official” challenge in U.S. v. Esquenazi).   

A legitimate concern or a bluff?  (See here from The Globe and Mail – “The head of Canadian engineering giant SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. says any move by authorities to charge the company in connection with an extensive bribery scandal would immediately threaten its future and could force it to close down.”).

An interesting video on Bloomberg’s “Market Matters” regarding the DOJ’s approach to prosecuting alleged corporate crime. The FCPA is not specifically discussed, although the issues discussed are FCPA relevant.

From the Economist “The Kings of the Courtroom:  How Prosecutors Came to Dominate the Criminal-Justice System.” (“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America,” said Robert Jackson, the attorney-general, in 1940. As the current attorney-general, Eric Holder, prepares to stand down, American prosecutors are more powerful than ever before. Several legal changes have empowered them. The first is the explosion of plea bargaining, where a suspect agrees to plead guilty to a lesser charge if the more serious charges against him are dropped. Plea bargains were unobtainable in the early years of American justice. But today more than 95% of cases end in such deals and thus are never brought to trial.”).

*****

A good weekend to all.

Voluntary Disclosures and the Role of FCPA Counsel

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Dyncorp International Inc. (“Dyncorp”), a provider of “specialized, mission critical professional and support services for the U.S. military, non-military U.S. governmental agencies and foreign governments” (according to its recent 10-Q filing) (see here) recently disclosed a potential FCPA issue.

Page 19 of its filing states:

“We have identified certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies that may raise compliance issues under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The payments, which we believe totaled approximately $300,000 in the aggregate, were made to sub-contractors in connection with servicing a single existing task order that the Company has with a U.S. government agency. We have retained outside counsel to investigate these payments. We are in the process of evaluating our internal policies and procedures and are committed to improving our compliance procedures. During the past week, we voluntarily brought these matters to the attention of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. We cannot predict the ultimate consequences of these matters at this time, nor can we reasonably estimate the potential liability, if any, related to these matters. However, based on the facts currently known, we do not believe that these matters will have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations or cash flow. We have not recorded any reserves with respect to this matter.” (emphasis added).

This disclosure, along with the more recent disclosure that Dyncorp’s Senior Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer and Executive Counsel was terminated (see here) has been covered by the Wall Street Journal (see here and here) and has been discussed elsewhere (see here).

I inject the following question/issue into the conversation (so to speak).

Why did Dyncorp voluntarily disclose to DOJ/SEC conduct that is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA? More broadly, what do such voluntary disclosures of potential FCPA issues say about the potential conflict of interests FCPA counsel has in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue.

First things first.

As readers of this blog likely know, many FCPA enforcement actions result from voluntary disclosures companies make to DOJ and (if an issuer) to SEC.

The reason?

There are some “carrots” out there.

First, “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (see here) (a.k.a. the former Thompson Memo which is now included in the US Attorney Manual) state that one of the factors a prosecutor should consider in deciding whether to criminally charge a company is the “value of cooperation” and the “corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its cooperation with the government’s investigation…” (see 9-28.700).

Second, Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (specifically s. 8C2.5(g)) (see here) will reduce an organization’s “culpability score” (which is key in calculating a company’s fine upon conviction as well as the company’s fine in a settlement) if: “the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct”

See (here) for what Assistant AG Breuer recently told an FCPA audience about voluntary disclosure.

A company deciding whether or not to voluntarily disclose to the government will thus have to weigh the risk of the government finding out about the conduct in the absence of the company’s voluntary disclosure (and thus likely assume the risk of a harsher fine/penalty) vs. voluntarily disclosing the conduct to the government, yet being able to take advantage of the above mentioned “carrots”.

In weighing these options in the face of evidence of an actual FCPA violation, companies often choose the voluntary disclosure route – although the merits of the voluntary disclosure route and how to assess the leniency are issues subject to debate.

The weighing of these options when confronted with evidence of an actual FCPA violation is one thing.

However, and as demonstrated by Dyncorp’s recent disclosure, companies often also voluntarily disclose conduct to DOJ/SEC that may only potentially violate the FCPA.

Perhaps the analysis is similar to that above; however, is there any other area of law where companies (and their counsel) race to Washington to tell the government not about an actual violation of law, but merely about a potential violation of law (save perhaps for the DOJ’s antitrust leniency program (see here) which nevertheless involves actual violations)?

Before addressing the issue of what potential conflict of interest FCPA counsel may have in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue (particularly where the disclosure merely involves a potential FCPA violation), a bit about why the conduct Dyncorp disclosed is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA.

I’ve written before (see here) about the Fifth Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) on the FCPA’s obtain or retain business element and how the court concluded that payments to customs officials to reduce customs duties and sales tax could fall within the FCPA, but that such conduct does not automatically constitute an FCPA violation. The Kay case is one of the few instances in which a court has rendered a substantive FCPA decision.

Post-Kay there has been an explosion in FCPA enforcement actions involving payments made to secure foreign government licenses, permits, and certifications or otherwise involving custom duties and the like. However, because these enforcement actions have not been contested, it remains an open question as to under what circumstances such payments can indeed satisfy the FCPA’s obtain or retain business element.

Dyncorp’s disclosure (“[w]e have identified certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies”) involves the type of payments at issue in Kay and one reason why the conduct Dyncorp disclosed is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA is the equivocal nature of the Kay decision (the only case law on this subject).

Here is the real head-scratcher though.

The Dyncorp payments were not made in order to obtain or retain business with any foreign government or foreign government entity, but rather assisted Dyncorp obtain or retain business with the U.S. government.

Has there ever been an FCPA enforcement action where the questionable payments were made to assist the payor in obtaining or retaining business with the U.S. government? To my knowledge no, and if anyone is aware of such an enforcement action please do let me know.

True, the DOJ’s “Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA” (see here) (the DOJ’s interpretation of the statute) notes “that the business to be obtained or retained does not need to be with a foreign government or foreign government instrumentality.”

However, as the Kay court noted, the payments still need to be in connection with foreign business (i.e. seemingly not business with the U.S. government).

The Kay court framed the issue as follows: “…how attenuated can the linkage be between the effect of that which is sought from the foreign official in consideration of a bribe (here, tax minimization) and the briber’s goal of finding assistance or obtaining or retaining foreign business with or for some person, and still satisfy the business nexus element of the FCPA?” (emphasis added).

Later in the opinion, the Kay court framed the issue as follows: “…the question whether the defendants’ alleged payments constitute a violation of the FCPA truly turns on whether these bribes were intended to lower ARI’s cost of doing business in Haiti enough to have a sufficient nexus to garnering business there or to maintaining or increasing business operations that ARI already had there, so as to come within the scope of the business nexus element as Congress used it in the FCPA.” (emphasis added).

In holding “that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage” (emphasis added), the Kay court still nevertheless focused on business in a foreign country (… “the FCPA’s legislative history instructs that Congress was concerned about both the kind of bribery that leads to discrete contractual arrangements and the kind that more generally helps a domestic payor obtain or retain business for some person in a foreign country…) (emphasis added).

The Kay court’s focus on foreign business is consistent with the FCPA’s extensive legislative history which also focuses on payments made to secure foreign business, not business with the U.S. government.

This provides another reason why Dyncorp’s disclosure of “certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies” in “connection with servicing a single existing task order that the Company has with a U.S. government agency” is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA.

So the question remains, why did Dyncorp disclose this conduct – conduct that could only potentially violate the FCPA?

This leads to the final issue/question – what potential conflict of interest does FCPA counsel have in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue (particularly where the disclosure only involves a potential FCPA violation)?

By raising this issue/asking this question, I am not accusing Dyncorp’s counsel of anything (I don’t even know which firm is representing Dyncorp). Rather, I ask this question in the context of the Dyncorp’s disclosure because it seems to present (for the above reasons) the perfect “case” in which to raise this lurking issue / ask this lurking question (even though the same question could legitimately be asked in connection with other corporate voluntary disclosures of conduct that could potentially violate the FCPA).

It truly is the “elephant in the [FCPA] room” in my estimation.

Here is the potential conflict of interest as I see it. FCPA counsel has every incentive (it would seem) to nudge a corporate client to make the disclosure.

Simply stated, no disclosure, the “case” (for all practical purposes) is over and thus no more billable hours.

Conversely, with the disclosure the “case” continues meaning more billable hours.

Often times if a voluntary disclosure is made the “case” continues for several more years as DOJ (and if applicable) SEC will demand a wide range of factual information and documents involving the conduct at issue.

Morever, often times the “case” gets expanded because a favorite question of the enforcement agencies is something along the following lines – “if Business Unit A was involved in this conduct in Country A, how do we know that Business Unit A was not also involved in this conduct in Country B, and, more broadly, how do we know that the Company (in general) was also not involved in this same conduct in Countries C,D, and E (all FCPA high-risk jurisdictions)?

Because cooperation with the government’s investigation is a prominent factor a prosecutor weighs in deciding whether to criminally charge a business entity under the above described “Principles of Prosecution”, a corporate client invariably (yet reluctantly) will accept FCPA’s counsel’s recommendation to broaden the “case” to demonstrate cooperation with the DOJ/SEC’s investigation.

Next thing the company knows, it is paying for a team of lawyers (accompanied by forensic accountants and other specialists) to travel around the world to answer DOJ/SEC’s questions even though the voluntary disclosure that got this whole process started involved conduct that may not actually violate the FCPA.

Because FCPA counsel’s “worldwide review” will often not be deemed credible unless it comes back to DOJ/SEC with at least something of concern or suspicion, FCPA counsel will often disclose several small, non-material, practically meaningless issues which also could potentially violate the FCPA.

DOJ/SEC, to demonstrate the thoroughness of its investigation, will often include these “tag-along” facts in the ultimate resolution documents (most often a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement).

Thus, disclosure often times leads to significantly more work, and more billable hours for FCPA counsel. Because FCPA counsel is able to demand premium billing for its services given the high-profile, sensitive nature of the issue, the disclosure decision is literally a several hundred thousand / multimillion dollar issue for FCPA counsel and could mean the difference between several more months / years of work and no additional work.

To be clear, I am not suggesting any actual conflict of interest by Dyncorp’s counsel (or any other FCPA counsel for that matter).

Rather, I am pointing out that a potential conflict of interest is present in FCPA counsel’s disclosure advice given the significant difference in billable hours hinging on the disclosure decision.

This potential conflict of interest is hardly ever discussed, and this is not surprising given that few “outside” of the FCPA bar (given the opaque nature in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved) even know how the disclosure and resolution process actually works to ask the question.

Here is another issue that is hardly ever discussed.

The same enforcement officials who often encourage the voluntary disclosure route, and speak of the credit that will be given to a company when it voluntarily discloses, are the same individuals who often rotate in and out of government service and the FCPA bar. Again, I am not suggesting any actual conflict of interests by these individuals.

However, these potential conflict of interest issues (i.e. the “elephants in the [FCPA] room”) should not be shoved aside in analyzing why there are so many FCPA voluntary disclosures (including of conduct that may only potentially violate the statute) and why FCPA enforcement is indeed the unique creature that it is.