Archive for the ‘Double Standard’ Category

As Foreign Scrutiny Grows, Dollars Continue To Flow In The U.S.

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2014

This 2012 post highlighted the origins and prominence of an enforcement theory in this new era of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement.

The enforcement theory is that employees (such as physicians, nurses, mid-wives, lab personnel, etc.) of various foreign health care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  The prior post detailed eleven corporate enforcement actions in which the enforcement theory was used, in whole or in part, and since then four additional corporate enforcement actions (Stryker, Philips Electronics, Tyco and Eli Lilly) have been based, in whole or in part, on the same enforcement theory.  Perhaps telling, the DOJ has never charged an individual based on this FCPA enforcement theory.

In most of the corporate enforcement actions based on the enforcement theory, the “things of value” provided to the alleged “foreign officials” have included consulting opportunities and services contracts and payment of travel and entertainment expenses such as  wine, speciality foods, visits to bath houses, card games, karaoke bars, door prizes, spa treatments and cigarettes.

The enforcement theory continues to be the reason certain companies are under FCPA scrutiny as evidenced by the on-going FCPA scrutiny of GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi to name just a few (see here).

Yet as this foreign scrutiny of pharmaceutical and other healthcare related companies continues, the dollars continue to flow in the United States.

Recently, the Wall Street Journal ran articles here (“Doctors Net Billions From Drug Firms”) and here (“Payments Reveal Range of Doctors’ Ties With Industry”) based on information from “a new federal government transparency initiative mandated in the 2010 Affordable Care Act which required manufacturers of drugs and medical devices to disclose the payments they make to physicians and teaching hospitals every year.

In the words of the Wall Street Journal:

“The payments and so-called transfers of value to an estimated 546,000 doctors and 1,360 teaching hospitals include such items as free meals that company sales representatives bring to physicians’ offices, fees paid to doctors to speak about a company’s drug to other doctors at restaurants, and compensation for clinical trial research and consulting fees. Some doctors earned tens of thousands of dollars annual from drug companies by flying to various cities to give paid speeches, while some surgeons received even larger amounts from medical device makers, partly from royalties on products they helped develop.”

In short, many of the “things of value” are similar to those alleged in FCPA enforcement actions involving foreign physicians and other healthcare personnel.

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that in the United States approximately 20% of hospitals are owned by state or local governments (see here). In addition, approximately 150 more medical centers are run by the Veterans Health Administration (see here).

Presumably then, a healthy percentage of the “things of value” are going to U.S. officials – at least so long as one applies the FCPA enforcement theory to the U.S. context.

Yet, one should not hold their breath waiting for enforcement actions under 18 U.S.C 201, the U.S. domestic bribery statute with very similar elements to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  Nor should one hold their breath as to any books and records or internal controls enforcement actions regarding such payments by issuer companies.

But the question is why?

Assuming that foreign physicians and healthcare personnel are indeed “foreign officials” under the FCPA, why should corporate interaction with a “foreign official” be subject to greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than corporate interaction with a U.S. official?  Why do we reflexively label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value” from private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind eye when it happens here at home?

For numerous other prior posts on the “double standard,” see this tag.

Look In The Mirror Moments?

Thursday, October 16th, 2014

Looking in the MirrorFor some time, I have used the picture to the left in various public presentations when discussing certain public policy aspects of this new era of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement.

Two developments related to China caused me to ponder the picture once again.

The first concerns a letter recently sent by U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew to Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang. The second concerns the general thrust of much “western” commentary concerning China’s recent enforcement action against GlaxoSmithKline.

Lew Letter

As highlighted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, Treasury Secretary Lew “warned his Chinese counterpart in a recent letter that a spate of antimonopoly investigations against foreign companies could have serious implications for relations between the two countries.”  As noted in the article, “the warning comes after international business lobbies have raised complaints over a string of monopoly and pricing probes that they say unfairly focus on foreign companies.”

Predictably, China reportedly responded to the letter and concerns by stating – as noted in the article – that foreign and domestic Chinese companies are treated equally, that foreign companies are “welcome to hire the most famous lawyers in the world” to dispute Chinese allegations, and that if foreign companies disagree with Chinese law enforcement interpretations any company is free to “take the discrepancies to court.”

Although outside the FCPA context, the trading of barbs between the U.S. and China has FCPA parallels as concerns have been raised about U.S. enforcement of the FCPA against foreign companies and similar “see you in court” type statements have been made by the DOJ in response.

It is a fact that the clear majority of the largest FCPA enforcement actions of all-time (based on settlement amounts) are against foreign companies.

It is also a fact that many of these enforcement actions have been based on spare jurisdictional allegations.  For instance and as highlighted in this prior post, the 2013 FCPA enforcement action against Total (the $398 million settlement amount was the third largest in FCPA history) was based on the following salient points:

  • The enforcement action was against a French oil and gas company for making improper payments to an Iranian Official through use of an employee of a Swiss private bank and a British Virgin Islands company.
  • The vast majority of the alleged improper conduct took place between 1995 and 1997 (that is 16 to 18 years ago prior to the enforcement action).
  • The sole U.S. jurisdictional nexus (a required legal element for an anti-bribery violation since Total is a foreign issuer) is a 1995 wire transfer of $500,000 (representing less than 1% of the alleged bribe payments at issue) from a New York based account.

Expansive FCPA enforcement theories against foreign actors made its way into the Senate’s 2010 FCPA hearing when Senator Christopher Coons stated:  ”Today we the only nation that is extending extraterritorial reach and going after the citizens of other countries, we may someday find ourselves on the receiving end of such transnational actions.”

As a matter of law, Senator Coon’s statement was technically inaccurate, there is no extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign actors under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, but the expansive jurisdictional theories are what I have called “de facto extraterritoriality.”

In any event, the concluding point is this:  aggressive enforcement of domestic laws against foreign companies raise various policy issues and can lead to “lawfare.”  At the very least, when the tables are turned it ought to cause U.S. law enforcement agencies and policy makers to look in the mirror because Secretary Lew’s recent warning letter may be viewed by some as the “pot calling the kettle black.”

China GSK Enforcement Action

As previously highlighted here, in September GSK announced that it had agreed to pay approximately $490 million to resolve a Chinese law enforcement investigation after a Chinese court ruled “that GSK China Investment Co. Ltd (GSKCI) has, according to Chinese law, offered money or property to non-government personnel in order to obtain improper commercial gains, and been found guilty of bribing non-government personnel.”

The general thrust of certain “western” reporting of the China action was critical in various respects as highlighted below.

  • “an opaque justice system ultimately controlled by the Communist Party” (here)
  • “after a one day closed hearing” (here)
  • “The bribery conviction of a GSK unit took all of one day in Chinese court” “Unlike the U.S. Department of Justice, which often allows the companies accused of bribery to spend years conducting their own internal investigations–often followed with non-prosecution agreements–these convictions came just 15 months after Chinese officials began their investigation.”  ”Chinese authorities moved very quickly to assess significant penalties in a forum that provided very little transparency”  (here)
  • “Many of us had wondered when the GSK investigation in China would end and we all found about the trial when it was announced in the newspapers last week. It certainly showed that the quality of justice in China is quite different than in the west. While it is not entirely clear how long the trial lasted, it appeared that it was [a one-day trial] …” (here)

Without in any way trying to comprehensively compare the overall U.S. legal system to the overall Chinese legal system, the following attributes of FCPA enforcement must at least be acknowledged.

The vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions lack transparency and the resolution documents (whether a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or civil administrative order) are the result of an opaque process ultimately controlled by the same office prosecuting or bringing the action.

As to the swiftness of FCPA enforcement actions, one can only assume that the majority of general counsels and board of directors of companies under FCPA scrutiny would be jumping for joy if the scrutiny – from start to finish – would resolve itself in 15 months rather than the typical 3-5 years (and in some instances more) of FCPA scrutiny lingering.

The concluding point is this:  before criticizing how other countries are enforcing their anti-corruption laws (something the U.S. government has been pleading for other countries to do for years), we should at least look in the mirror regarding various aspects of FCPA enforcement.

The White House Omits Several Facts And Other Information From Its “Fact Sheet”

Tuesday, September 30th, 2014

The White House recently released this “Fact Sheet: The U.S. Global Anticorruption Agenda.”

It is an informative read as it sets forth in one document the policy views of the White House on bribery and corruption topics.

The fact sheet also highlights that FCPA enforcement is merely one prong of the U.S. government’s multi-dimensional approach to fighting bribery and corruption.  Other prongs mentioned include asset recovery, denial of visas, money laundering, curtailing the use of shell companies, increasing transparency in certain industries, and other open government initiatives.

As to the FCPA specifically, the White House Fact Sheet states:

“The United States has been a global leader on anticorruption efforts since enacting the first foreign bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in 1977.  [...]  The United States continues to apply the FCPA to prosecute those who pay bribes to foreign officials to obtain business benefits.  Since 2009, the United States has resolved criminal cases against more than 50 corporations worldwide with penalties of approximately $3 billion, and it has convicted more than 50 individuals, including CEOs, CFOs, and other high-level corporate executives, for FCPA and FCPA-related crimes.”

However, and consistent with prior examples of political actors or advocates describing FCPA enforcement – see here and here for instance), the White House “fact” sheet omits several salient facts or other relevant information concerning FCPA enforcement and/or the general fight against bribery and corruption.

Such as:

Since 2008 approximately 80% of DOJ/SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions have not resulted in any related charges against company employees.  In other words, the U.S. government’s FCPA enforcement efforts are, to a large extent, corporate only and not achieving, as even the enforcement agencies recognize, maximum deterrence as only individual enforcement can achieve.

The U.S. government has an overall losing record – including during this so-called new era of FCPA enforcement – when put to its ultimate burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions.  In other words, the White House is emphasizing the quantity of FCPA enforcement over the quality of FCPA enforcement.  However, in a legal system based on the rule of law, quality of enforcement should take priority over quantity.

The U.S. government largely enforces the FCPA through non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and other vehicles (such as with increasing frequency SEC administrative settlements) not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.  These resolution vehicles – in the minds of many – are inconsistent with rule of law principles such as limited government authority, a system of checks and balances, and transparency in law enforcement.

The U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths or double standards.  For instance, the U.S. government offers bags of cash to influence foreign leaders.  For instance, some of the most egregious FCPA violators, per the U.S. government’s own allegations, have involved U.S. government contractors or suppliers including of goods and services critical to national security, and because of this, those companies were not even charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations.  For instance, a notable example of FCPA enforcement (the Giffen case) ended with a whimper after the defendant asserted that the alleged bribery occurred with the knowledge and support of the highest levels of the U.S. government.  For instance, the general fight against bribery and corruption suffers from a double standard in that corporate interaction with “foreign officials” under the FCPA is judged by different standards than corporate interaction with U.S. officials under other U.S. laws.

In sum, the recent White House document is an informative read and to be sure the U.S. government does deserve credit for advancing certain of the policy objectives and initiatives described in the document.

However, the purpose of this post was to provide additional data points and information concerning the topics discussed in the recent White House document.

Attorney General Holder – “The Buck Needs to Stop Somewhere” – But Does It Stop With Him?

Tuesday, September 23rd, 2014

Buck Stops HereLast week U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder delivered this speech at New York University School of Law.  While focusing on financial fraud issues, the speech also touched upon several issues of general interest such as Holder’s statement that “the buck needs to stop somewhere where corporate misconduct is concerned.”  (emphasis in original).  Holder spoke of corporate structures that “blur lines of authority and prevent responsibility for individual business decisions from residing with a single person.”  Holder also highlighted that:

“[A]t some institutions that engaged in inappropriate conduct before, and may yet again, the buck still stops nowhere.  Responsibility remains so diffuse, and top executives so insulated, that any misconduct could again be considered more a symptom of the institution’s culture than a result of the willful actions of single individual.”

Recognizing that there are obvious differences between a government department and a business organization, the fact remains there are many similarities between the two when it comes to internal behavior, diffusion of responsibility and insulation of top leadership.

For instance and to borrow corporate analogies, Attorney General Holder is the CEO of DOJ Inc. and even the DOJ describes itself as the “world’s largest law office, employing more than 10,000 attorneys nationwide.”  That employee headcount (obviously the DOJ also employs non-attorneys as well) is rather small compared to a typical corporation doing business in the global marketplace through employees and hundreds, if not thousands, of third parties.

Returning to an issue previously highlighted here and here, if the DOJ was a business organization and subject to the same legal principles its uses to prosecute business organizations, the DOJ would constantly be under scrutiny and the subject of numerous enforcement actions.

Why?

Because as highlighted in this recent report by the Project on Government Oversight (“POGO”) titled “Hundreds of Justice Department Attorneys Violated Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical Standards:”

“An internal affairs office at the Justice Department has found that, over the last decade, hundreds of federal prosecutors and other Justice employees violated rules, laws, or ethical standards governing their work.”

[...]

“From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2013, the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) documented more than 650 infractions … In the majority of the matters – more than 400 – OPR categorized the violations as being at the more severe end of the scale:  recklessness or intentional misconduct, as distinct from error or poor judgment.”

Although not specifically discussed in the POGO report, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions have seen instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  For instance, as highlighted in this post, in the DOJ’s enforcement action against Lindsey Manufacturing and two of its executives, the judge in dismissing the case, stated that the instances of misconduct were “so varied, and occurr[ed] over so lengthy a period … that they add up to an unusual and extreme picture of a prosecution gone badly awry.” In the failed Africa Sting case, the judge in dismissing the cases, stated that certain of the DOJ’s conduct had “no place in a federal courtroom.”  (See here).

The DOJ’s Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations state, among the factors prosecutors should consider in deciding whether – and how – to charge a business organization as follows.

“Among the factors prosecutors should consider and weigh are whether the corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers, once those employees are identified by the corporation as culpable for the misconduct.”

Against this backdrop, the POGO report stated that several “examples of misconduct” within the DOJ often result in lenient sanctions such as a 10, 14 or 30 day suspensions.  Moreover, if I am not mistaken, certain of the DOJ prosecutors in the above FCPA enforcement actions – far from being disciplined – were promoted after their conduct was called into question by the federal judiciary.

The policy question needs to be asked: as a matter of principle should not the prosecutor / regulator and the prosecuted / regulated be held to the same general standards?

As a matter of principle and borrowing Holder’s policy pronouncements, should not the buck somewhere in the DOJ when improper conduct occurs within its ranks?  Is responsibility so diffuse in the DOJ that top leaders are insulated from accountability?

As noted in the POGO report, “high-level DOJ officials have said in the past that given the context – tens of thousands of its attorneys working on tens of thousands of cases each year – the amount of misconduct is small.”  (See here).

Could not the same be said of a typical business organization doing business in the global marketplace?  After all, dig into the details of many corporate FCPA enforcement actions and you will quickly learn that the conduct at issue was engaged in by a “small fraction” of the company’s global workforce to borrow the phrase the DOJ used in the HP enforcement action.

To be clear, the point of this post is not to call (as some actually have) for Holder’s resignation or to insist that Holder ought to be personally responsible, legally or ethically, for the improper conduct that has taken place in the DOJ under his leadership.

Rather, the point of this post is to highlight from a policy perspective the similarities between the DOJ and a business organization when it comes to compliance, internal behavior, diffusion of responsibility and insulation of top leadership.

These similarities ought to make top government enforcement officials less confident and less sweeping in their policy statements and simplistic views of legal and ethical culpability.  And if not, the similarities should at least cause top government enforcement officials to recognize that the same statements and views can be appropriately used to shine a light on the organizations they are tasked with running.

*****

For additional views of Holder’s recent speech, see here from Debevoise & Plimpton and here from Professor Peter Henning at his White Collar Crime Watch column in the New York Times.

Friday Roundup

Friday, September 12th, 2014

The problem with NPAs and DPAs, how does your product go to market in China, media coverage in China, victory, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

The Problem With NPAs and DPAs

I’ve long called for the abolition of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context as part of a two-pronged reform approach (see here among other posts).  As highlighted here among other posts, NPAs and DPAs are problematic across a wide spectrum and the agreements often contain meaningless or senseless language.

This recent Wall Street Journal Law Blog post titled “5 Things Companies Agree to But Can’t Deliver On in DPAs” is a worthy read. It begins:

“FCPA lawyers have a love-hate relationship with deferred-prosecution agreements,” said Laurence Urgenson, a partner at Mayer Brown. “We need them to get around the collateral consequences of prosecutions…but there is language in the agreements that drives us crazy.” Mr. Urgenson said the agreements originated with settlements prosecutors would reach with individuals, often children, placing certain requirements on them as a condition for the charges eventually being dropped. But many of those requirements make no sense in a settlement with a company; Mr. Urgenson picked out some of his favorites.”

How Does Your Product Go To Market In China?

Returning to issues discussed in this 2011 post and this 2011 post, this recent article in Food Navigator – Asia (not my typical source of FCPA material) states as follows concerning practices in China:

“One currently emerging trend is how companies are apparently becoming more comfortable to talk openly about measures they are taking to avoid gaining approvals and still move their products to market.  Indeed, four companies outlined to us the agreements they had made with Chinese distributors to deliver their products to locations near to China and then leave the local partners to navigate their movement into the People’s Republic.  Most likely, this would be done in cahoots with ministry officials in deals that would involve sweeteners and other transactions.  ’Once we’ve delivered the product, it isn’t our problem what our partner decides to do with it,’ an executive at a U.S.-based multinational told us in Hong Kong.  ’It’s not the cost of approvals that concerns us, it’s the time,” a mid-market manufacturer, also from the U.S., told us.  ”It is important for us that we hit China right now.’  Not all the companies we talked to about this were from America, but the fact that two were was surprising.  This is not least because business practices there are governed by the FCPA …  [...]  What is surprising to us is not the fact that these practices exist at all, it is how U.S. businesses in particular have now become comfortable enough to openly brief the press about their part in this trend.”

That makes two of us that are surprised!

Media Coverage in China

This prior 2012 post titled “All the News That Fit? To Print” highlighted the practice of paying journalists for media coverage in China.  Related to the general issue is this recent New York Times article which describes how “journalists who worked for a business news website under investigation in Shanghai have described a scheme of extorting Chinese companies, which were pressed to pay in return for the production of flattering articles or the burying of damaging ones.”

Victory

In this prior post I exposed how the DOJ and SEC literally re-wrote the FCPA statute in the November 2012 issued FCPA Guidance. The post highlighted the difference – even a first year law student would be expected to see – between what the FCPA actually says and the version of the FCPA in the Guidance.

Set forth below is the text of the FCPA regarding the “obtain or retain business” element.

   ”anything of value to

         any foreign official for purposes of

(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,

         in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;

Set forth below is how the text of the FCPA was [originally] portrayed in the FCPA Guidance.

   “anything of value to

         any foreign official for purposes of

(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or

(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;

Recently, I received an interesting e-mail from a reader who was confused by my prior post because the FCPA Guidance does not portray the FCPA as suggested in my original post.  The reader was right!  That’s because the DOJ/SEC changed the version of the FCPA originally set forth in the Guidance to its proper form.  To prove that the original FCPA Guidance literally re-wrote the FCPA, here is the version of the FCPA that originally appeared in the FCPA Guidance which relevant portions highlighted.

Subtle yes, but sometimes victory occurs in the shadows.

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

HP Russia

Related to the April 2014 DOJ enforcement action against HP related entities (see here for the prior post), the DOJ announced yesterday that HP Russia formally pleaded guilty.

As stated in the DOJ release

“In a brazen violation of the FCPA, Hewlett Packard’s Russia subsidiary used millions of dollars in bribes from a secret slush fund to secure a lucrative government contract,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Marshall Miller.  “Even more troubling was that the government contract up for sale was with Russia’s top prosecutor’s office.   Tech companies, like all companies, must compete on a level playing field, not resort to secret books and sham transactions to hide millions of dollars in bribes.  The Criminal Division has been at the forefront of this fight because when corruption takes hold overseas, American companies and the rule of law are harmed.  Today’s conviction and sentencing are important steps in our ongoing efforts to hold accountable those who corrupt the international marketplace.”

“Today’s conviction and sentence of HP Russia demonstrates that the United States Attorney’s Office is dedicated to aggressively prosecuting all forms of corporate fraud that touch our district, wherever they may occur,” said U.S. Attorney Melinda Haag.  “HP’s cooperation during the investigation is what we expect of major corporate leaders facing the challenges of doing business around the world.”

“For more than a decade HP Russia business executives participated in an elaborate scheme that involved paying bribes to government officials in exchange for large contracts,” said Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office Andrew McCabe. “There is no place for bribery in any business model or corporate culture.  Along with the Department of Justice, the IRS and international law enforcement partners, the FBI is committed to investigating corrupt backroom deals that threaten our global commerce.”

Image Sensing Systems

Earlier this week, the company issued the following release:

“Image Sensing Systems, Inc. today announced that the DOJ has closed its inquiry into the Company in connection with the previously disclosed investigation of potential violations of the FCPA citing the Company’s voluntary disclosure, thorough investigation, cooperation and voluntary enhancements to its compliance program.  The SEC earlier notified the Company that it had closed its investigation under the FCPA without recommending enforcement action. Kris Tufto, Image Sensing Systems chief executive officer, commented, “We are very pleased to conclude the DOJ and SEC investigations without further action.  From the very beginning, we have voluntarily cooperated with the authorities and have worked diligently to implement measures to enhance our internal controls and compliance efforts. We understand that those efforts have been recognized and that the resolution of the investigation reflects this cooperation.”  As previously reported by Image Sensing Systems, it had learned in early 2013 that Polish authorities were conducting an investigation into alleged violations of Polish law by two employees of Image Sensing Systems Europe Limited SP.Z.O.O., its Polish subsidiary, who had been charged with criminal violations of certain laws related to a project in Poland. A special subcommittee of the audit committee of the board of directors immediately engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation.  Image Sensing Systems voluntarily disclosed the matter to the DOJ and the SEC, and it has cooperated fully with those agencies in connection with their review.”

Alstom

Regarding the previously announced U.K. criminal charges against Alstom (see here for the prior post), the U.K. Serious Fraud Office recently released this charge sheet detailing the charges in connection with alleged conduct in India, Poland and Tunisia.

Reading Stack

A very interesting read from the New York TimesForeign Powers By Influence at Think Tanks.”  The article begins as follows.

“More than a dozen prominent Washington research groups have received tens of millions of dollars from foreign governments in recent years while pushing United States government officials to adopt policies that often reflect the donors’ priorities, an investigation by The New York Times has found. The money is increasingly transforming the once-staid think-tank world into a muscular arm of foreign governments’ lobbying in Washington.”

Forbes asks – is it “silly season” in China?  What is perhaps silly is the advice highlighted in the article to negotiate the regulatory minefield:

“[B]uild a network. ‘Involve some powerful local Chinese partners in some peripheral areas in order to build a political foundation. I don’t necessarily recommend an overall partnership, since they would be better off with a well-placed approach in specific areas. Have a partnership in marketing or R&D and develop a perception that you are working closely with Chinese firms, but in reality you will not give away anything that is sensitive.”

This is probably only going to increase a company’s risk because of the FCPA’s third-party payment provisions.

*****

A good weekend to all.