Archive for the ‘DOJ Enforcement Action’ Category

DOJ Individual Actions: The Strange Public – Private Divide

Thursday, January 14th, 2016

SurpriseThis recent post highlighted certain facts and figures regarding the DOJ’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2015 and historically.

As highlighted in the prior post, DOJ FCPA individual enforcement actions are significantly skewed by a small handful of enforcement actions and the reality is, despite the DOJ’s rhetoric, that 72% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

Another very interesting and significant picture emerges when analyzing DOJ individual FCPA prosecutions based on whether the individual charged was employed by or otherwise associated with a publicly traded corporation or a private business organization.

Of the 107 individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008, 82 of the individuals (77%) were employees or otherwise affiliated with private business organizations.  This is a striking statistic given that 53 of the 69 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 (79%) were against publicly traded corporations.

In the 16 private business organization DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, individuals were charged in connection with 9 of those actions (56%).  In contrast, in the 53 publicly traded corporation DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, individuals were charged in connection with 10 of those cases (19%). Indeed, since 2012 there have been only three instances of an individual associated with a publicly traded company being criminally charged with FCPA violations (Garth Peterson, Alain Riedo and Vicente Garcia).

In short, a DOJ FCPA enforcement against a private business organization is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a DOJ FCPA enforcement action against a publicly traded corporation.

The below information highlights all individuals criminally charged with FCPA violations since 2008 and whether they were associated with a publicly traded company or private business organization.

Individuals Charged With FCPA Criminal Offenses Since 2008 (Employer / Affiliation)

Bold = employed or affiliated with a private business entity

Gerald Green, Patricia Green (owners / operators of several private companies)

Martin Eric Self (employees of Pacific Consolidated Industries LP – a private business entity)

Shu Quan Sheng (owner of AMAC International Inc., but acting on behalf of French Company A – a publicly traded corporation)

Misao Hioki (employee of Bridgestone Corporation – a publicly traded corporation)

Nam Nguyen, Joseph Lukas, Kim Nguyen, An Nguyen (employees / agents of Nexus Technologies – a private business entity)

James Tillery and Paul Novak (employee / agent of Willbros Group)

Albert Jack Stanley, Jeffrey Tesler, Wojciech Chodan (employees / agents of KBR Inc., – a publicly traded corporation and/or other publicly traded corporations)

Richard Morlock, Stuart Carson, Hong Carson, Paul Cosgrove, David Edmonds, Flavio Ricotti, Han Yong Kim, Mario Covino (employees of Control Components Inc. – a private business entity)

Ousama Naaman (agent of Innospec – a publicly traded corporation)

John Jospeh O’Shea, Fernando Maya Basurto (employee / agent of ABB Ltd. – a publicly traded corporation)

Charles Paul Edward Jumet, John Warwick (employees of Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation – a private business entity)

Jorge Granados, Manuel Caceres, Juan Pablo Vasquez, Manuel Salvoch (employees of Latin Node Inc. – a private business entity)

Juan Diaz, Antonio Perez, Joel Esquenazi, Carlos Rodriguez, Marguerite Grandison, Jean Fourcand, Washington Vasconez Cruz, Amadeus Richers, Cecilia Zurita (employees / agents of Terra Telecommunications Corp., Telecom Consulting Services Corp., JD Locator Services, Inc. or Cinergy Telecommunications – all private business entities)

Enrique Faustino Aguilar, Angela Maria Gomez Aguilar, Keith Lindsey, Steve Lee (employees / agents of Lindsey Manufacturing Corp. – a private business entity)

Richard Bistrong (employee of Armor Holdings Inc. – a publicly traded corporation)

Jonathan Spiller John Mushriqui, Jeanna Mushriqui, David Painter, Lee Wares, Pankesh Patel, Ofer Paz, Israel Weisler, Michael Sacks, John Benson Wier, Haim Geri, Yochanan Choan, Saul Mishkin, R. Patrick Caldwell, Stephen Giordanella, Andrew Bigelow, Helmie Ashiblie, Daniel Alvirez, Lee Allen Tolleson, John Gregory Godsey (all employees of private business entities), Mark Morales (employee of Allied Defense Group – a publicly traded corporation), Amaro Goncalves (employee of Smith & Wesson – a publicly traded corporation)

Bobby Elkin (employee of Alliance One International – a publicly traded corporation)

Uriel Sharef, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer, Eberhard Reichert, Carlos Sergi and Miguel Czysch (employees / agents of Siemens – a publicly traded corporation)

Garth Peterson (employee of Morgan Stanley, a publicly traded corporation

Peter DuBois, Neah Uhl, Bernd Kowalewski, Jald Jenson (associated with BizJet Int’l – a private business entity)

William Pomponi, Lawrence Hoskins, David Rotschild, Frederic Pierucci (associated with Alstom Power – a private business entity [note the individuals were charged under the dd-2 prong of the FCPA even though Alstom (the parent company) was a publicly traded company]

Joseph Sigelman, Knut Hammarskjold, Gregory Weisman (associated with Petro Tiger Ltd – a private business entity)

Dmitry Firtash, Andras Knopp, Suren Gevorgyan, Gajendra Lal, Periyasamy Sunderalingam (associated with DF Group – a private business entity)

Benito Chinea, Joseph DeMeneses, Tomas Clark, Alejandro Hurtardo, Ernesto Lujana (associated with Direct Access Partners – a private business entity)

Alain Riedo (associated with Maxwell Technologies – a publicly traded corporation)

Dmitrij Harder (associated with Chestnut Consulting Group – a private business entity)

James Rama (associated with IAP Worldwide – a private business entity)

Richard Hirsch, James McClung (associated with Louis Berger Int’l – a private business entity)

Vicente Garcia (associated with SAP – a publicly traded corporation)

Daren Condrey (associated with Transport Logistics International – a private business entity)

Roberto Rincon, Abraham Shiera (associated with private business entities)

A Focus On DOJ Individual Actions

Tuesday, January 12th, 2016

Criminal LawYesterday’s post focused on SEC individual FCPA actions and this post highlights certain facts and figures concerning the DOJ’s prosecution of individuals for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act offenses in 2015 and historically.

As highlighted numerous times on FCPA Professor over the past several years, the DOJ frequently talks about the importance of individual FCPA prosecutions. Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell has stated that “certainly…there has been an increased emphasis on, let’s get some individuals” and that it is “very important for [the DOJ] to hold accountable individuals who engage in criminal misconduct in white-collar (cases), as we do in every other kind of crime.”

DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Patrick Stokes has said that the DOJ is “very focused” on prosecuting individuals as well as companies and that “going after one or the other is not sufficient for deterrence purposes.”

Most recently, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sung-Hee Suh stated:

“[T]he prosecution of individuals for corporate wrongdoing has been and continues to be a high priority for the Criminal Division and for the Justice Department as a whole.”

Against this backdrop, what do the facts actually show?

Since 2000, the DOJ has charged 141 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.  The breakdown is as follows.

  • 2000 – 0 individuals
  • 2001 – 8 individuals
  • 2002 – 4 individuals
  • 2003 – 4 individuals
  • 2004 – 2 individuals
  • 2005 – 3 individuals
  • 2006 – 6 individuals
  • 2007 – 7 individuals
  • 2008 – 14 individuals
  • 2009 – 18 individuals
  • 2010 – 33 individuals (including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
  • 2011 – 10 individuals
  • 2012 – 2 individuals
  • 2013 – 12 individuals
  • 2014 – 10 individuals
  • 2015 – 8 individuals

An analysis of the numbers reveals some interesting points.

Most of the individuals – 107 (or 76%) were charged since 2008.  Thus, on one level the DOJ is correct when it states that there has been an “increased emphasis” on individual prosecutions – at least as measured against the historical average given that between 1978 and 1999, the DOJ charged 38 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.

Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 and 1999, the DOJ’s statements about its focus on individuals represents hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.

Of the 107 individuals criminally charged with FCPA offenses by the DOJ since 2008:

  • 22 individuals were in the failed (and manufactured) Africa Sting case;
  • 9 individuals (minus the “foreign officials” charged) were in the Haiti Teleco case;
  • 8 individuals were in connection with the Control Components case;
  • 8 individuals were in connection with the Siemens case;
  • 5 individuals were associated with DF Group in the Indian mining licenses case;
  • 5 individuals were associated with Direct Access Partners;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Lindsey Manufacturing case;
  • 4 individuals were  in connection with the LatinNode / Hondutel case;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Nexus Technologies case;
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the BizJet case; and
  • 4 individuals were in connection with the Alstom case.

In other words, 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just six cases and 72% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just eleven cases.  This was previously highlighted as the clustering phenomenon of DOJ individual FCPA actions.

Considering that there has been 69 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather remarkable statistic.  Of the 69 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions, 50 (or 72%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

Compare this figure to FCPA enforcement prior to 2004.

As highlighted in this prior post, from 1977 to 2004 approximately 90% of DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions RESULTED in related charges against company employees.

Why the change?

Read the recent article “Measuring the Impact of NPAs and DPAs on FCPA Enforcement” in which a hypothesis is tested as well as to see comprehensive charts detailing every DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement and whether the action also resulted in related charges against company employees.

In short, and as demonstrated by the statistics, DOJ FCPA individual enforcement actions are significantly skewed by a small handful of enforcement actions and the reality is that 72% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

Further Details Regarding The DOJ’s Recent Individual FCPA Enforcement Action In Connection With PDVSA Procurement

Tuesday, December 29th, 2015

PDVSAThis previous post briefly mentioned the DOJ’s recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Roberto Rincon and Abraham Shiera for alleged improper business practices with officials at Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s alleged state-owned and state-controlled oil company.

This post goes in-depth regarding this recently unsealed criminal indictment.

In the indictment, Rincon is described as a U.S. lawful permanent resident and a resident of Texas who controlled, together with others, a number of closely held companies, including several U.S. companies, that he used to secure contracts with PDVSA.

Shiera is described as a Venezuelan national who resided in Florida who controlled, together with others, a number of closely held companies, including several U.S. companies, that he used to secure contracts with PDVSA.

Both Rincon and Shiera, along with their respective unnamed Texas or Florida-based companies, are alleged to be “domestic concerns.”

The “foreign officials” are described as follows.

Official A – employed by PDVSA, including as a buyer at PDVSA and a supervisor of other PDVSA buyers. Official A’s job responsibilities including assigning bidding panels to PDVSA buyers, including Official C and Official D, who would then be responsible for selecting companies for the bidding panels, which allowed those companies to submit bids on individual PDVSA projects.

Officials B – employed by PDVSA, including as a purchase analyst for PDVSA. Official B’s job responsibilities included selecting companies for bidding panels, which allowed those companies to submit bids on individual PDVSA projects.

Official C – employed by PDVSA, including as a purchasing manager and superintendent of purchasing at PDVSA. Official C’s job responsibilities included selecting companies for bidding panels, which allowed those companies to submit bids on individual PDVSA projects, and selecting which companies would win the economic portion of the bid process.

Official D – employed by PDVSA, including as a buyer for PDVSA. Official D’s job responsibilities included selecting companies for bidding panels, which allowed those companies to submit bids on individual PDVSA projects.

Official E – employed by PDVSA, including as a purchasing manager.  Official E’s job responsibilities included selecting companies for bidding panels, which allowed those companies to submit bids on individual PDVSA projects.

The indictment refers to various PDVSA entities collectively as PDVSA including PDVSA Services Inc. (a U.S. based affiliate of PDVSA located in Houston, Texas that was, at various times, responsible for international purchasing on behalf of PDVSA) and Bariven S.A. (a PDVSA procurement subsidiary responsible for equipment purchases).

The indictment alleges that Rincon and Shiera “referred to the PDVSA officials who were assisting them in obtaining and retaining contracts with PDVSA in exchange for the bribes as ‘aliados,’ which translates into English as ‘allies’ or “allieds.”

The indictment alleges a conspiracy between 2009 and 2014 in which Rincon, Shiera and others enriched themselves “by obtaining and retaining lucrative energy contacts with PDVSA through corrupt and fraudulent means, including by paying bribes to PDVSA officials.” The alleged bribes to PDVSA officials were to “influence acts and decisions of the PDVSA officials in their official capacities and to induce the PDVSA officials to do and omit to do certain acts, including, but not limited to:

  • assisting Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies in winning PDVSA contracts;
  • providing Rincon and Shiera with inside information concerning the PDVSA bidding process;
  • placing one or more of Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies on certain bidding panels for PDVSA projects;
  • helping to conceal the fact that Rincon and Shiera controlled more than one of the companies on certain bidding panels for PDVSA projects;
  • supporting Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies before an internal PDVSA purchasing committee;
  • preventing interference with the selection of Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies for PDVSA contracts;
  • updating and modifying contract documents, including change orders to PDVSA contracts awarded to Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies;
  • assisting Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies in receiving payment for previously awarded PDVSA contracts, including by requesting payment priority for projects involving Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies.

The indictment alleges that “in addition to monetary bribes, Rincon and Shiera, together with others, bribed PDVSA officials by providing things of value, including recreational travel (including stays at the Fontaineblue Hotel in Miami Beach), meals (including whiskey), and entertainment, in order to obtain and retain business on behalf of Rincon’s and Shiera’s companies.”

The indictment also alleges that money was transferred from a bank account in the name of one of Rincon’s companies “to pay off the balance of a mortgage loan in Official E’s name for a residence in the Southern District of Texas, in exchange for Official E’s assistance in connection with PDVSA contracts” as well as money to “a close personal associate of Official E, but over which Official E held power of attorney.”

According to the indictment, Rincon and Shiera “provided to certain PDVSA officials who were receiving bribes proposed bidding panel lists that would include more than one company controlled by Rincon or Shiera to create the false appearance that the bidding process was competitive.” The indictment also alleges that Rincon and Shiera “attempted to conceal the bribes to certain PDVSA officials, which they referred to as ‘commissions,’ by creating false justifications for the bribes, including requesting or receiving invoices for equipment that was not provided and services that were never rendered in order to disguise the bribe payments to PDVSA officials.”

In addition to the conspiracy charge, the indictment also charges: (i) Rincon with four substantive violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; (ii) Shiera with five substantive violations of the anti-bribery provisions; and (iii) Rincon and Shiera with money laundering conspiracy as well as seven substantive money laundering offenses.

An Order of Detention Pending Trial against Rincon states that the DOJ’s investigation “covered 730 bank accounts; of those 108 were related to Rincon, his family and his companies.” According to the filing, “the indictment seeks forfeiture of three Swiss bank accounts” that the Government has “traced $100 million from the scheme.” The filing further states that “from 2009 to 2014, over one billion dollars was traced to this conspiracy.”

In response to the U.S. allegations, PDVSA released the below statement.

PDVSA2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FCPA Risks On Campus

Monday, November 2nd, 2015

University of Maryland College Park CampusIt’s hard not to read this recent Wall Street Journal article titled “American Colleges Pay Agents to Woo Foreigners Despite Fraud Risk” without thinking about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the article:

“Like many U.S. colleges, Wichita State University wants more foreign students but isn’t a brand name abroad. So the school, whose mascot is a muscle-bound wheat bundle, in late 2013 started paying agents to recruit in places like China and India. The independent agents assemble candidates’ documents and urge them to apply to the Kansas school, which pays the agents $1,000 to $1,600 per enrolled student. Overseas applications “shot up precipitously,” says Vince Altum, Wichita State’s executive director for international education. But there is a down side: Wichita State rejected several Chinese applications this year from an agency it suspected of falsifying transcripts, Mr. Altum says, adding that it terminates ties with agencies found to violate its code of conduct by faking documents. Paying agents a per-student commission is illegal under U.S. law when recruiting students eligible for federal aid—that is, most domestic applicants. But paying commissioned agents isn’t illegal when recruiting foreigners who can’t get federal aid. So more schools like Wichita State are relying on such agents, saying the intermediaries are the most practical way to woo overseas youths without the cost of sending staff around the world. No one officially counts how many U.S. campuses pay such agents, most of whom operate abroad, but experts estimate at least a quarter do so.”

The above use of agents is not the only FCPA risk that colleges and universities face.

In recent years, several schools have opened foreign campuses (either directly or through affiliates) in places such as China, India, and the Middle East. In short, the government approvals, licenses, permits, and certifications in doing so are no different than a company needing government approvals to establish a manufacturing presence in a foreign country.

No doubt in recognition of the above risks, I’ve noticed in recent years more and more schools adopting FCPA policies.  See here and here for examples.

That educational institutions (or those that purport to be as highlighted by the below enforcement action) can face FCPA risk is not merely an academic hypothetical.

The remainder of this post summarizes an unusual 2006 FCPA enforcement against Richard Novak.

Novak and others owned and operated several internet businesses using the names “Saint Regis University,” “Robertstown University” and “James Monroe University.” According to the superseding information “they were diploma mills in that these ‘universities’ had no legitimate faculty members; offered no legitimate academic curriculum or services; required no course work or class work; and were not recognized by the United States Department of Education.”

According to the superseding information, Novak made a bribe payment to the “Consult and First Secretary at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. in order to assist Saint Regis University and its owners in fraudulently selling diplomas through their internet businesses.”

Elsewhere, the superseding information states that “various foreign government officials who received the bribes held various positions at the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Liberian Embassy in Accra, Ghana, and at the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Liberia in Monrovia, Liberia” and that these individuals, among other things, “were in a position to: issue certificates of accreditation and recognition; issue notarial certificates; issue letters claiming that Saint Regis University was fully accredited and recognized by the Ministry of Education in the Republic of Liberia; and cause staff at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. to answer the telephone calls in a positive way when inquiries regarding the legitimacy [of the Universities] were made.”

Although not specifically mentioned in the superseding information, a component of the original indictment (here) against Novak and several others was that U.S. Secret Service agents posed as high school dropouts seeking degrees.

Novak was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and FCPA violations.  He pleaded guilty (see here) and was sentenced to three years probation.

DOJ Announces FCPA And Related Actions In Connection With Russian Nuclear Industry Bribe Scheme – Additional Actions Likely

Wednesday, September 2nd, 2015

TENEXIt’s not often the DOJ announces a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action via a one sentence statement in a press release about another enforcement action.

But that is what the DOJ did earlier this week when it announced in this press release that Daren Condrey (50, of Glenwood, Maryland) pleaded guilty on June 17, 2015, to conspiring to violate the FCPA and conspiring to commit wire fraud.

This June 2015 criminal information sets forth the DOJ’s allegations.

According to the information, Condrey was an owner and executive of Transportation Corporation A (a Maryland headquartered company in the business of providing logistical support services for the transportation of nuclear materials to customers in the United States and to foreign customers) from August 1998 through in or about October 2014.

According to this Wall Street Journal, Transportation Corporation A is Transport Logistics International (TLI).  In November 2014, TLI released this statement concerning the DOJ’s investigation.

The Condrey information alleges various bribe payments made to “Foreign Official One” to secure business with TENEX.

JSC Techsnabexport (“TENEX”) is described as a supplier of “uranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclear power companies throughout the world on behalf of the government of the Russian Federation.”  According to the information, “TENEX was indirectly owned and controlled by, and performed functions of, the government of the Russian Federation, and thus was an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA.”  The information further states:

“TENEX established a wholly-owned subsidiary company located in the United States in or about October 2010, TENAM Corporation (“TENAM”). TENAM was TENEX’s official representative office in the United States. TENAM was indirectly owned and controlled by, and performed functions of, the government of the Russian Federation, and thus was an ”agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA.”

“Foreign Official One”[Vadim Mikerin - see below] is described in the information as follows:

“[A] national of the Russian Federation, was a Director of TENEX from at least 2004 through in or about October 2010, and was the President of TENAM from in or about October 2010 through in or about October 2014. Foreign Official One was a”foreign official,” as that term is used in the FCPA. From in or about December 2011 through in or about October 2014, Foreign Official One was a resident of Maryland.”

According to the information, Condrey and others:

“with the knowledge of Foreign Official One, caused Transportation Corporation A to provide quotations and invoices to TENEX hiding the cost of the bribe payments promised to Foreign Official One within Transportation Corporation A’s pricing”;

“at the direction of Foreign Official One, attempted to conceal the payments to Foreign Official One by making the bribe payments to bank accounts in Cyprus, Latvia, and Switzerland”;

“sent email communications and used other forms of communication in which they used terms like ”lucky figure,” “LF,” “cake,” and “remuneration” as code words to conceal the true nature of the bribe payments, and utilized fraudulent invoices which did not truthfully describe the services provided or the purpose of the payments”;

“caused Transportation Corporation A to act as a conduit for a bribe payment another company made to Foreign Official One in order to conceal that bribe payment;” and

“wired, and caused to be wired, payments from Transportation Corporation A’s bank account in Maryland to bank accounts in Cyprus, Latvia, and Switzerland for the purpose of making bribe payments to Foreign Official One.”

Based on the above allegations, Condrey was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud.

In this June plea agreement, Condrey pleaded guilty. The statement of facts attached to the Condrey plea agreement also refers to the following company:

“Cylinder Corporation A was a company, based in Ohio, which engaged in the manufacture of tanks and vessels for the oil and gas, nuclear, and marine markets. Cylinder Corporation A secured contracts with TENEX to supply storage and transportation cylinders. In or about September 2012, Cylinder Corporation A was acquired by another company headquartered in Ohio (“Ohio Corporation”).”

According to this Wall Street Journal article:

“People familiar with the investigation identified that company as Westerman Cos., which was acquired by [publicly traded] Worthington Industries, Inc. in 2012 and now operates as Worthington Cylinders. Court records refer to the company as Cylinder Corporation A and identify its location as Bremen, Ohio.”

According to the DOJ’s release, Condrey will be sentenced on Nov. 2, 2015. Condrey is represented by Robert Bonsib.

Back to the DOJ’s press release earlier this week which made brief mention of the above FCPA enforcement action.  As noted in the release:

“[Vadim Mikerin] a Russian official residing in Maryland pleaded guilty today to conspiracy to commit money laundering in connection with his role in arranging over $2 million in corrupt payments to influence the awarding of contracts with the Russian state-owned nuclear energy corporation. According to court documents, Mikerin was the president of TENAM Corporation and a director of the Pan American Department of JSC Techsnabexport (TENEX).  TENAM, based in Bethesda, Maryland, is a wholly-owned subsidiary and the official representative of TENEX in the United States.  TENEX, based in Moscow, acts as the sole supplier and exporter of Russian Federation uranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclear power companies worldwide.  TENEX is a subsidiary of Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation.”

According to the release, Mikerin is to be sentenced on Dec. 8, 2015.  See here for the Mikerin plea agreement.  Mikerin is represented by former FCPA Unit Assistant Chief William Jacobson and Jonathan Lopez (both with Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe).

As noted in the release, “Boris Rubizhevsky, 64, of Closter, New Jersey, pleaded guilty on June 15, 2015, to conspiracy to commit money laundering and will be sentenced on Oct. 19, 2015.” Rubinzhevsky is described in the Mikerin plea agreement as the owner and sole employee of “Consulting Corporation Two,” which was based in New Jersey.