Disgorgement « FCPA Professor

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Economic Analysis And FCPA Damages

Friday, January 4th, 2013

Although economic analysis is not my field, I have long been interested in basic economic theory as it applies to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act fine and penalty amounts, specifically disgorgement.

In my opening remarks at the World Bribery and Corruption Compliance Forum in London in September 2010 (see here), I observed as follows.

“Another issue in need of deeper analysis is the commonly held enforcement view that the contract (and thus net profits of the contract) at issue was secured solely because of the alleged improper payments made by the corporate. This ignores the fact that most of the companies settling enforcement actions are otherwise viewed as industry leaders presumably because they offer the best product or service for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company secured the contract at issue, thus justifying the company being forced to disgorge all of its net profits associated with the contract? Does a but for analysis have a place in bribery laws – in other words should the enforcement agency have to prove that but for the improper payment, the company would not have secured the contract at issue?”

In the context of the recent Pfizer enforcement action, I again highlighted here some basic economic issues when thinking about the disgorgement penalty in that case.

This previous post highlighted the work of Dr. Patrick Conroy (here) and Dr. Graeme Hunter (here) – both of Nera Economic Consulting. In their thoughtful article titled “Economic Analysis of Damages under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” the authors note that “to date there has been little consideration of the true benefit of the bribe,” but “with fines in the hundreds of millions of dollars and increasing enforcement, it is necessary to clearly understand what effect a bribe had on profits and to carefully establish what the but-for profits would have been without the bribe.”

I recently came across a similar article by Mark Gueck (here) and Jeff Armstrong (here) - both of Finance Scholars Group. Their article “Competition Principles Applied to FCPA Damages” (here), rightly notes that “disgorgement is complex and may put the firm [resolving an FCPA enforcement action] in the position of forfeiting some legally earned profits as well.” The authors “propose strengthening FCPA disgorgement with robust economic analysis, in particular, applying principles of market competition in ways that are accepted in other areas of government oversight so that the proper balance between penalty, incentive and opportunity is achieved.” Among other things, the authors point out, as I frequently have as well, that “companies fined under the FCPA are industry leaders” and that “customers can be expected to purchase from the firm in the absence of a bribe.”

Even if a company is found to have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the law nevertheless demands that fine and penalty amounts are fair and just. The time has come for basic economic principles, accepted in other areas of law, to be accepted in FCPA enforcement actions. FCPA counsel would be wise to consider such issues, and engage such expertise, when negotiating resolutions to FCPA enforcement actions with the DOJ and SEC.

Analyzing Allianz

Wednesday, December 19th, 2012

Earlier this week, $12.3 million flowed into the U.S. treasury.

Why?

Because a German company used to have shares and bonds registered with the SEC. The German company had a German subsidiary that invested in an Indonesian joint venture. The Indonesian joint venture made, without any apparent knowledge or approval of the German company, alleged improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia between seven to eleven years ago. When the German company learned of suspicious account activity at the Indonesian joint venture seven years ago, it directed the joint venture to close the suspicious account. The joint venture agreed to close the account and stop making the payments, even though it continued to make the payments through 2008.

The above paragraph pretty much explains the SEC’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action earlier this week against Allianz SE , a German company engaged in property and casualty insurance, life and health insurance, and asset management businesses around the world.

From November 2000 to October 2009, Allianz’s American Depositary Shares and bonds were registered with the SEC and it was thus an “issuer” under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In 1989 PT Asuransi Allianz Utama Indonesia (“Utama”) was formed as a joint venture. JV members included Allianz of Asia-Pacific and Africa GmbH (AZAP - a German company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allianz), PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (“Jasindo”) (“an Indonesian state-owned entity) and PT Asuransi Wuwungan. According to the SEC, during the relevant time period, AZAP owned 75% of Utama.

In the administrative cease and desist order (here) announced (here) earlier this week, the SEC found improper payments by Utama to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain or retain business. The order also found that the payments were improperly recorded and that Allianz failed to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal controls.

The SEC order states, in summary, as follows.

“These proceedings arise out of violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Allianz SE (“Allianz” or the “Company”), through its Indonesian majority-owned subsidiary, PT Asuransi Allianz Utama (“Utama”). Between 2001 and 2008, Utama managers made improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain and retain business. Allianz learned of the improper payments from two complaints made several years apart. The first complaint was submitted in 2005 alleging significant misconduct, including unsupported payments to agents. A subsequent audit of Utama’s accounting records uncovered that managers at Utama were using “special purpose accounts” to make illicit payments, many to government officials, in order to secure business in Indonesia. Despite the audit, the conduct continued. The second complaint was lodged in 2009 to Allianz’s external auditors and alleged that Allianz created illicit off-the-books accounts. In response, Allianz began an internal investigation. The Commission staff opened an investigation in April 2010 after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The investigation determined that from at least 2001 through December 2008, the Utama managers, with the assistance of others in the Indonesian office, made payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia to procure or retain insurance contracts related to large government projects in Indonesia. As a result of improper payments of approximately $650,626 to agents and employees of state-owned entities and others, Allianz realized $5,315,649 in profits. The payments were improperly recorded as legitimate transaction costs, thereby causing Allianz’s books and records to be inaccurate. Allianz failed to devise and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances to detect and prevent such payments.”

The order contains the following additional facts.

“In 1989, Allianz established Utama and continued the practice of using special purpose accounts for paying commissions to agents that generated business for Allianz. However, in February 2001, Indonesian Agent, an agent for Utama, Utama CEO 1 [a German citizen who was the Utama CEO from 1998 to 2001] and Utama’s Chief Financial Officer opened a separate, off-the-books account in the Indonesian Agent’s name (the “Agent special purpose account”). The Agent special purpose account was used to make improper payments to employees of Indonesian state-owned entities and others for the purpose of obtaining and retaining insurance contracts. In February 2001, Indonesian Agent and Utama CEO 1 executed a “Paying Agency Agreement” that set up the scheme to make the payments to employees of state-owned entities. This agreement established the off-the-books account that served as a slush fund to make bribe payments to foreign officials and others as instructed by Utama.”

Under the heading “Utama’s 2001-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“During the period 2001 to 2005, Utama Marketing Manager [an Indonesian citizen] made payments from the Agent special purpose account to account introducers employed by state-owned entities to secure insurance contracts on large government projects in Indonesia. Utama Marketing Manager received approval from Utama management to use the Agent special purpose account for improper purposes. Utama CEO 2, the CEO from 2003-2006, was aware of the Agent special purpose account and the improper payments to foreign officials. [...] The improper payments made to foreign officials were disguised in the Utama insurance contracts as “overriding commissions.” Despite the fact that Allianz has a majority share of Utama and consolidated the subsidiary’s accounts into its own books and records, Utama’s accounting system was maintained in Indonesia and Allianz did not have effective controls over the accounting. Allianz did not have the ability to access Utama’s accounting system and, therefore, did not detect the movement of funds to the Agent special purpose account. In addition, the Agent special purpose account was maintained in the name of the Indonesian Agent to make it appear that all movement of funds to this account was for legitimate commission payments. Likewise, Allianz did not have effective controls over the commission payment request process, which allowed payments to go to the Agent special purpose account without supporting documentation. [...] On December 1, 2005, a whistleblower complaint concerning the special purpose account was submitted to both the Allianz whistleblower hotline and Utama’s joint venture partner Jasindo, and then forwarded to the head of AZAP. The complaint itemized a number of control weaknesses, most notably, the existence of the Agent special purpose account and its lack of transparency. On December 8, 2005, Allianz Group Audit initiated an audit of the Indonesian office; however, the review was limited to embezzlement from the Company. [...] However, no additional steps were taken to determine the nature and purpose of the accounts or to identify the recipients of payments from the accounts. On December 12, 2005, based on the audit findings Allianz directed the Utama management to close the Agent special purpose account. Although the Utama management agreed to close the account and to stop making the payments, it continued making improper payments to secure business for Allianz through 2008.”

Under the heading “Utama’s Post-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Despite the directive to close the account and to stop making payments, Utama Marketing Manager continued to use the Agent special purpose account to make improper payments to foreign officials from 2005 to 2008. [...] Utama CEO 2 approved the continued use of the Agent special purpose account to make payments on the two government insurance contracts at issue. Later, Utama Marketing Manager and his staff expanded the improper payments to numerous other foreign officials on government insurance contracts. From 2005 to 2008, Utama Marketing Manager employed various methods to make payments to foreign officials. In addition to booking payments through the Agent special purpose account, Utama Marketing Manager made payments by either: 1) booking commissions to an agent that was not associated with the account for the government insurance contract and then withdrawing the funds booked to the agent’s account as cash to pay the foreign official; or 2) overstating the amount of a client’s insurance premium, booking the excess amount to an unallocated account and then “reimbursing” the excess funds to the foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Similar to the Agent special purpose account, Allianz did not have effective controls over the Utama accounting system or the commission payment process, which allowed payments to be made to an agent’s account without supporting documentation. Allianz did not have any controls over the use of the unallocated account that was maintained at Utama. As a result, Utama Marketing Manager was able to take funds from Utama to pay foreign officials without detection. In March 2009, Allianz’s outside auditor received an anonymous complaint alleging that an Allianz executive created or initiated slush funds during his tenure with AZAP. Between December 2005, when the Allianz Executive Vice-President of the Asia-Pacific Division directed Utama to close the Agent special purpose account and the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz took no steps to ensure that the Agent special purpose account was closed and that similar improper payments were not being made.”

Under the heading “Investigation and Remediation” the order states, in full, as follows.

“In response to the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz convened a Whistleblower Committee to do an internal investigation and retained counsel to conduct an internal investigation of Utama’s payment practices in Indonesia. Allianz did not report the conduct to the Commission staff. In April 2010, the staff opened an investigation after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The staff contacted Allianz concerning the allegations. Allianz’s cooperation in the staff’s investigation and the timeliness of its response to the Commission’s requests for documents and information improved over time. Allianz hired new counsel and took steps to further its cooperation and remedial efforts. The staff’s investigation uncovered 295 government insurance contracts that were obtained or retained by improper payments of approximately $650,626 to Indonesian government officials and others from 2001 through 2008. As stated above, in some instances the nature of the improper payments was disguised in invoices as an “overriding commission” or as a commission for an agent that was not associated with the government insurance contract. In other instances the improper payments were structured as an overpayment by the government insurance contract holder, who was later “reimbursed” for the overpayment. The excess funds were then paid to foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Allianz took various remedial measures, including employment action against several individuals who were involved in the conduct or failed to stop the conduct. Allianz issued new or enhanced FCPA compliance and internal accounting control policies and procedures, including mandating strict scrutiny of payments to third party intermediaries. Allianz also updated the anti-corruption clause in its third-party contracts to specifically refer to the FCPA. Allianz provided enhanced FCPA compliance training to its employees and improved its current global anti-corruption compliance program.”

Under the heading, “FCPA Violations” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.

“Utama, a majority-owned subsidiary of Allianz, made improper payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain government insurance contracts. Utama improperly recorded the payments as legitimate transaction costs. Utama’s financial statements were consolidated into Allianz’s financial statements. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to keep accurate books, records and accounts. Further, as evidenced by the extent and duration of Utama’s improper payments and their improper recordation, and the fact that Allianz was not aware that Utama’s commission payment request process allowed funds to be diverted for improper payments, Allianz failed to recognize the compliance risks posed by Utama. Allianz also failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that improper payments were not being made by its subsidiary. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls. [...] Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act does not require that the amounts involved be “material,” nor is it necessary to prove “scienter” under its provisions. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749-51 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Similarly, there is no scienter requirement for establishing a violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B).

According to the SEC release, “without admitting or denying the findings, Allianz agreed to cease and desist from further violations and pay disgorgement of $5,315,649, prejudgment interest of $1,765,125, and a penalty of $5,315,649 for a total of $12,396,423.”

See here for a prior guest post discussing the Dodd-Frank provision granting the SEC authority to impose civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings such as the Allianz matter.

There is much to analyze in the nine-page cease and desist order.

For starters, the SEC required disgorgement even though no FCPA anti-bribery violations were alleged or asserted. This prior post highlighted an article concerning ”no-charged bribery disgorgement” by various Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys, including Paul Berger (here) a former Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement. The article concluded that “settlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its complaint.” The article noted that such “no-charged bribery disgorgement settlements appear designed to inflict punishment rather than achieve the goals of equity.”

Your first reaction might be – the SEC could have charged Allianz with FCPA anti-bribery violations given the findings of the cease and desist order, but choose not to. If that is your reaction, based on the information in the cease and desist order, you are wrong.

Contrary to popular misperception, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to foreign issuers only to the extent “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” are used in connection with the improper payments. The SEC’s order does not contain any findings concerning any U.S. nexus in regards to the payments at issue.

The above paragraph, in addition to the notion that the SEC’s order does not contain any findings to suggest willful violations of the FCPA’s books and records or internal control provisions, helps explain the lack of DOJ involvement in the matter. Nevertheless, some (see here) used the “d” word (as in declination) in describing the DOJ’s decision not to bring charges against Allianz. However, for the reasons explained above, there appears to have been no criminal charges to bring against Allianz. This is not a declination.

In this regard, the Allianz enforcement action is similar to the 2011 enforcement action against Diageo (see here for the prior post).

According to this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, “Claudius Sokenu of Arnold & Porter LLP conducted the company’s internal investigation and Joel Cohen of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP was brought in subsequently to assist as the company neared a resolution.”

Of Note From The Pfizer Enforcement Action

Thursday, August 9th, 2012

Yesterday’s post (here) went long and deep as to the Pfizer / Wyeth enforcement action. Today’s post continues the analysis by highlighting additional notable issues.

FCPA Reform Issue

For the second time in recent months, the DOJ has attempted to address an FCPA reform proposal in an enforcement action press release. See here and here for prior posts concerning the Garth Peterson enforcement action / Morgan Stanley no enforcement action.

As noted here and here (among other posts), one FCPA reform proposal seeks to address an acquiring company inheriting the acquired company’s FCPA exposure.

The DOJ’s release (here) in the Pfizer enforcement action stated as follows. “In the 18 months following its acquisition of Wyeth, Pfizer Inc., in consultation with the department, conducted a due diligence and investigative review of the Wyeth business operations and integrated Pfizer’s Inc.’s internal controls system into the former Wyeth business entities. The department considered these extensive efforts and the SEC resolution in its determination not to pursue a criminal resolution for the pre-acquisition improper conduct of Wyeth subsidiaries.”

Kudos to the DOJ … in part.

As evident from a close read of the statement of facts attached to the DPA (here), a substantial portion of the improper conduct giving rise to the allegations in Pfizer HCP’s information resulted from Pfizer’s acquisition of Pharmacia Corporation in 2003. The statement of facts state as follows. “[In April 2003] Pfizer acquired Pharmacia Corporation in a stock-for-stock transaction. Pharmacia’s international operations were combined with Pfizer’s, including Pharmacia’s operations in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia which were thereafter restructured and incorporated into Pfizer HCP.” [Conduct in these countries was the focus of the information].

No Knowledge at Corporate Headquarters

Pfizer’s press release (here – pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer had to consult with the DOJ prior to issuing) stated as follows. “There is no allegation by either DOJ or SEC that anyone at Pfizer’s or Wyeth’s corporate headquarters knew of or approved the conduct at issue before Pfizer took appropriate action to investigate and report it. As soon as these local activities came to the attention of Pfizer’s corporate headquarters, they were voluntarily brought to the attention of the DOJ and SEC. Today’s settlements are focused solely on these local activities.”

You do wonder whether those opposed to FCPA reform (such as here) actually read FCPA resolution documents and understand this as well as other alleged facts in the Pfizer action such as the successor liability issue discussed above and that the conduct at issue in the DOJ enforcement took place between 6 – 15 years ago. Probably not.

Curious Charging Decisions

In criminal actions, the DOJ’s burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil actions, the SEC’s burden of proof is a more lenient preponderance of the evidence. Given these different burdens of proof, it is common for the SEC to charge FCPA anti-bribery violations even in the absence of similar DOJ charges.

The exact opposite happened in this enforcement action.

The DOJ’s information charges FCPA anti-bribery violations, however, the SEC’s complaint which tracks the DOJ’s allegations (and then some) merely charge FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

Thinking About Disgorgement

There are certain exceptions, but one FCPA-related issue that has always intrigued me is that most corporate FCPA violators are otherwise viewed as selling the best product or service for the best price. In my 2010 opening remarks at the World Bribery and Corruption Compliance (see here) I observed as follows. “Another issue in need of deeper analysis is the commonly held enforcement view that the contract (and thus net profits of the contract) at issue was secured solely because of the alleged improper payments made by the corporate. This ignores the fact that most of the companies settling enforcement actions are otherwise viewed as industry leaders presumably because they offer the best product or service for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company secured the contract at issue, thus justifying the company being forced to disgorge all of its net profits associated with the contract? Does a but for analysis have a place in bribery laws – in other words should the enforcement agency have to prove that but for the improper payment, the company would not have secured the contract at issue?”

Given my interest in this issue, I was delighted to read (as highlighted in this prior post) a piece titled “Economic Analysis of Damages under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” (here) by Dr. Patrick Conroy (here) and Dr. Graeme Hunter (here) – both of Nera Economic Consulting. The authors note that “to date there has been little consideration of the true benefit of the bribe” but “with fines in the hundreds of millions of dollars and increasing enforcement, it is necessary to clearly understand what effect a bribe had on profits and to carefully establish what the but-for profits would have been without the bribe.” The authors note that “while a bribe may have led to very high gains, the but-for profits could have been high (and the gain from the bribe low) if the bribe would have little effect on the probability of winning the work or if alternative projects were similarly profitable.”

As noted by the FCPA Blog (here), the combined SEC disgorgement (and pre-judgement interest amount) in the Pfizer / Wyeth settlements was approximately $45 million.

However, does anyone truly believe that the only reason Chinese doctors prescribed Pfizer products was because under the “point programs” the physician would receive a tea set? Does anyone truly believe that the only reason Czech doctors prescribed Pfizer products was because the company sponsored educational weekend took place at an Austrian ski resort? Does anyone truly believe that the only reason Pakistani doctors offered Wyeth nutritional products to new mothers was because the company provided office equipment to the physicians? Numerous other examples could also be cited in connection with the enforcement action, be I trust you get the point.

Given the above referenced SEC charges, the enforcement action also again raises the issue of “no-charged bribery disgorgement” which was the focus of this prior post that highlighted an FCPA Update by Debevoise & Plimpton (the author group included Paul Berger (here) a former Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement).

A Gray Cloud That Lasted 8 Years

The FCPA Blog recently highlighted here the FCPA’s long shadow and asked “how long should the DOJ and SEC keep self reporting companies on the hook?” I share the concern that FCPA scrutiny, and the gray cloud it represents as hanging over a company, simply lasts too long. In many cases, the gray cloud lasts between 2-4 years from the point of first disclosure to the point of an enforcement action. In certain cases the gray cloud hangs over a company for a longer period of time. Pfizer is one such example. As noted in the resolution documents, Pfizer voluntarily disclosed various conduct giving rise to the enforcement action in 2004. Thus the gray cloud lasted approximately 8 years.

Where Should The Money Go?

Monday, March 26th, 2012

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It is a thorny question with no easy answer. Where should the money go when a company resolves an FCPA enforcement action? It was addressed last year in connection with the Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action. (See here, and here for prior posts). Two recent events raise the issue again.

*****

Earlier this month, it was announced (here) that the U.K. “Serious Fraud Office, the Government of Tanzania, BAE Systems and the Department for International Development (DFID) … signed a Memorandum of Understanding enabling the payment of £29.5 million [$47 million USD] plus accrued interest to be paid by BAE Systems for educational projects in Tanzania.” As noted in the release, “textbooks will be purchased for all 16,000 primary schools in the country and as a result 8.3 million children will benefit” in subjects such as Kiswahli, English, Maths and Science. The release further notes that funds will also be used to ”provide all 175,000 primary school teachers with teachers’ guides, syllabi and syllabi guides to help improve their teaching skills” as well as the purchase of desks. In the release, SFO Director Richard Alderman stated as follows. “This agreement is a first for the SFO which piloted it through the UK legal system. It provides a satisfactory outcome for all concerned but most of all for the Tanzanian people and I am personally delighted that SFO staff were able to achieve this.”

In this release, BAE stated as follows. “We are glad to finally be able to make the payment to the Government of Tanzania and bring this matter to a close. We are grateful to DFID for their work in agreeing the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Tanzania.” The BAE release states that the “payment follows the settlement agreed between BAE Systems and the SFO.” For a prior post on the settlement, see here.

To be sure, BAE’s payment to Tanzania, and the role of the SFO in brokering the payment, feels good. What is not to like about children receiving textbooks?

However, the feel good nature of this most recent BAE development should not mask the significant problems with the BAE enforcement action (on both sides of the Atlantic). As noted in this prior post, even the U.K. judge who accepted the SFO-BAE plea agreement called it “loosely and hastily drafted” and said the fine he levied reflected that he couldn’t “sentence for an offense which the prosecution failed to charge.”

And let’s not forgot how this story began. In 2004, the SFO began investigating whether BAE made bribe payments to secure Saudi fighter jet contracts. However, in late 2006, the SFO was forced to halt its investigation under pressure from the U.K. government, which cited national security concerns should the investigation go forward. However, because BAE also allegedly made bribe payments in numerous other countries to secure business, the SFO, under a new Director, revived its investigation of BAE, at least as to non-Saudi issues, including whether the company paid bribes to secure contracts in various European and African countries. After settlement talks stalled – the conventional wisdom is that BAE was unwilling to plead guilty to bribery related offenses given the collateral effect of the mandatory European Union debarment provisions – the SFO pressed ahead with the case. In late January 2010, the SFO issued a release (here) stating that Count Mensdorff, a former BAE agent, was criminally charged with “conspiracy to corrupt” and for “conspiring with others to give or agree to give corrupt payments […] to officials and other agents of certain Eastern and Central European governments, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure, or as rewards for having secured, contracts from those governments for the supply of goods to them, namely SAAB/Gripen fighter jets, by BAE Systems Plc.” Then, in early February 2010, the SFO announced (here) its long-awaited resolution of the BAE matter. Despite allegations of wide-spread bribery on a global scale, and despite BAE’s agent being criminally indicted a few days earlier in connection with bribe payments in “certain Eastern and Central European countries” (presumably on evidence that such payments did indeed occur), the SFO resolution related solely to the company’s failure “to keep reasonable and accurate accounting records in relation to its activities in Tanzania.” Most dramatic, and in a strange turn of events, the SFO announced that it had withdrawn the criminal charges filed days earlier against Count Mensdorff. The same release also noted that “[t]his decision brings to an end the SFO’s investigations into BAE’s defense contracts.” For more on “BAE – Inside the SFO”, see this prior post.

In any event, at least some children in Tanzania received some textbooks from BAE as a result.

*****

As previously highlighted on the FCPA Blog (here), Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (“SERAP”) (a non-governmental civil society organization in Nigeria) recently wrote a letter (here) to SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami (with a copy to Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer and Deputy Chief, Fraud Section Charles Duross) regarding “FCPA civil penalty and disgorgement proceeds that companies agree to pay to resolve US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations.” As the letter notes, “currently such proceeds, once paid, are retained by the U.S. government.”

In summary, the SERAP letter requests “that the Enforcement Division establish a case-by-case policy or process that would enable foreign governmental entities that have been victims of corruptly-procured contracts to apply for, subject to appropriate anti-corruption safeguards, some or all of the civil penalty and disgorgement proceeds that would eventually be paid by companies alleged to have violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” SERAP also suggests that “civil society groups in the home country, or U.S. non-profit organizations serving that country, be eligible within a short time-period to apply for such proceeds as well, or instead, for use for ‘public benefits projects’ in the affected foreign country, again subject to anti-corruption safeguards.”

The SERAP letter notes, among other things, as follows. “… Many citizens in a country where such bribery has occurred might consider FCPA civil penalties and disgorgement payments imposed by the US, and then kept by the US, as in fact representing funds that rightfully ‘belong’ to the victim.”

Stating that “corruptly procured contracts ‘cost’ the victim at least 10 percent extra” the SERAP letter says that “this figure ought to be a presumed measure of possible funds available for third-party application in the context of a civil FCPA settlement, particularly since the Enforcement Division typically settles an investigation before extensive evidence of damages, as opposed to liability, is placed in the public realm.”

The specific SERAP proposal is as follows. “…[A]fter, and ony after, public notice of an FCPA settlement agreement, the victim foreign government entity and any applicant NGO would have 60 days to file a request that the Enforcement Division pay some or all of the agreed payment proceeds to or for the benefit of the victim government entity or to a home country-based or US based NGO that would present a proposal [to] spend the proceeds for public purposes (e.g. on public health programs) in the country of the victim entity. Thereafter, the Enforcement Division would have 60 days to act upon the request, favorably or not in its discretion; in this context the Enforcement Division should provide a brief statement of its reasons for its decisions. In reaching its decisions the Enforcement Division would have the inherent authority to consult with Executive Branch agencies of the US government.

The SERAP letter raises some interesting issues regarding alleged victims of FCPA enforcement actions. The SERAP letter also raises some interesting questions, including the following.

If the SEC would be required to relinquish a certain portion of money recovered in an FCPA enforcement action, what impact would this have on FCPA enforcement? Would the SEC be less aggressive in bringing enforcement actions or perhaps more aggressive because more enforcement actions would be needed to sustain the current FCPA ”revenue stream”? For instance, 10% of SEC FCPA “revenue” in 2011 was approximately $15 million, in 2010 approximately $53 million.

The SERAP proposal appears to assume that all FCPA enforcement actions involve foreign government procurement. This is not the case. Approximately 50% of recent FCPA enforcement actions (i.e. in the past five years) do not involve foreign government procurement, but rather issues relating to foreign taxes, customs duties, or foreign licenses, permits, certifications and the like. Is the victim analysis the same in these FCPA enforcement actions compared to foreign government procurement enforcement actions?

Are individuals or organizations located in the country giving rise to the FCPA enforcement action really the most direct victims of the conduct at issue? In the procurement context, what about a competitor who may have lost out on the foreign business because it was unwilling to make an improper payment? With victim issues attracting new attention, should an FCPA private right of action receive new attention?

Last, but certainly not least, companies settling SEC FCPA enforcement actions are allowed to settle without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations. Even the SEC itself has stated that this settlement device often leads to settlements that ”do not necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s position over the other.” Given this dynamic, would SERAP’s proposal lead to undeserved “windfalls” for civil society organizations? [In this prior post, I asked the same question as to Dodd-Frank Act whistleblowers.]

SEC Enforcement Of The FCPA – Year In Review

Tuesday, January 10th, 2012

FCPA enforcement, it is not just about the DOJ. Granted, its sticks are less sharp than the DOJ’s, but the SEC also claims a significant piece of the FCPA enforcement pie (query whether it should – but that is a subject for another day).

Today’s post is a Year in Review of SEC FCPA Enforcement. (See here for a similar post for 2010). Stay tuned for a similar post on the DOJ’s Enforcement of the FCPA in 2011.

In 2011, the SEC collected approximately $148 million in 13 corporate FCPA enforcement actions. By comparison, in 2010 the SEC brought in approximately $530 million in 19 corporate FCPA enforcement actions. SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011 was both small (Ball Corp. – $300,000) and large (Johnson & Johnson – $48.6).

Five corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2011 were SEC only (IBM, Ball Corp., Rockwell Automation, Diageo, and Watts Water Technologies). Of the 13 corporate enforcement actions, only 5 (Armor Holdings, Johnson & Johnson, Tyson Foods, Maxwell Technologies, and Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom) included FCPA anti-bribery charges. In other words 8 SEC FCPA enforcement actions charged FCPA books and records and internal controls only yet in those enforcement actions the SEC collected approximately $51 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. This is noteworthy because many question, and rightfully so, whether disgorgement is an appropriate remedy in cases that do not charge FCPA anti-bribery violations. See here for a prior post.

Of the $148 million the SEC collected in 2011 corporate FCPA enforcement actions, approximately $80 million (54%) were in two enforcement actions (Johnson & Johnson and Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom). Of the $148 million, approximately $53 million (36%) were in enforcement actions against foreign issuers (Tenaris, Diageo, and Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom).

The $148 million further breaks down as follows: $9.6 million in civil penalties; $138.4 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. Thus 94% of SEC FCPA enforcement settlement amounts in 2011 consisted of disgorgement and prejudgment interest. This figure last year was 96%. If one tries to analyze why some SEC FCPA enforcement actions include a civil penalty, disgorgement and prejudgment interest (Watts Water Technologies, Diageo, Armor Holdings, Rockwell Automation, IBM), whereas other enforcement actions include only disgorgement and prejudgment interest (Comverse Technologies, Johnson & Johnson, Tenaris, Tyson Foods, Maxwell Technologies, Aon, Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom), whereas other enforcement actions include only a civil penalty (Ball Corp.), good luck and please enlighten us all with your insight.

Other notable developments from corporate SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011 include use of the first alternative resolution vehicle (a DPA) against Tenaris (see here for the prior post) and four enforcement actions resolved via administrative proceedings (Ball Corp., Rockwell Automation, Diageo, and Watts Water Technologies). As noted in this previous guest post, a provision in Dodd-Frank granted the SEC broad authority to impose civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings.

Another significant development in 2011, albeit not FCPA specific, was the much needed scrutiny on the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy – a policy relevant to SEC FCPA enforcement actions. See here for the prior post. This will remain an issue to watch in 2012 as neither admit nor deny heads to the Second Circuit.

In recent years, the DOJ has been the subject of well deserved criticism for the lack of individual prosecutions in many corporate FCPA enforcement actions. The same criticism can also be made of the SEC’s FCPA enforcement program. The SEC, at a minimum, has jurisdiction over the employees of companies settling an FCPA enforcement action and can, as demonstrated by certain FCPA enforcement actions, pursue civil FCPA anti-bribery charges, civil FCPA books and records and internal control charges, as well as other related civil charges.

However, in just 2 of the 13 (15%) corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions in 2011 did the SEC charge individuals (Lessen Chang (Watts Water Technologies) and Elek Straub, Andras Balogh, and Tamas Morvai (Magyar Telekom)) despite allegations in other enforcement actions that employees, including in certain cases senior management, were engaged in the improper conduct at issue. Last year, the SEC charged individuals in only 3 of the 19 corporate enforcement actions (15%).

In 2011, the SEC did charge 1 individual (Paul Jennings – see here) in connection with the 2010 Innospec enforcement action as well as 7 individuals (Uriel Sharef, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer, Carlos Sergi and Bernd Regendantz - see here) in connection with the 2008 Siemens enforcement action. It is interesting to note that all 12 of the individuals the SEC charged with FCPA violations in 2011 were foreign nationals (in a few cases, dual citizens of a foreign country and the U.S.).

Of the 13 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions in 2011, 12 enforcement actions (92%) were the result of corporate voluntary disclosures or previous foreign law enforcement investigations. The only exception is the Aon enforcement which, as noted in this prior post, “following inquiries from regulators, the Company commenced an internal review of its compliance with certain U.S. and non-U.S. anti-corruption laws, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” Stated in terms of the approximate $148 million the SEC collected in the 13 corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2011, $133.5 million (90%) was the result of such disclosures. As noted in last year’s SEC Year in Review post, in 2010, 97% of the SEC’s intake in FCPA enforcement actions was the result of voluntarily or otherwise publicly disclosed information and not the result of original investigation by either the SEC.

This remainder of this post provides an overview of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011.

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Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom (Dec. 29th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery and books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: $31.2 million in disgorgement and pre-judgement interest.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: Yes.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Aon Corp. (Dec. 20th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: Approximately $14.5 million (disgorgement of $11,416,814 and prejudgment interest of $3,128,206).

Disclosure: Aon’s SEC filings stated that ”following inquiries from regulators, the Company commenced an internal review of its compliance with certain U.S. and non-U.S. anti-corruption laws, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Watts Water Technologies (Oct. 13th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None. Administrative cease and desist order finding violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.

Settlement: $3.8 million ($2.8 million in disgorgement, $820,000 in prejudgment interest and a $200,000 civil monetary penalty).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: Yes.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: No.

Diageo (July 27th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None. Administrative cease and desist order finding violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.

Settlement: Approximately $16.4 million (approximately $11.3 million in disgorgement, approximately $1.2 million in prejudgement interest; and a $3 million civil penalty).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure and/or based on previous foreign law enforcement investigation.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: No.

Armor Holdings (July 13th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: Approximately $5.7 million (approximately $1.5 million in disgorgement; $458,000 in prejudgment interest; and a $3.7 million civil penalty)

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Comverse Technologies (April 7th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

Settlement: Approximately $1.6 million (approximately $1.2 million in disgorgement and approximately $360,000 in prejudgment interest).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Johnson & Johnson (April 8th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations and FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: Approximately $48.6 million (approximately $38.2 million in disgorgement and $10.4 million in prejudgment interest).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure (however the Iraq Oil for Food conduct was not voluntarily disclosed).

Related DOJ Enforcement Action. Yes.

Rockwell Automation (April 7th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None. Administrative cease and desist order finding violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.

Settlement: Approximately $2.7 million (approximately $1.7 million in disgorgement; approximately $590,000 in prejudgment interest; and a $400,000 civil penalty).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: No.

Tenaris (May. 17th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None – resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement – term two years.

Settlement: $5.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Ball Corporation (March 24th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None. Administrative cease and desist proceeding finding FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: $300,000 penalty.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: No.

IBM Corporation (March 18th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.

Settlement: $10 million ($5.3 million in disgorgement, $2.7 million in prejudgment interest, and a $2 million civil penalty).

Disclosure: Yes, the action is reportedly the result of a prior South Korean government investigation.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: No.

Tyson Foods (Feb. 10th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations and books and records and internal control violations.

Settlement: $1.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.

Maxwell Technologies (Jan. 31st)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Settled civil complaint charging: FCPA anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls violations; and Section 13 disclosure violations.

Settlement: Approximately $6.3 million (approximately $5.6 million in disgorgement and $700,000 in prejudgment interest)

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Individuals Charged: No.

Related DOJ Enforcement Action: Yes.