Archive for the ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ Category

Potpourri

Monday, July 21st, 2014

Inversions

Readers of business news know that a term du jour these days is “inversion.”  In other words and at the risk of oversimplification , the process by which, largely for tax reasons,  a U.S. company acquires a foreign company, obtains that foreign company’s “legal address,” yet maintains – in many cases –  its operational base in the U.S.

I’ve been asked a few times recently what impact, if any, “inverting” will have on a company’s FCPA exposure.  My answer has been very little, if any, impact.

Most of the companies that are “inverting” remain issuers under the FCPA.  Moreover, even if an “inverted” company is not an issuer, because most of these companies are keeping an operational base in the U.S. – even if a legal address elsewhere – it is likely that the DOJ would consider such companies to be “domestic concerns” under the FCPA.

The FCPA defines “domestic concern,” in pertinent part, as follows.

“any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”

In other words, place of incorporation and “legal address” is one way for an entity to be a domestic concern under the FCPA, but so too is having a principal place of business in the U.S.

For instance, in the Weatherford action, the DOJ stated:

“Prior to March 2009, Weatherford was incorporated in Bermuda and headquartered in Houston, Texas … As of March 2009, Weatherford was incorporated and headquartered in Switzerland, although it maintained a significant presence in Houston, Texas.”

In short, while inversions may have tax implications, it is difficult to see any meaningful implication under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

It Can Be Done

You know the narrative.

In 2002, an accounting partnership (Arthur Anderson) was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding documents related to its audit of Enron.  Even though the Supreme Court ultimately tossed the conviction, Arthur Anderson essentially went out of business.  Because of this, in the minds of some, the DOJ can’t criminally charge business organizations with crimes and business organizations can’t mount legal and factual defenses to criminal charges.  Thus, the DOJ has crafted, and the business community has accepted,  alternative resolution vehicles such as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements to avoid the perceived collateral consequences of a criminal indictment or conviction.

Never mind that the narrative is based on a false premise.  (See here for the guest post and article by Gabriel Markoff titled “Arthur Anderson and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty).

Nevertheless, the narrative persists and is accepted by some as gospel truth.

I have been publicly wondering since 2010 (see here) what the “shelf life” of the Arthur Anderson effect would be and how long the Arthur Anderson myth would be believed.

If there are still believers, witness yet another instance (PG&E from earlier this year was an example as well – see here) that companies (even publicly-traded companies) can mount legal and factual defenses to what the company views as aggressive and overzealous DOJ enforcement theories.

As widely reported, last week FedEx Corporation, FedEx Express, Inc., and FedEx Corporate Services, Inc.,  were criminally indicted “with conspiracies to traffic in controlled substances and misbranded prescription drugs for its role in distributing controlled substances and prescription drugs for illegal Internet pharmacies.”  (See here for the DOJ release).

In response, FedEx issued this statement which stated, in pertinent part, as follows.

“FedEx is innocent of the charges brought today by the Department of Justice. We will plead not guilty. We will defend against this attack on the integrity and good name of FedEx and its employees.”

FedEx stock is still trading, (in fact it is up since the criminal charges were announced), it is still employing people, and it is still operating its business.  In fact, a FedEx truck just went down my residential street a few hours prior to writing this post.

While the FedEx example is outside the FCPA context, the message to corporate boards, audit committees, and other corporate leaders should be clear.

Yes, there are “carrots” and “sticks” which motivate risk-adverse business organizations to do things regardless of the law or facts in any particular matter.  However, fighting back against what the company perceives to be aggressive and overzealous DOJ theories is an acceptable and viable option in many cases despite speculative doomsday scenarios to the contrary.

If more companies would do what FedEx is doing in the FCPA context. and thereby expose certain DOJ and SEC theories of enforcement, I am confident of one thing.  This “new era” of FCPA enforcement would look different than it does today.  In this regard, and as highlighted in my recent article, the business community is, at least in part, responsible for the current aggressive FCPA enforcement climate. Indeed, as Homer Moyer, a dean of the FCPA bar, recently observed:

“One reality is the enforcement agencies’ [FCPA] views on issues and enforcement policies, positions on which they are rarely challenged in court. The other is what knowledgeable counsel believe the government could sustain in court, should their interpretations or positions be challenged. The two may not be the same. The operative rules of the game are the agencies’ views unless a company is prepared to go to court or to mount a serious challenge within the agencies.”

Kudos to FedEx, its board, counsel and corporate leaders for having the courage of conviction and not rolling over and playing dead in the face of DOJ scrutiny.  (Note, last year UPS resolved its alleged scrutiny for the same core conduct by agreeing to a non-prosecution agreement in which it paid $40 million).

In-House Counsel Opportunity at Avon

Avon Cosméticos, a subsidiary of Avon Products, Inc., based near Buenos Aires, Argentina, is looking for an attorney to join the Ethics & Compliance team.  The Compliance Counsel has day-to-day operational responsibility for managing the compliance program in the South Markets Group (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay).  The program seeks to minimize risk exposure of corporate and regulatory law through company guidance and controls.  A primary activity of the Compliance Counsel is to provide operational advice and interpretation of company policies and procedures, including but not limited to the company’s anti-corruption policy.  As part of the program, the Compliance Counsel supports corporate, regional and local governance, monitoring, auditing, training and communication initiatives.  A primary goal for the Compliance Counsel is to enhance the culture of awareness and adherence to company policies.  Prospective candidates should apply via the Avon website:  https://avon.zonajobs.com.ar/listadoAvisosBj/.

Friday Roundup

Friday, July 11th, 2014

The cheerleaders fume, quotable, scrutiny alert, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

The Cheerleaders Fume

In the SEC’s failed enforcement action against Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen, the SEC was forced to carry its burden of proof in the context of an adversarial proceeding.  This should be celebrated as evidence that the rule of law worked.

Yet, to the cheerleaders of more FCPA enforcement regardless of enforcement theories or quality of evidence, the end result of the SEC’s failed enforcement action is something to fume about.  (See here).

Four words come to mind.  Silly, just plain silly.

Quotable

From Robert Amsterdam (here)

“My law firm has counselled entrepreneurs who have seen their companies needlessly gutted by their own lawyers, who in an act of self-preservation turn themselves into appendages of the state to work against their own clients. Even worse, we’ve seen courts seize property for years with little regard for the personal impact on the owners, while others have spent the majority of margin on FCPA compliance costs, leaving little motivation to run their business.

This is all possible thanks to the culture being spread by the war on wealth — we have been so eager to hand over vast powers to regulators and rapidly diminish the rights of those who stand accused, trusting in the flawless execution of the fight against graft and fraud.

There is such a tremendous distrust of the wealthy that politically ambitious prosecutors seek out opportunities for advancement rather than enforcement of the law. The victims tend to be individuals — not the behemoth banks who knowingly traded on debt and credit default swaps, not the industrial giants with decades of experience in bribery, nor the corporate quasi-state bodies that leech off subsidies.

Means to an end

The fight against corruption is important and commendable, and the drive to achieve greater income equality bears an undeniable moral truth. But the way we go about achieving these goals must be intelligent. Rights and due process must continue to be strong throughout the administration of justice. Then expanding opportunities for all, rather than depriving them from some, will put our society back on track for success.”

Scrutiny Alert

GPT Special Project Management Ltd, a unit of Airbus, has been under scrutiny August 2012 (see here).  The Wall Street Journal reports here:

“Airbus Group NV said … that the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office has contacted some of its current and former employees, as well as U.K. defense ministry officials, in a long-running corruption probe into activities at one of its units. Airbus “understands that four former and current employees were recently interviewed, along with MOD [Ministry of Defence] officials, as part of a wide-ranging SFO investigation,” a spokesman said by email. The U.K.’s anticorruption regulator has for roughly two years investigated GPT Special Project Management Ltd., an Airbus unit that works with the U.K.’s defense ministry, regarding allegations relating to its business in Saudi Arabia.”

Reading Stack

See here for Gibson Dunn’s mid-year FCPA update.

“The Ruehlen and Jackson settlements, earned only after two years of hard-nosed litigation that brought the parties to the brink of trial, demonstrate that those who are willing to put the Government to its burden of proof can come out materially better for their efforts.”

See here for Gibson Dunn’s mid-year update on corporate NPAs and DPAs.

“As the debate continues over whether and how to punish companies for unlawful conduct, U.S. federal prosecutors continue to rely significantly on NPAs and DPAs.  [...]  During the first half of 2014, DOJ entered into 11 agreements to resolve a variety of alleged conduct spanning multiple DOJ divisions and sections.  The SEC entered into one agreement.  Of the 12 agreements total, 5 were NPAs and 7 were DPAs.  This figure is in line with the 12 agreements reached in the first half of 2013.  In past years, we observed the phenomenon of an uptick in NPAs and DPAs during the second half of the year, so we anticipate that this year’s tallies could match or exceed the 2013 figure of 27 agreements.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Exploring A Deferred Prosecution Agreement Courtesy Of Biomet

Monday, July 7th, 2014

Since introduced to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act context in 2004, most corporate FCPA enforcement actions are resolved via non-prosecution agreements or deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs).

DPAs are essentially contracts, but beyond the fine amount, few of the contractual terms are explored.

This post uses recent events involving Biomet to explore other terms of a typical FCPA DPA.

As highlighted in this previous post, in March 2012 Biomet resolved an FCPA enforcement action involving alleged conduct in Brazil, Argentina, and China by agreeing to pay approximately $22.8 million ($17.3 million via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement, and $5.5 million via a settled SEC civil complaint).

The three-year DPA stated, as is typical in FCPA DPAs, as follows.

Deferred Prosecution:  In consideration of: (a) the past and future cooperation of Biomet [...] ; (b) Biomet’s payment of a monetary penalty of $17,280,000; and (c) Biomet’s implementation and maintenance of remedial measures, the Department agrees that any prosecution of Biomet for the conduct set forth in the … Statement of Facts, and for the conduct that Biomet disclosed to the Department, prior to the signing of this Agreement, be and hereby is deferred for the Term of this Agreement. The Department further agrees that if Biomet fully complies with all of its obligations under this Agreement, the Department will not continue the criminal prosecution against Biomet [...]  and, after the Term, this Agreement shall expire and the Department shall seek to move to dismiss, with prejudice, the Criminal Information filed against Biomet.”

Breach of Agreement:  If during the term of this Agreement, the Department determines, in its sole discretion, that Biomet has: (a) committed any felony under federal law subsequent to the signing of this Agreement; (b) at any time, provided deliberately false, incomplete or misleading information; or (c) otherwise breached the Agreement, Biomet shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the Department has knowledge, including the charges in the Information [...]

As relevant to the above terms of the Biomet DPA, on July 3rd, Biomet disclosed as follows.

“As previously disclosed, on March 26, 2012, Biomet entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement, or DPA, with the Department of Justice, or DOJ, and a Consent to Final Judgment, or Consent, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, regarding an investigation regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Pursuant to the DPA, the DOJ agreed to defer prosecution of Biomet in connection with those matters, provided that Biomet satisfies its obligations under the DPA over the term of the DPA. The DPA has a three-year term but provides that it may be extended in the sole discretion of the DOJ for an additional year. Pursuant to the Consent, Biomet consented to the entry of a Final Judgment which, among other things, permanently enjoined Biomet from violating the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In October 2013, Biomet became aware of certain alleged improprieties regarding its operations in Brazil and Mexico. Biomet retained counsel and other experts to investigate both matters. Based on the results of the investigation, Biomet terminated, suspended or otherwise disciplined certain of the employees and executives involved in these matters, and took certain other remedial measures. Additionally, pursuant to the terms of the DPA, in April 2014, Biomet disclosed these matters to the independent compliance monitor and to the DOJ and SEC.

On July 2, 2014, the SEC issued a subpoena to Biomet requiring that Biomet produce certain documents relating to such matters. Moreover, pursuant to the DPA, the DOJ has sole discretion to determine whether conduct by Biomet constitutes a violation or breach of the DPA. If the DOJ determines that the conduct underlying these investigations constitutes a violation or breach of the DPA, the DOJ could, among other things, extend or revoke the DPA or prosecute Biomet and/or the involved employees and executives. Biomet continues to cooperate with the SEC and DOJ and expects that discussions with the SEC and the DOJ will continue.”

In short, Biomet’s recent disclosure creates the risk that the company may be in breach of the DPA giving the DOJ the ability, per the terms of the DPA, to continue or resurrect the prosecution of Biomet deferred under the DPA, as well as bring an enforcement action for any conduct occurring after the DPA.

As relevant to DPAs, the DOJ maintains that such agreements “have had a truly transformative effect on particular companies and, more generally, on corporate culture across the globe.”

Yet, Biomet’s recent disclosure puts it in a category of many other companies (such as Orthofix International, Willbros Group, Marubeni, Diebold, IBM, Tyco, Aibel Group, and Ingersoll-Rand) that have become the subject of additional scrutiny or enforcement after resolving FCPA enforcement actions through a DPA or agreeing to an SEC permanent injunction.  For more, see this prior post Do NPAs and DPAs Deter?

Yet, what Biomet’s recent disclosure demonstrates is that not even companies with the greatest incentive to comply with the FCPA – and subject to post-enforcement action compliance obligations – are able to ensure FCPA compliance across its business organization or eliminate FCPA scrutiny.  In short, FCPA compliance can not be guaranteed in a business organization, rather steps can be taken that only minimize the risk of non-compliance occurring.

This fundamental fact (and it is a fact that even the enforcement agencies have recognized)  is one of the policy reasons underlying an FCPA compliance defense.  (See here for the article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense”).

Whether Biomet may ultimately be in breach of its 2012 DPA is not the only contractual term that could implicated by recent events at Biomet.

In April 2014, Biomet and Zimmer Holdings announced ”that their respective Boards of Directors have approved a definitive  agreement under which Zimmer will acquire Biomet in a cash and stock transaction valued at approximately $13.35 billion, including the assumption of net debt.” The transactions is expected to close in the first quarter of 2015.

As relevant to this pending merger, the DPA states as follows.

Sale or Merger:  Biomet agrees that in the event it sells, merges, or transfers all or substantially all of its business operations as they exist as of the date of this Agreement, whether such sale is structured as a stock or asset sale, merger, or transfer, it shall include in any contract for sale, merger, or transfer a provision binding the purchaser, or any successor in interest thereto, to the obligations described in this Agreement.”

Checking In With Richard Alderman

Tuesday, June 24th, 2014

Richard Alderman is the former Director of the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”).  Since leaving the SFO in April 2012, Alderman has remained active in anti-corruption projects.

In this Q&A, Alderman discusses certain of these projects and offers insight on the following issues:  the current international enforcement climate including multi-jurisdictional issues; voluntary disclosure; DPAs; and a compliance defense.

*****

In April 2012, you left the SFO.  What have you been doing since?

I have been working with some international institutions and NGOs dealing with anti-corruption on the front line. This is what I wanted to do because I had met a number of individuals who inspired me. Recent examples are the Convention on Business Integrity in Nigeria and an initiative by the Egyptian Junior Business Association aimed at the vibrant SME sector in Egypt. I have also had the privilege of meeting individuals involved in the radical transformation of the procurement practices of Moscow City Council.

How do you see the current international corruption enforcement scene?

We have moved on from where we were a few years ago when there were only a few states that took action in these cases. Examples of issues now are-

  • How do we deal with the interests of the different states that want to enforce the law?
  • What will be the impact of more enforcement by demand states (including demand states that are also supply states)?
  • When will law enforcement agencies uncover and prosecute corrupt companies that have no intention of complying with global rules?
  • How do we get the proceeds of settlements back to the demand states?
  • Can a system of incentives be devised to reward companies with top quality anti-corruption systems?

In current enforcement era, multiple sovereigns may have jurisdiction over the same alleged conduct.  What issues do you see regarding multi-jurisdictional enforcement?

This is becoming a key issue. I prepared a detailed report for the UNCAC conference in Panama in November 2013 that covered these and other issues.

Companies are undoubtedly at risk here. If we look at violations first, different states can prosecute for the same violation. The company’s only protection is the principle of double jeopardy but this is interpreted in different ways in different states. For example it is not an issue for the US because the US does not recognise foreign convictions and acquittals for this purpose.

This will become a particular issue when one of the enforcing states is the demand state. Why should such a state be prevented from taking action in its own courts because of a resolution elsewhere? We can expect national sovereignty issues.

Companies can also seek to exclude a state with a wide concept of double jeopardy by reaching a settlement with another state and then pleading double jeopardy in the first state. I have seen this.

The issue also arises with asset forfeiture. I do not understand how multiple states can confiscate the same asset or profit. Once the money has been paid to law enforcement somewhere then any further disgorgement is actually a criminal fine.

What about global settlements?

I am very much in favour of these. I know from my own experience that they are very difficult to bring about. The international mechanisms in Article 47 of UNCAC and Article 4(3) of the OECD Convention should be used to discuss how the different enforcing states should work together and how a global settlement should be structured. Neither mechanism has yet been used for this purpose but they are available. Enforcing states will be nervous but these mechanisms will be vital as more and more states start to enforce the law.

Do the recent Libor settlements have any implications for global settlements in corruption cases?

These settlements have been very remarkable. A UK prosecutor cannot however enter into such an agreement if there are criminal pleas in the UK. This is because the senior judge in the Innospec case said that it was wrong for the SFO to discuss the penalty to be paid by the company even if the penalty was subject to the overall approval of the court.

One consequence of the new UK DPA system is that the UK enforcing authority can enter into these discussions if what is being discussed is a DPA rather than a traditional prosecution. It will be up to the judge to decide if this is the right way forward.

The result is that UK prosecuting authorities will not be able to participate in global settlements in the future unless there is a DPA approved by the court. I see this as an issue that will be increasingly important in the UK.

Do you still favour corporate self-reporting of conduct that could implicate bribery and corruption laws?

Yes. I remain a keen supporter of self-reporting. This has however become more difficult for companies. There are two main reasons. These are-

  • No enforcing state has set out its policy on when it will refer the self-report to another state.  A company considering a self-report therefore has to think about the other states that may see the report (and whether employees are at risk). We need a proper understanding of what enforcing states should do. This needs to be publicly available and agreed by the UN and the OECD.
  • Even if the report is not passed to another state, that other state is likely to see media reports of the resolution and the admissions made by the company and decide to start its own action. There is an increasing risk of these follow up cases.

Should companies carry out their own investigations when alerted to alleged instances of improper conduct?

My experience is that major global companies take these allegations very seriously and want to see what happened. There is an issue about whether the company should self-report immediately or whether it should carry out some preliminary work to satisfy itself that there is something in the allegation. The expectations of enforcing authorities can vary here. My view has always been that the company should be satisfied first that there is something that requires detailed investigation.

I am in favour of companies carrying out their own investigations with agreement from the enforcing state about scope, milestones and regular updates. I know that some enforcing states will also want to carry out their own independent investigation. I understand the reasons for this but it means that the authority is spending its scarce resource on a case where the company is willing to cooperate and not on the more difficult cases where the company has no intention of self-reporting and cooperating. As I see it there is too little action by enforcing authorities in finding such companies and dealing with them.

Recently the U.K. adopted DPAs.  How do you feel about DPAs and what are the issues as you see them?  What issues do you see regarding DPAs?

I have always been in favour of DPAs as one tool available to prosecutors. My experience was that the UK was in a poor position in global cases with international resolutions with the traditional criminal justice tools. I saw two main advantages of DPAs. These are-

  • They can form part of a system of incentives to encourage companies to self-report and cooperate and to improve compliance.
  • They enable prosecutors to discuss global resolutions without contravening the Innospec case.

I know that the FCPA Professor has expressed considerable public opposition to DPAs. I agree that they need to be transparent and that the judges have to be fully involved. I also agree that we still need to see the traditional full prosecution with debarment in suitable cases. This could be where the company is systemically corrupt and has no intention of abandoning corruption. I want to see more of these cases being pursued by enforcing states.

The full prosecution should be part of the toolkit of the prosecutor. There should be other tools for other types of case. It is notable that the only states that have made a sustained attack on corporate corruption over the years have either not used traditional prosecution or have used it sparingly and have also used alternatives. This is significant although it seems to me to be insufficiently appreciated.

Should corporate compliance be a defence to a bribery or corruption offense or merely mitigate the potential fine and penalty amount?

I remain in favour of the compliance defence. The Bribery Act offence is an excellent model in this area. I have seen how much impact this had on companies and the scale of the improvement made in their anti-corruption work. There are a number of other states that have compliance as a defence.

There is however an issue that is going to be increasingly relevant in those states that have compliance as a defence. The public wants to see the offence produce results in terms of criminal convictions. So far there do not appear to be any in the states with a compliance defence. There will be a question about whether compliance as a defence is right or whether the US approach with compliance as mitigation is to be preferred because of the results achieved. We can expect a lot more on this. It may be one of the issues to be considered in the recently announced UK review of the effectiveness of the enforcing institutions.

You have talked publicly about sanctions and incentives for companies as it relates to bribery and corruption offenses.  Can you elaborate on this issue?

Alternatives to traditional prosecution together with self-reporting and cooperation are important incentives in the area of violations. There is though a wider issue that is not sufficiently recognised and discussed. This is whether there should be more general incentives to companies that have brought about an excellent standard of anti-corruption compliance.

There was a Recommendation by the OECD in 2009 encouraging states to look at public procurement, licenses, aid funding and export credits as a way of recognising companies with the highest standards of anti-corruption. There has been little progress on this although a few states have introduced some initiatives.

I am very much in favour of this. For example the citizens of a state will benefit if a company that meets very high standards is successful in a public procurement exercise and companies with a poor anti-corruption approach are not. If those companies with a poor record decide that they have to reform then that is a benefit to everyone.

I see this as one of the key issues in anti-corruption that will become increasingly prominent in the coming years. It has great potential to make a difference.

Confusing And Conflicting Policy Statements From The U.K. SFO

Monday, May 12th, 2014

As the United Kingdom settles into the Bribery Act and enters the “facade” era of enforcement (see here for the prior post), it is difficult to reconcile the confusing and conflicting statements from Serious Fraud Office officials.

For instance, in this recent speech by Alun Milford (SFO General Counsel) titled “Corporate Criminal Liability and Deferred Prosecution Agreements” he states:

“Whatever the offence under investigation, there can be no prosecution unless the two stage test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors is met. First, there must be sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction. If there is not, then that is the end of the matter.”

This is inconsistent with what the SFO previously said when it rolled out its Code of Practice relevant to DPAs.  In defending adoption of the “lower evidential test” in the Code of Practice and addressing concerns that this standard “was so easily satisfied as to have very little substance,” the SFO’s response was, in pertinent part, as follows.

“One of the principal purposes of DPAs is to bring a resolution to cases of corporate criminality more quickly. [...] If a prosecutor had to be satisfied that the evidence against an organization was sufficient to meet the Full Code Test (“Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge”) without the alternative of the ‘lower’ evidential test before considering whether a DPA was in the public interest, a key purpose of DPAs, as was the express intention of parliament, would become redundant. In order to achieve one of parliament’s key intentions in legislating for the introduction of DPAs a ‘lower’ evidential test is necessary.”

“Satisfaction of the Full Code Test, particularly in view of the well documented difficulties in proving corporate liability, would in most circumstances require a complete an full scale investigation, sometimes spanning many jurisdictions, which inevitably is time consuming and expensive. It is not intended for there to be such an investigation before a DPA is entered into.”

It is also difficult to square the above previous SFO statement – “it is not intended for there to be such a [full scale] investigation before a DPA is entered into” with the following statement from Milford’s recent speech regarding self-reporting:

“It is clear that we cannot accept such [self] reports at face value, especially where the company denies any wrongdoing on its part. [Note:  Query why a company would self-report if it denies any wrongdoing on its part - but that is separate issue]

Even in the case of a self-report, we will need to conduct our own, independent investigation into the extent of the wrongdoing not least because, if on initial review the case seemed right in principle for a DPA disposal, we would need to satisfy ourselves and possibly also a judge that the extent of what was reported was accurate. If, on embarking on our investigation, we find evidence trails disturbed, witnesses tipped off and their first accounts denied us, then we will find it hard to regard the company’s conduct in the preparation of the report as anything other than unhelpful, not least as we will in all probability have identified key individuals within the company as suspects who we might wish to prosecute.”

When law enforcement agencies create alternate realities with different standards and procedures – none of which have historical grounding in rule of law principles – the end result is confusing and conflicting policy statements.

That is exactly what is occurring at the present as the U.K. prepares to enter the “facade” era.