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	<title>FCPA Professor &#187; Daimler</title>
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	<description>A Forum Devoted to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</description>
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		<title>Friday Roundup</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-36</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-36#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2012 09:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mike Koehler</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monitor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Permits / Licenses / Customs / Tax]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wal-Mart]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/?p=4562</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Shining a light on monitor reports, the Wal-Mart effect, when the dust settles, and Alberto Gonzalez joins the club, it&#8217;s all here in the Friday roundup. Shining A Light on Monitor Reports As Willkie Farr &#38; Gallagher notes in this recent client alert, although the imposition of compliance monitors in FCPA enforcement actions is less frequent [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Shining a light on monitor reports, the Wal-Mart effect, when the dust settles, and Alberto Gonzalez joins the club, it&#8217;s all here in the Friday roundup.</p>
<p><strong>Shining A Light on Monitor Reports</strong></p>
<p>As Willkie Farr &amp; Gallagher notes in <a href="http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C4063%5CImposition_of_Compliance_Monitors.pdf">this</a> recent client alert, although the imposition of compliance monitors in FCPA enforcement actions is less frequent than it used to be, &#8220;companies that do receive monitors must now be concerned that their reports may be publicly disclosed.&#8221;  This is due to a recent decision (<a href="http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/KesslerFOI_opinion.pdf">here</a>) in <em>SEC v. American International Group. Inc.</em> (D.D.C.) in which Judge Gladys Kessler granted journalist Sue Reisigner&#8217;s Motion for Leave to Intervene and for Access to Monitor&#8217;s Reports.</p>
<p>In 2004, the SEC filed a complaint against AIG alleging violations of the federal securities laws.  Under the terms of the settlement consent order, AIG, among other things, agreed to retain an independent consultant, selected by the Fraud Section of the DOJ and acceptable to the SEC to review various AIG transactions.  At the conclusion of the consultant&#8217;s review, the consultant was required  to provide copies of reports of his or her findings to the SEC and DOJ.  Thereafter, the SEC and AIG filed a joint motion for clarification stating that it was not the intent of the parties that information provided by AIG to the independent consultant be disseminated or available to anyone outside of the entities identified in the consent order.  The court granted the motion.</p>
<p>Enter Sue Reisinger who filed Freedom of Information Act requests requesting disclosure of the consultant reports.  Her requests were denied citing the court&#8217;s order restricting dissemination of the reports.  Thereafter, Reisinger filed a Motion to Intervene and for Access to Monitor&#8217;s Reports.  The SEC and AIG filed a joint opposition.  Reisinger argued that &#8220;the Court should order the SEC to make the IC Reports publicly available on two grounds:  (1) a First Amendment right to access to judicial proceedings and (2) a common law right of access to judicial records.</p>
<p>As to the second issue, the key issues were whether the IC reports are a &#8220;judicial record&#8221; and if so, competing interests in publicity and secrecy.  Judge Kessler concluded that the IC reports &#8220;are relevant to the judicial function and therefore are properly considered judicial records.&#8221;  Judge Kessler stated as follows.  &#8220;The Reports may provide information leading the SEC to return to this Court to secure further relief.  In other words, the Consent Order empowers the Court to retain jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the Consent Order, including compliance with the IC Reports.&#8221;  In addition, Judge Kessler concluded that &#8220;the central role the IC Reports play in the operation of the Consent Order makes them precisely the kind of documents that must be open to the public in order for the federal courts &#8216;to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.&#8217;&#8221;  As to the balancing of interests, Judge Kessler stated that the public&#8217;s interest in favor of disclosure of the IC Reports &#8220;is overwhelming&#8221; and that &#8220;there is no question that the public interest far outweighs AIG&#8217;s or the SEC&#8217;s interest in confidentiality &#8230;&#8221;.</p>
<p>As to the first issue, Judge Kessler concluded that there is no First Amendment right of access to the IC Reports because the SEC &#8220;brought a civil, not criminal, action against AIG&#8221; and &#8220;Reisinger has not even attempted to make the requisite showing that &#8216;such access has historically been available.&#8221;   As the Willkie client alert notes however, given that Judge Kessler&#8217;s analysis as to this first issue focused on the civil nature of the proceedings, it leaves &#8220;the door open for an additional argument that the First Amendment would mandate public disclosure of corporate monitor reports in the context of a criminal settlement.&#8221;</p>
<p>As to monitors, Professor Brandon Garrett (University of Virginia Law School) and the Corporate Crime Reporter are seeking information on certain corporate monitors in the FCPA context and otherwise &#8211; see <a href="http://corporatecrimereporter.com/corporatemonitors05072012.htm">here</a>.</p>
<p><strong>The Wal-Mart Effect</strong></p>
<p>Wal-Mart is clearly not the only company subject to the FCPA that needs licenses, permits and the like when doing business in Mexico.  It is likely that Wal-Mart&#8217;s potential FCPA exposure has caused sleepless nights for many company executives doing business in Mexico and the general region.</p>
<p>The FCPA is also on the minds of investors of other companies doing business in Mexico &#8211; such as Kimco Realty Corporation (<a href="http://www.kimcorealty.com/">here</a>).</p>
<p>In a recent earnings call, a UBS analyst asked the following question.  &#8220;I hate to even ask this question. But I&#8217;m wondering if you have any comments on the Wal-Mart allegations down in Mexico and if Kimco had conducted any reviews, maybe not so much of your local Mexico employees. Maybe my concern is more toward JV partners to make sure that they&#8217;re operating to the same high ethical standards that Kimco has already operated toward.&#8221;</p>
<p>David Henry (Kimco Realty Corporation &#8211; Vice Chairman, President, CEO) answered as follows.  &#8220;Obviously, we anticipated this question, so permit me to be very, very specific in a response, and I&#8217;d like to make the following points.  One, the extent of what we know about the Wal-Mart actions is what we read in the New York Times article, the same way you did. We are not aware of any Wal-Mart improprieties with respect to any of our Mexican properties or any of our Mexican operating partners. The acquisitions and development of the Wal-Mart projects in our portfolio occurred in 2005 or later, and this is a year after the activities that were described in the article occurred.  With respect to all of our Wal-Mart projects, the developer obtained the building permit, not Wal-Mart. We employ a third-party consultant to oversee the construction process. There&#8217;s a construction manager in many cases right on site that reviews and approves every payment we make on these development projects. We also have our own Kimco employees provide asset management and oversee the project construction and approve the individual payments. As part of our normal operating procedures, all of our local Mexican development partners execute letters certifying to us they are not aware of any kind of improper payments. We have a very comprehensive FCPA policy, foreign corrupt practices act policy, at Kimco that includes extensive training for all of our employees that are directly or indirectly involved with any international projects. The training includes members of senior management and our Board are taken through this training on an annual basis.  And then I just have to zoom up to the highest level. From the very beginning, when we went to both Canada and Mexico and then South America, we really tried to set the right tone because we&#8217;ve always emphasized that we are a public company and as a public company we adhere to the highest ethical standards and we expect that all of our local operating partners to also meet those standards. So that gives you the highest level of flavor I can give you at this point.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>When the Dust Settles</strong></p>
<p>In 2010, Daimler (and certain of its subsidiaries) resolved a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement &#8211; see <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/dissecting-daimler">here</a> for the prior post.</p>
<p>As to conduct in Russia, the DOJ also filed a two count criminal information against DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (“DCAR”), a “Moscow-based, wholly-owned subsidiary of Daimler” that “sold Daimler spare parts, assisted with the sale of vehicles from various Daimler divisions in Germany, including in particular its overseas sales division (“DCOS”), to government customers in [Russia], and also imported Daimler passenger and commercial vehicles into Russia for sale to customers and distributors.”</p>
<p>The charged conduct focused on Daimler’s, DCAR’s and DCOS’s relationships with: “the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (“MVD”) a department and agency of the Russian government principally responsible for police, militia, immigration and other functions” including supervising the “Russian traffic police; “the Special Purpose Garage (“SPG”) an ‘instrumenality’ of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA; “Machinoimport a Russian government-owned and controlled purchasing agent for the City of Moscow,” an “instrumentality of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA; and “Dorinvest a Russian government-owned and controlled purchasing agent for the City of Moscow,” an “instrumentality of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA.</p>
<p>The information charged that “Daimler, through DCAR, made improper payments at the request of Russian government officials or their designess in order to secure business from Russian government customers.”  Among other things, the information charges that: “between 2000 and 2005″ Daimler’s sale of vehicles to Russian government customers was approximately “€64,660,000″ and that “in connection with these vehicle sales, DCAR and Daimler made over €3 million in improper payments to Russian government officials employed at their Russian governmental customers, their designess, or to third-party shell companies that provided no legitimate services to Daimler or DCAR with the understanding that the funds would be passed on, in whole or in part, to Russian government officials.”</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/report-investigators-drop-daimler-corruption-case-against-military/457528.html">this</a> recent article, The Moscow Times reports that Russian &#8220;investigators have reportedly dropped inquiries against military officials and employees of four companies implicated in a 2010 corruption case involving kickbacks for state purchases of Mercedes automobiles.&#8221;</p>
<p>For more on the dynamic of what I&#8217;ve called &#8220;when the dust settles&#8221; &#8211; see <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/when-the-dust-settles">this</a> prior post.</p>
<p><strong>Alberto Gonzalez Joins the Club</strong></p>
<p>What club you ask?</p>
<p>The former Attorney General who has taken a great interest in the FCPA club.  Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey&#8217;s FCPA reform activities are well known, <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-john-ashcroft-on-corporate-governance-and-the-fcpa">this</a> prior post discussed a recent FCPA speech by former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and in<a href="http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202552821910&amp;Forecasting_the_Future_of_FCPA_Enforcement"> this </a>recent article in Corporate Counsel, Gonzalez and his co-authors forecast the future of FCPA enforcement.</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>A good weekend to all.</p>
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		<title>Friday Roundup</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-37</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-37#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2012 09:08:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mike Koehler</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deferred Prosecution Agreements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FCPA Reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marathon Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monitor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Walters Power International]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Willbros Group]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/?p=4336</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A costly monitor, Daimler&#8217;s DPA debacle, meeting releases, and another addition to the list (in an unusual way), it&#8217;s all here in the Friday roundup. Willbros Monitor Costs Earlier this week, Willbros Group announced (here) &#8220;that in connection with the Company&#8217;s completion of the requirements of the DPA and expiration of the term of the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A costly monitor, Daimler&#8217;s DPA debacle, meeting releases, and another addition to the list (in an unusual way), it&#8217;s all here in the Friday roundup.</p>
<p><strong>Willbros Monitor Costs</strong></p>
<p>Earlier this week, Willbros Group announced (<a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=95816&amp;p=irol-newsArticle&amp;ID=1681131&amp;highlight=">here</a>) &#8220;that in connection with the Company&#8217;s completion of the requirements of the DPA and expiration of the term of the monitorship, on March 30, 2012, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges filed previously against the Company stemming from legacy issues in Nigeria and South America in 2005 and prior years, which led to the DPA.&#8221;  In May 2008, Willbros resolved parallel DOJ (<a href="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/May/08-crm-417.html">here</a>) and SEC (<a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20571.htm">here</a>) FCPA enforcement actions and agreed to pay approximately $32 million in combined fines and penalties.</p>
<p>Pursuant to the May 2008 DOJ DPA, the monitor was supposed to be engaged by Willbros within 60 days.  However the company disclosed that its monitor was not engaged until September 25, 2009 &#8211; an astounding year plus delay in engaging the monitor.  Furthermore, although the monitor was supposed to serve a three year term per the DPA, the early termination provisions of the DPA apparently were triggered.  Even though the monitor got a late start and its three year term was trimmed, the Willbros monitor had a nice assignment.  Doing the math from figures disclosed in various SEC filings, the Willbros monitor cost has been approximately $10.2 million subject to increase for 1st quarter 2012 expenses ($3.6 million for the year ended Dec. 31, 2011; $4 million for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010; and $2.6 million for the year ended Dec. 31, 2009).</p>
<p>During a recent earnings conference call, Randy Harl (President and CEO of Willbros) stated as follows.  &#8220;The DOJ monitorship brought great positive change to Willbros in the form of a stronger compliance culture. The cost of the monitor and the major spending to establish the required controls and processes are behind us. However, we will continue to invest in a compliance culture.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Daimler DPA Debacle</strong></p>
<p>While Willbros&#8217;s DPA expired, Daimler&#8217;s DPA was extended.  As noted by Christopher Matthews in <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/04/05/daimler-not-out-of-the-woods-in-bribery-case/">this</a> Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents report, the two year DPA was set to expire, but was extended until December 31st.  As noted in <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/dissecting-daimler">this</a> prior post, in April 2010, Daimler agreed to pay approximately $185 million to resolve parallel DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions.  The prior post, along with <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/daimler-thats-all-folks">this</a> post, noted that the prosecution was a joke from the start, among other things, U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon approved settlement on April Fool&#8217;s Day.  The DOJ&#8217;s release noted that Daimler (and three of its subsidiaries) “brazenly offered bribes in exchange for business around the world” and that Daimler “saw foreign bribery as a way of doing business.”  The DOJ alleged improper conduct all the way up to senior levels of the company, yet Daimler was not required to plead guilty to anything.</p>
<p>Instead Daimler was offered a two-year DPA. The term of the DPA could be extended if Daimler &#8220;knowingly violated any provision of the Agreement.&#8221;  <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/2012-04-04-daimler-amendment-to-dpa.pdf">This</a> recently filed amendment to the DPA is silent as to the reason for the extension.</p>
<p>I intended, but forgot, to include the above Daimler development in yesterday&#8217;s post (<a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-problem-with-fcpa-enforcement-look-no-further-than-bizjet-lufthansa-technik">here</a>) regarding NPAs and DPAs.  Needless to say, the Daimler DPA debacle furthers the rationale for abolishing such resolution vehicles.</p>
<p><strong>Chamber Sponsored FCPA Roundtable</strong></p>
<p>Earlier this week, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform hosted a roundtable discussion regarding the FCPA and upcoming FCPA guidance with Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, SEC Enforcement Division chief Robert Kuzami and Commerce Department General Counsel Kameron Kerry.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2012/april/business-coalition-engages-discussion-administration-regarding-foreign-cor">this</a> release, Lisa Rickard (President of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) stated as follows.  &#8220;The business community is pleased with today’s frank and productive discussion on the significant uncertainty that many U.S. businesses face when attempting to comply in good faith with the FCPA.  We are encouraged by the thoughtful dialogue that helped us reach a mutual understanding on many of these important issues.  We look forward to working with the administration as it prepares the forthcoming guidance.”  As noted in the release, the roundtable was attended by the following business groups or trade associations:   the Advanced Medical Technology Association, the American Insurance Association, the International Association of Drilling Contractors, the International Stability Operations Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade Council, PhRMA, the Professional Services Council, the Retail Industry Leaders Association, and The Financial Services Roundtable.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.nam.org/Communications/Articles/2012/04/Manufacturers-Urge-DOJ-and-SEC-Officials-to-Address-Uncertainty-in-Compliance-with-the-FCPA.aspx">this</a> release, Rosario Palmieri (Vice President for Infrastructure, Legal and Regulatory Policy of the National Association of Manufacturers) stated as follows.  “Manufacturers are facing a great deal of uncertainty when it comes to complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  Today we had a very productive discussion and were able to share manufacturers’ concerns. We are hopeful that a continuing dialogue with the Administration will help us meet our mutual goals of increasing exports, stamping out corruption and providing clear rules of the road for international business.”</p>
<p><strong>Another Addition to the List</strong></p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.transparency.org.pk/news/newsdetail.php?nid=6303">this</a> recent release, Transparency International urges the DOJ to investigate the conduct of Walters Power International  (an Oklahoma based company that supplies, develops, services and manages electrical generation power plants around the world see <a href="http://www.walterspower.com/">here</a>) in connection with power plant projects in Pakistan.  It is certainly not the traditional way in which companies become the subject of FCPA scrutiny, but even so it makes the list, and according to my tally, in the last seven weeks, eight companies have newly become the focus of FCPA scrutiny.</p>
<p>Also, last week&#8217;s post (<a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-latest-disclosures">here</a>) discussed recent Libya related disclosures by Total S.A. and Eni S.p.A.  It turns out that Marathon Oil Corp. can be added to that list.  In its recent annual report, the company stated as follows.  &#8220;On May 25, 2011, we received a subpoena issued by the SEC requiring production of documents related to payments made to the government of Libya, or to officials and persons affiliated with officials of the government of Libya. We have been and intend to continue cooperating with the SEC in its investigation.&#8221;</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>A good weekend to all.</p>
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		<title>The Siemens Argentina Individual Enforcement Actions Are A Step Forward, But Issues Remain</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-siemens-argentina-individual-enforcement-actions-are-a-step-forward-but-issues-remain</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-siemens-argentina-individual-enforcement-actions-are-a-step-forward-but-issues-remain#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 10:06:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mike Koehler</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debarment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eckhardt Amendment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FCPA Jurisprudence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Individual Enforcement Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens Argentina Enforcement Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. v. McLean]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/?p=3155</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Last week (see here for the prior post) the DOJ and SEC brought FCPA enforcement actions against several former executives and agents of Siemens.  As noted in this initial post, the enforcement action comes nearly three years after the Siemens corporate enforcement action, a portion of which concerned improper conduct in Argentina and allegations that Siemens [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week (see <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/in-depth-on-the-siemens-argentina-enforcement-action">here</a> for the prior post) the DOJ and SEC brought FCPA enforcement actions against several former executives and agents of Siemens.  As noted in <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-siemens-executives-and-agents-charged">this</a> initial post, the enforcement action comes nearly three years after the Siemens corporate enforcement action, a portion of which concerned improper conduct in Argentina and allegations that Siemens S.A. (Argentina), and those acting on its behalf, engaged in a bribery scheme in connection with an Argentine government contract to produce national identity cards.</p>
<p>The Siemens Argentina individual enforcement actions were brought after the DOJ faced scrutiny for not bringing any individual enforcement action in connection with a bribery scheme &#8220;unprecedented in scale and geographic reach&#8221; in which there existed at Siemens a “corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the company.”</p>
<p>Thus, the Siemens Argentina individual enforcement actions with allegations (and that is all they are at this point) of individual improper conduct are a welcome development and the DOJ ought to be recognized for bringing what will likely be a difficult case to prosecute.  Among other things, extradition issues loom, and many of the defendants are likely to aggressively mount a defense.</p>
<p>While a welcome development, two facts remain unchanged by last week&#8217;s development.</p>
<p>First, Siemens itself was never charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations for the same conduct its former employees and agents are now facing FCPA anti-bribery charges.  The reason is that FCPA anti-bribery charges would have hurt Siemens too much.  In its sentencing memorandum (<a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensvenez-sent.pdf">here</a>), the DOJ in explaining its charging decisions specifically stated as follows.  &#8220;The Department&#8217;s analysis of collateral consequences included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.&#8221;  As noted last week in a Wall Street Journal article by Vanessa Fuhrmans &#8220;Shrugging Off Bribery Case, Siemens Gains Favor in the U.S.&#8221; (<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203893404577098632947522176.html?mod=WSJ_business_whatsNews">here</a>),  &#8220;three years after Siemens AG reached a record foreign-bribery settlement with U.S. authorities, the German industrial conglomerate is capitalizing on business from an unexpected place—the U.S. government.&#8221;  Among things, the article notes that &#8220;Siemens today isn&#8217;t just benefitting from its ongoing business with the government. It&#8217;s made capturing more business and influence in Washington a central part of its U.S. strategy.&#8221; </p>
<p>In short, the notion that certain companies selling certain products to certain customers are essentially immune from FCPA anti-bribery scrutiny remains a troubling issue, notwithstanding last week&#8217;s development. </p>
<p>[Incidentally, under the FCPA's former so-called Eckhardt amendment, the lack of FCPA anti-bribery charges against Siemens would have precluded the FCPA anti-bribery charges the individuals now face.  See <em>U.S. v. McLean</em>, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984)  ("[B]oth the language of the Act and its legislative history reveal a clear intent to impose criminal sanctions against the employee who acts at the behest of and for the benefit of his employer only where his employer has been convicted of similar FCPA violations. [...] We hold that in order to convict an employee under the FCPA for acts committed for the benefit of his employer, the government must first convict the employer.&#8221;]</p>
<p>Second, even with last week&#8217;s development, the fact remains that the DOJ and SEC have addressed - through individual enforcement actions - only a sliver of the conduct at issue in the 2008 enforcement action.  As alleged by the enforcement agencies, the corruption at Siemens involved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas.  As alleged (see <a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20829.pdf">here</a>) &#8220;among the transactions on which Siemens paid bribes were those to design and build metro transit lines in Venezuela; metro trains and signaling devices in China; power plants in Israel; high voltage transmission lines in China; mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh; telecommunications projects in Nigeria; national identity cards in Argentina; medical devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia; traffic control systems in Russia; refineries in Mexico; and mobile communications networks in Vietnam.&#8221; </p>
<p>Some individual or individuals presumably paid or authorized these numerous non-Argentina bribes.   If last week&#8217;s development is the only individual enforcement actions resulting from the 2008 Siemens enforcement action, continued scrutiny and asking of the why questions is warranted.</p>
<p>What other egregious corporate FCPA enforcement action might yield future individual enforcement actions?  Based on the DOJ&#8217;s allegations, Daimler would seem like a good bet.  See <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/will-there-be-any-daimler-related-prosecutions">here</a> for the prior post.</p>
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		<title>Will There Be Any Daimler-Related Prosecutions?</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/will-there-be-any-daimler-related-prosecutions</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/will-there-be-any-daimler-related-prosecutions#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Sep 2011 09:14:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mike Koehler</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Third Parties]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/?p=2357</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Bribery schemes are often facilitated, aided and abetted, and enabled by third parties and with increasing frequency the DOJ targets such enablers.  In November 2009, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated as follows.  &#8220;The use of intermediaries to pay bribes will not escape prosecution under the FCPA.  The Department will continue to hold accountable all [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bribery schemes are often facilitated, aided and abetted, and enabled by third parties and with increasing frequency the DOJ targets such enablers.  In November 2009, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated as follows.  &#8220;The use of intermediaries to pay bribes will not escape prosecution under the FCPA.  The Department will continue to hold accountable all the players in an FCPA scheme – from the companies and their executives who hatch the scheme, to the consultant they retain to carry it out.“  Recent FCPA enforcement actions that have targeted such enablers include:  Jeffrey Tesler and Wojciech Chodan (in connection with the Bonny Island, Nigeria cases); the Aquilars (in connection with the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action); Ousama Naaman (in connection with the Innospec enforcement action); and Paul Novak (in connection with the Willsbro enforcement action).</p>
<p>The March 2010 FCPA enforcement action against Daimler and its related entities (see <a href="http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/dissecting-daimler">here</a> for the prior post) contained unusually detailed allegations concerning the conduct of various enablers in Daimler&#8217;s bribery scheme.  Thus, back in March 2010, I observed as follows.  &#8220;The alleged improper payments involved dozens and dozens of third parties, including several located in the U.S., which were allegedly utilized by Daimler and its affiliates to bribe foreign officials. Given Daimler’s use of numerous U.S. based entities, it will be interesting to see if any of these U.S. entities and/or entity employees will be prosecuted for their role in the respective bribery schemes.&#8221;</p>
<p>A year and a half has passed, there have been no related prosecutions, and it is appropriate to again ask the question &#8211; will any U.S. enablers of Daimler&#8217;s bribery scheme be held accountable?</p>
<p><em>Based on the DOJ&#8217;s allegations in the Daimler enforcement action</em>, the following entities would seem to be the most logical candidates.</p>
<p>M.F. Mechanical &amp; Electrical, Inc. (Daimler payment to the entity for the benefit of Chinese &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; &#8211; para 50 of Daimler AG information);</p>
<p>Shores International, a Texas corporation (Daimler payment to the entity for the benefit of the wife of a Chinese government official &#8211; para 51 of Daimler AG information);</p>
<p>Lily Energy Services, Inc., a Texas corporation (Daimler payment to the entity for the benefit of Chinese &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; &#8211; para 52 of Daimler AG information);</p>
<p>King Jack Inc., a California corporation (Daimler payment to the entity for the benefit of Chinese &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; &#8211;  para 53 of Daimler AG information);</p>
<p>Oldenburgh Financial Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, and United Petrol Group LLP, incorporated in Oregon (Daimler payments to the entities for the benefit of Latvian government officials &#8211;  para 106 of Daimler AG information);</p>
<p>Biotop Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Marketing Research and Consultants LLC, a Wyoming corporation (Daimler payments to the entities for the benefit of Croatian government officials &#8211; para 123-128 of Daimler AG information)</p>
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		<title>Turkey and the FCPA</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/turkey-and-the-fcpa-2</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/turkey-and-the-fcpa-2#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Nov 2010 10:37:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delta and Pine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Micrus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[York]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fcpaprofessor.com/turkey-and-the-fcpa-2</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The following FCPA enforcement actions have involved (in whole or in part) business conduct in Turkey. Daimler AG (March 2010) In March 2010, Damiler AG agreed to settle a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement action alleging that &#8220;between 1998 and January 2008, Daimler made hundreds of improper payments worth tens of milions of dollars to foreign officials [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The following FCPA enforcement actions have involved (in whole or in part) business conduct in Turkey.</p>
<p><strong>Daimler AG (March 2010)</strong></p>
<p>In March 2010, Damiler AG agreed to settle a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement action alleging that &#8220;between 1998 and January 2008, Daimler made hundreds of improper payments worth tens of milions of dollars to foreign officials in at least 22 countries &#8211; including China, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Latvia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, <strong>Turkey</strong>, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and others &#8211; to assist in securing contracts with government customers for the purchase of Daimler vehicles valued at hundreds of milions of dollars.&#8221;</p>
<p>As to <strong>Turkey</strong>, the criminal information (<a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/daimlerag-info.pdf">here</a>) charges that Daimler&#8217;s Corporate Audit Department &#8220;discovered three binders located in a safe at MB Turk&#8217;s [a Daimler subsidiary in Turkey] offices in Istabul&#8221; that, along with other evidence, demonstrated that &#8220;MB Turk made approximately €6.05 million in payments to third parties in connection with vehicle export transactions that involved the sale of vehicles to non-Turkish government customers in North Korea, Latvia, Bulgaria, Libya, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other countries in deals with revenues of approximately €95 million.&#8221; According to the information, at least €3.88 million of the €6.05 million comprised of &#8220;improper payments and gifts [...] paid to foreign government officials or to third parties with the understanding that the payments and gifts would be passed on, in whole or in part, to foreign government officials to assist in securing the sale of Daimler vehicles to government customers.&#8221;</p>
<p>Daimler agreed to pay $185 million in combined DOJ and SEC fines and penalties (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-360.html">here</a>).</p>
<p><strong>York International Corp. (Oct. 2007)</strong></p>
<p>In October 2007, York International Corporation (York), a global provider of heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration products and services, agreed to pay approximately $22 million in combined fines and penalties to settle DOJ and SEC enforcement actions principally relating to improper payments made by various subsidiaries to the Iraqi government under the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. The enforcement action also involved certain other improper payments made in connection with government projects in Bahrain, Egypt, India, <strong>Turkey</strong> and the United Arab Emirates. (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/2007/10/10-01-07york-defer.pdf">here</a>).</p>
<p><strong>Delta &#038; Pine Land Co. (July 2007)</strong></p>
<p>In July 2007, the SEC announced a settled FCPA enforcement action against Delta &#038; Pine Land Company, a Mississippi-based cottonseed company, and its subsidiary, Turk Deltapine, Inc. According to the SEC, between 2001 &#8211; 2006, Turk Deltapine made payments of approximately $43,000 to officials of the Turkish Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs in order to obtain various governmental reports and certifications that were necessary for Turk Deltapine to obtain, retain and operate its business in Turkey. Per the complaint, the improper payments were discovered by Delta &#038; Pine, but instead of halting the payments, the payments continued via a third party supplier and pursuant to an inflated invoice scheme. Based on the above conduct, Delta &#038; Pine and Turk Deltapine jointly agreed to pay a $300,000 civil penalty and engage an independent compliance consultant. (see <a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20214.htm">here</a> and <a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20214.pdf">here</a>).</p>
<p><strong>Micrus Corp. (March 2005)</strong></p>
<p>In March 2005, Micrus Corporation, a privately-held California medical device manufacturer, agreed to a two year non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ to resolve its FCPA liability in connection with over $100,000 in payments (disguised in the company&#8217;s books and records as stock options, honorariums and commissions) to physicians employed at publicly owned and operated hospitals in France, <strong>Turkey</strong>, Spain, and Germany.(see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/2005/03/2005_3860_micruscorp030205.pdf">here</a>) and <a href="http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/micrus.pdf">here</a>)</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>Thanks for reading, safe travels, and may your turkey be golden brown!</p>
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		<title>When the Dust Settles</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/when-the-dust-settles</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/when-the-dust-settles#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2010 10:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Official]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Related Foreign Investigations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fcpaprofessor.com/when-the-dust-settles</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Documents used to resolve a typical FCPA enforcement action (whether a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement, plea, or settled civil complaint) are often peppered with vague generalities. This is not surprising given that there is little serious threat of defense challenges and/or judicial scrutiny. One element that is often vaguely described is the &#8220;foreign official&#8221; [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Documents used to resolve a typical FCPA enforcement action (whether a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement, plea, or settled civil complaint) are often peppered with vague generalities.</p>
<p>This is not surprising given that there is little serious threat of defense challenges and/or judicial scrutiny.</p>
<p>One element that is often vaguely described is the &#8220;foreign official&#8221; recipient of the alleged bribe. (This is in contrast to what the U.K. SFO has been doing in some of its recent enforcement actions when it &#8220;names names&#8221; &#8211; see <a href="http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/41953/sfo-annex2-statement-01-250909.pdf">here</a> and <a href="http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/105634/opening%20note%2018.03.10.pdf">here</a>).</p>
<p>For instance, in the recent Daimler action (see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/03/dissecting-daimler.html">here</a>), certain of the &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; are described simply as follows:</p>
<p>&#8220;Nigerian government officials,&#8221; &#8220;high-level members of the executive branch of the Nigerian government,&#8221; &#8220;high-level executive branch official of Nigeria,&#8221; and &#8220;a member of the Nigerian police force&#8221; and</p>
<p>&#8220;senior official of a [Egypt] government owned factory.&#8221;</p>
<p>Given the ease in which information now flows and the world-wide interest in corruption and bribery, FCPA enforcement actions are read around the world. </p>
<p>Not only by foreign government officials and law enforcement agencies, but also by foreign media, foreign-based non-governmental organizations, and just plain old people.</p>
<p>It is thus not surprising that when the dust settles on the <em>U.S.</em> FCPA enforcement action, many are left wondering &#8230; who are those &#8220;foreign officials&#8221;?</p>
<p>For the foreign government involved, it is potentially embarrassing to have &#8220;one of your own&#8221; (assuming that all &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; in FCPA enforcement actions are properly deemed as such) become the focus of a bribery investigation in the U.S. without doing something about it &#8220;at home.&#8221;</p>
<p>Thus, with increasing frequency, one sees stories such as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE6562AZ20100607?type=marketsNews">this</a> recent Reuters report which details how the Nigeria Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has begun to probe the alleged bribe payments to the Nigerian &#8220;foreign officials&#8221; mentioned above.</p>
<p>What about that &#8220;senior official of a [Egypt] government owned factory&#8221;? </p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been told that this issue has become sort of a guessing game in Egypt and that Egyptian authorities have launched an investigation (see <a href="http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/attorney-general-requests-govt-daimler-benz-contracts">here</a>)</p>
<p>Whether such foreign government investigations are bona fide or merely politically expediate cover is a valid question.</p>
<p>However, the take-away point is that just because the <em>U.S.</em> Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action is over, does not necessarily mean that all the dust has settled.  Often, other persons, for entirely different reasons, remain interested.</p>
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		<title>The Holder Memo and FCPA Enforcement</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-holder-memo-and-fcpa-enforcement</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-holder-memo-and-fcpa-enforcement#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jun 2010 11:01:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[BAE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Charles Paul Edward Jumet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Enforcement Agency Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Enforcement Agency Speeches]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-holder-memo-and-fcpa-enforcement</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Attorney General Eric Holder recently issued a memo (here) regarding &#8220;Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing.&#8221; There is little that is new is this memo; in fact Holder states that the purpose of the memo is &#8220;to reaffirm the guidance&#8221; provided by Title 9 of the U.S. Attorneys&#8217; Manual, Chapter 27&#8243; (see here) &#8211; a [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Attorney General Eric Holder recently issued a memo (<a href="http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/holdermemo.pdf">here</a>) regarding &#8220;Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing.&#8221;</p>
<p>There is little that is new is this memo; in fact Holder states that the purpose of the memo is &#8220;to <em>reaffirm</em> the guidance&#8221; provided by Title 9 of the U.S. Attorneys&#8217; Manual, Chapter 27&#8243; (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm">here</a>) &#8211; a manual which has &#8220;guided federal prosecutors&#8221; for &#8220;nearly three decades.&#8221;</p>
<p>Nor is there anything FCPA specific in the memo.</p>
<p>Yet the memo, and the broad pronouncements Holder makes, call into question whether several recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions <em>contradict</em> the guidance the Attorney General has reaffirmed.</p>
<p>In the memo, Holder states &#8211; &#8220;persons who commit similar crimes and have similar culpability should, to the extent possible, be treated similarly.&#8221; </p>
<p>Under the law, &#8220;persons&#8221; include both individuals and business entities, including corporations.</p>
<p>However, as explored in <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/04/two-tiered-justice.html">this</a> post, a two-tiered justice system has seemingly developed in FCPA enforcement. </p>
<p>Certain corporations in certain industries, most often selling certain things to certain customers, can seemingly violate the FCPA&#8217;s anti-bribery provisions with very little consequence. In fact, with increasingly frequency, such companies are not even charged with FCPA antibribery violations and/or may not even have to plead guilty to anything. See <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/03/dissecting-daimler.html">here</a> for the recent Daimler, <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/02/bae-non-bribery-bribery-allegations.html">here</a> for the recent BAE, and <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2009/11/was-dojs-fcpa-enforcement-action.html">here</a> for the Siemens &#8220;bribery, yet no bribery&#8221; enforcement actions. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the DOJ seeks long prison sentences for individuals such as Charles Paul Edward Jumet, who make payments that <em>pale</em> in comparison to the payments made by the above corporations. In doing so, the DOJ usually trots out its get tough language (i.e. &#8220;bribery isn&#8217;t just a cost of doing business overseas [... but] a serious crime that the U.S. government is intent on enforcing&#8221;).</p>
<p>The Holder memo also states &#8220;in accordance with long-standing principle, a federal prosecutor should ordinarly charge &#8216;the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant&#8217;s conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.&#8221; </p>
<p>Again, reference is made to the Daimler, BAE, and Siemens enforcement actions. </p>
<p>In Daimler, the DOJ release (<a href="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-360.html">here</a>) notes that Daimler &#8220;brazenly offered bribes in exchange for business around the world&#8221; and that Daimler &#8220;saw foreign bribery as a way of doing business.&#8221; Yet, Daimler was <strong>not</strong> charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations. In fact, Daimler was not required to plead guilty to anything as it received a deferred prosecution agreement.</p>
<p>In BAE, the DOJ&#8217;s criminal information (<a href="http://www.mediafire.com/?id1z55n4mxk">here</a>) alleges that “BAE provided substantial benefits to one KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) public official, who was in a position of influence regarding the KSA Fighter Deals (the “KSA Official”), and to the KSA Official’s associates.” The indictment alleges that BAE “provided these benefits through various payment mechanisms both in the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. and elsewhere.” Yet, BAE was <strong>not</strong> charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations.</p>
<p>In Siemens, the DOJ release (<a href="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html">here</a>) states, among other things, that for &#8220;much of its operations across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure for Siemens.&#8221; Yet, Siemens was <strong>not</strong> charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations.</p>
<p>It is difficult to reconcile the charging decisions in these recent enforcement actions with the language of the Holder memo.</p>
<p>As to sentencing, the Holder memo states &#8211; &#8220;in a typical case&#8221; the appropriate sentence should be reflected by the &#8220;applicable guidelines range, and prosecutors should generally continue to advocate for a sentence within that range.&#8221;</p>
<p>Apparently, neither Siemens and Daimler were &#8220;typical&#8221; cases, because in both enforcement actions the DOJ advocated for a sentence significantly below the guidelines range. </p>
<p>In Siemens, the guidelines range (see <a href="http://www.foley.com/files/SiemensDOJSentencingMemo.pdf">here</a>) was $1.35 billion &#8211; $2.7 billion. However, the ultimate DOJ fine was $448.5 million. Siemens did not voluntarily disclose the conduct at issue, nevertheless, the DOJ gave Siemens greater sentencing credit than allowed for under the guidelines because the guidelines calculation was &#8220;incongruent with the level of cooperation and assistance provided by the company in the Department’s investigation.&#8221; For more on Siemens&#8217; fine, see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/05/doj-speaks.html">here</a> and <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/05/breuer-siemens-investigation-as-to.html">here</a>.</p>
<p>In Daimler, the guidelines range (see <a href="http://www.mediafire.com/?myt1menzu32">here</a>) was $116 million &#8211; $232 million. However, the ultimate DOJ fine was approximately $94 million. Again, Daimler did not voluntarily disclose the conduct at issue, nevertheless, the DOJ gave Daimler greater sentencing credit allowed for under the guidelines. The DOJ stated, &#8220;indeed, because Daimler did not voluntarily disclose its conduct prior to the filing of the whistleblower lawsuit, it only receives a two-point reduction in its culpability.&#8221; However, the DOJ &#8220;respectfully submit[ed] that such reduction is incongruent with the level of cooperation and assistance provided by the company in the Department&#8217;s investigation.&#8221; </p>
<p>As demonstrated above, three of the DOJ&#8217;s most high-profile FCPA or &#8220;FCPA like&#8221; enforcement actions seemingly contradict many of the guiding principles in the Holder memo.</p>
<p>With Attorney General Holder now re-affirming these principles, it will be interesting to see if future FCPA enforcement actions comply more closely with these principles or if the future holds more facade enforcement actions.</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>Speaking of Attorney General Holder, while most of us were enjoying the Memorial Day barbeque, he was delivering remarks at the OECD Conference in Paris.  See <a href="http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html">here</a> for a copy of his remarks.</p>
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		<title>Congressman Towns Is Asking The Right Questions</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/congressman-towns-is-asking-the-right-questions</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/congressman-towns-is-asking-the-right-questions#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2010 11:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[BAE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congressional Activity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debarment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[KBR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fcpaprofessor.com/congressman-towns-is-asking-the-right-questions</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[One interesting, surprising, and controversial aspect of FCPA enforcement is that the U.S. government remains a lucrative customer for many FCPA violators, including some of the most egregious violators. Last December, on the one-year anniversary of the record-setting Siemens enforcement actions, I ran this post &#8211; &#8220;Siemens &#8230; The Year After.&#8221; Among other things, the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One interesting, surprising, and controversial aspect of FCPA enforcement is that the U.S. government remains a lucrative customer for many FCPA violators, including some of the most egregious violators.</p>
<p>Last December, on the one-year anniversary of the record-setting Siemens enforcement actions, I ran this <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2009/12/siemens-year-after.html">post</a> &#8211; &#8220;Siemens &#8230; The Year After.&#8221;  </p>
<p>Among other things, the post noted that in the year since resolution of the Siemens FCPA matter, the U.S. government continues to do substantial business with the company it charged with engaging in a pattern of bribery “unprecedented in scale and geographic scope.”</p>
<p>Using www.recovery.gov, the post then identifies many of the hundreds of government contracts awarded to Siemens&#8217; business units with funds made available from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the $787 billion stimulus bill passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in February 2009. </p>
<p>These contracts have been awarded by the following government agencies: Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of Transportation, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy, Department of Commerce, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the General Services Administration.  According to Recovery.gov, even the DOJ (i.e. the same government agency that prosecuted Siemens for a pattern of bribery the agency termed “unprecedented in scale and geographic scope”) awarded a Siemens business unit a contract funded with stimulus dollars.  Because these are just government contracts awarded with stimulus money, they represent merely the tip of the iceberg.</p>
<p>Siemens is not alone.</p>
<p>In February, BAE settled &#8220;FCPA-like&#8221; charges.  Since the enforcement action, the company has been inking contracts with U.S. government agencies left and right.</p>
<p>Last week it was a $10.7 million contract with the U.S. Army (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110417142356.html">here</a>). The week before it was a $5.5 million contract and a $10 million contract with U.S. government agencies (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110412172322.html">here</a> and <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_11041114155.html">here</a>).</p>
<p>Numerous other FCPA violators could be listed as well.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, Congressman Edolphus Towns (D-NY), Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, is asking the right questions.</p>
<p>In a May 18th letter to Attorney General Eric Holder (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_11041114155.html">here</a>) the Committee expresses its concern &#8220;that settlements of civil and criminal cases by DOJ are being used as a shield to foreclose other appropriate remedies, such as suspension and debarment, that protect the government from continuing to do business with contractors who do not have satisfactory records of quality performance and business ethics.&#8221;</p>
<p>The letter specifically mentions Kellogg, Brown &#038; Root (KBR), including its 2009 FCPA enforcement action (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kellogg-brown.html">here</a> and <a href="http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm">here</a>).</p>
<p>The letter notes that &#8220;remarkably, neither the criminal [FCPA] conviction&#8221; nor KBR&#8217;s other legal woes &#8220;have precluded KBR from continuing to receive new government contracts.&#8221;</p>
<p>The letter then correctly notes, as detailed above, that &#8220;KBR does not appear to be an isolated example of this inconsistent policy whereby DOJ pursues fines and criminal sanctions for illegal actions by government contractors, yet the negotiated resolution of these cases does not have any effect on the company&#8217;s eligibility to continue to receive new contracts. In fact, an agreement by DOJ to intervene on the company&#8217;s behalf in any collateral proceedings, such as suspension and debarment, is a staple of deferred prosecution agreements.&#8221;</p>
<p>The letter continues:</p>
<p>&#8220;This type of clause, in which DOJ agrees to take the company&#8217;s side in suspension and debarment proceedings, has become standard and continues to this day. In a settlement just last month in which Daimler paid $185 million to settle criminal and civil charges that it violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DOJ &#8220;agrees to cooperate with Daimler&#8221; &#8220;[w]ith respect to Daimler&#8217;s present reliability and responsibility as a government contractor.&#8221;  (See <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/daimlerag-def-agree.pdf">here</a> for the Deferred Prosecution Agreement &#8211; para 21).</p>
<p>The letter concludes by the Committee asking for answers to the following questions by May 28th.</p>
<p>1. Does DOJ consider resolution of charges to foreclose action by other government agencies to suspend or debar companies from contracting?</p>
<p>2. In view of the fact that suspension and debarment is not a penalty, but is an important means for government agencies to protect themselves from unscrupulous and poorly performing contractors, please provide a detailed explanation of whether the Justice Department believes it is in the government&#8217;s best interest to continue to award contracts to those with a record of violations of law.</p>
<p>3. Does DOJ consult with federal government contracting authorities when entering into settlement agreements with companies that compete for government contracts?</p>
<p>4. Identify all instances in which DOJ officials intervened in a suspension and debarment proceeding on behalf of government contractors since 2005 and explain the basis for the DOJ intervention.</p>
<p>These are all the right questions to ask of the DOJ.  </p>
<p>I&#8217;ve noted in numerous other posts (and elsewhere) that DOJ&#8217;s deterrance message will not fully be heard until an FCPA violator is debarred from receiving lucrative government contracts.  </p>
<p>For a copy of the Committee&#8217;s news release (see <a href="http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&#038;view=article&#038;id=4938:chairman-towns-questions-effectiveness-of-dojs-contractor-settlements&#038;catid=3:press-releases&#038;Itemid=49">here</a>).</p>
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		<title>The FCPA and Reputational Damage</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-fcpa-and-reputational-damage</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-fcpa-and-reputational-damage#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2010 11:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Avon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BAE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[H-P]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reputational Damage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Nearly every FCPA presentation one sees or hears seems to talk about collateral sanctions which flow from an FCPA enforcement action, including the reputational harm companies &#8220;suffer&#8221; when disclosing FCPA issues or settling FCPA enforcement actions. But is it true? Do companies that disclose FCPA issues or settle FCPA enforcement actions actually suffer any reputational [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nearly every FCPA presentation one sees or hears seems to talk about collateral sanctions which flow from an FCPA enforcement action, including the reputational harm companies &#8220;suffer&#8221; when disclosing FCPA issues or settling FCPA enforcement actions.</p>
<p>But is it true?</p>
<p>Do companies that disclose FCPA issues or settle FCPA enforcement actions actually suffer any reputational damage?</p>
<p>For companies, reputation is traditionally measured by stock price performance and business revenue.</p>
<p>Do companies that disclose FCPA issues or settle FCPA enforcement actions have a decrease in stock price or lose business?</p>
<p>How does one even measure such an issue?</p>
<p>Stock price movement upon the market first learning of a potential FCPA issue? Stock price movement upon settlement of an FCPA enforcement action? Something in between? Business revenue during the period of uncertainty (i.e. from disclosure to settlement)? Business revenue in the year after settlement of an FCPA enforcement action?</p>
<p>Whatever the metric, the answer to whether companies suffer reputational damage upon disclosing an FCPA issue or settling an FCPA enforcement action seems to be inconclusive.</p>
<p>That was the conclusion of a January 2009 study by Nera Economic Consulting (see <a href="http://www.nera.com/image/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109_Final2.pdf">here</a>). Among other things, the study concluded that &#8220;the extent of the fallout from the relatively recent trend of increased FCPA enforcement actions remains uncertain.&#8221; For some companies &#8220;there was no statistically significant price reaction&#8221; yet for other companies there was a &#8220;negative price reaction.&#8221;</p>
<p>The below examples also seem to support the inconclusive answer.</p>
<p>Last month, (see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/H-P">here</a>) Hewlett-Packard Co.&#8217;s (HP) Moscow offices were raided in connection with an investigation focusing on whether company executives made millions in payments to the prosecutor general of the Russian Federation to secure contracts. It was front page news in several publications, including the Wall Street Journal. This week HP (see <a href="http://h30261.www3.hp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71087&#038;p=irol-newsArticle&#038;ID=1428528&#038;highlight=">here</a>) disclosed second quarter results (the same quarter the issue surfaced).  The results &#8230; stellar.  &#8220;Second quarter net revenue of $30.8 billion, up 13%, or $3.5 billion, from a year earlier.&#8221;  HP&#8217;s Chairman and CEO said &#8220;HP had an exceptional quarter with strong performance across every region,&#8221; &#8211; &#8220;we&#8217;ve built the best portfolio in the industry, and our customers are responding. We&#8217;re winning in the marketplace, investing for the future and confident in the enormous opportunity that lies ahead.&#8221;  What about the company&#8217;s performance in Russia?  Even better.  The HP release notes &#8220;revenue from outside of the United States in the second quarter accounted for 66% of total HP revenue, with revenue in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) increasing 25% while accounting for 10% of total HP revenue.&#8221; </p>
<p>Front page press coverage of HP&#8217;s potential FCPA issues seems to have had no affect on the company&#8217;s reputation when viewed through the prism of financial performance.</p>
<p>What about Siemens?</p>
<p>In the 365 days after the Siemens enforcement action, Siemens outperformed its competitors and received mounds of new business from the U.S. government, including taxpayer funds from the $787 billion stimulus bill passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in February 2009 (see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2009/12/siemens-year-after.html">here</a>). This despite the fact (according to DOJ statements) that Siemens engaged in a pattern of bribery &#8220;unprecedented in scale and geographic scope&#8221; and for much of Siemens operations around the world &#8220;bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure.&#8221;  Siemens surely paid a hefty fine/penalty amount, but did its reputation suffer?  It would appear not.</p>
<p>What about BAE?</p>
<p>When the BAE &#8220;FCPA-like&#8221; enforcement action was announced, the company&#8217;s stock rose. Since the February 2010 enforcement action, the company has been inking contracts with the U.S. and U.K. governments (the prosecuting governments) left and right. This week it was a $10.7 million contract with the U.S. Army (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110417142356.html">here</a>). Last week it was a $5.5 million contract and a $10 million contract with U.S. government agencies (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110412172322.html">here</a> and <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_11041114155.html">here</a>). Throw in a recent £111 million contract from the UK&#8217;s Ministry of Defence (see <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_110231144433.html">here</a>) and one would be justified in concluding that it matters very little if a company is caught engaging in bribery and corruption.</p>
<p>However, just when one is set to reach such a conclusion, along comes a company like Avon. Last month, the company shares dropped 8% upon news that its previously disclosed FCPA issues appear to have escalated. (see <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1318680420100413">here</a>, <a href="http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2010/05/03/what-is-the-cost-of-fcpa-compliance-or-what-is-the-cost-of-non-compliance/">here</a> and <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/Avon">here</a>).  It sure looks like Avon&#8217;s reputation (viewed through the prism of its stock price) has suffered because of the FCPA escalation.</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>Somewhat &#8220;on topic&#8221; is the recent news that Daimler AG, after a 17 year listing on the New York Stock Exchange, has decided to delist.  Purely coincidence that this delisting is occuring approximately one month after Daimler resolved its FCPA case?</p>
<p>Daimler agreed to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement for conspiring to violate the FCPA&#8217;s books and records provisions and knowingly falsifying books, records and accounts, <em>provisions which only apply to &#8220;issuers&#8221;</em>.  </p>
<p>(The DOJ&#8217;s allegations as to Daimler also allege use of U.S. bank accounts and U.S. entities &#8211; an independent basis by which a foreign company like Daimler can become subject to the FCPA).  For more on the Daimler enforcement action (see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/03/dissecting-daimler.html">here</a> and <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/04/daimler-thats-all-folks_01.html">here</a>).</p>
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		<title>Breuer &#8211; Siemens Investigation (As to Individuals) Remains Open</title>
		<link>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/breuer-siemens-investigation-as-to-individuals-remains-open</link>
		<comments>http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/breuer-siemens-investigation-as-to-individuals-remains-open#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 May 2010 11:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Congressional Activity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daimler]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Enforcement Agency Speeches]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Individual Enforcement Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siemens]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Last week, Lanny Breuer (Assistant Attorney General &#8211; Criminal Division) testified before The Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. During his Q&#038;A exchange with Senator Arlen Specter, Breuer stated that &#8220;individuals, executives and others who were involved [in the Siemens bribery scandal], remain exposed and the matter is not closed.&#8221; Why was Specter [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week, Lanny Breuer (Assistant Attorney General &#8211; Criminal Division) testified before The Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. During his Q&#038;A exchange with Senator Arlen Specter, Breuer stated that &#8220;individuals, executives and others who were involved [in the Siemens bribery scandal], remain exposed and the matter is not closed.&#8221;</p>
<p>Why was Specter asking Breuer about the Siemens enforcement action?</p>
<p>A bit of background.</p>
<p>In December 2008, right in time for the holidays, the DOJ put a nice &#8220;bribery, yet no bribery&#8221; bow on the Siemens enforcement action. </p>
<p>According to the DOJ, for much of Siemens operations around the world &#8220;bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure.&#8221; The egregious nature of Siemens conduct is set forth in the criminal information (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/siemensakt-info.pdf">here</a>). </p>
<p>Among other allegations, the information details how Siemens paid out, through various mechanisms, $805.5 million in “corrupt payments to foreign officials” including: (i) payments made by various subsidiaries, including those with offices in the U.S., to “purported business consultants, knowing that at least some or all of those funds would be passed along to foreign government officials;” (ii) money withdraw from “cash desks within Siemens’ offices” for “corrupt payments;” and (iii) “slush funds to generate cash for corrupt payments.” </p>
<p>As to the amount of business Siemens obtained or retained through these corrupt payments, the DOJ’s sentencing memorandum (see <a href="http://www.foley.com/files/SiemensDOJSentencingMemo.pdf">here</a>) states that calculating a traditional loss figure under the Sentencing Guidelines “would be overly burdensome, if not impossible” given the “literally thousands of contracts over many years.”</p>
<p>Yet, Siemens was not charged with violating the FCPA&#8217;s anti-bribery provisions.</p>
<p>That would have hurt too much, a point made in the DOJ&#8217;s sentencing memorandum which notes that a key factor the DOJ considered in resolving the case against Siemens in the way it did was the “collateral consequences” that could have resulted from criminal antibribery charges including the “risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.”</p>
<p>All of this troubled Senator Specter who has &#8220;long been concerned about the acceptance of fines instead of jail sentences in egregious cases.&#8221; (see <a href="http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&#038;ContentRecord_id=26542601-e466-6cb8-ff30-c6bf442307a4&#038;Region_id=&#038;Issue_id=">here</a>). In a release, Senator Specter notes that &#8220;there are many illustrative cases but three will suffice to make the point. In each of these cases, I registered my complaint with the Department of Justice.&#8221;</p>
<p>One such case was the Siemens enforcement action. </p>
<p>As Senator Specter&#8217;s release notes:</p>
<p>&#8220;On December 15, 2008, Siemens AG entered guilty pleas to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and agreed to pay $1.6 billion in fines, penalties and disgorgements with no jail sentences. Again, that amounts to a calculation as part of the cost of doing business for a company which had revenues of $104 billion and a net income of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2008 after the penalty.&#8221; </p>
<p>Thus, the reason Senator Specter questioned Breuer about the Siemens enforcement action during last week&#8217;s hearing.</p>
<p>Set forth below is the exchange.</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>SPECTER: Are you familiar with the Siemens prosecution, Mr. Breuer? </p>
<p>BREUER: I am, Senator, to a degree, I am familiar with the Siemens prosecution. </p>
<p>SPECTER: Well, that&#8217;s a &#8212; that&#8217;s a case where Siemens, according to the information provided to me, agreed to pay a total criminal fine of $450 million and a disgorgement of $350 million in profits. And nobody went to jail. Siemens&#8217; income, according to the information I have, was $104 billion, and income in excess or approximately $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2008. Did that conviction arise during the course of the current administration? </p>
<p>BREUER: It did, Senator. It was in &#8212; it did, Mr. Chairman. It was an ongoing investigation. And you&#8217;re right. Let me just add a little to what you say. First, Siemens, its total monetary penalties were actually $1.6 billion. That would include both from the U.S. and in Germany. The company was incredibly cooperative and very, very &#8212; very, very helpful in the information it provided over an extensive period. In making Siemens&#8217; plea, we made it as an absolute explicit provision that there was absolutely no protection for any of the individuals of Siemens, and therefore the individuals, executives and others who were involved, remain exposed and the matter is not closed. The matter &#8212; simply all that we have done is have a plea against the corporation, we have not closed out nor have we claimed to have closed out investigations with respect to individuals. They&#8217;re ongoing. And, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you, I think the hallmark of an effective criminal justice plan must be that we will prosecute individuals when appropriate and ongoing. And I should say in that vein, Mr. Chairman, just two weeks ago we received the longest sentence in an FCPA case in the history of the FCPA when we attained an 87-month sentence against a fellow who had violated and was convicted of the FCPA. So we will continue to pursue that. </p>
<p>SPECTER: Well, you are saying that even though the case was concluded against the corporation that the matter is ongoing as to the individuals. Ordinarily a case is wrapped up once and for all and that before a corporation will pay a fine they want to know that that&#8217;s the limit of their liability. </p>
<p>BREUER: Right. </p>
<p>SPECTER: And there&#8217;s obviously a motivation to not have a jail sentence, for the corporation to pay a fine. And this morning we heard very extensive testimony &#8212; not that it was surprising &#8212; that fines are added into the cost of doing business. One testimony related to one defendant who paid $50 million and said if it had been a criminal prosecution he would have fought it to the teeth &#8212; tooth and nail. But you are saying that you&#8217;re really going to go after some people in this Siemens matter? </p>
<p>BREUER: Well, Mr. Chairman, what I&#8217;m saying is that I don&#8217;t want to say whether we are or not, for the reasons that I know you understand well. But I will say is the following. We&#8217;re not willing &#8212; and you&#8217;re absolutely right. Corporations do want to settle these cases. They do want to pay money, and they do want the assurance that the matters will be closed against the individuals of their company. We&#8217;re not &#8212; we&#8217;re not going to &#8212; we didn&#8217;t allow that to happen in that case, and we won&#8217;t let it happen, for the reasons you said. Now, in the Siemens case, I do want companies to feel an enormous incentive to come in and to disclose. And in Siemens, they did come in &#8212; they did come in. They did disclose. And they provided us with an enormous amount of information. And so there was a real judgment that there was a real merit to having closure with respect to that and for the company to be rewarded for providing us with almost unparalleled cooperation. </p>
<p>SPECTER: Did you (inaudible) the prosecution before they made the disclosures? </p>
<p>BREUER: I don&#8217;t think so, in that case. I think, Senator, I&#8217;ll have to go back. That&#8217;s a good question. So my &#8212; my colleague is right. In this case, of course, one of the challenges that I was going to go into is, in this particular case, the prosecution began in Germany. And then we, of course, as we try now, more and more, to deal with the challenges we have, are working closely with our international colleagues and partners. That was the case where it began with the German prosecutors. And, of course, many of the individuals involved are in Europe. But there &#8212; nonetheless, it began in Germany. The company &#8212; we reached out, I believe. The company provided us with an enormous amount of information. </p>
<p>SPECTER: Mr. Breuer, what I&#8217;m getting at is, did they provide you with information after you already had the case? </p>
<p>BREUER: No. I mean, Mr. Chairman, in a case like this, these are very complicated cases. And this, of course, was a massive example of &#8212; of violations of the FCPA in different countries. And so, there, there&#8217;s no question that the law firm providing us, and Siemens providing us with information, were able to provide us with information that we would not have had but for them giving us the information. It was all over the world. Frankly, we would not have had the resources to have investigated to the degree that the company provided us the information. And so they did get a benefit for that. The benefit they got was certainty in their &#8212; in the resolution of the corporate deal. What they did not get was closure for the individuals. </p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>As the above exchange demonstrates, Senator Specter also seems troubled that Siemens received cooperation credit even though the credit came <strong>after</strong> the company was busted. </p>
<p>The DOJ&#8217;s release (see <a href="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html">here</a>) states:</p>
<p>&#8220;The resolution of the U.S. criminal investigation of Siemens AG and its subsidiaries reflects, in large part, the actions of Siemens AG and its audit committee in disclosing potential FCPA violations to the Department <strong>after</strong> the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated searches of multiple Siemens AG offices and homes of Siemens AG employees.&#8221; (emphasis added).</p>
<p>If Senator Specter is troubled by this aspect of the Siemens enforcement action, he may want to take a close look at the Daimler enforcement action as well. </p>
<p>Daimler, like Siemens, was another &#8220;bribery, yet no bribery&#8221; case as to the parent entity that orchestrated the bribery scheme (per the DOJ&#8217;s own allegations). However, unlike Siemens, Daimler was not required to plead guilty to <strong>anything</strong> &#8211; it received a deferred prosecution agreement.</p>
<p>In arriving at a fine amount, Daimler, like Siemens, also received cooperation credit.</p>
<p>The DOJ&#8217;s sentencing memorandum (see <a href="http://www.mediafire.com/?myt1menzu32">here</a>) notes that Daimler received a sentencing credit (a credit which reduces the overall fine amount) because the &#8220;organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct.&#8221; </p>
<p>This <strong>despite the fact </strong>that elsewhere in the sentencing memo the DOJ notes that the entire investigation started in March 2004 when a &#8220;former Daimler employee filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety &#038; Health Administration &#8230; allege[ing] that he was terminated for voicing concerns about Daimler&#8217;s practice of maintaining secret accounts, including accounts in its own books and records, for the purpose of bribing foreign government officials.&#8221;</p>
<p>In other words, even though the Daimler enforcement action was hatched by an internal whistleblower, the company still received a sentencing credit for cooperating in the eventual investigation.</p>
<p>The sentencing range set forth in the DOJ memo is $116 &#8211; $232 million. </p>
<p>The ultimate $93.6 million DOJ penalty was 20% below the bottom fine range of $116 million. </p>
<p>DOJ justified this reduction by stating that such a &#8220;reduction is appropriate given the nature and extent of Daimler&#8217;s cooperation in this matter, including sharing information with the Department regarding evidence obtained as a result of Daimler&#8217;s extensive investigation of corrupt payments around the world.&#8221; </p>
<p>The DOJ further stated, &#8220;indeed, because Daimler did not voluntarily disclose its conduct prior to the filing of the whistleblower lawsuit, it only receives a two-point reduction in its culpability.&#8221; However, in a rather odd statement, DOJ then said that it &#8220;respectfully submits that such reduction is incongruent with the level of cooperation and assistance provided by the company in the Department&#8217;s investigation.&#8221; </p>
<p>In other words, Daimler, like Siemens, received cooperation credit even though disclosure of the conduct at issue was <strong>involuntarily</strong>.  Also, the DOJ gave Daimler cooperation credit <strong>greater</strong> than that allowed under the guidelines. </p>
<p>In conclusion, the DOJ noted that the disposition &#8220;promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, and affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct for Daimler and the marketplace generally.&#8221;</p>
<p>*****</p>
<p>Mr. Breuer had a busy week last week (see <a href="http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/05/as-we-say-not-necessarily-as-we-do.html">here</a> for a prior post).  During his Council of Foreign Relations speech, Breuer was asked about some of the DOJ&#8217;s &#8220;old cases.&#8221;  See <a href="http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/05/07/breuer-doj-may-rethink-costly-fcpa-cases-like-bourke-giffen/print/">here</a> for the Main Justice story and his response.</p>
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