Enforcement Agency Speeches

This prior post detailed comments by Mary Jo White prior to becoming SEC Chairman.

Last week, White spoke before the Investment Company Institute on the general topic of the SEC’s role in an increasingly global financial and regulatory system.  She stated as follows (see here) concerning the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA.

“Of course, misrepresentations and other unlawful actions travel in both directions across borders, which is another reason why our partnership with our regulatory counterparts abroad is so important.  Among the most prominent concerns in this regard is bribery by U.S. companies overseas, which not only undermines international markets and governments but also simultaneously undermines the reporting and disclosure integrity of our own markets.  Thus, strong and fair enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which forbids U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials, has been and will continue to be a priority for us. Our first objective is to help companies avoid FCPA violations by educating them. And so our staff along with our colleagues at the Department of Justice recently published a comprehensive Guide to the FCPA to give clear guidance and clear up some myths.  Of course, the other side of education is deterrence.  Deterrence can mean strong enforcement actions with tough disgorgement and penalties.  But it can also mean the tangible benefits that come with cooperation – as demonstrated by the Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation we announced in April. In this particular case, the corporation’s Argentine subsidiary paid bribes to government and customs officials to improperly secure the importation of their products into the country.  The bribes occurred during a period when the U.S. parent company lacked meaningful anti-corruption compliance and control mechanisms over its foreign subsidiary.  The misconduct came to light as a result of the company’s efforts to improve internal controls and compliance.  And the company immediately reported the problem to the SEC and provided exceptional assistance to our investigation. Successful FCPA cases also increasingly require assistance from foreign law enforcement authorities.  That is why we recently partnered with the DOJ and FBI in conducting a foreign bribery training program that provided intensive training to 130 foreign investigators and prosecutors from 30 countries, many on which the SEC staff relies for mutual legal assistance in FCPA cases.”

Yesterday, Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division) spoke at the Minnesota Bar Association’s Annual International Business Law Institute.  (See here).  Suleiman offered “some views from the U.S. Department of Justice on the topic of anti-corruption enforcement” and “what the Justice Department is doing in the area of criminal enforcement to fight corruption at home and abroad.”  He stated, in pertinent part, as follows.

“I think of our anti-corruption efforts as falling into three principal buckets:  number one is criminal prosecution; number two is assisting foreign countries to build up their judicial, prosecutorial, and investigative institutions; and number three is the pursuit, through civil actions, of the proceeds of foreign official corruption.  I will discuss each of these buckets in turn.

First and foremost, the Criminal Division is a litigating operation.  We investigate and prosecute cases.  Our corruption prosecutions are of two kinds:  we prosecute corruption by domestic officials, and we prosecute foreign bribery offenses under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA.”

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“[W]e have an incredibly strong team of prosecutors who focus exclusively on enforcing the FCPA.  Depending upon how familiar you are with FCPA enforcement, you may know that the Criminal Division is the entity in the United States with primary responsibility for criminal enforcement of the Act.  It is Justice Department policy that no FCPA prosecution can be brought without authorization from the Criminal Division, which distinguishes FCPA prosecutions from most other kinds of federal criminal cases.  The Securities and Exchange Commission, which is a few blocks up the street from us, has primary responsibility for the Act’s civil enforcement.”

“Foreign bribery enforcement has for a long time been an important aspect of U.S. policy.  The FCPA was enacted roughly 35 years ago, around the same time that our Public Integrity Section was created to focus on public corruption prosecutions, and it was the first effort of any nation to specifically criminalize the act of bribing foreign officials.  The statute was enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal, but it took more than 20 years for the Act to become a strong enforcement tool.  And, over the past several years, the Justice Department has substantially increased its enforcement of the Act.”

“One important aspect of our FCPA enforcement involves, of course, our corporate resolutions.  We have collected billions of dollars in criminal fines and penalties to resolve FCPA investigations against companies doing business abroad, including BizJet International Sales and Support Inc., a Lufthansa subsidiary; Alcatel-Lucent; Johnson & Johnson; and many others.”

“But another, critically important aspect of our enforcement regime involves holding individuals responsible for FCPA offenses.  There is no greater deterrent to corporate crime than the prospect of prison time.  As many have recognized, if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be seen as merely the cost of doing business.  In the past four years, the Criminal Division’s FCPA Unit has obtained over three dozen criminal convictions of individuals, including of people who have been sentenced to as many as 15 years in prison.”

“We are as active today in this area as we have ever been.  In the past month alone, we have announced charges against several key defendants in ongoing, active FCPA investigations.  In mid-April, in a case that we are prosecuting with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, we secured the arrest of a defendant in connection with an alleged bribery scheme to secure mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.  In a separate case, which we are prosecuting with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Connecticut, we also secured the arrest last month of a defendant in connection with an alleged bribery scheme to secure power contracts in Indonesia.  And just two days ago, together with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, we announced charges against two broker-dealer employees and a senior Venezuelan banking official for engaging in a multi-million dollar bribery scheme.”

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“Finally, I want to tell you about a relatively new Justice Department initiative.  About three-and-a-half years ago, Attorney General Holder gave a speech in Qatar, at which he pledged to increase the United States’ commitment to recovering foreign corruption proceeds.  Since that time, the Criminal Division has led the charge in developing what we refer to as the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative.”

“The initiative’s purpose is to identify the proceeds of foreign official corruption – in other words, the spoils – forfeit them through civil actions, and, to the extent possible, repatriate the forfeited funds for the benefit of the people harmed. In most criminal prosecutions, a court can order forfeiture, upon conviction, as part of the defendant’s sentence.  Often, however, it may be impractical or impossible to bring a criminal prosecution against a particular person – because that person is immune from prosecution, for example, beyond our jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable.  In these circumstances, we have begun bringing civil forfeiture actions to recover the stolen property.”

“We have brought several Kleptocracy cases in the past couple of years, and forfeited millions of dollars in corrupt proceeds.  The most high-profile of our Kleptocracy cases to date involves two civil actions we have brought against approximately $70 million in assets allegedly belonging to a government minister in Equatorial Guinea who is also the son of that country’s president.  According to court papers, despite an official government salary of less than $100,000 per year, this minister amassed wealth of over $100 million.  Among the items we are seeking to forfeit are nearly $2 million worth of Michael Jackson memorabilia (including the white glove), a Gulfstream G-V jet worth $38.5 million, and a $30 million house in Malibu.  These are hard, and hard-fought, cases, but we believe strongly that foreign officials who amass wealth through corruption should not be permitted to use the United States as a haven for their ill-gotten gains.”

“Foreign Official” Delay

Oral argument in the “foreign official” challenge pending in the 11th Circuit – originally scheduled for later this month, has been postponed until the week of October 7th.

This is a historic appeal in that it will be the first instance in which a circuit court directly confronts the enforcement theory that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities are “foreign officials” under the FCPA (see here for a prior post, including embedded links).

Scrutiny Alerts

For more on Barclay’s scrutiny, on both sides of the Atlantic, see this recent article in Middle East Monitor concerning the bank’s relationship with the Abu Dhabi government, including Sheikh Mansour, the deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Samuel Rubenfeld (Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance Journal) has the latest (here) regarding BSG Resources Ltd. a Guernsey-based company in the news after Frederic Cilins, a French citizen associated with the company, was recently arrested and accused of attempting to obstruct an ongoing investigation into whether a mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.  (See here for the prior post).  As noted in the WSJ article, BSG recently released this detailed statement concerning its conduct in Guinea.

Reading Stack

Several articles of interest to pass along from last week’s Corporate Crime Reporter conference.  This article details comments made by Denis McInerney (DOJ Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General) regarding non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.  This article details comments made by McInerney concerning my suggested two-step reform plan (see here for the prior post) and also details McInerney’s response to my question concerning the definition of a declination.  Articles here and here concern corporate monitors.

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Over the years, Bloomberg’s David Glovin has written some excellent articles concerning Viktor Kozney, Frederic Bourke, et al.  With Bourke soon to report to prison, Glovin pens another great article here.

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This prior post discussed the NY Times recent “With Bags of Cash, CIA Seeks Influence in Afghanistan” story and how the story put our stark double standards in the headlines once again.  More recently, the NY Times reports (here) as follows. ”[Afghan President] Karzai said he had called a meeting [...] with the CIA’s Kabul station chief. “I told him because of all these rumors in the media, please do not cut all this money, because we really need it,” he said. “We want to continue this sort of assistance, and he promised that they are not going to cut this money.”  For more on the situation, including the views of others, see here from Alison Frankel’s On the Case column.

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See here from Josh Goodman (an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission) titled “The Anti-Corruption and Antitrust Connection.”

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A good weekend to all.

After listening to fellow panelist Denis McInerney (DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) describe the goals of DOJ prosecution – among other things, to better promote compliance and to hold individuals accountable – I offered a solution in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act context that could help the DOJ achieve these laudable goals.

Have a compliance defense and abolish NPAs and DPAs.

A compliance defense, along the lines I outlined in my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,” would not eliminate corporate criminal liability.  Far from it.  Rather, a compliance defense would only apply when, notwithstanding a company’s pre-existing compliance policies and procedures and its good-faith efforts to comply the law, a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to those policies and procedures in violation of the law.

If a company did not have pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, it could not avail itself of a compliance defense.  Similarly, even if a company did have pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, the company could not avail itself of a compliance defense if executive officers or employees (a concept already used in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) were involved in the improper conduct.

If this were the framework governing corporate criminal liability, then NPAs and DPAs should be abolished and the DOJ would return to the historical choice of two options:  charge or do not charge.

At the conference, I stated my genuine belief that such a two-step reform would better incentive more robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and thus best advance the FCPA’s objectives of reducing bribery.  Such a two-step reform would also increase public confidence in FCPA enforcement actions and allow the DOJ to better allocate its limited prosecutorial resources to cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper conduct.  (See the article for additional details).

In short, this two-step reform will better allow the DOJ to achieve many of the objectives McInerney articulated.

However, not surprisingly, McInerney’s response to my two-step reform was the comment that this would be like returning to the “dark ages.”

The question is why?

Presumably most countries have an incentive to better promote compliance and to hold individuals accountable for wrongdoing.  Does this mean that the following OECD Convention countries that have a compliance-like defense relevant to their FCPA-like laws are living in the “dark ages” – Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  (See here).

Are Stanley Sporkin (former Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, among other positions), James Doty (current head of the PCAOB), and Andrew Weissmann (former Director of the Enron Task Force and current General Counsel of the FBI) all living in the “dark ages”?  All have supported compliance-like defenses or concepts relevant to the FCPA.  (See here, here, and here).

Are former Attorney Generals Michael Mukasey and Alberto Gonzales or other former high-ranking DOJ officials such as Larry Thompson living in the “dark ages”? (See here, here, and here).  Is former DOJ FCPA Unit chief Joseph Covington living in the “dark ages.”  (See here).

Or have all these individuals, and others who support an FCPA compliance defense, seen the light and it’s the DOJ who is living in the “dark ages”?

U.S. Intervenes in Wynn-Okada Dispute

Numerous prior posts (see here, here and here for instance) have highlighted the dispute between Wynn Resorts and its former board member Kazuo Okada.  Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported as follows.  “The U.S. asked to intervene in a lawsuit brought by Wynn Resorts Ltd., which accused Okada of making improper payments to Philippine gambling regulators. The Justice Department said in an April 8 filing in state court in Las Vegas that it doesn’t want the civil case to disrupt its criminal investigation into the same underlying allegations.”  According to Bloomberg:  “Okada’s lawyers have said they would probably oppose the request “in whole or in part,” according to the filing. Wynn Resorts won’t oppose its request, the Justice Department said.”  For additional coverage, see here from the Las Vegas Review-Journal.

I Disagree

Earlier this week a reader of the FCPA Blog (see here) posed the following question.  “One thing  that has not gotten much discussion is the possibility that the apparent slowdown in FCPA enforcement may be due to the spike in declinations.”

Putting aside the big-picture and highly relevant issue of what is a declination (see here as well as other embedded posts on this issue), when addressing the issue of FCPA enforcement statistics, it is important to keep in mind (as highlighted in this prior post) the following.

Just three unique historical events (Iraq Oil for Food, Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct, and Panalpina-related issues) served as the foundation for 35% of all corporate FCPA enforcement actions between 2007-2011 and resulted in 55% of settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.  Adding just the 2008 Siemens enforcement action to the settlement amount calculation, results in just four unique historical events accounting for 77% of settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.

Recognizing these events and how they impacted FCPA enforcement data is important to understanding why FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years.

Even though FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years, unique events giving rise to FCPA enforcement actions have remained relatively constant between 2007 and 2012.  In 2007, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 15 unique events.  In 2008, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 10 unique events.  In 2009, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 11 unique events.  In 2010, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 14 unique events.  In 2011, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 16 unique events.  In 2012, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 12 unique events.

I Agree

Dieter Juedes (who like me is a product of Sheboygan County, Wisconsin) recently published “Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense” in the William & Mary Business Law Review.  Among other things, the article “proposes specific statutory language that Congress could use in adopting such a defense and it establishes precise factors to be promulgated by the DOJ and SEC for determining whether a firm’s procedure would be deemed “adequate.”

Given my prior article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,” I agree with the general thrust of Juedes’s article.

Say What?

I don’t quite understand the logic or rationale of this op-ed piece in the South China Morning Post by Robert Precht (director of Justice Labs Limited, a Hong Kong think tank).

Precht argues that ”the efforts of some Western countries to enforce their own anti-bribery laws in China are more likely to produce false accusations and hinder democratic reform than reduce corruption.”  He states as follows.  “One of the unintended harms of enforcing the US anti-bribery law in China is that it may actually stifle efforts to end corruption. US journalists, human rights workers and university researchers play an important role in shining light on the darker recesses of Chinese politics. Preventing Americans from making gifts to Chinese to obtain information useful to promote democratic reform will hinder the disclosure role the Americans play.”

According to Precht, “the solution is simple.”  He argues that “the US Congress should amend the law, providing that it will only be applied in countries that meet certain minimum requirements of democracy and will not be applied in authoritarian regimes such as China.”

During a featured interview at the event with David Wessel of the Wall Street Journal, Gonzales said that the DOJ could ”give more guidance and transparency” concerning issues relevant to an FCPA enforcement action.  Gonzales mentioned the FCPA Guidance, but stated that it represents no change in policy and again reiterated that “more transparency” is important because he does not see actual reform of the FCPA statute coming from this Congress or this administration.

Gonzales “salute[d] the efforts of business groups” post-FCPA Guidance who have asked for additional clarification and guidance concerning the FCPA and FCPA enforcement (see here for the prior post) and said that the FCPA Guidance “does not end the need for additional discussion” regarding these topics and the enforcement approach of the agencies.

Gonzales also had pointed criticisms for DOJ non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.  Asked by Wessel whether the original motivations Congress had in passing the FCPA are being served by the current enforcement environment or whether the current enforcement environment has “lost sight of the [FCPA's] end point” Gonzales said that it is “hard to tell quite frankly” because many FCPA enforcement actions are resolved via NPA and DPAs and that these resolution vehicles do not necessarily reflect instances of companies violating the FCPA, but rather companies feels compelled to agree to the agreements.

Equally problematic, Gonzales said as to NPAs and DPAs, is that enforcement actions resolved via these vehicles mean that “legitimate wrongdoing is not being prosecuted as it should.”  Gonzales said it is “easy, much easier quite frankly” for the DOJ to resolve FCPA inquiries with NPAs and DPAs, that such resolution vehicles have “less of a toll” on the DOJ’s budget and that such agreements “provide revenue” to the DOJ.  It is all “unfortunate” Gonzales stated.  [For additional reading on this issue, see my article "The Facade of FCPA Enforcement" and numerous prior posts - including here and here - concerning NPAs and DPAs].

Gonzales further observed that the DOJ appears more focused on FCPA enforcement numbers, how successful it is being, and the dollars it receives from FCPA enforcement actions, rather than achieving the “true objective [of the FCPA] which is to discourage bribery of foreign officials.”

Gonzales also joined the growing chorus of those who have called for the DOJ to release more specific information concerning its so-called declination decisions, and also spoke out in favor, as he has in the past (see here for the prior post) for “common-sense reform” such as compliance defense

So I ask the question yet again (see here for the prior post), – how many former high-ranking DOJ officials and/or former DOJ FCPA enforcement attorneys does it take before the current DOJ realizes that its FCPA enforcement policies and procedures are, in certain cases, broken?

Why do Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations occur?

Do companies subject to the FCPA do business in foreign markets: (i) intent on engaging in bribery as a business strategy and without a committment to FCPA compliance; or (ii) with a committment to FCPA compliance, yet subject to difficult business conditions?

To be sure, there have been some instances, as reflected in FCPA enforcement actions, where bribery was used as a business strategy and approved of and condoned by high-level corporate executives.  However, the latter is the more common reason for FCPA enforcement actions and related scrutiny.

Indeed, as Joseph Covington (a former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief) commented in this prior guest post, he has “rarely seen American companies affirmatively offering bribes in the first instance.”  Rather, Covington observed that companies doing business in international markets are “reacting to a world not of their making” and that “as the world shrinks companies who seek to do the right thing can’t help but confront corrupt officials – as customers, regulator and adjudicators – and confront them often.”

This point is evident in reviewing the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings and then comparing the results to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

The “ease of doing business index” ranks countries based on factors such as the ease of starting a business, obtaining permits and otherwise dealing with regulatory officials.  The “corruption perceptions index” ranks countries based on the perceived levels of public sector corruption. You don’t have to be trained in sophisticated statistical methods (which I am not) to see a positive correlation between the two rankings.  That is, the lower the regulatory burdens imposed on business, the less corrupt the country is perceived to be.  The greater the regulatory burdens imposed on business, the more corrupt the country is perceived to be.

Regulatory burdens (ranging from customs procedures, licensing and certification requirements, foreign government procurement policies, etc.) create bureaucracy, bureaucracy creates interactions with foreign officials, and the more interactions with foreign officials the greater the FCPA risk will be.

In short, in addition to the forced business relationships that many companies are required to endure while doing business in a foreign country, companies are often funneled into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants who administer entrenched bureaucracies which create the conditions for harassment bribes to flourish.

In “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” I argued that the U.S. ought to recognize this simpl fact of doing business in many international markets.

Well, in fact, the U.S. Congress did recognize this fact when it passed the FCPA.  Congress exempted so-called “grease” or “facilitation” payments from the reach of the FCPA (first through the definition of “foreign official” and then in 1988 through a stand-alone facilitation payment exception) and otherwise included an obtain or retain business element in the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. (See my article “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” for a detailed overview of the legislative history).

I argued in “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense” that, so long as the enforcement agencies refuse to recognize congressional intent in enacting the FCPA, that such congressional intent is best advanced through an FCPA compliance defense in which a company can assert, as a matter of law, that its pre-existing FCPA policies and procedures sought to prevent such payments in foreign markets.  As detailed in the article, this is not the only reason I, and many others, support an FCPA compliance defense, but it is clearly an important reason.

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The below chart has two segments.  The left segment lists the countries at the top of the “ease of doing business index” and a country’s associated “corruption perceptions index” score.  The right segment lists the countries at the bottom of the “ease of doing business index” and a country’s associated “corruption perceptions index” score.

From the SEC Chairman

SEC Chairman Elisse Walter stated as follows earlier this week (see here) in opening a Foreign Bribery and Corruption Training Conference for law enforcement officials from around the world.

“[W]e have found that corrupt practices by a registered company are generally indicators of larger problems within the business – problems with the potential to harm that business’s shareholder-owners.  Bribery and other corrupt practices may result in accounting fraud and falsified disclosures where shareholders are not getting an accurate picture of a company’s finances in their regulatory filings.  Bribery means losing control of – or deliberately falsifying – books and records.  Often, key executives or board members are kept in the dark, limiting their ability to make informed decisions about the company’s business. Obviously, engaging in corrupt practices means weakening or circumventing internal control mechanisms, leaving a company less able to detect and end not just corruption but other questionable practices. A company that has lost its moral compass is in grave danger of losing its competitive roadmap, as well – while shareholders are kept in the dark.”

Congress Is Capable

Well, at least as to certain issues.

Such as introducing and passing laws that expressly describe state-owned entities (“SOEs”).  In reading my historical account of the FCPA’s legislative history, “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” or my “foreign official” declaration here, you will learn that despite being aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting a capability for drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, and despite being provided a more precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose not to include such definitions or concepts in S. 305, the bill that ultimately became the FCPA in December 1977.

This prior post highlighted Congress’s capability in capturing SOEs in Dodd-Frank Section 1504 and along comes another example which demonstrates that Congress is capable of legislating as to SOEs.  Recently, H.R.491 - the Global Online Freedom Act of 2013 was introduced in the House.  The purpose of the bill is “To prevent United States businesses from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance, to fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of United States businesses, and for other purposes.”

The bill defines “foreign official” as follows.

The term ‘foreign official’ means– (A) any officer or employee of a foreign government or of any department; and (B) any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of, or acting under color of law with the knowledge of, any such government or such department, agency, state-owned enterprise, or instrumentality.” (emphasis added).

It is a basic premise of statutory construction that Congress is presumed not to use redundant or superfluous language.  Granted, H.R.491 is not yet law, but let’s assume it becomes law as introduced.   If instrumentality includes SOEs (as the enforcement agencies maintain), then Congress will violate this legislative maxim by using redundant or superfluous language in H.R. 491.

Adding To The List

The Heritage Foundation recently published (here) a speech by Peter Hansen titled “Unleashing the U.S. Investor in Africa: A Critique of U.S. Policy Toward the Continent.”  Hansen critiqued U.S. government thinking about African development, including Ambassador statements that it is important to raise incentives for overly “cautious” U.S. companies to invest in Africa.  Hansen stated that this “mistaken assumption” assumed that ”mainstream U.S. companies will be motivated more by the prospect of higher rewards than by the diminishment of risks.”  He noted that this view is not just wrong, but counterproductive and stated as follows.

“The problem with Africa is not a lack of attractive prospects, but rather Africa’s risk profile. With few exceptions, sensible U.S. direct investors (that is, those who run projects, not just take portfolio positions) have steered clear of Africa for the simple reason that Africa’s risks often exceed their risk tolerance. The African market has been left largely to non-Americans, to the unsophisticated seekers of El Dorado, and to a legion of “chancers” who seek sweetheart deals with no money down. The resulting tales of woe coming out of Africa, due largely to poor investment planning or thwarted get-rich-quick schemes, serve wrongly to tarnish Africa’s reputation.  By exclusively raising incentives and failing to reduce risks, Ambassador Carson’s approach simply encourages those already prone to failure, without inspiring broad-spectrum investment by serious U.S. companies. Such bedrock U.S. firms do not need higher incentives. Africa already presents high-return opportunities. What serious U.S. firms need instead is for Africa’s risks to be reduced. Rewards that cannot be obtained are, after all, just mirages. The easiest way for the U.S. government to reduce risks for U.S. investors in Africa is to provide them with legal protection.  The basic legal tools for protecting U.S. investors are double tax treaties (DTTs), often called double tax agreements (DTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).”

Query whether an FCPA compliance defense should be added to this list?  See here to download my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense.”

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

This previous post highlighted the scrutiny Brookfield Asset Management (a Toronto based global asset management company with shares traded on the NYSE) was facing in Brazil concerning allegations that its subsidiary paid bribes to win construction permits.  As the Wall Street Journal recently reported (here), Sao Paulo, Brazil prosecutors filed civil charges against the company’s Brazilian subsidiary, two of its top executives and a former employee.  The prosecutor is quoted in the WSJ as saying that “Brookfield has created a high system of bribery in order to obtain approval for its projects quickly and with irregularities.”  A spokesman for the company stated as follows.  “These are unproven allegations made by a former employee.  We don’t believe Brookfield did anything wrong and we are cooperating with authorities.”

This previous post highlighted scrutiny of EADS subsidiary, GPT Special Management Systems in the U.K.  The Financial Times recently reported here that the FBI is also probing corruption allegations against GPT ”relating to a contract in Saudi Arabia.”  The article states as follows.  “The FBI has interviewed a witness and taken possession of documents in connection with allegations that GPT bribed Saudi military officials with luxury cars and made £11.5m of unexplained payments – some via the US – to bank accounts in the Cayman Islands.”

This recent Reuters article reports that Italian police arrested the head of defense group Finmeccanica SpA (Giuseppe Orsi) on a warrant alleging that he paid bribes to win an Indian contract.  According to the report, Prosecutors accuse Orsi of paying bribes to intermediaries to secure the sale of 12 helicopters in a 560 million euro ($749 million) deal when he was head of the group’s AgustaWestland unit.  Finmeccanica, which is approximately 30% owned by the Italian government, has ADRs registered with the SEC and AgustaWestland does extensive business in the U.S. (see here), including with the U.S. government.  According to this Wall Street Journal article, Italian prosecutors are also “investigating [Finmeccanica] on suspicion that it engaged in corrupt activities to win various types of contracts in Latin America, Asia, and at home.”

This recent Bloomberg article reports that “Eni SpA Chief Executive Officer Paolo Scaroni is being investigated for alleged corruption in an Italian probe of contracts obtained by its oil services company, Saipem SpA, in Algeria.”  Eni has ADRs registered with the SEC.  In 2010, Eni resolved (see here) an SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct.  In resolving the action, Eni consented to the entry of a court order permanently enjoining it from violating the FCPA’s books and record and internal controls provisions.

NCR Corporation stated in a recent release here, in pertinent part, as follows concerning its FCPA scrutiny.

“Update regarding OFAC and FCPA Investigations

The Company and the Special Committee of the  Company’s Board of Directors have each completed their respective internal investigations regarding the anonymous allegations received from a purported whistleblower regarding certain aspects of the Company’s business practices in China, the Middle East and Africa. The principal allegations relate to the Company’s compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and federal regulations that prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in certain activities in Syria.

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The Company has made a presentation to the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission(“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) providing the facts known to the Company related to the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations, and advising the government that many of these allegations were unsubstantiated.  The Company’s investigations of the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations identified a few opportunities to strengthen the Company’s comprehensive FCPA compliance program, and      remediation measures were proposed and are being implemented.  As previously disclosed, the Company is responding to a subpoena of the SEC and requests of the DOJ for documents and information related to the FCPA, including matters related to the whistleblower’s FCPA allegations.”

Investigating the purported whistleblower’s allegations has been a costly exercise for NCR.  In a recent earnings conference call, company CFO Bob Fishman stated that the “overall cost” has been approximately $4.8 million.

Reading Stack

See here for the New York Times DealBook writeup of oral arguments in SEC v. Citigroup - an appeal which focuses of Judge Jed Rakoff’s concerns about common SEC settlements terms, including neither admith nor deny.

FCPA enforcement statistics are over-hyped for compliance assessments says Ryan McConnell (Morgan Lewis) in this Corporate Counsel article.  In this Corporate Counsel article, McConnell and his co-author compare 2012 to 2011 numbers in terms of facilitation payments data found in corporate policies.

The three types of employees one encounters when conducting FCPA training – here from Alexandra Wrage (President, Trace International).

If for no other reason, because of the picture associated with this recent post on thebriberyact.com.

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A good weekend to all.

Not surprisingly, given the nature and extent of the conduct at issue, as part of its plea agreement (here), Siemens was required to engage a corporate monitor for a three year period.

Time passes quickly, and on December 18, 2012, the DOJ filed this ”Notice Regarding Corporate Monitorship” notifying the court that Siemens has “satisfied its obligations under the plea agreement with respect to the corporate compliance monitor engaged by the company.”

This post details the monitor’s work and then highlights the difficulties of anti-corruption compliance in a large, multinational company.

The Work of a Monitor

The recent DOJ filing details the work of the monitor and states as follows.

“In accordance with the plea agreement, the Monitor conducted an initial review and three subsequent reviews of Siemens’s anti-corruption compliance program, and documented the Monitor’s findings and recommendations in four annual reports dated October 5, 2009, October 13, 2010, October 7, 2011, and October 12, 2012. Over the course of those four years, the Monitor conducted on-site or remote reviews of Siemens’ activities in 20 countries; conducted limited or issue-specific reviews in or relating to an additional 19 countries; reviewed over 51,000 documents totaling more than 973,000 pages in 11 languages; conducted interviews of or meetings with over 2,300 Siemens employees; observed over 180 regularly scheduled company events; and spent the equivalent of over 3,000 auditor days conducting financial studies and testing.

During that time, the Monitor made a total of 152 recommendations in over a dozen topic areas, such as third-party risks, financial controls, and compliance policies and training that, pursuant to the plea agreement, were “reasonably designed to improve the effectiveness of Siemens’ program for ensuring compliance with the anti-corruption laws.”  Without objection, Siemens AG adopted and implemented all 152 recommendations. Thereafter, the Monitor confirmed that all of the recommendations had been fully implemented.

Those recommendations and the other remedial measures and internal control improvements undertaken by Siemens have included enhanced policies and a revised code of conduct directed at prohibiting corruption; additional and more frequent training for employees, agents, and business partners on the enhanced anti-corruption policies and procedures; additional staffing and resources dedicated to coordinating and overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the anti-corruption program; improved hotline for reporting potential violations of the code of conduct; improved accounting system controls designed to ensure the maintenance of accurate books and records; and improved due diligence and review processes for agreements with agents and business partners, including an express clause related to anti-corruption.

Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the Monitor has met with representatives from the government and the SEC on an annual basis to review the findings and recommendations in the Monitor’s annual reports.  In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the Monitor certified on October 13, 2010, October 7, 2011, and October 12, 2012, that “Siemens’ compliance program is reasonably designed and implemented to detect and prevent violations within Siemens of anti-corruption laws . . . .”

Based on the monitor’s work, the filing then states as follows.

“[T]he government concludes that Siemens AG has satisfied its obligations under the plea agreement with respect to the corporate compliance monitorship. The government has conferred with the staff of the SEC and the staff of the SEC concludes that Siemens AG has also complied with the terms of the Final Judgment in the civil action with respect to the corporate compliance monitorship.”

As highlighted in my article “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense” (here), even before the Siemens monitor began its work, Siemens had – in the words of the DOJ – “already implemented substantial compliance changes” and was setting “a high standard for multi-nationals to follow.”  According to the DOJ, Siemens’ total external costs for this pre-monitor remediation exceeded $150 million.  Although Siemens has not, to my knowledge, disclosed its costs associated with its post-enforcement action monitor, one can safely assume that the monitor costs easily exceeded this $150 million figure and perhaps reached as high as the $800 million amount announced on enforcement action day.

I noted in my Compliance Defense article that “there is likely no other company in the world today … that has devoted as many corporate resources towards compliance” and that “likewise, there is likely no other company in the world today .. that faces as many negative consequences should its compliance efforts fail.”

Difficulties of Anti-Corruption Compliance

The discussion of Siemens in my article, and here, demonstrates that not even a company that has “set a high standard for multi-national companies to follow” (again, in the words of the DOJ) can insulate itself from FCPA and related exposure.

This fact (and a fact I submit makes a compelling case for an FCPA compliance defense as outlined in my article) is clear from a review of Siemens most recent annual report (here), filed with the SEC on Nov. 28, 2012.   The filing contains a separate section titled “public corruption proceedings.” To be sure, the section lists various proceedings that pre-date 2008 and that may have been indicative of the corporate culture at Siemens that gave rise to the 2008 FCPA enforcement action in the first place.  However, certain proceedings in listed in the filing are post 2008, including the following.

“As previously reported, in May 2011 Siemens AG voluntarily reported a case of attempted public corruption in connection with a project in Kuwait in calendar 2010 to the U.S. Department of Justice, the SEC, and the Munich public prosecutor. The Munich public prosecutor discontinued the investigations, which related to certain former employees, but imposed conditions on them. Siemens is cooperating with the U.S. authorities in their ongoing investigations.”

“As previously reported, in July 2011 the Munich public prosecutor notified Siemens AG of an investigation against an employee in connection with payments to a supplier related to the oil and gas business in Central Asia from calendar 2000 to 2009. Siemens is cooperating with the public prosecutor.”

Add to this list a Dodd-Frank whistleblower retaliation complaint (here) recently filed against Siemens in federal court by Meng-Lin Liu, a former compliance officer for Siemens AG in China.  As highlighted by this Reuters report, Liu alleges that Siemens fired him after he tried to expose a kickback scheme involving medical equipment sales to hospitals in China.

In pertinent part, the complaint alleges as follows.

“Shortly after he started at [Siemens China Ltd. (SLC)] in March 2008, Liu began encountering and confronting a culture within Siemens’ Chinese healthcare business of evading and circumventing the anti-corruption due diligence systems and controls required by the FCPA and Siemens’ 2008 Plea Agreement.”

” … Liu consistently objected to and tried to remedy systemic evasion of Siemens’ due diligence systems in circumstances where there were major ‘red flags’ indicating extremely high risks of corruption.  Ultimately, Liu uncovered incontrovertible evidence that Siemens was submitting inflated bids for many of the multi-million-dollar medical diagnostic and scanning equipment sales it made to public hospitals in China, and then selling the equipment at substantially lower prices to intermediaries designated by the hospital’s procurement officials.  In other words, Liu discovered that Siemens itself was complicit in a scheme whereby the end-user hospitals paid amounts to third-party intermediaries that were between 20% and 130% higher than the price Siemens received for the equipment, which was resold by these intermediaries to the end-user hospital at the original Siemens’ inflated bid price.  This had all the hallmarks of a classic bribery or ‘kickback’ scheme and there was no legitimate explanation for the huge price differential that existed between prices at which Siemens sold the equipment and the prices paid by the end-user hospitals.”

“Within a week of presenting this evidence to SLC’s CFO for Healthcare, Liu was summarily removed from his position as Compliance Officer, instructed not to report to the office for the remaining four months of his employment contract and given ‘early notice’ that his contract would not be renewed upon its expiration.  Four months later his employment was terminated.”

Indeed, at both the November 2010 Senate FCPA hearing and the June 2011 House FCPA Hearing, Andres was the voice and face of the Department of Justice.

This post highlights how Andres’s new position has resulted in new positions as to several FCPA issues and also highlights the significant public policy issue of former enforcement agency attorneys marketing, in private practice, the reality they helped to create while at the government.

During his Senate testimony (here), Andres encouraged companies to voluntarily disclose conduct that could implicate the FCPA.

Now that he is in private practice, Andres appears to have a different position on voluntary disclosure.

In an interview published by Corporate Crime Reporter on November 19th, Andres stated as follows.  “Not every issue that a company uncovers should necessarily be disclosed.  Some of it depends on size and scale – hundreds, or thousands or tens of thousands of dollars – it may not rise to the level where you would need to bring it to the Department’s attention.”

During his House testimony (here), Andres stated that an FCPA compliance defense ”is a novel and somewhat risky approach, the time is not right to adopt such a compliance defense.”

Now that he is in private practice, Andres appears to have softened his position.  The same Corporate Crime Reporter interview included the following Q&A.

Q: You were with the government when the government was saying no compliance defense is necessary.  Is that your view now?

A: I don’t know that I would take a specific view on that.  I’m certainly aware of what the government’s arguments were in favor [of rejecting such a defense]“

The Corporate Crime Reporter interview also highlights the significant public policy issue of former enforcement agency attorneys marketing, in private practice, the reality they helped to create while at the government.

For instance, in both his written and oral Senate testimony, Andres stated as follows.  “The investigation and prosecution of transnational bribery is an important priority for the Department of Justice and we have been hard at work.”

Now in private practice, Andres’s practice appears to be benefitting from the priorities and policy he recently articulated while at the DOJ.  The Corporate Crime Reporter interview included the following Q&A.

“Q:  What part of your practice is FCPA?

A:  At the moment a large part.  That remains a large focus of the government’s white collar program.  Our practice reflects in part the priorities of the Department of Justice.  And clearly the FCPA is one.”

For another instance of a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA official marketing the reality he helped to create, see this prior post.

I have frequently written about the revolving door of FCPA enforcement attorneys into private practice.  Some will say, that is just how Washington works.  That is hardly a persuasive response.

Given the niched nature of both the DOJ and SEC FCPA units, I have long called for (see here and here) a five year prohibition on FCPA enforcement attorneys and those setting government FCPA policy from providing FCPA defense or compliance services in the private sector.

Related to this issue, a recent study focused on the SEC (here) and examined whether SEC lawyers’ future career prospects influence their enforcement efforts while at the SEC.  The study found that lawyers that leave the SEC to join law firms that specialize in defending clients against the SEC are associated with stronger enforcement efforts.

However, noticeably missing from the Guidance is any acknowledgment that the enforcement agencies current position as to FCPA compliance policies and procedures is working or that it creates the best incentives for FCPA compliance.

In fact, the Guidance surprisingly acknowledges that the enforcement agencies current position is not working as the Guidance cites survey data that “64% of general counsel whose companies are subject to the FCPA say there is room for improvement in their FCPA training and compliance programs.”  This statistic is in accord with numerous other statistics (see here at pg. 655 for several examples, and  here for Howard Sklar’s recent discussion of survey data at a recent FCPA conference) that all point to the same conclusion: despite the general increase in FCPA enforcement, despite the incentives currently in place, a meaningful percentage of business organizations are not doing what the enforcement agencies want them to do.

The DOJ and SEC recognize in the Guidance that “positive incentives” can drive compliant behavior.  The enforcement agencies current incentive – that such compliance policies and procedures can only lessen the impact of legal exposure – is not the right positive incentive.

An FCPA compliance defense, along the lines I’ve outlined in the below-linked article, is the best positive incentive to more robust corporate compliance and it can help reduce improper conduct and best advance the FCPA’s objective of reducing bribery.   However, instead of addressing a potential compliance defense with even a modicum of sophistication, the enforcement agencies dismiss it with simple sound-bites.  In the latest example, at the Guidance press conference (see here for the prior post), Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer repeated the DOJ’s opposition to such a defense calling it “dangerous” and a “race to the bottom.”

The DOJ’s opposition to a compliance defense stands in contrast to several former Attorney Generals and other former high-ranking DOJ officials who have publicly supported a compliance defense.  The DOJ’s opposition is further contrasted with the fact that several countries, like the U.S., that are signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have compliance-like defense in their domestic FCPA-like laws.

A compliance defense is not a “race to the bottom” but a “race to the top” and such a defense can, among other things, allow the enforcement agencies to better allocate limited prosecutorial resources to cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper conduct thereby increasing the deterrent effect of FCPA enforcement actions.

For additional reading, see my recent scholarship “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense.”

Not so with the press conference yesterday by Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer and SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami.  This post highlights certain of the comments made by Breuer and Khuzami at the press conference and contains a few comments of my own.

Breuer began the conference by noting that the guidance represents the “most comprehensive effort ever [by the DOJ] to explain [its] approach to enforcement as to a particular statute.”  He said that the DOJ strives to be “transparent” in this area and wants everyone to “understand why we prosecute cases as vigorously as we do and why we make our charging decisions.”

Khuzami added that the guidance should “clear up some myths about the types of conduct that get prosecuted.”

In response to a question whether the Chamber of Commerce should be satisfied with the guidance, Breuer stated that he called former Attorney General Michael Mukasey [who has lobbied on behalf of the Chamber for FCPA reform) prior to the conference and that the guidance reflects the Chamber's suggestion for various hypotheticals.  Breuer said that "any fair-minded person" should see the guidance as a "substantial step forward in transparency in a very real way."

Breuer was asked specifically about an FCPA compliance defense and said such a defense would be "dangerous and antithetical to the way [the DOJ] pursues criminal justice cases.”  Breuer stated that such a defense “runs the risk of a race to the bottom” and that there “can’t be an absolute defense.”

As to declinations and the inclusion in the guidance of various generic examples of apparent enforcement agency declinations, Breuer stated that the enforcement agencies “tried to provide clarity as to how [they] use [their] discretion” and that the guidance tries to give reader sa “fair sense of how we evaluate the cases.”  Khuzami added that the declination “numbers are not really that important” but the principles behind the declinations are and that “companies can mold behavior” based on the declination examples given.

From my perspective, one of the more important statements made during the press conference was when Khuzami and Breuer spoke about how companies should spend compliance dollars.

In reference to the various hypotheticals in the guidance concerning travel and entertainment, Khuzami said that he heard from companies that they were spending compliance dollars to guard against these issues, that companies were spending a huge amount of resources on such issues and that such a focus was taking dollars away from compliance efforts as to high risk activity.  Khuzami said that this was an argument he and Breuer have heard and that this argument “makes perfect sense.”  Khuzami said that he was “interested in companies spending compliance dollars in the most sensible way” and he hoped that the guidance and the hypotheticals provided would help companies as to where they can “minimize investment and where they can maximize it.”  Breuer added that the DOJ wants compliance programs “to address real matters of concern.”

One can interpret Khuzami’s and Breuer’s remarks on this topic as they like, but my interpretation was that they were saying that part of the reason why companies have such a high level of FCPA anxiety is not necessarily because of the FCPA or its enforcement, but rather the marketing and commentary by certain segments of FCPA Inc.  If that was their intent and purpose, I agree.

Breuer next was asked whether the guidance will put an end to the Chamber’s concerns surrounding the FCPA and its enforcement.  He said that “like with everything in life there is a process” and that the Chamber will probably want ongoing discussions about the FCPA and its enforcement and that the DOJ “welcomes that discussion.”  Breuer said that the guidance was likely not “complete closure” as to various concerns regarding FCPA issues.  Khuzami added that he “expects further commentary and proposal and expression of dissatisfaction” but that this “is the nature of the business we are in and an important part of the process.”

As to “foreign official” and the lack of a bright-line rule in the guidance, Khuzami said that they declined to draw a bright line because control of an enterprise can occur in different ways and that there are “many indirect ways of ownership and control.”  Breuer did say that the guidance acknowledges that it is unlikely that less than 50% control will result in an enterprise being considered an instrumentality, but that there might “specific factors” that may make such an enterprise an instrumentality.

To those who are inclined to believe that the guidance represents anything new, Breuer said that the guidance “does not represent a change in policy” but it “gives others a window and greater guidance” as to the enforcement agencies policies.  Khuzami agreed and said that Breuer’s comment was “absolutely right.”  Khuzami said that the “real value [of the guidance] is its clarity and transparency” and that the guidance is a unique opportunity “to communicate directly with the regulated community.”  He said that this opportunity does not always exist and that companies often receive information that is delivered and deciphered through counsel.  Khuzami said that the real “value of the guidance is that [corporate] officials can put this on their desk and read it, understand it directly and not through others.”  He said that this is the “great value” of the guidance.  I agree and previously stated (here) that the guidance collects in one document information that was previously scattered and that in this way the guidance has substantial value and is easily accessible to anyone.

Breuer was next asked whether the enforcement agencies plan to update the guidance over time or whether it represents a one-time publication.  Breuer stated that “for the foreseeable future” the guidance is it.  He said that the public needs to be realistic as to the roles the DOJ has and that by devoting time to the guidance prosecutors were not spending time prosecuting cases.  Khuzami added that rather than a “second-edition” that the guidance may be clarified over time through speeches or other commentary.