U.S. Intervenes in Wynn-Okada Dispute

Numerous prior posts (see here, here and here for instance) have highlighted the dispute between Wynn Resorts and its former board member Kazuo Okada.  Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported as follows.  “The U.S. asked to intervene in a lawsuit brought by Wynn Resorts Ltd., which accused Okada of making improper payments to Philippine gambling regulators. The Justice Department said in an April 8 filing in state court in Las Vegas that it doesn’t want the civil case to disrupt its criminal investigation into the same underlying allegations.”  According to Bloomberg:  “Okada’s lawyers have said they would probably oppose the request “in whole or in part,” according to the filing. Wynn Resorts won’t oppose its request, the Justice Department said.”  For additional coverage, see here from the Las Vegas Review-Journal.

I Disagree

Earlier this week a reader of the FCPA Blog (see here) posed the following question.  “One thing  that has not gotten much discussion is the possibility that the apparent slowdown in FCPA enforcement may be due to the spike in declinations.”

Putting aside the big-picture and highly relevant issue of what is a declination (see here as well as other embedded posts on this issue), when addressing the issue of FCPA enforcement statistics, it is important to keep in mind (as highlighted in this prior post) the following.

Just three unique historical events (Iraq Oil for Food, Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct, and Panalpina-related issues) served as the foundation for 35% of all corporate FCPA enforcement actions between 2007-2011 and resulted in 55% of settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.  Adding just the 2008 Siemens enforcement action to the settlement amount calculation, results in just four unique historical events accounting for 77% of settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.

Recognizing these events and how they impacted FCPA enforcement data is important to understanding why FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years.

Even though FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years, unique events giving rise to FCPA enforcement actions have remained relatively constant between 2007 and 2012.  In 2007, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 15 unique events.  In 2008, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 10 unique events.  In 2009, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 11 unique events.  In 2010, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 14 unique events.  In 2011, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 16 unique events.  In 2012, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 12 unique events.

I Agree

Dieter Juedes (who like me is a product of Sheboygan County, Wisconsin) recently published “Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense” in the William & Mary Business Law Review.  Among other things, the article “proposes specific statutory language that Congress could use in adopting such a defense and it establishes precise factors to be promulgated by the DOJ and SEC for determining whether a firm’s procedure would be deemed “adequate.”

Given my prior article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,” I agree with the general thrust of Juedes’s article.

Say What?

I don’t quite understand the logic or rationale of this op-ed piece in the South China Morning Post by Robert Precht (director of Justice Labs Limited, a Hong Kong think tank).

Precht argues that ”the efforts of some Western countries to enforce their own anti-bribery laws in China are more likely to produce false accusations and hinder democratic reform than reduce corruption.”  He states as follows.  “One of the unintended harms of enforcing the US anti-bribery law in China is that it may actually stifle efforts to end corruption. US journalists, human rights workers and university researchers play an important role in shining light on the darker recesses of Chinese politics. Preventing Americans from making gifts to Chinese to obtain information useful to promote democratic reform will hinder the disclosure role the Americans play.”

According to Precht, “the solution is simple.”  He argues that “the US Congress should amend the law, providing that it will only be applied in countries that meet certain minimum requirements of democracy and will not be applied in authoritarian regimes such as China.”

Hits and Misses

I read pretty much everything churned out by FCPA Inc., including the flood of recent client alerts concerning the Straub and Steffen decisions.  (See here and here for previous posts summarizing the decisions).  Many of these alerts are good and informative (for instance, see here from Debevoise & Plimpton).  However, some of these alerts are just plain wrong.

The headline of one alert was “District Court Decision Limits the Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA.”  The headline of another alert was “Court Sets Limits on Extraterritorial FCPA Reach; Dismisses Case Against Foreign Siemens Executive.”

Neither the Straub nor Steffen decisions concerned extraterritorial application of the FCPA.  In fact, there is no extraterritorial reach of the FCPA as to foreign actors.  Yes, the FCPA was amended in 1998 to provide for alternative “nationality” jurisdiction (i.e. extraterritorial jurisdiction) over U.S. persons (both legal and natural), however, 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) are strictly limited to U.S. persons.

Rather, the Straub decision concerned the scope of territorial jurisdiction under 78dd-1(a), specifically the meaning of “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce …”.

The Steffen decision did not even reach this issue as the judge found the initial threshold issue of personal jurisdiction lacking.

Wal-Mart’s FCPA Scrutiny Expenses Mount

During the media feeding frenzy after the New York Times April 2012 Wal-Mart article (see here for the prior post), I had the pleasure to appear on Eliot Spitzer’s Viewpoint program on Current TV.  At the end of the segment, after the substantive issues were discussed, Spitzer offered that he has several contacts in the FCPA bar and that, regardless of the substantive issues involved in Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny or the ultimate outcome, lots of lawyers were poised to make lots of money.

Spitzer of course was right.

Wal-Mart recently stated (here) that it has incurred “$157 million of professional fees and expenses related to the ongoing” FCPA matter during its last fiscal year and that it expect to incur an additional ”$40 to $45 million for the first quarter of fiscal 2014.”  During Wal-Mart’s recent earnings conference call, a company executive stated as follows.  “On FCPA, we continue  to work closely with anticorruption compliance experts to review and to assess  our programs and help us implement concrete steps for each particular market. In  the various markets, these experts have spent tens of thousands of hours on  anti-corruption support and training. We remain committed to follow all laws and  regulations in the markets where we operate.”

The $157 million Wal-Mart spent in the last FY equates to approximately $604,000 in professional fees and expenses per working day.

I observed in this March 2011 articles as follows.

“This new era of enforcement has resulted in wasteful overcompliance, companies viewing every foreign business partner with irrational suspicion, and companies deploying teams of lawyers and specialists around the world spending millions to uncover every potential questionable or unethical $100 corporate payment.  This new era of enforcement has proven lucrative to many segments of the legal, accounting, and compliance industries and the status quo would, from their perspective, seem desirable.”

The question again ought to be asked – does it really need to cost this much or has FCPA scrutiny turned into a boondoggle for many involved?  For more on this issue, see my article “Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era.”

While minor compared to Wal-Mart’s FCPA professional fees and expenses, Beam Inc. recently disclosed here that in 2012 the company spent approximately $4.2 million for “legal, forensic accounting, and other fees related to our internal investigation into Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance in our India operations.”

Wal-Mart Effect

Switching gears, but sticking with Wal-Mart related issues, this May 2012 post highlighted a potential “Wal-Mart effect.”  In short, the point was that Wal-Mart is clearly not the only company subject to the FCPA that needs licenses, permits and the like when doing business in Mexico.  I predicted that Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure would cause sleepless nights for many company executives doing business in Mexico and the general region.  The post then discussed statements made during a Kimco Realty Corporation earnings call in May 2012 concerning its properties in Mexico.

Earlier this week, Kimco Realty stated in an SEC filing as follows.

“On January 28, 2013, the Company received a subpoena from the Enforcement Division of the SEC in connection with an investigation, In the Matter of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (FW-3678), that the SEC Staff is currently conducting with respect to possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company is responding to the subpoena and intends to cooperate fully with the SEC in this matter. The Company has also been notified that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is conducting a parallel investigation, and the Company expects that it will cooperate with the DOJ investigation. At this point, we are unable to predict the duration, scope or result of the SEC or DOJ investigation.”

Survey Says

The annual Litigation Trends and Survey report by Fulbright & Jaworski is always a good read.  This year’s report (see here to download) surveyed 392 “senior corporate counsel” (275 in the U.S., 100 in the U.K. and 17 in other jurisdictions) on a wide-range of litigation and related matters.  The following were FCPA or related survey results.

“Companies that have retained outside counsel to assist with a corruption or bribery investigation in the past 12 months (including, but not limited to, FCPA in U.S. and equivalent in U.K.”

• 9% of U.S. respondents answered “yes”; 18% of U.K. respondents answered “yes.”  As noted, “U.S. figures [2010-2012] have remained relatively stable.”

“Companies that have engaged in due diligence for bribery or corruption (including FCPA matters) relating to a merger, acquisition or other business transactions with a foreign country in the past 12 months.”

• 18% of U.S. respondents answered “yes”; 26% of U.K. respondents answered “yes.”  As noted, “more companies this year have engaged outside counsel in due diligence for corruption or bribery investigations due to business transactions with entities based in a foreign country.”

As to the due diligence figures, in the abstract these figures do not mean much, unless one knows how many responding companies actually engaged in foreign acquisitions or other business combinations.

The last survey result in the report perhaps speaks best to the over-hyped nature of the U.K. Bribery Act.

“Has your company changed the way it operates due to the emergence of anti-bribery legislation outside the U.S., such as U.K. Bribery Act 2010?”

• 78% of U.S. respondents answered “no” and 63% of U.K. respondents answered “no.”

Senate Hearing Quotable

Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) had some quotable moments (here) during a recent Senate Banking hearing.  The hearing concerned financial regulation, not the FCPA.  Nevertheless, some of the issues have some overlap to FCPA enforcement - including how settlement policies in regulatory enforcement actions create conditions in which there is “not much incentive to follow the law” and how “too big to fail” perhaps means “too big for trial.”

Disclosure Issues

This recent Wall Street Journal CFO Journal post notes as follows.

“Securities and Exchange Commissioner Troy Paredes called for a complete review of the information companies disclose to investors, amid concerns that investors suffer from “disclosure overload” that could hamper their ability to gauge the importance of the data.  “What we need is a top-to-bottom review of our disclosure regime,” Mr. Paredes said at the Practising Law Institute’s annual “SEC Speaks” conference in Washington, D.C. on Friday.”

While they’re at it, the SEC should take a look at its absurd position that all payments in violation of the FCPA, no matter how small the payment and no matter how large the company, are “qualitatively material.”  For instance, as noted in this previous post concerning comments made by enforcement officials at a conference I chaired, an SEC official suggested that the concept of materiality itself has two “sub-concepts”: (i) quantitative materiality (something that impacts a company’s financial statements) and (ii) qualitative materiality.  While conceding that very few improper payments are “quantitatively material” and while recognizing that “qualitative materiality” is a “complicated gray area,” the SEC officials nevertheless said that all bribes can be considered qualitatively material because they may “automatically trigger a books and records violation.”  For formal SEC guidance on this issue, see here.

Checking In

Hollywood Industry Sweep

From the New York Times regarding the on-going scrutiny of Hollywood movie studios in China.

“Last March, word reached several studios of a confidential inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commissionand the Justice Department into possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by people or companies involved in the China film trade. Since then, executives and their advisers have been waiting for some public sign of the scope or focus of the government’s interest.  So far, there has been none. But official silence has not kept the investigation from casting a chill over dealings between Hollywood and China.”

Goldman

From the Wall Street Journal regarding the on-going scrutiny of Goldman’s dealings with Libya’s sovereign wealth fund.

“Libya’s sovereign-wealth fund said it is cooperating with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in its ongoing investigation into Goldman Sachs Group Inc. over the securities firm’s dealings with the fund when Col. Moammar Gadhafi was in power.  [...]  People close to the Libyan investment fund said officials have authorized some former fund executives to give testimony to the SEC. The officials also agreed to provide documents and other data to U.S. regulators about the fund’s ties to Goldman, these people said.”

Spot On

Two recent Q&A’s on Law360 caught my eye.  The question was “what is an important issue or case relevant to your practice area and why.”

Neil Eggleston (Kirkland & Ellis) stated as follows.

“We are beginning to see the development of case law in the FCPA area, which I believe is good for the process. Most of these cases have been settled. When that occurs, defendants have little incentive to refuse to agree to novel Department of Justice theories of prosecution or jurisdiction, so long as the penalty is acceptable. The department then cites its prior settlement as precedent when settling later ones. But no court approved the earlier settlement, and the prior settlement should have no precedential value in favor of the DOJ in later settlements. As the DOJ increases its prosecution of individuals, we will see many more trials, which will give rise to courts, not the DOJ, interpreting the statute.”

For more on these issues, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” and this previous guest post on ”prosecutorial common law.”

Richard Marmaro (Skadden) answered the same question as follows.

“An issue of importance in the white collar area is the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, and appropriate remedies for prosecutors who intentionally conceal evidence, intimidate witnesses, or otherwise compromise or impact a defendant’s right to a fair trial. I have seen firsthand in several of my cases shocking misconduct, which has gone undisciplined by the U.S. Department of Justice. I have been fortunate enough to expose this misconduct, and have had cases dismissed as a result. Indeed, over the last decade, there have been several dismissals nationwide at trial or reversals on appeal based on willful misconduct by government lawyers. Despite these judicial findings, however, the Justice Department’s record of disciplining misbehaving prosecutors is shockingly inadequate. I don’t know of any prosecutor that has been terminated based on a judicial finding of intentional misconduct. In addition, I believe that only two prosecutors have received any discipline at all (both in the Stevens case). In my view, the failure to sanction prosecutors who have been found by judges to have committed misconduct sends the wrong signal to defendants, the public and the vast majority of prosecutors who do their jobs honestly every day.”

For more, see this previous post titled ”Should There Be A Difference?”

Refreshing Words

Every now and then it is refreshing to read some common sense words about FCPA compliance and risk assessment.  Such as this recent post from the Trace blog.

“Remember, perfection is neither possible nor necessary.  When devising a compliance plan, it’s important to remind oneself of the big picture.  A company need not break the bank to have a compliance program that follows accepted best practices.  As discussed below, there are various ways that good compliance can be affordable.  And companies are not responsible for developing full-proof compliance programs; they only need to develop programs proportionate to the risk they face, with the understanding that no program will completely eliminate all risk from the equation.  Unlike in other areas of business, when it comes to compliance, being in the middle of the pack is okay.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Double Standard

A pharmaceutical company faces pending government restraints that could negatively affect its business.  The company turns to its lobbyists that include the former chiefs of staff to various current government officials on a key government committee.  Also, in recent years the company indirectly gave thousands of dollars to the current government officials and otherwise made large donations to groups favored by the current government officials.  The government officials insert a paragraph into a massive spending bill that, while not specifically mentioning the company, strongly favors one of the company’s drugs.  The effect of the paragraph in the bill gives the company two additional years to sell the drug without government price controls.

Having read the recent Eli Lilly FCPA enforcement action (see here for the prior post) and otherwise being an astute FCPA observer, your FCPA antennas are going off.

But wait.

The government officials were not “foreign officials” – they were U.S. government officials!

See here for the recent New York Times story on Amgen’s courting of various members of the Senate Finance Committee.

Scrap those internal investigation plans, forget about voluntary disclosure, and slim chance there will be an enforcement action. Nobody said our system was perfect, but that is just how the system works some will say.

But why should corporate interaction with a “foreign official” be subject to greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than corporate interaction with a U.S. official? After all, there is a U.S. domestic bribery statute (18 USC 201) with elements very similar to the FCPA.  Why do we reflexively label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value” from private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind eye when it happens here at home?

As you contemplate these questions, just remember, as soon to be former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently declared (see here), “we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.”

For numerous prior posts concerning the double standard, see here.

A Rocky Mountain Rakoff

We celebrate Mary Jo White’s appointment to be the next Chair of the SEC by focusing on yet another federal court judge calling into question the SEC’s signature neither admit nor deny settlement policy.  For more on that policy and how it contributes to a facade of enforcement, see numerous prior posts here, here, here, and here - focusing mostly on Judge Jed Rakoff’s (S.D.N.Y.) disdain of the policy.

In August 2012, the SEC brought a complaint (see here) against Colorado-based Bridge Premium Finance LLC and certain of its executives for allegedly perpetrating a Ponzi scheme.  The SEC and defendants agreed to resolve the matter and, as typical and as is frequently the case in SEC FCPA matters, the defendants did so without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.

Enter U.S. Senior District Court Judge John Kane (D. Co.) who pulled a Rocky Mountain Rakoff.  In a January 17th order, Judge Kane stated as follows.

“I refuse to approve penalties against a defendant who remains defiantly mute as to the veracity of the allegations against him. A defendant’s options in this regard are binary: he may admit the allegation or he may go to trial. I also object to the language in the consents and the proposed final judgments whereby the defendants waive their rights to the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to FRCP 52 and their rights to appeal. These findings are important to inform the public and the appellate courts. I will not endorse any final judgments including such provisions.”

Returning to Judge Rakoff, you may recall (see here for the prior post) that his disdain for the SEC’s settlement policy is currently before the Second Circuit in SEC v. Citigroup.  As Professor Barbara Black notes on her Securities Law Prof blog, oral arguments on the merits is scheduled for February 8th.

Interesting Tidbits

Alexandra Wrage (President of Trace International) writes in a recent Forbes column (here) as follows.

“Whether they’re stating it expressly or acting on it quietly, governments are using corporations as their primary tool to reduce international bribery.   They alarm companies with vast fines and terrify individuals with substantial prison sentences with the hope of ending the payment of bribes because they cannot, in most cases, do much of anything about those demanding them.   This is not inappropriate.  Companies are regulated, subject to laws and answerable to shareholders.  The worst offenders demanding bribes, on the other hand, do so with impunity, hiding behind sovereign immunity and, often, their own, complicit local law enforcement.  Abacha.  Suharto. Marcos.  Duvalier.  It’s a longstanding tradition, still thriving in many countries today.  US and some European law enforcement agencies have been extraordinarily successful, with fines in the United States now counted in the billions of dollars and other jurisdictions promising to catch up soon.   While these efforts have done more than anything else to reduce bribery, they have yet to convince us that companies are both the sole source and solution of all international corruption — and that’s insupportable.  [...]  The simple reality is that there are just some things that companies can’t do about corruption.”

Spot-on.

Wrage’s comments remind me a similar spot-on observation made during the middle of the FCPA’s legislative history.  See here for the prior post regarding Milton Gwirtzman’s dandy article published by the New York Times Magazine in October 1975 in which he observes as follows – “it would be unwise, as well as unfair, simply to write off bribery abroad to corporate lust – it is a symbol of far deeper issues …”.

As to those deeper issues, an issue I frequently write about is why do FCPA violations occur?  Do companies subject to the law have bribery as a business strategy?  Or do companies subject to the law encounter difficult and opaque business conditions abroad?  To be sure, FCPA enforcement actions have been based on both scenarios, but my opinion (as well as that of the former chief of the DOJ’s FCPA unit – see here for his previous guest post) is that the later scenario is the more common reason for FCPA exposure.

For instance, a recent post on the China Law Blog by Dan Harris (here) begins as follows.

“Got a call the other day from an American company wanting to sell its food products into China. And fast.  The problem this company is facing is that one cannot “just” sell food into China immediately.  To sell food legally into China, Foreign companies must first pass certification before China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, better known as AQSIQ.  The food company told me that its research had revealed that it typically takes around a year to secure this certification, but that someone in China was promising they could do it in “around six to eight weeks.”

Also on the list of FCPA exposure risks, I would add various trade distortions and barriers, such as central government procurement policies.  For this reason, I found this recent Sidley & Austin alert interesting.  It concern a new China “regulation that subjects certain high-value medical devices to a centralized procurement regime.”

Save the Date

D.C. area readers may be interested in a February 12th event hosted by American University Washington College of Law and presented by the American University International Law Review.  Titled “Bribes Without Borders:  The Challenges of Fighting Corruption in the Global Context,” the symposium will feature panels of academics, practitioners, and civil society representatives and will touch upon a variety of bribery and corruption topics including the FCPA.  I will be participating on an afternoon panel and will be speaking on FCPA enforcement and the rule of law.  Robert Leventhal (Director, Anti-Corruption and Governance Initiatives, U.S. State Department) will deliver a keynote luncheon address.  The symposium is free, but registration is requested.

Just in Case

Just in case you were wondering about the U.K. SFO’s position on facilitation payments (see here for a prior post), the Bribery Library site shines light on a December 6, 2012 “to whom it may concern” letter (here) from SFO Director David Green in which he states that “facilitation payments are illegal under the Bribery Act 2010 regardless of their size or frequency.”

You can now head into the weekend confident in your knowledge of the U.K.’s position.

*****

A good weekend to all.

On-Point Editorial

“Government enforcers always need to be watched, especially when their business targets are politically unpopular.  Then the feds think they can get away with anything.”  So begins a recent Wall Street Journal editorial (here) on the Supreme Court’s recent oral arguments in Gabelli v. SEC – a case in which the five year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is squarely before the court (see here for SCOTUS Blog coverage).  Gabelli is a case to watch given that the limitations period in most SEC FCPA enforcement actions would seemed to be stretched.

Former DOJ Fraud Chief on Voluntary Disclosures

Recently the online news site Main Justice interviewed former DOJ Fraud Section chief Steven Tyrrell (see here for the video).  Much of the interview was about voluntary disclosures.  Tyrrell stated that he is “certain” there have been so-called declinations that are “simply not public” where companies did not voluntary disclose, but had extensive remediation and cooperation.  In the interview Tyrrell also agreed that the declination examples in the recent FCPA Guidance – all of which had voluntary disclosure as an apparent factor - was likely an enforcement agency attempt to encourage more voluntary disclosures.  Tyrrell stated that voluntary disclosure “should not be the be all and end all” in any case.

Once again, selective government information as to FCPA enforcement designed to achieve policy objectives of the enforcement agencies.

For The Reading Stack

Some recommended reading on FCPA jurisdictional issues, Chinese SOEs, and an additional year in review.

Jurisdictional Issues

The current edition of the ABA International Law News has a great article by Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys Sean Hecker and Margot Laporte titled “Should FCPA ’Territorial’ Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?”

As to FCPA enforcement actions against foreign entities and individuals for conduct that occurred overseas with only minimal U.S. contacts, the authors ask “whether the United States is the appropriate authority to prosecute such cases, where the evidence, witnesses, and conduct are located overseas and where alternative jurisdictions often have an even greater interest in enforcement.”

As to Judge Leon’s rejection of the DOJ’s expansive jurisdictional theory in the Africa Sting prosecution of Pankesh Patel (see here for the prior post), the authors state as follows.  “This decision, which suggests a requirement of physical presence in the United States in connection with an allegedly corrupt act, call into question much of the DOJ and SEC’s expansive construction of territorial jurisdiction over foreign entities and individuals under the FCPA.  Until additional courts speak to the issue, however, the DOJ and SEC are unlikely to back off their more expansive views of jurisdiction.”

As alluded to in the article, additional courts are poised to speak on jurisdictional issues as to foreign actors.  (See here for general discussion of motions to dismiss pending in SEC enforcement actions against former Maygar Telekom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai and former Siemens executive Herbert Steffen).

Chinese SOEs

Interested in Chinese SOEs?  How can you not be if your interested in FCPA issues.  If so, see here for a recent Wall Street Journal article titled “China’s Investments Prompt Call for New Rules.”  The article details investments by Chinese companies, including SOEs, in the U.S. over the past several years and states as follows – “according to a U.S. congressional commission, state-owned companies accounted for 90% of the value of Chinese investments in the U.S. industrial-machinery, aerospace, automobile and logistics industries between 2007 and the third quarter of 2011.”  The article also notes as follows.  “Even figuring out which Chinese operations qualify as state-controlled can be tough.”

Year in Review

Miller & Chevalier recently published (here) its FCPA Winter Review 2013.  The review highlights developments from Q4 of 2012, reviews 2012 enforcement trends, and looks forward to 2013.  [Note, Miller & Chevalier keeps its FCPA statistics differently from the "core" approach described here].

*****

A good weekend to all.

Next up is Eli Lilly in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action announced last week by the SEC.   This post goes long and deep as to the SEC’s allegations which resulted in a $29 million settlement.

In summary, the SEC alleges in a civil complaint (here) as follows.

“Eli Lilly and Company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the activities of its subsidiaries in China, Brazil, Poland, and Russia.  Between 2006 and 2009, employees of Lilly’s China subsidiary falsified expense reports in order to provide improper gifts and cash payments to government-employed physicians. In 2007, a pharmaceutical distributor hired by Lilly in Brazil paid bribes to government health officials in a Brazilian state in order to assure sales of a Lilly product to state government institutions. In Poland, between 2000 and 2003, Lilly’s subsidiary made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to a small charitable foundation that was founded and administered by the head of one of the regional government health authorities at the same time that the subsidiary was seeking the official’s support for placing Lilly drugs on the government reimbursement list. Finally, Lilly’s subsidiary in Russia paid millions of dollars to off-shore entities for alleged “services” beginning as early as 1994 and continuing through 2005 in order for pharmaceutical distributors and government entities to purchase Lilly’s drugs. In some instances, the off-shore entities appear to have been used to funnel money to government officials or others with influence in the government in order to obtain business for the subsidiary. These off-shore entities rarely provided the contracted-for services. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008, contemporaneous with requests to government officials to support the government’s purchase or reimbursement of Lilly’s products, the subsidiary in Russia made proposals to government officials about how the company could donate to, or otherwise support, various initiatives that were affiliated with, or important to, the government officials.  As a result of this conduct, Lilly violated [the FCPA's internal controls provisions] by failing to have an adequate internal controls system in place to detect and prevent illicit payments.  Lilly violated [the FCPA's books and records provisions] by improperly recording each of those payments in its accounting books and records.  Lilly also violated the [FCPA's anti-bribery provisions] in connection with certain activities of its subsidiary in Russia.”

As indicated by the above paragraph, conduct in Poland, China, and Brazil gave rise to FCPA books and records and internal controls violations only.

Poland

The SEC’s allegations relating to Poland are substantively identical to allegations made against Schering-Plough in this 2004 FCPA enforcement action.

In pertinent part, the SEC alleges in its complaint against Eli Lilly as follows.

“During 2000 through 2003, Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Poland (“Lilly- Poland”) made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to the Chudow Castle Foundation (“Chudow Foundation”), a small charitable foundation in Poland that was founded and administered by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund (“Director”). The Director established the Chudow Foundation in 1995 to restore the Chudow Castle in the town of Chudow and other historic sites in the Silesian region of Poland.

The Silesian Health Fund (“Health Fund”) was one of sixteen regional government health authorities in Poland during the period. Among other things, the Health Fund reimbursed hospitals and healthcare providers for the purchase of certain approved products.  The Health Fund, through the allocation of public money, exercised considerable influence over which pharmaceutical products local hospitals and other healthcare providers in the region purchased.

Beginning in early 2000 and into 2002, Lilly-Poland was in negotiations with the Health Fund over, among other things, the Heath Fund’s financing of the purchase of Gemzar, one of Lilly’s cancer drugs, by public hospitals and other healthcare providers. Those negotiations occurred primarily between a team manager at Lilly-Poland (“Lilly Manager”) and the Director. Continuing at intervals throughout these negotiations, the Director asked that Lilly Poland contribute to the Chudow Foundation. The initial request came directly from the Director and the subsequent requests came from the Chudow Foundation.

The Lilly-Poland Manager knew that the Director had established the Chudow Foundation and that it was a project to which he was devoted and lent much effort. The Manager requested the approval of payments to the Chudow Foundation. The Manager falsely described the first payment as being for the purchase of computers for the Chudow Foundation. The second Lilly-Poland payment request falsely characterized the proposed payment as “[t]o support foundation in its goal to develop activities in [Chudow Castle].” That request documentation also noted that the “value of the request” was “[i]ndirect support of educational efforts of foundation settled by Silesia [Health Fund].” Similarly, the remaining payments were mischaracterized as monies paid by Lilly-Poland to secure the use of the Chudow Castle for conferences after its renovation. No such conferences took place.

Lilly-Poland eventually made a total of eight payments to the Chudow Foundation, starting in June 2000 and ending in January 2003.  [...]  The Manager requested the approval of the payments to the Chudow Foundation with the intent of inducing the Health-Fund Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and other health care providers in the Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing Gemzar.

China

As to China, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.

“Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary through which it does business in China (“Lilly- China”) employs more than one-thousand sales representatives whose main focus is on marketing Lilly products to government-employed health-care providers. During the relevant period, the sales representatives worked from regional offices and traveled throughout the country, interacting with the health-care providers in order to convince them to prescribe Lilly products. The sales representatives were directly supervised by District Sales Managers who, in tum, were supervised by Regional Managers. Sales representatives paid out-of-pocket for their travel expenses and submitted receipts and other documentation to the company for reimbursement.

Between 2006 and 2009, various sales representatives and their supervisors abused the system by submitting, or instructing subordinates to submit, false expense reports. In some instances, Lilly-China personnel used reimbursements from those false reports to purchase gifts and entertainment for government-employed physicians in order to encourage the physicians to look favorably upon Lilly and prescribe Lilly products.

In one sales area, in 2006 and 2007, a District Sales Manager for Lilly’s diabetes products instructed subordinates to submit false expenses reports and provide the reimbursement money to her. She then used the reimbursements to purchase gifts, such as wine, specialty foods and a jade bracelet, for government-employed physicians. At least five sales representatives in the oncology sales group submitted false expense reports and then used those reimbursements to provide meals, visits to bath houses, and card games to government-employed physicians.

Similarly, in three other provinces, three sales representatives submitted false expense reports and then used the reimbursements to provide government-employed physicians with visits to bath houses and karaoke bars. In another city, five sales representatives submitted false reimbursements and then their Regional Manager used the money to provide door prizes and publication fees to government-employed physicians. In another city, seven sales representatives and the District Sales Manager for the diabetes sales team used reimbursements to buy meals and cosmetics for government-employed physicians.

Between 2008 and 2009, members of Lilly-China’s “Access Group,” which was responsible for expanding access to Lilly products in China by, among other things, convincing government officials to list Lilly products on government reimbursement lists, engaged in similar misconduct. At least six members of the sixteen-member Access Group, including two associate access directors, falsified expense reports and used the proceeds to provide gifts and entertainment to government officials in China. The gifts included: spa treatments, meals, and cigarettes.

Although the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were wide-spread throughout the subsidiary. Lilly has terminated, or otherwise disciplined, the various employees who submitted false expense reports and/or used the proceeds to provide gifts and services to government officials.”

Brazil

As to Brazil, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.

“Between 2007 and 2009, Lilly-Brazil distributed drugs in Brazil through third party distributors who then resold those products to both private and government entities. As a general rule, Lilly-Brazil sold the drugs to the distributors at a discount; the distributors then resold the drugs to the end users at a higher price and took the discount as their compensation.  Lilly-Brazil negotiated the amount of the discount with the distributor based on the distributor’s anticipated sale. The discount to the distributors generally ranged between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount.

In early 2007, at the request of one of Lilly-Brazil’s sales and marketing managers at the time, Lilly-Brazil granted a nationwide pharmaceutical distributor, unusually large discounts of 17% and 19% for two of the distributor’s purchases of a Lilly drug, which the distributor then sold to the government of one of the Brazilian states. Lilly-Brazil’s pricing committee approved the discounts without further inquiry. The policies and procedures in place to flag unusual distributor discounts were deficient. They relied on the representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transactions. In May 2007, Lilly sold 3,200 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state; in August 2007, Lilly-Brazil sold 13,500 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state. Together the sales were valued at approximately $1.2 million.

The distributor used approximately 6% of the purchase price (approximately $70,000) to bribe government officials from the Brazilian state so that the state would purchase the Lilly product. The Lilly-Brazil sales and marketing manager who requested the discount knew about this arrangement.”

Russia

As to Russia, in pertinent part, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

“From 1994 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lilly, sold pharmaceutical products either directly to government entities in the former Soviet Union or through various distributors, often selected by the government, who would then resell the products to the government entities. Along with the underlying purchase contract with the government entity or distributor, Lilly-Vostok sometimes entered into another agreement with a third-party selected by a government official or by the government-chosen pharmaceutical distributor. Generally, these third-parties, which had addresses and bank accounts located outside of Russia, were paid a flat fee or a percentage of the sale. These agreements were referred to as “marketing” or “service” agreements.  In total, Lilly-Vostok entered into over 96 such agreements with over 42 third-party entities between 1994 and 2004.

Lilly-Vostok had little information about these third-party entities, beyond their addresses and bank accounts. Rarely did Lilly-Vostok know who owned them or whether the entities were actual businesses that could provide legitimate services. Senior management employees in Lilly-Vostok’s Moscow branch assisted in the negotiation of these agreements. The contracts themselves were derived from a Lilly-Vostok-created template and enumerated various broadly-defined services, such as ensuring “immediate customs clearance” or “immediate delivery” of the products; or assisting Lilly-Vostok in “obtaining payment for the sales transaction,” “the promotion of the products,” and “marketing research.”

Contrary to what was recorded in the company’s books and records, there is little evidence that any services were actually provided under any of these third-party agreements. Indeed, in many instances, the “services” identified in the contract were already being provided by the distributor, a third-party handler (such as an international shipping handler) or Lilly itself. To the extent services such as expedited customs clearance or other services requiring interaction with government officials were provided, Lilly-Vostok did not know or inquire how the third party intended to perform their services.

Contemporaneous documents reflect that Lilly-Vostok employees viewed the payments as necessary to obtain the business from the distributor or government entity, and not as payment for legitimate services.

The SEC also alleges that in 1997 and in 1999 Lilly conducted a business review of Lilly-Vostok.  According to the SEC, the reports raised concerns about Lilly-Vostok’s business practices and the reports “recommended that Lilly-Vostok modify its internal controls to ensure that [certain third-party] services were documented” and to “assure itself that [certain third-party] agreements accurately and fairly reflect the services to be provided.”

However, the SEC alleged as follows.

“Lilly did not curtail the use of marketing agreements by its subsidiary or make any meaningful efforts to ensure that the marketing agreements were not being used as a method to funnel money to government officials, despite recognition that the marketing agreements were being used to “create sales potential” or “to ‘support’ activities leading to agreement-signing” with government entities. In fact, during the 2000-2004 period — after the above-described reports, but prior to the company ending use of the agreements– Lilly-Vostok entered into the three most expensive of these arrangements.”

The three arrangements are as follows.

First, the SEC alleged that in response to a 2002 Russian Ministry of Health tender, the ministry selected a “large Russian pharmaceutical distributor” for which to purchase the products and the distributor in turn negotiated with Lilly-Vostok for the purchase of diabetes products.  According to the SEC, the distributor required Lilly-Vostok, “as a condition of their agreement” to enter into various agreements with an entity incorporated in Cyprus.

According to the SEC.

“Lilly’s due diligence regarding the entity in Cyprus was limited to ordering a Dun and Bradstreet report and conducting a search using an internet service to scan publicly available information. Neither the Dun and Bradstreet report nor the internet search revealed the Cyprus entity’s beneficial owner or anything about its business. Nonetheless, pursuant to the terms of its arrangement with the distributor, Lilly-Vostok paid the entity in Cyprus over $3.8 million in early 2003.

The Cyprus entity was, in fact, owned by the Russian businessman who was the owner of the distributor. There is no evidence of services provided to Lilly-Vostok by the Cyprus entity in consideration for Lilly-Vostok’s $3.8 million in payments. Lilly’s books and records improperly reflected these payments as payments for services.”

Second, the SEC alleges “at least two instances” involving foreign government officials and alleges as follows.

“Between 2000 and 2005, Lilly-Vostok sold significant amounts of pharmaceutical products to a major Russian pharmaceutical distributor for resale to the Russian Ministry of Health. The pharmaceutical distributor was owned and controlled by an individual who, at the beginning of the distributor’s relationship with Lilly-Vostok, was a close adviser to a member of Russia’s Parliament. In 2003, this official became a member of the upper house of Russia’s Parliament. Throughout the period, this official exercised considerable influence over government decisions relating to the pharmaceutical industry in Russia.

As part of most of the sales arrangements with the distributor, the official demanded that Lilly-Vostok enter into separate “marketing” agreements with entities with addresses and bank accounts in Cyprus. Under the arrangement, Lilly-Vostok paid the Cypriot entities up to thirty percent of the sales price of the underlying sales contracts in return for the Cypriot entities entering into an agreement “to offer all assistance necessary” in various areas like storage, importation and payment.

In conjunction with outside counsel, Lilly-Vostok conducted limited due diligence on these third-parties. However, the due diligence did not identify the beneficial owners of these third-parties or determine whether the third-parties were able to provide the contracted-for assistance. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok concluded that it could proceed with the transactions and paid the Cypriot entities over $5.2 million. In fact, the Cypriot entities were owned by an individual associated with the distributor controlled by the member of the upper house of Russia Parliament. The Cypriot entity transferred the payments from Lilly-Vostok to other off-shore entities.”

Third, the SEC alleges “in connection another series of contracts, from 2000 through 2004, Lilly-Vostok sold products to a distributor, headquartered in Moscow, which was wholly-owned by a Russian government entity.

The SEC alleged as follows.

 ”The purchase agreements were signed on the government-owned distributor’s behalf by its General Director. As part of the arrangement, the government-owned distributor selected a third-party entity with an address in the British Virgin Islands (“the BVI entity”) with which Lilly-Vostok entered into agreements for the broadly defined “services” enumerated in the Lilly-Vostok template (see above). Under the terms of the agreements between Lilly-Vostok and the BVI entity, Lilly-Vostok was to pay the BVI entity up to 15% of the price of the product purchased by the government-owned distributor. Accordingly, from 2000 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok made approximately 65 payments to the BVI entity totaling approximately $2 million.

There is no evidence that the BVI entity performed any of the services listed in its agreement with Lilly-Vostok. There is also no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry as to whether the BVI entity was able or did perform the contracted-for services. Lastly, there is no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry into the identity of the beneficial owner of the BVI entity. In fact, the beneficial owner of the BVI entity was the General Director of the government-owned distributor, and he ultimately received the payments from the BVI entity.”

As to these various arrangements, the SEC alleges as follows.  “Lilly did not direct Lilly-Vostok to cease entering into these third-party agreements until 2004. However, Lilly permitted the subsidiary to continue making payments under already existing third-party contracts as late as 2005.”

As to the above Russian conduct, the complaint charges violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  Of note, the complaints specifically pleads as follows regarding knowledge.  “When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances, unless the person actually believes that the circumstance does not exist.”

The SEC complaint also contains the following allegation.

“From 2005 through 2008, Lilly-Vostok made various proposals to government officials in Russia regarding how Lilly-Vostok could donate to or otherwise support various initiatives that were affiliated with public or private institutions headed by the government officials or otherwise important to the government officials. Examples included their personal participation or the participation of people from their institutions in clinical trials and international and regional conferences and the support of charities and educational events associated with the institutes. At times, these proposals to government officials were made in a communication that also included a request for assistance in getting a product reimbursed or purchased by the government. Generally, Lilly-Vostok personnel believed these proposals were proper because of their relevance to public health issues and many of the proposals were reviewed by counsel. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok did not have in place internal controls through which such proposals were vetted to ascertain whether Lilly-Vostok was offering something of value to a government official for a purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business.”

As to Lilly’s books and records, the SEC alleges as follows.

“[S]ubsidiaries of Eli Lilly made numerous payments that were incorrectly described in the company’s books and records. In China, payments were falsely described as reimbursement of expenses when, in fact, the money was used to provide gifts to government-employed physicians. In Brazil, money that was described in company records as a “discount” for a pharmaceutical distributor was, in actuality, a bribe for government officials. In Poland, payments classified as charitable donations were not intended for a genuine charitable purpose but rather to induce a government official to assent to the purchase of a Lilly product. Finally, in Russia, millions of dollars in payments, described in the company’s books and records as for various services, were actually payments to assure that Lilly was able to conduct business with certain pharmaceutical distributors.”

As to Lilly’s internal controls, the SEC alleges as follows.

“During the relevant period, Lilly and its subsidiaries failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the company maintained accountability for its assets and transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authorization. Particularly, Lilly did not adequately verify that intermediaries with which the company was doing government-related business would not provide a benefit to a government official on Lilly’s behalf in order to obtain or retain business. Lilly and its subsidiaries primarily relied on assurances and information provided in the paperwork by these intermediaries or by Lilly personnel rather than engaging in adequate verification and analyzing the surrounding circumstances of the transaction. Lilly and its subsidiaries’ employees considered and offered benefits to government officials at the same time they were asking those government officials to assist with the reimbursement or purchase of Lilly’s products with inadequate safeguards to assure that its employees were not offering items of values to a government official with a purpose to assist Lilly in retaining or obtaining business.

Moreover, despite an understanding that certain emerging markets were most vulnerable to FCPA violations, Lilly’s audit department, based out of Indianapolis, had no procedures specifically designed to assess the FCPA or bribery risks of sales and purchases. Accordingly, transactions with off-shore entities or with government-affiliated entities did not receive specialized or closer review for possible FCPA violations.  In assessing these transactions, the auditors relied upon the standard accounting controls which primarily assured the soundness of the paperwork. There was little done to assess whether, despite the existence of facially acceptable paperwork, the surrounding circumstances or terms of a transaction suggested the possibility of an FCPA violation or bribery.

As to Lilly’s remedial efforts, the SEC complaint states as follows.

“Since the time of the conduct noted in this Complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anticorruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”

As noted in this SEC release,  Lilly, without admitting or denying the allegations, agreed to pay disgorgement of $13,955,196, prejudgment interest of $6,743,538, and a penalty of $8.7 million for a total payment of $29,398,734.  The release also notes that “Lilly also agreed to comply with certain undertakings including the retention of an independent consultant to review and make recommendations about its foreign corruption policies and procedures.”

In Lilly’s release (below) the retention period of the consultant is identified as 60 days and in the SEC’s proposed final judgement, the consultant is identified as FTI Consulting which has been assisting Lilly in connection with a previous Corporate Integrity Agreement.

The case has been assigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia).

William Baker III (Latham & Watkins) represented Lilly.

In the SEC’s release, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit) stated as follows. “Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries possessed a ‘check the box’ mentality when it came to third-party due diligence. Companies can’t simply rely on paper-thin assurances by employees, distributors, or customers. They need to look at the surrounding circumstances of any payment to adequately assess whether it could wind up in a government official’s pocket.”  In the same release, Antonia Chion (Associate Director in the SEC Enforcement Division) stated as follows.  “When a parent company learns tell-tale signs of a bribery scheme involving a subsidiary, it must take immediate action to assure that the FCPA is not being violated.  We strongly caution company officials from averting their eyes from what they do not wish to see.”

This Lilly release quotes Anne Nobles (Lilly’s Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and Senior VP of Enterprise Risk Management) as follows.  “Lilly requires our employees to act with integrity with all external parties and in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.  Since ours is a business based on trust, we strive to conduct ourselves in an ethical way that is beyond reproach. We have cooperated with the U.S. government throughout this investigation and have strengthened our internal controls and compliance program globally, including significant investment in our global anti-corruption program.”  The Lilly release further states as follows.  “The SEC noted that since the time of the conduct alleged in its complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anti-corruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”  The release further notes that “Lilly was first notified of the investigation in August 2003″ and describes the independent compliance consultant as conducting a ”60-day review of the company’s internal controls and compliance program related to the FCPA.”

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope

Academic publishing is seldom quick. Yet before the calendar flips into another year, I am pleased to share my article concerning 2011 FCPA enforcement.  The abstract of ”The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope” (see here to download) recently published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law is as follows.  Information in the article is current as of January 16, 2012.

For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s history, key decisions concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind closed doors around conference room tables in Washington, D.C. The FCPA took on a life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to mean whatever the DOJ or SEC could get putative corporate FCPA defendants (mindful of the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to agree to behind those closed doors. However, as the enforcement agencies continued to push the envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and as the DOJ brought more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including through manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals alike began to openly fight back. While many FCPA enforcement decisions and procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. This Article (i) provides an overview of 2011 FCPA enforcement and discusses certain problematic enforcement trends, and (ii) highlights how in 2011 the FCPA was subjected to the most meaningful public scrutiny in its history. FCPA enforcement trends and scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the FCPA.

Start your collection of FCPA Year in Reviews.  For my 2011 (short version), see here.  For 2010, see here (short version), here (long version).  For 2009, see here (long version).

Judge Leon Pulls a Judge Rakoff

My post concerning the SEC’s March 2011 enforcement action against IBM was titled “Questions Abound in IBM Enforcement Action.”  (See here).  Among the issues I discussed were the following.  That in December 2000, IBM resolved an FCPA enforcement action and consented, as part of the settlement, to the entry of an Order that requires IBM to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violation of [the FCPA's books and records provisions].  I noted that because the March 2011 enforcement action alleged FCPA books and records charges, that IBM was thus in clear violation of the 2000 court order.

The case was assigned to Judge Richard Leon (of Africa Sting fame) and lingered for a long time.  This Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post and this Bloomberg article report that Judge Leon has refused to approve the settlement.

As stated by Bloomberg – “The heart of the dispute is that Leon, who has had the case under review for 22 months, wants reporting on a broader range of possible wrongdoing than the company is willing to turn over.  Leon, who spoke loudly and angrily, asked why the regulator would agree to limit such requirements for a company with a history of books-and-records violations. [...]   “I guess you want that $10 million judgment on your list of achievements this year,” Leon told [the SEC lawyer]. “Well, it’s not going to happen.”  He scheduled a hearing for Feb. 4.”

As stated by Wall Street Journal Corruption Current – “Leon also questioned broader SEC settlement policies and warned that he was among “a growing number of district judges who are increasingly concerned” by those policies.”

In not ”rubber stamping” the SEC – IBM settlement, Judge Leon pulled a Judge Rakoff.  Judge Rakoff of the S.D. of N.Y. has been a frequent focus on this site – see here, here, here and here.  See also, the discussion of Judge Rakoff in my 2010 article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”

Edmonds Sentence

This past June, David Edmonds, a defendant in the long-running “Carson” enforcement action involving former employees of Control Components Inc., agreed to plead guilty on the eve of trial to substantially reduced charges. (See here for the prior post).  Earlier this week, Judge James Selna sentenced Edmonds to four months in prison and four months of home confinement.  (See here for Judge Selna’s sentencing memo).  As noted in the DOJ’s sentencing memo (here), the DOJ sought a 14 month prison sentence.

Other defendants previously sentenced in the case are Stuart Carson (4 months in prison followed by 8 months of home detention), Hong Carson (3 years probation to include 6 months of home detention) and Paul Cosgrove (13 months home detention).

It’s Official

Imagine a foreign country in which the president is actively seeking and accepting corporate money to fund inaugural festivities.  All sorts of red flags right?

But wait, this describes the United States and President Obama’s upcoming inauguration.  As detailed in this prior post, President Obama’s fundraising advisers “have urged the White House to accept corporate donations for his January 2013 inaugural celebration rather than rely exclusively on weary donors who underwrote his $1 billion re-election effort.”

It’s now official.  As noted by this recent New York Times article “President Obama’s finance team is offering corporations and other institutions that contribute $1 million exclusive access to an array of inaugural festivities.”  As noted in the article, Obama’s finance team is offering four different packages “with differing levels of access depending on the level of contribution.”

Our FCPA enforcement agencies are bringing enforcement actions against companies for conduct that includes providing $600 bottles of wine, Cartier watches, cameras, kitchen appliances, business suits, and executive education classes to individuals employed by foreign companies that are allegedly state-owned or state-controlled.  (These are all allegations found in recent FCPA enforcement actions).

But remember, as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently declared (see here), “we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.”

Whistleblower Statistics

The Dodd-Frank Act enacted in July 2010 contained whistleblower provisions applicable to all securities law violations including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  In this prior post from July 2010, I predicted that the new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA enforcement.  As noted in this prior post, my prediction was an outlier (so it seemed) compared to the flurry of law firm client alerts that predicted that the whistleblower provisions would have a significant impact on FCPA enforcement.

So far, there have not been any whistleblower awards in connection with FCPA enforcement actions.  Given that enforcement actions (from point of first disclosure to resolution) typically take between 2-4 years, it still may be too early to effectively analyze the impact of the whistleblower provisions on FCPA enforcement.

Whatever your view, I previously noted that the best part of the new whistleblower provisions were that its impact on FCPA enforcement can be monitored and analyzed because the SEC is required to submit annual reports to Congress.  Last month, the SEC released (here) its annual report for FY2012.

Of the 3,001 whisteblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the FCPA.  As noted in this similar post from last year, in FY2011 (a partial reporting year)  3.9% of the 334 tips received by the SEC related to the FCPA.

It Ought to Stop Marketing

In this previous post titled “It Ought to Stop” I focused on the FCPA conference industry and how conference firms drive attendance to their events by touting the public servants who will speak at the event.

Here is how conference firm C5 touts its upcoming conference in a press release (here).

Ask the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC directly how your company can remain compliant

Hear the latest on the newly released FCPA guidance. Along with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission’s, Charles E. Cain, the Deputy Chief of the FCPA Unit, Enforcement Division, we will have Matthew S. Queler, from the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, presenting comprehensive, insightful and practical details of the U.S. government’s interpretation of the guidance, and highlight recent examples designed to help prevent future violations.  Their session at 14:00 on Day 1, will help you navigate the ever evolving markets and recognize the current enforcement trends; giving you the tools to reanalyse risk profiles and minimize areas of exposure. Finally, to top off the hour you will be given an exclusive opportunity to have your FCPA questions answered. The only way to obtain answers directly from the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC is to register for this forum!

The event, depending when you register and which package you select, costs between €4341 – €1795.

It ought to stop.

China Related Issues

An occassional topic of discussion on this site is Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and how such companies are frequently doing business outside its borders, including here in the U.S. (See here, here, and here for prior posts).

Wall Street Journal Columnist Dennis Berman “hit the nail on the head” in his recent column when he noted that one of “the most intriguing business stories of the past month has been taking place in San Francisco, where a group of U.S. developers is planning the biggest real-estate expansion there since the 1906 earthquake. The group—which includes Lennar Corp., Ross Perot Jr. and others —isn’t getting financing from an American bank or pension fund. No, the money, some $1.7 billion of it, is coming from the China Development Bank, a policy arm of the Chinese state.  As Berman further notes, a financing contingency is that China Railway Construction Corp. – a state-owned infrastructure builder with roots in the People’s Liberation Army—take part in the projects, which will develop up to 20,000 new homes.

Another occasional topic of discussion on this site is how Chinese companies are listing shares on U.S. exchanges and thus becoming “issuers” for purposes of the FCPA.  (See here for a prior post).  A core FCPA enforcement action of a Chinese issues has never occurred, but I predict it will some day – diplomatic and foreign policy issues aside.  Only now, the universe of potential targets is shrinking.  As noted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, several Chinese companies have delisted from U.S. exchanges.  The article provides the following information.  “At the peak, at year-end 2010, 167 Chinese companies were listed on Nasdaq and 99 on the NYSE. That compares with 84 China-based companies on NYSE and 129 on Nasdaq as of Nov. 30, 2012, according to the exchanges.”  For more, see this recent article from the New York Times.

ICE Melted Quickly

This recent post highlighted the cert petition of Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica (“ICE”) to the Supreme Court related to victim issues in connection with the December 2010 Alcatel-Lucent FCPA enforcement action.  After several unsuccessful 11th Circuit appeals, ICE petitioned the Supreme Court to hears it case (see here).  The question presented for review is as follows.  “Whether a crime victim who is denied rights conferred by the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act has a right to directly appeal the denial of those rights.”

The ice melted quickly as recently the Supreme Court denied ICE’s petition.

U.K. Enforcement Action

Earlier this week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced (here) charges against former employees of Swift Group (an oil and gas services provider) following “a two-year investigation into allegations of corruption in relation to the tax affairs of Swift Technical Energy Solutions Ltd, a Nigerian subsidiary of the Swift Group of companies.”  According to the SFO release,  ”the value of the bribes alleged to have been paid is approximately£180,000.”

The SFO release notes that Paul Jacobs (the former Chief Financial Officer of Swift), Bharat Sodha (the former Tax Manager of Swift), Nidhi Vyas (the former Financial Controller of Swift), and Trevor Bruce (the former Area Director for Nigeria of Swift) were charged in relation to “bribes to tax officials to avoid, reduce or delay paying tax on behalf of workers placed by Swift.  The charges relate to payments said to have been made to agents of the Rivers State Board of Internal Revenue and the Lagos State Board of Internal Revenue, both in Nigeria. The payments were made in 2008 and 2009.”

*****

A happy holiday season to all.

First, a recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce report titled “China’s Approval Process for Inbound Foreign Direct Investment” which details a number of trade barriers and distortions (which can serve as breeding grounds for harassment bribery) when doing business in China.

Second, U.S. developments which demonstrate that trade barriers and distortions are a two-way street.  A recent House Intelligence Committee report recommending that the U.S. block acquisitions or mergers involving two Chinese telecom companies and President Obama’s recent Executive Order directing the divestiture by a U.S. company (owned by Chinese nationals) of its investment in Oregon wind farms and a subsequent lawsuit brought by the company.

China’s Approval Process for Inbound Foreign Direct Investment

Why do Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations occur?

To be sure, certain violations have occurred because a company has a corrupt culture and has used bribery and corruption as a short-sighted business strategy.  However, such occurrences - as evidenced by actual enforcement actions alleging such egregious facts - are rare.  Rather, as I argue in “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” (here) many FCPA violations occur because companies are subject to various trade barriers and conditions in foreign markets.

In short, trade barriers (ranging from customs procedures, licensing and certification requirements, foreign government procurement policies, etc.) create the conditions in which harassment bribes flourish as companies are funneled into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants.

As relevant to China (a jurisdiction in which many recent FCPA violations have occurred and in which many companies are currently the subject of FCPA scrutiny), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently released an extensive report titled “China’s Approval Process for Inbound Foreign Direct Investment:  Impact on Market Access, National Treatment and Transparency” (see here).  The report, based on research conducted by Covington & Burling at the Chamber’s request, should be must read for practitioners advising clients on FDI in China as well as others generally interested in the topic of trade barriers.  Although the report does not contain the words bribery or corruption, it is very much on topic.

The report draws on interviews conducted with foreign companies doing business in China and discusses, among other topics, the following.

How China’s Foreign Investment Catalogue requires “different levels of approval scrutiny or tougher application requirements” for non-Chinese prospective investors and how the Catalogue “may require that investment take certain forms and/or that the foreign shareholder’s proportion of investment in the enterprise be limited.”

Various project and regulatory approvals needed to do business in China and how various characteristics of the approval process have resulted in “application of vaguely written or unpublished rules in ways that restrict or unreasonably delay market entry by foreign companies” and how in other instances “approval authorities have orally communicated deal-specific conditions for investment approval beyond those required by written law.”  As to China’s licensing regimes, the report notes that licenses are required for more than 100 business activities in China and that government approval is also needed for certain modifications to an enterprise “such as change of registered capital, change of shareholders, amendment of business scope, merger, or the acquisition of a company in a restricted industry.”

As if the various Chinese governmental approvals were not enough, the report also notes that obtaining certain governmental approvals is exacerbated by the fact that in certain Chinese – foreign joint ventures, the local partner may serve in certain instances as the applicant and “control the communications channels between the foreign investor and the government approval authorities …”.

House Intelligence Committee Report

As noted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, the House Intelligence Committee has concluded that two Chinese companies (Huawei Technologies and ZTE Inc.) pose security risks to the U.S. because their equipment could be used for spying on Americans,  The House Committee recommended that the U.S. block acquisition or mergers involving the two companies through the Committee on Foreign Investments in the U.S. (“CFIUS”).

The report (here) also accuses Huawei of bribery and corruption.  Page 35 of the report states as follows. ”[Huawei] employees have alleged instances [of] fraud and bribery when seeking contracts in the United States.”  The apparent lack of a “foreign official” may take this alleged conduct outside the scope of the FCPA, but the Travel Act may remain relevant.

President Obama’s Executive Order and Subsequent Lawsuit

As noted in this recent Reuters article, President Obama recently issued an Executive Order ordering Ralls Corp. (a U.S. company owned by two Chinese nationals) to sell off four planned winds farms in Oregon due to national security threats.  As noted in the article, President Obama’s recent order is the first time since 1990 that a President has formally blocked a business transaction.

The Executive Order (here) states that “there is credible evidence” that Ralls Corp. ”might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”  President Obama’s order followed a recommendation by CFIUS (see here) recommending the divestiture.

In response, Ralls Corp. filed this lawsuit against President Obama, CFIUS and others.  In pertinent part, the suit alleges as follows.

“At no time has Ralls ever had any opportunity to view, review, respond to, or rebut any evidence that CFIUS, the President, or any person or entity acting on their behalf has obtained, reviewed, or relied upon in reviewing the transaction in question, concluding that the transaction raises national security concerns, issuing the aforementioned orders, and imposing the foregoing extraordinary prohibitions and restrictions.  In issuing their respective orders, CFIUS and the President acted in an unlawful and unauthorized manner. By exceeding the powers granted to it [by law] and failing to provide any evidence or reasoned explanation for its decision, CFIUS violated the Administrative Procedure Act. By imposing restrictions far beyond the limited scope of the powers specifically granted to him [by law], the President has committed ultra vires acts in violation of the law. By failing to provide Ralls with sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard prior to prohibiting its acquisition of the windfarms and imposing extraordinary restrictions on the use and enjoyment of its property interests, CFIUS and the President have unconstitutionally deprived Ralls of its property absent due process. And by unfairly and unjustly singling out Ralls for differential treatment compared to similarly situated parties, CFIUS and the President have violated Ralls’s right to equal protection of the law.”

Former U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement (here) represents Ralls.  For additional analysis, see this recent Covington & Burling alert and this recent Mayer Brown client alert.

Yesterday’s post (here) went long and deep as to the Tyco enforcement action.  This post continues the analysis by highlighting additional notable issues.

The Tyco Enforcement Action Should Be An FCPA Practitioners New Best Friend

During the negotiation phase of resolving an FCPA enforcement action with the DOJ and/or the SEC, a topic that often comes up, and an analysis that an FCPA practitioner frequently performs, is comparing the conduct at issue in the current case to prior enforcement actions.  The enforcement agencies typically dismiss such comparative efforts by practitioners by saying that every enforcement action (and negotiation) is unique and that what the agencies did in one enforcement action is not binding in another.  On the flip side, and a position I think is imminently reasonable, is that the enforcement agencies ought to be bound by some consistency in enforcement approaches.

If so, the Tyco enforcement action should be the FCPA practitioners new best friend.

For starters, this enforcement action involved a company that settled a wide-ranging fraud action in 2006 – one that involved a material FCPA component (see here for the prior SEC action).  In that 2006 action, Tyco was permanently enjoined from, among other things, future FCPA violations.  (For more on so-called “obey the law injunctions – see this recent guest post and this prior post).

The government bluntly stated in this week’s enforcement action that certain of the misconduct occurred even after the 2006 injunction.  In addition, and per the government, the alleged misconduct in this week’s enforcement action was carried out by several different methods, the conduct occurred over a lengthy time period and involved conduct in approximately 25 countries.

Even so, against this backdrop of an injunction being violated and widespread misconduct in approximately 25 countries, Tyco was offered a non-prosecution agreement by the DOJ and the government did not require an imposition of a corporate monitor.

Should an FCPA practitioner in the future be faced with anything other than a DOJ NPA or should a monitor be insisted upon by the government, the Tyco enforcement action should be your new best friend.

Assessing Tyco’s Culpability

Yes, as noted above, Tyco is now an FCPA ”recidivist.”  By my count, it has now joined ABB, Baker Hughes, and General Electric in that category.

Yet in reading the Tyco enforcement action, I am hardly surprised nor shocked.  The company is a diversified global company operating in more than 60 countries with more than 100,000 employees worldwide.  The vast majority of the conduct at issue in the enforcement actions allegedly occurred between 2000 and 2006.

Furthermore, there is no allegation or suggestion that Tyco (the parent company entity) knew of or participated in the improper conduct.  For instance, the closest Tyco connection alleged is in the SEC’s complaint concerning conduct in Turkey.  However, even there, the SEC only alleges a dual officer structure between the relevant subsidiary and executive officers while at the same time alleging that there was “no indication that any of these individuals [the dual officers] knew of the illegal conduct.”   In other respects, the resolution documents allege or suggest that various indirect subsidiaries took steps to conceal the conduct at issue or circumvent Tyco’s internal controls.

I’ve said before and I will say again (based on nearly a decade of FCPA practice experience conducting FCPA internal investigations around the world) that if every large multi-national company with diverse global business units, with tens of thousands of employees scattered across the world, would hire FCPA counsel to do a complete and thorough world-wide review of the company’s operations, given the current enforcement theories, including the standardless books and records and internal controls theories of enforcement, 95% of companies would find problematic conduct (the other 5% of companies either hired counsel not well versed on the current enforcement theories and/or counsel did not look hard enough).

It Takes A While … Just To Negotiate

As noted in this previous post regarding Pfizer, the gray cloud that is FCPA scrutiny can hang over a company for a long time.  On this issue, it is interesting to note that Tyco’s most recently quarterly filing stated that the company began its negotiations with the DOJ and SEC in February 2010.

The FCPA As An M&A Issue

The $26 million in combined fines and penalties will not be borne entirely by Tyco and its shareholders.  The FCPA frequently finds its way into corporate divestitures and other transactions.

On this note, Tyco’s most recent quarterly filing stated as follows concerning previously spun off business units and now separate companies.  “Covidien  and TE Connectivity agreed, in connection with the 2007 Separation, to cooperate with the Company in its responses regarding these matters. Any judgment required to be  paid or settlement or other cost incurred by the Company in connection with the FCPA investigation matters would be subject to the liability sharing provisions of the Separation and Distribution  Agreement, which assigned liabilities primarily related to the former Healthcare and Electronics businesses of the Company to Covidien and TE Connectivity, respectively, and provides that the Company  will retain liabilities primarily related to its continuing operations. Any liabilities not primarily related to a particular segment will be shared equally among the Company, Covidien and TE  Connectivity.”

In addition, as noted in the NPA, one of Tyco’s business units is poised to be spun-off to Pentair Inc. later this week.  The NPA states as follows.  “Tyco agrees that if this separation and merger occur during the term of this Agreement, Tyco shall, for any business entities, operations, or units involved in the conduct [at issue] and included in the spin-off and merger, including provisions in any separation agreement binding the relevant and culpable entities to the [compliance] obligations [set forth in the NPA].  Tyco shall no longer be responsible for ensuring compliance by any separated entities, operations or units with the obligations described in the [NPA].”

More Foreign Healthcare Providers as “Foreign Official”

This recent post traced the origins and prominence of the enforcement theory that employees of certain foreign health care systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  Add the Tyco enforcement action to the list as the enforcement action included conduct involving Chinese health care providers, Saudi Arabian health care providers, and Polish health care providers.

With the Tyco action on the list, 5 of the 9 (55%) core corporate enforcement actions this year have been based, in whole or in part, on this theory.

More Chinese Design Institutes

The number of FCPA enforcement actions involving Chinese design institutes (an entity category that has given many an FCPA practitioner a headache trying to figure them out) has grown with the Tyco enforcement action.  As noted in this previous post concerning Watts Water Technologies, other enforcement actions that have involved, in whole or in part, Chinese design institutes include the following:  Rockwell Automation (here), ITT (here), and Avery Dennison (here).

This post goes long and deep as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents (approximately 85 pages in total).  Tomorrow’s post will discuss various items of note from the enforcement actions.

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Tyco Valves & Controls Middle East Inc., (an indirect subsidiary of Tyco) resolved through a plea agreement (here) and a non-prosecution agreement (here) entered into between the DOJ and Tyco.

Criminal Information

The criminal information begins by identifying Tyco Valves & Controls Middle East Inc. (TVC ME) as a Delaware company headquartered in Dubai that “sells and markets valves and actuators manufactured by other entities throughout the Middle East for the oil, gas, petrochemical, commercial construction, water treatment,and desalination industries.”

According to the information, Tyco Flow Control Inc. (“TFC) was TVC ME’s direct parent company and TFC was a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Tyco.  According to the information, “TVC ME’s financials were consolidated into the books and records of TFC for the purposes of preparing TFC’s year-end financial statements, and in turn, TFC’s financials were consolidated into the books and records of Tyco for the purposes of preparing Tyco’s year-end financial results.”

The information alleges a conspiracy as follows.

Between 2003 and 2006 TVC ME conspired with others to ”obtain and retain business from foreign government customers, including Aramco, ENOC, Vopak, NIGC, and other customers by paying bribes to foreign officials employed by such customers.”

The information alleges: that Saudi Aramco (“Aramco”) was a Saudi Arabian oil and gas company that was wholly-owned, controlled, and managed by the government, and an ”agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Emirates National Oil Company (“ENOC”) was a state-owned entity in Dubai and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Vopak Horizon Fujairah (“Vopak”) was a subsidiary of ENOC based in the U.A.E. and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; and that the National Iranian Gas Company (“NIGC”) was a state-owned entity in Iran and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government.

Under the heading “manner and means of the conspiracy” the information alleges in pertinent part as follows.

“TVC ME, together with others, decided to pay bribes to employees of end-customers in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Iran, including to employees at Aramco, ENOC, Vopak, and NIGC, in order to obtain or retain business.  TVE ME, together with others, found ways to obtain cash in order to make the bribe payments.  TVE ME, together with others, made payments through Local Sponsor [a company in Saudi Arabia that acted as a distributor for TVC ME in Saudi Arabia].  Local Sponsor provided TVC ME with false documentation, such as fictitious invoices for consultancy costs, bills for fictitious commissions, or ‘unanticipated costs for equipment,’ to justify the payments to Local Sponsor that were intended to be used for bribes.  TVE ME, together with others, approved and made payments to Local Sponsor for the purpose of paying bribes.  TVC ME, together with others, paid bribes to employees of foreign government customers in order to remove TVC manufacturing plans from various Aramco ‘blacklists’ or ‘holds’; win specific bids; and/or obtain specific product approval.  TVC ME, together with others, improperly recorded the bribe payments in TVC ME’s books, records, and accounts, and instead falsely described the payments, including as consultancy costs, commissions, or equipment costs.  TVC ME earned approximately $1.153,500 in gross margin as a result of the bribe payments.”

Based on the above conduct, the information charges conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Plea Agreement

The plea agreements sets forth a Sentencing Guidelines range of $2.1 million – $4.2 million.  In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that $2.1 million was “appropriate.”  Pursuant to the plea agreement, TVC ME agreed “to work with its parent company in fulfilling the obligations” described in Corporate Compliance Program attached to the plea agreement.

NPA

The DOJ also entered into an NPA with Tyco in which the DOJ agreed “not to criminally prosecute [Tyco] related to violations of the books and records provisions of the FCPA … arising from and related to the knowing and willful falsification of books, records, and accounts by a number of the Company’s subsidiaries and affiliates …”.

The NPA contains a Statement of Facts.

Under the heading, “details of the illegal conduct” the NPA states as follows.

“[From 1999 through 2009] certain Tyco subsidiaries falsified books, records, and accounts in connection with transactions involving customers of Tyco’s subsidiaries, including government customers, in order to secure business in various countries, including China, India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iran, Saudia Arabia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritania, Congo, Niger, Madagascar, and Turkey.  During that time period, certain Tyco subsidiaries made payments, both directly and indirectly, to government officials and falsely described the payments to government officials in Tyco’s corporate books, records, and accounts as legitimate charges, including as ‘consulting fees,’ ‘commissions,’ ‘unanticipated costs for equipment,’ ‘technical consultation and marketing promotion expenses,’ ‘conveyance expenses,’ ‘cost of goods sold,’ ‘promotional expenses,’ and ‘sales development’ expenses.  As early as 2004, Tyco alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to payments at certain of Tyco’s subsidiaries that could violate the FCPA.  In 2006, Tyco acknowledged that ‘prior to 2003 Tyco did not have a uniform, company-wide FCPA compliance program in place or a system of internal controls sufficient to detect and prevent FCPA misconduct at is globally dispersed business units’ and that ‘employees at two Tyco subsidiaries in Brazil and South Korea did not receive adequate instruction regarding compliance with the FCPA, despite Tyco’s knowledge and awareness that illicit payments to government officials were a common practice in the Brazilian and South Korean construction and contracting industries.’  However, despite Tyco’s knowing of a high probability of the existence of improper payments and false books, records, and accounts, the improper payments and falsification of books, records, and accounts continued until 2009.”

As to Thailand, the Statement of Facts states a follows.

“[Between 2004 and 2005] ET Thailand [Earth Tech (Thailand) Ltd. - a Thai corporation that was approximately 49% indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $292,286 to a consultant and recorded those amounts as fictitious disbursements related to the NBIA project [New Bangkok International Airport].  In connection with these improper payments, ET Thailand earned approximately $879,258 in gross profit.”

“[Between 2000 to 2006] ADT Thailand [ADT Sensormatic Thailand an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] recorded payments in the amount of approximately $78,000 to one of its subcontractors as payments for site surveys for a government traffic project in Laos, but the payments instead were channeled to other recipients in connection with ADT Thailand’s business in Laos.  During the same time period, ADT Thailand made payments to one of its consultants related to a contract for the installation of a CCTV system in the Thai Parliament House, and ADT Thailand and the consultant created invoices that stated that the payments were for ‘renovation work’ when no renovation work was actually performed.  During that same time period, ADT Thailand made three payments in connection with a design and traffic survey that ADT Thailand provided from the city of Pattaya, in Southern Thailand, but the payments were issued pursuant to falsified invoices without any evidence that work was ever performed.  In connection with these improper transactions, ADT Thailand earned approximately $473,262 in gross profit.”

As to China, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2003 and 2005] TTC Huzhou [Tyco Thermal Controls (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] authorized approximately 112 payments in the amount of $196,267 to designers at design institutes owned or controlled by the Chinese government, and falsely described the payments in company books, records, and accounts as ‘technical consultation’ or ‘marketing promotion’ expenses.  In 2005, in connection with a contract with China’s Ministry of Public Security, TTC Huzhou paid a commission to one of its sales agents that was used, in part, to pay the ‘site project team’ of a state-owned corporation, and that was improperly recorded in the company’s books and records.  In connection with these improper transactions, TTC Huzhou earned approximately $3,470,180 in gross profit.”

“TFCT Shanghai [Tyco Flow Control Trading (Shanghai) Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made approximately eleven payments in the amount of approximately $24,000 to employees of design institutes, engineering companies, subcontractors and distributors which were inaccurately described in its books and records.  In connection with these improper transaction, TFCT Shanghai earned approximately $59,412 in gross profit.”

“[Between 2005 and 2006] TFC HK  [Tyco Flow Control Hong Kong Limited] and Keystone [Beijing Valve Co. Ltd.] [both indirect wholly owned subsidiaries of Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $137,000 to agencies owned by approximately eight Keystone employees, who in turn gave cash or gifts to employees of design institutes or commercial customers, and then improperly recorded these payments.  [From 2005 to 2006] Keystone made payments to one of its sales agents in connection with sales to Sinopec, for which no legitimate services were actually provided, and then improperly recorded the payments as ‘commissions.’  In connection with these improper transactions, Keystone earned approximately $378,088 in gross profits.”

“[Between 2001 to 2002] THC China [Tyco Healthcare International Trading (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] gave publicly-employed healthcare professionals (HCPs) approximately $250,00o in meals, entertainment, domestic travel, gifts and sponsorships.  [Between 2004 to 2007] employees of THC China submitted expenses claims related to entertaining HCPs that were supported by fictitious receipts, including references to a non-existent company, in order to circumvent Tyco’s internal guidelines.  In connection with medical conferences involving HCPs, THC China employees submitted false itineraries and other documentation that did not properly identify trip expenses in order to circumvent internal controls and policies.  Approximately $353,800 in expenses was improperly recorded as a result of the false documentation relating to these improper expenditures.”

As to Slovakia, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2004 to 2006] Tatra [a Slovakian joint venture that was approximately 90 percent indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $96,000 to one of its sales agents in exchange for the sale agent’s attempt to have Tatra products included in the specifications for tenders to a government customer, while at the same time the sales agent was getting paid by the government customer to draw up the technical specifications for the tenders.  Tatra improperly recorded the payments to the sales agent as ‘commissions’ in Tatra’s books and records.  In connection with these improper transactions, Tatra earned approximately $226,863 in gross profit.”

As to Indonesia, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2003 and 2005] Eurapipe [Tyco Eurapipe Indonesia Pt. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made approximately eleven payments in the amount of approximately $358,000 to a former employee of Banjarmasin provincial level public water company (PDAM) and two payments to the project manager for PDAM Banjarmasin in connection with the Banjarmasin Project.  During the same time period, Eurapipe made payments in the amount of approximately $23,000 to sales agents who then passed some or all of the payments on to employees of government entities in connection withe projects other than the Banjarmasin Project.  Eurapipe improperly recorded the payments as ‘commissions payable’ in Eurapipe’s books and records. In connection with these improper transactions, Eurapipe earned approximately $1,298,453 in gross profit.”

“[Between 2002 and 2005] PT Dulmision Indonesia [an Indonesia corporation 99% indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments to third parties, a portion of which went to employees of PLN [a state-owned electricity company in Indonesia], including approximately seven payments one of PT Dulmison’s sales agents, who in turn passed money on to the PLN employees.  PT Dulmison Indonesia improperly recorded the payments in PT Dulmison Indonesia’s books, records and accounts.  In addition, PT Dulmison Indonesia improperly recorded travel expenses in company books and records, including payments for non-business entertainment in connection with visits by PLN employees to TE Dulmision Thailand’s factory and paid hotel costs incurred as part of a social trip to Paris for PLN employees following a factory visit to Germany, as ‘cost of goods sold’ in PT Dulmison Indonesia’s and TE Dulmison Thailand’s records.  In connection with these improper transactions, PT Dulmision Indonesia and TE Dulmison Thailand earned approximately $109,259 in gross profit.”

As to Vietnam, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2001 and 2005] TE Dulmison Thailand [a Thai corporation approximately 66% indirectly owned by Tyco] made nine payments in the amount of approximately $68,426, either directly or through intermediaries, to employees of a public utility owned by the Government of Vietnam and recorded these payments in the books and records of the relevant subsidiaries as ‘cost of goods sold.’”

As to Mauritania, Congo, Niger and Madagascar, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2002 to 2007] Isogard [a branch of Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions France (TFIS France0, an indrect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made payments to a security officer employed by a government-owned mining company in Mauritania involved in the technical aspects of sales projects for the purpose of introducing Isogard to local buyers in Africa.  Isogard made the payments to the security officer’s personal bank account in France without any written contract or invoice and improperly recorded the payments in Isogard’s books and records.  Isogard paid sham ‘commissions’ to approximately twelve other intermediaries in Mauritania, Congo, Niger and Madagascar, half of which were to employees, or family members of employees, of Isogard customers.  In total, TFIS France made paments in the amount of approximately $363,839 since 2005.”

As to Saudi Arabia, in addition to the conduct at issue in TVC ME’s criminal information, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2004 through 2006] Saudi Distributor maintained a ‘control account’ from which a number of payments were made at THC Saudi Arabia’s [an operational entity within Tyco Healthcare AG, a indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] direction to Saudi hospitals and doctors, some of whom were publicly employed HCPs.  Several expenses from the control account were booked improperly as ‘promotional expenses’ and ‘sales development’ expenses.  In connection with these improper transactions, THC Saudi earned approximately $1,960,000 in gross profit.”

As to Turkey, the Statement of Facts state as follows.

“[Between 2001 and 2006] SigInt [a division of M/A-Com, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] products were sold through a sales representative to government entities in Turkey.  The sales representatives sold the SigInt equipment in Turkey at an approximately twelve to forty percent mark-up over the price at which he purchased the equipment from M/A-Com and also received a commission on one of the sales.  The sales representative transferred part of his commission and part of his mark-up to a government official in Turkey to obtain orders.  In connection with these improper transactions, M/A-Com earned approximately $71,770 in gross proft.”

The Statement of Facts also states as follows.

“[Between 2004 and 2009] Erhard [a subsidiary of Tyco Waterworks Deutschland GmBH (TWW Germany), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $2,371,094 to at least thirteen of its sales agents in China, Croatia, India, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of making payments to employees of government customers, and improperly booked the payments as ‘commissions.’  In connection with these improper transactions, TWW Germany earned approximately $4,684,966 in gross profits.”

In the NPA, Tyco admitted, accepted and acknowledged responsiblity for the above conduct and agreed not to make any public statement contradicting the above conduct.

The NPA has a term of three years and states as follows.

“The Department enters into this Non-Prosecution Agreement based, in part, on the following factors:  (a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Company’s global internal investigation concerning bribery and related misconduct; (c) the Company’s extensive remediation, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, the termination of employees responsible for the improper payments and falsification of books and records, severing contracts with the responsible third-party agents, the closing of subsidiaries due to compliance failures, and the agreement to undertake further compliance enhancements ….; and (d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures …”.

Pursuant to the NPA, the company agreed to pay a penalty of $13.68 million (the $2.1 million TVC ME agreed to pay pursuant to the plea agreement is included in this figure).  Pursuant to the NPA, Tyco also agreed to a host of compliance undertakings and agreed to report to the DOJ (at no less than 12 month intervals) during the three year term of the NPA regarding “remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures” required pursuant to the NPA.

In this DOJ release, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated as follows.  “Together with the SEC, we are leading a fight against corruption around the globe.”

SEC

In a related enforcement action, the SEC brought a civil complaint (here) against Tyco.

The introductory paragraph of the complaint states as follows.  “This matter concerns violations by Tyco of the books and records, internal controls, and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.”

The complaint then states as follows.

“In April 2006, the Commission filed a settled accounting fraud, disclosure, and FCPA injunctive action against Tyco, pursuant to which the company consented to entry of a final judgment enjoining it from violations of the anti-fraud, periodic reporting, books and records, internal controls, proxy disclosure, and anti-bribery provisions of the federal securities laws and ordering it to pay $1 in disgorgement and a $50 million civil penalty. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered the settled Final Judgment against Tyco on May 1, 2006. At the time of settlement, Tyco had already committed to and commenced a review of its FCPA compliance and a global, comprehensive internal investigation of possible additional FCPA violations. As a result of that review and investigation, certain FCPA violations have come to light for which the misconduct occurred, or the benefit to Tyco continued, after the 2006 injunction. Those are the violations that are alleged in this Complaint.  [...]  The FCPA misconduct reported by Tyco showed that Tyco’s books and records were misstated as a result of at least twelve different, post-injunction illicit payment schemes occurring at Tyco subsidiaries across the globe. The schemes frequently entailed illicit payments to foreign officials that were inaccurately recorded so as to conceal the nature of the payments. Those inaccurate entries were incorporated into Tyco’ s books and records.   Tyco also failed to devise and maintain internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that all transactions were properly recorded in the company’s books, records, and accounts. [...] As reflected in this Complaint, numerous Tyco subsidiaries engaged in violative conduct, the conduct was carried out by several different methods, and the conduct occurred over a lengthy period of time and continued even after the 2006 injunction.  Through one of the illicit payment schemes, Tyco violated the FCPA anti-bribery provisions. Specifically, through the acts of its then-subsidiary and agent, TE M/A-Com, Inc. Tyco violated [the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions] by corruptly making illicit payments to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business.”

As to the SEC’s anti-bribery charge based on the conduct of TE M/A-Com, Inc. the complaint alleges that M/A Com retained a New York sales agent who made illicit payments in connection with a 2006 sale of microwave equipment to an instrumentality of the Turkish government.  The complaint alleges that “employees of M/A-Com were aware that the agent was paying foreign government customers to obtain orders” and cites an internal e-mail which states as follows – “hell, everyone knows you have to bribe somebody to do business in Turkey.”  The complaint then alleges as follows.  “Tyco exerted control over M/A-COM in part by utilizing dual roles for its officers. At the time of the September 2006 transaction, four high-level Tyco officers were also officers of M/A-COM, including one who was M/A-COM’s president. Additionally, one of those Tyco officers served as one of five members of M/A-COM’s board of directors. While there is no indication that any of these individuals knew of the illegal conduct described herein, through the corporate structure used to hold M/ A-COM and through the dual roles of these officers, Tyco controlled M/A-COM. As a result, M/A-COM was Tyco’s agent for purposes of the September 2006 transaction, and the transaction was squarely within the scope of M/ACOM’s agency.  The benefit obtained by Tyco as a result of the September 2006 deal was $44,513.”

The SEC’s complaint contains substantially similar allegations compared to the NPA Statement of Facts.  In addition, the SEC complaint alleges additional improper conduct in Malaysia, Egypt, and Poland.

As to Malaysia, the complaint alleges as follows.

“[Between 2000 to 2007] TFS Malaysia [an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] used intermediaries to pay the employees of its customers when bidding on contracts.  Payments were made to approximately twenty-six employees of customers, and one of those payees was an employee of a government-controlled entity.  TFS Malaysia inaccurately described these expenses as ‘commissions’ and failed to maintain policies sufficient to prohibit such payments.  As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated.  Tyco’s benefit as a result of these illicit payments was $45,972.”

As to Egypt, the complaint alleges as follows.

“[Between 2004 to 2008] an Egyptian agent of TFIS UK [a indirect wholly owned subsidiary] wired approximately $282,022 to a former employee’s personal bank account with the understanding that the money would be used in connection with entertainment expenses for representatives of a company majority-owned by the Egyptian government.  A portion of the funds was used to pay for lodging, meals, transportation, spending money, and entertainment expenses for that company’s officials on two trips to the United Kingdom and two trips to the U.S.  TFIS UK made payments pursuant to inflated invoices submitted by the company’s Egyptian agent, who wired funds to the former employees to be used to entertain foreign officials.  TFIS U.K. books and records did not accurately reflect TFIS’s U.K.’s understanding that the funds would be used for entertainment of government officials, and TFIS UK did not maintain sufficient internal controls over its payments to agents.  As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated.  Tyco’s benefits as a result of these illicit payments was $1,589,374.”

As to Poland, the complaint alleges as follows.

“[Between 2005 to 2007] THC Polska [an indirect wholly owned subsidiary] used ‘service contracts’ to hire public healthcare professionals in Poland for various purposes, including conducting training sessions, performing clinical studies, and distributing marketing materials.  Approximately five such service contracts involved falsified records and approximately twenty-six other service contracts involved incomplete and inaccurate records, including some related expenses paid by THC Polska to family members of healthcare professionals.  As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated.  In connection with the transactions related to these inaccurate books and records, Tyco’s benefit was approximately $14,673.

As to the SEC’s internal controls charge, the complaint contains the following allegation.  “Tyco failed to devise and maintain … a system of internal controls and was therefore unable to detect the violations …  Numerous Tyco subsidiaries engaged in violative conduct, the conduct was carried out by several different methods, and the conduct occurred over a lengthy period of time, and it continued even after the 2006 injunction.”

The SEC complaint contains the following paragraph.

“As its global review and investigation progressed, Tyco voluntarily disclosed this conduct to the Commission and took significant, broad-spectrum remedial measures. Those remedial measures include: the initial FCPA review of every Tyco legal operating entity ultimately including 454 entities in 50 separate countries; active monitoring and evaluation of all of Tyco’s agents and other relevant third-party relationships; quarterly ethics and compliance training by over 4,000 middle-managers; FCPA-focused on-site reviews of higher risk entities; creation of a corporate Ombudsman’s office and numerous segment-specific compliance counsel positions; exit from several business operations in high-risk areas; and the termination of over 90 employees, including supervisors, because of FCPA compliance concerns.”

As noted in this SEC release, Tyco consented to a final judgment that orders the company to pay approximately $10.5 million in disgorgement and approximately $2.6 million in prejudgment interest.  Tyco also agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating the FCPA.

In this release, SEC Associate Director of Enforcement Scott Friestad stated as follows.  “Tyco’s subsidiaries operating in Asia and the Middle East saw illicit payment schemes as a typical way of doing business in some countries, and the company illictly reaped substantial financial benefits as a result.”

Martin Weinstin (Willkie Farr & Gallagher - here) represented the Tyco entities.

Recent Comments From The Director of the U.K. SFO

The briberyact.com previously mentioned here recent comments made by David Green (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) in a Daily Mail article (here) that “mainstream corporate entertaining” is of little concern to the SFO.  Green states in the article as follows.  “We are not  interested in that sort of case. We are interested in hearing that a large company has mysteriously come second in bidding for a big contract. The sort of  bribery we would be investigating would not be tickets to Wimbledon or bottles of champagne. We are not the ‘serious champagne office.’”

The same can not always be said of the DOJ or SEC.  Although such seemingly minor corporate entertainment expenditures have never been the sole focus of an enforcement action, several enforcement actions have included such allegations. For instance, the UTStarcom enforcement action (see here for the prior post) contained allegations about a $600 bottle of wine.  The Data Systems and Solutions enforcement action (see here for the prior post) contained allegations regarding a Cartier watch.  The IBM enforcement action (see here for the prior post) contained allegations about a camera.  The RAE Systems enforcement actions (see here for the prior post) contained allegations about kitchen appliances, business suits, and high-priced liquor.  Numerous other examples abound.  One must assume that the enforcement agencies included such allegations in the resolution documents for a reason, not just to fill up paper.

Alexandra Wrage (President of Trace International) noted the U.K. / U.S.  irony in this recent piece for Corporate Counsel.   ”[W]hereas the U.S. law permits these expenditures [facilitation payments and reasonable entertainment expenses], within reason, and then enforces when companies overstep, the U.K. prohibits them, but assures the public that they won’t be prosecuted.”

Green’s comments to the Daily Mail were also notable for his calling out of FCPA (or as the case may be Bribery Act) Inc.  The Daily Mail article notes as follows.  “[Green] criticised American law firms that had taken  advantage of the uncertainty. ‘It is in their interest to focus attention on the  Bribery Act. They put up talking heads and arrange conferences. It is a huge  industry.’”  Green’s comments are similar to those noted in this prior post by Kenneth Clark (the U.K.’s anti-corruption champion) who stated, in the House of Commons, leading up to the Bribery Act as follows.   “I hope to put out very clear guidance [regarding the Bribery Act] to save [businesses] from the fears that are sometimes aroused by the compliance industry, the consultants and lawyers who will, of course, try to persuade companies that millions of pounds must be spent on new systems that, in my opinion, no honest firm will require to comply with the Act.”

Harris Corp.

As previously noted in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, Harris Corporation disclosed as follows in its recent annual report.

“[I]n April 4, 2011, we completed the acquisition of Carefx and thereby also acquired its subsidiaries, including in China (“Carefx China”). The consolidated revenue of the Carefx China operations for fiscal 2012 was approximately $1.4 million, or less than 0.1% of our consolidated revenue. In connection with our integration activities and the subsequent audit of the financials of the Carefx China operations, we became aware that certain entertainment, travel and other expenses in connection with the Carefx China operations may have been incurred or recorded improperly. In response, with the concurrence of our Audit Committee, we initiated an internal investigation, with the assistance of outside legal counsel, to determine whether violations of the FCPA potentially occurred. In the course of our investigation, we learned that certain employees of the Carefx China operations had provided pre-paid gift cards and other gifts and payments to certain customers and potential customers. Although our investigation is not complete, we have already taken remedial actions related to the Carefx China operations, including changes to internal control procedures, termination of the gift-giving practice, additional compliance training and termination of the employment of certain individuals. The preliminary results of the investigation have been disclosed to our Audit Committee, Board of Directors and auditors, and we have also contacted the U.S. Department of Justice and the SEC to voluntarily disclose that we are conducting the investigation and to advise that it is our intent to fully cooperate with any investigation that they may conduct with respect to this matter. We cannot predict at this time any regulatory action that may be taken with respect to this matter or any other potential consequences that may result. However, based on the information available to date, we do not believe that this matter will have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations or cash flows.”

As noted in this previous post, Harris Corp. is part of FCPA history.  It is believed to be the first, and to this day only, publicly traded company to have put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial.  As noted in the post, Harris Corp. prevailed in the enforcement action (1990-1991).  I noted in the previous post as follows.  If non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements existed in 1990, would Harris have resolved the enforcement action via such a resolution vehicle? Likely yes. Yet Harris and the individual defendants all prevailed at trial.

If the conduct Harris recently disclosed gives rise to an enforcement action, will Harris likewise this time around put the DOJ to its burden of proof?  Even if it has valid legal and factual defenses, not a chance.  NPAs and DPAs exist today and resolving FCPA inquiries is often more about cost-beneft / risk-reward, than law and facts.

*****

A good weekend to all.