May 23rd, 2013

Ashland Oil – The “FCPA’s” First Repeat “Offender”

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding "old" FCPA enforcement actions]

In 1986 the SEC brought this civil injunctive action against Ashland Oil, Inc. (a Kentucky based oil refining company) and its Chairman and CEO Orin Atkins for engaging in conduct in violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

The complaint began by noting that in 1975, prior to the passage of the FCPA, the defendants consented to final judgments of permanent injunction enjoining them from using corporate funds “for unlawful political contributions or other similar unlawful purposes.” As noted in “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” Ashland Oil’s payments to Albert Bernard Bongo, the President of Gabon, were among a group of payments that drew Congressional attention to the foreign corporate payments problem and motivated Congress to pass the FCPA in 1977.

The 1986 Ashland Oil enforcement action is thus notable as the first instance of an “FCPA” repeat “offender.”

As highlighted in more detail below, the enforcement action is also notable for the following reasons: (i) the thing of value consisted of buying a “foreign official’s” interest in a largely worthless mine); (ii) the conduct at issue lead to an FCPA-related civil suit in which two terminated company employees were awarded $70 million in damages; and (iii) there was controversy both as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s handling of the conduct at issue.

In the 1986 action, the SEC alleged that Ashland Oil and Atkins “paid $25 million in principal plus approximately $4 million in interest, and by virtue of the acquisition of an interest in Midlands Chrome [a largely worthless Zimbabwe mine owned by the "foreign official" and his family], gave something of value to James Landon [a British national seconded (detailed) to the government of Oman who served as a special adviser to the Sultan of Oman on Omani intelligence and security matters] … for the purpose of inducing Landon to use his influence with the government of Oman … in order to assist Ashland in obtaining and retaining business with the government of Oman … namely certain business related to crude oil.”

According to the complaint, Atkins was told that Midlands Chrome “could be purchased from persons who could be sympathetic to Ashland’s desire to become a purchaser of crude oil from Oman.” Even though a company lawyer advised that the transaction raised issues under the FCPA, the SEC alleged that the “board of directors of Ashland held a meeting at which Atkins presented for the Board’s approval the acquisition of Midland Chrome.” According to the complaint, Atkins viewed the acquisition as a “high risk project” but one that had “potential of being more than offset by a potential crude oil contract …”. According to the complaint, initial board meeting minutes show that Atkins said “the corporation was interested [in the Midlands Chrome acquisition] for the reason that it might thereby be enabled to obtain a contract to purchase crude oil from Oman” but that “this statement was deleted from the final version of the minutes at Atkins’ direction.”

Based on the above core conduct, in a detailed 35 page complaint, the SEC alleged three substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations.

Atkins resigned as chairman of Ashland in 1981 after an internal investigation into a number of questionable foreign payments. According to media reports, when the 1986 matter was resolved Atkins issued a statement which read as follows. “Although it would be my personal preference to litigate this matter, I have agreed to settle this action so that the company can put this lingering dispute behind it, and because to contest this matter would have involved disproportionate trouble and expense.” For more on the life of Orin Atkins, see here and here.

In media reports, Richard Murphy, an SEC enforcement lawyer, said the Ashland case was significant because it demonstrated that the SEC will go beyond the traditional “cash cases” and scrutinize more complicated transactions to determine if they represent violations.

In 1995, Ashland Oil changed its name to Ashland Inc.

In an interesting side note, former Ashland employees Bill McKay and Harry Williams sued the company for breach of contract and wrongful discharge, asserting that Ashland’s pattern of corrupt practices amounted to a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law. McKay alleged that he was terminated because he refused to take part in any bribery schemes and that he refused in subsequent investigations to hide Ashland’s conduct from officials at the IRS and SEC. According to a 1989 ABA Journal report, “Williams had not been asked to take part in any foreign payments, but he’d become sympathetic to McKay’s efforts to change Ashland’s policy.” According to the report, Williams “made an anonymous phone call to the SEC and spoke freely about Ashland’s recent actions abroad.” A jury returned a verdict of approximately $70 million. According to the ABA report, McKay was awarded over $44.5 million, and the rest was apportioned to Williams. According to the report, Ashland threatened to appeal and the parties settled for $25 million.

Set forth below, in pertinent part, is an interesting article published in the Washington Post on July 10, 1988. about the DOJ’s and SEC’s handling of the conduct at issue.

“Lawyers for two former executives who won a $ 69.5 million award from Ashland Oil Co. contend that their victory shows the Securities and Exchange Commission pulled its punches in handling charges of overseas bribery and other illegal conduct by Ashland. The two former vice presidents had said in wrongful-dismissal lawsuits and in SEC testimony that Ashland paid tens of millions of dollars in bribes to foreign officials to get scarce crude oil and then tried to cover up the illegal conduct. They said they lost their jobs after refusing to participate in conspiracies, perjury and other crimes. Last month, a U.S. District Court jury in Covington, Ky., awarded Bill E. McKay $ 44.6 million and Harry D. Williams $ 24.9 million after a 35-day trial. The jury said the liability should be shared by Ashland; its former chairman and chief executive, Orin E. Atkins; John R. Hall, who succeeded Atkins in 1981, and Richard W. Spears, senior vice president for human resources and law.”

“The SEC filed a much narrower civil lawsuit in July 1986 charging that Ashland and Atkins had bribed an official of Oman to get oil from the sultanate. The suit was filed in tandem with a consent decree, a final court judgment in which Ashland and Atkins neither admitted nor denied past violations while agreeing to face criminal penalties for future ones.”

“The jury and the SEC each had essentially the same evidence of possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977. The gap between the jury’s verdict and the SEC action shows that the SEC dealt with the matter too lightly, according to John R. McCall and Kenneth M. Robinson, the lawyers for McKay and Williams. ‘I can understand how counsel for McKay and Williams are proud of their achievement, and they certainly have the right to crow about it,’ said SEC enforcement chief Gary G. Lynch. ‘But any criticism of the commission’s investigation, or of the results that we achieved, is simply unwarranted.’”

“Punitive damages accounted for only $ 3 million of the awards to McKay and Williams. Compensatory damages were tripled — to $66.5 million — for conspiring to violate, and for violating, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. RICO makes it unlawful for any person associated with an enterprise affecting commerce to lead or to join in ‘conduct of [the] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.’ The jury found that the three individual defendants had all conducted or participated in ‘a pattern of racketeering activity’ principally through multiple violations of the FCPA antibribery section and of a law prohibiting travel for the purpose of violating the section.”

[...]

“The SEC’s 1986 lawsuit, which followed months of negotiations with Ashland’s law firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, named only one person paid by the oil company, James T.W. (Tim) Landon of Oman, as a foreign government official under the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. The complaint also alleged only one bribe, described by Ashland as a $ 25 million investment in a Landon-controlled chromium mine in Rhodesia. But the jury found that Ashland, ‘with corrupt intent to bribe,’ had made payments to three figures it said were foreign officials under the FCPA: Landon and Yehia Omar of Oman, and Hassan Y. Yassin of Saudi Arabia (who also has operated a consulting firm in McLean). With the same corrupt intent, the jury said, Ashland had made payments to a fourth recipient, Sadiq Attia, ‘knowing or having reason to know that’ all or a portion of the money — $ 17 million — ‘would be used to bribe a government official of Abu Dhabi.’”

“The SEC complaint and consent decree did not mention Yehia Omar or cite any Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia payments. Last December, SEC Chairman David S. Ruder told Senate Banking Committee Chairman William Proxmire (D-Wis.) that the Division of Enforcement ‘concluded that the evidence was … insufficient to support further charges of violations’ of the FCPA. In an interview after the jury verdict, Lynch said ‘there was not sufficient evidence that we felt comfortable we could prevail’ if charges were brought based on Ashland payments to Omar. ‘Even before we sat down to negotiate, we had decided privately to exclude Omar, Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia from the consent decree. ‘It was clear to us that the Landon transaction was the strongest, because we believed we could establish that Landon was a government official at the time the chrome transaction occurred.’ Lynch said. He called a multiple-count complaint unnecessary. ‘We were suing for injunctive relief,’ and ‘we could get it with Landon,’ he said. ‘There was no need to push and take on a litigation risk in a case that was much less certain.’ He extended this argument to the omission of the Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia cases.”

“But lawyers McCall and Robinson disagreed. ‘The finest judicial scrutiny our American judicial system can provide has now determined that the earlier government efforts were incomplete,’ McCall said. It’s ‘ridiculous’ for the SEC to claim the evidence was insufficient to convince a jury that bribery far beyond that which it alleged hadn’t occurred, he said.”

“Lynch also defended the SEC’s decision not to ask a federal court to find Ashland and Atkins had violated a 1975 consent decree and to hold them in criminal contempt. ‘We did have a concern about meeting the higher burden of proof in order to prove criminal contempt,’ Lynch said. [...] One difficulty in going the criminal route was that ‘the major thrust’ of the 1975 decrees involved unlawful political contributions, and ‘these were foreign bribes,’ Lynch said.”

“But the lawyers for McKay and Williams dismissed this explanation. They pointed out that the 1975 consent decrees prohibited false or fictitious bookkeeping entries, and said the $ 25 million Oman item that the SEC called a bribe, as well as the Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia payments, all were recorded by Ashland as ordinary outlays. ‘It was like shooting ducks in a barrel,’ Robinson said. ‘There was no answer that any Ashland official could give on the stand to explain the fraud that was in the documents that they wrote. And how the SEC could miss that is beyond description.’ ‘The SEC should have seen it. These were indictable offenses … I don’t see the evidence that the SEC even slapped Ashland’s wrist. They just closed the book by executing another consent decree — a promise to pay, which is all that it is.’”

“Arthur F. Mathews, who was an SEC deputy enforcement chief in 1969, said in an interview that ‘in the horse-trading for not litigating,’ Cravath, Swaine ’got the staff to strike Yehia Omar … If I had to guess, they did not include Yehia Omar in their action because they thought it was a toss-up whether you could prove it, and they gave it up in the bargain.’”

“McCall said the SEC staff may well have done all it could have, particularly in light of the Reagan administration’s apparent reluctance to enforce the FCPA’s antibribery provisions.’ The SEC commissioners, for example, voted 3 to 2 to reject the division’s initial recommendation for a lawsuit that named only Landon as the recipient of a bribe. Only after the division reargued its case did the commission reverse itself, allowing Lynch to file the lawsuit. Lynch said the SEC disregarded a report by an outside counsel who concluded that the Oman transactions had not violated the FCPA or the 1975 consent decree. Williams and McKay had challenged the independence of the outsider, Pittsburgh attorney Charles J. Queenan. Queenan is a friend of Cravath, Swaine presiding partner and Ashland director Samuel C. Butler, who submitted the report to the SEC as the work of an independent counsel. ‘We did not accept the conclusion that it was an ‘independent counsel’ report,” Lynch said. The SEC staff ‘did our own very thorough investigation of the matter,’ he said. ‘It is clear that if we had accepted the Queenan report’s findings, we would not have filed an action.”

[...]

“Sen. Proxmire, who monitors FCPA enforcement, also has raised questions about the Justice Department’s role in the Ashland case. The department had full access to the SEC’s files from the start of the SEC staff investigation in May 1983. Last October, after a Washington Post series on Ashland’s payments to overseas consultants, Proxmire asked the department if it had investigated the matter and if ‘it has concluded that violations of the FCPA have taken place.’ If the conclusion was that there’d been no violations, ‘I would like an explanation of the rationale underlying such a judgment,’ Proxmire said. ‘If the department has not investigated these allegations, I request that you do so and let me know the results.’ Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton said on Jan. 20 that he would respond when he received a report from the fraud section of the Criminal Division. On June 20, Proxmire, having heard nothing more for six months, sent Attorney General Edwin Meese III a news story on the jury verdict in Kentucky and asked ‘whether the Department of Justice will now initiate a criminal action.’ If not, Proxmire said he wanted to know why. A department spokesman said a response is being prepared.”

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:05 am. Post Categories: 1978-1988 Enforcement Actions • Anything of Value • Ashland Oil • Individual Enforcement Action • Noisy Exit • Oil and Gas Industry • Oman • Orin Atkins • Related Civil Litigation • Repeat Offenders • SEC Enforcement Action

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May 22nd, 2013

Can We Make The Expenditure In The First Place? Practical Advice For Navigating Gift, Travel And Entertainment Issues

Today’s post is from Brian Chilton (DLA Piper LLP (US)).

*****

I first had the pleasure of meeting Professor Koehler in 2002, a time when, to paraphrase TRACE’s Alexandra Wrage, the legal world was still learning to spell F-C-P-A. Mike was a hard-working young associate already keenly (and presciently) interested in the statute’s nuances, and he was helping me wade through the bowels of a company’s documents detailing travel, meals, gifts and entertainment involving foreign officials after the company was “invited” to do so by the DOJ/SEC.

As the readers of Mike’s blog know all too well, FCPA awareness and enforcement has exploded since 2002, but one thing remains the same: gifts, meals, entertainment and travel remain the part of the statute that companies still find the most vexing in terms of day-to-day compliance. Rarely a day goes by that I don’t receive a call or email from a client with a question in this area.

The number and results of enforcement actions focusing exclusively on this area might lead a casual observer to conclude a gift/travel/entertainment mistake is unlikely to result in a serious penalty. But those practicing in the area know that a disproportionate number of enforcement matters ultimately resulting in a high penalty for bribes unrelated to gifts/meals/travel/entertainment had their genesis in marketing/promotion expenses that soon turned out to be the “tip of the iceberg” revealing more extensive and substantial corruption. Companies who focus on keeping a clean FCPA house in the gifts/meals/entertainment/travel part of the statute stand a better chance of keeping big problems from occurring elsewhere among the statute’s danger zones, both because it sends a strong “tone from the top” and because it keeps small problems from going undetected until they’ve morphed into big ones.

Advising companies to “keep a clean house” and accomplishing that are, of course, two entirely different matters. Companies, and particularly their business people on the front lines, understandably find the FCPA’s statutory language in this area quite frustrating, where the statutory language provides an affirmative defense to prosecution under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions if the thing of value otherwise given to the foreign official is (1) reasonable, (2) bona fide, and (3) directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of (4) the payer’s products or services. Congress purposefully left the key terms broad and undefined, providing a high degree of flexibility, but with a commensurate degree of uncertainty. Business people struggling with what’s lawful and what’s not feel like they’ve been given guidance that’s no more helpful than the famous admonition given by Justice Potter Stewart in the context of discerning nudity that loses the protection of the First Amendment: “I know it when I see it.”

The recent DOJ/SEC Guidance devotes all of one page (p.24) to the subject, helpfully pointing out, “Whether any particular payment is a bona fide expenditure necessarily requires a fact-specific analysis.” At the risk of vast understatement, the business community was hoping for more.

Nevertheless, the Guidance does offer “non-exhaustive list of safeguards, compiled from several DOJ Opinion releases that is better than nothing:

• Do not select the particular officials who will participate in the party’s proposed trip or program, or else select them based on pre-determined, merit based criteria;

• Pay all costs directly to travel and lodging vendors and/or reimburse costs only upon presentation of a receipt;

• Do not advance funds or pay for reimbursements in cash;

• Ensure that any stipends are reasonable approximations of costs likely to be incurred and/or that expenses are limited to those that are necessary and reasonable;

• Ensure the expenditures are transparent, both within the company and to the foreign government;

• Do not condition payment of expenses on any action by the foreign official;

• Obtain written confirmation that payment of the expenses is not contrary to local law;

• Provide no additional compensation, stipends, or spending money beyond what is necessary to pay for actual expenses incurred;

• Ensure that costs and expenses on behalf of the foreign officials will be accurately recorded in the company’s books and records.

Those are all good procedures to follow for planning meals/gifts/entertainment/travel after a decision to engage in such has been made, but what the Guidance largely ignores, and what businesses most want help with, is more fundamental than the “how.” It is, “Can we make the expenditure in the first place?” Here I offer some additional practical guidance built up through many years and many questions in this area.

Compliance for promotional and marketing expenses should conceptually focus on three fundamental questions. The most important is to determine whether the expenditure is “bona fide” or “corrupt.” This requires that the business purpose of the expenditure be carefully defined. In other words, ask, “What products or services does the Company wish to promote, demonstrate, or explain?” As the DOJ/SEC Guidance alludes to, the more the item leans in the direction of “fun,” and away from “business,” the more likely it is to be perceived by DOJ/SEC as not bona fide.

On the “bona fide” question, it turns out that Justice Stewart’s formulation is not so bad after all. Anyone who has been around the business world long enough should have sufficient instincts to “know it when they see it” in terms of an expenditure that appears to be intended to ingratiate the company with the foreign official versus one that is hospitably polite, but not so nice as to overwhelm the business purpose. Here I like to advise my clients to apply what I call “The Spouse Eye-Roll Test.” We all have those business occasions where decorum requires us to include our spouse in an event, and, when we finally get around to inviting them, they react with the expected eye roll and an exasperated “Do I really have to go again this year?” You know your gift/meal/entertainment/travel has veered into the “too nice” realm if you can imagine your spouse, upon being given/invited to what you’re planning for the official, instead breaking into a big smile and saying, “Wow! That sounds great!”

The next step is to make sure that expenditures are directly related to the defined business purpose, rather than being only indirectly or tangentially related to the business purpose. In other words, ask, “Is the expenditure necessary to promote, demonstrate, or explain the product or service at the core of the defined business purpose?” The more the expenditure, both in terms of time and resources, is slanted in the direction of fun, so that the fun aspect begins to overwhelm the business aspect, the more likely it is that the expenditure is only indirectly promoting the Company’s goods and services. Similarly, expenditures related to “good will” or “team building” or “establishing the relationship” with foreign officials are almost always indirect rather than direct. Thus, the next time a marketing person says, “We need to give the gift/have the meal/pay for the trip to establish good will with this official,” your compliance radar should be going off BING BING BING BING BING.

The final question to ask is, “Is the amount of the expenditure reasonable?” The reasonableness of the expenditure is contextual fact specific, so that there are no broad general rules that can be defined in advance in order to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, appropriate areas to look in order to measure reasonableness include: (1) prevailing market rates for similar expenditures; (2) the amount of the expenditure versus the government official’s salary or receipt of similar benefits from his or her own government; (3) activity of the Company’s U.S.-regulated competitors when entertaining similar foreign government officials in a similar context; (4) custom both locally and within the particular industry; and (5) a company’s own reimbursement guidelines for its own people at a similar peer level to the official when traveling/eating on the company dime. Company reimbursement allowances tend to be highly frugal and business oriented so that using that as the expected baseline for expenditures involving government officials is a very good analytical starting point.

Finally, I do have one procedural “how” to add to the DOJ/SEC’s list that is probably the single best thing a company can do to avoid a violation in this area: BEGIN PLANNING EARLY. Given the statute’s breadth and flexibility in this area, if planning for a particular gift/meal/entertainment/travel expenditure begins early enough, and legal compliance is part of that early planning, an appropriate plan satisfying both the legal and business goals can almost always be constructed (the exception is those rare cases where the government official involved is truly and implacably corrupt).

Where most violations occur, despite a company’s otherwise good track record and intentions, is where the business person in Farawayistan plans the trip and calls the compliance counsel for approval only after the government official is already flying toward Company HQ while seated comfortably in First Class. When companies call me to review their plans, I usually have to tweak some minor aspect of the plan (“Well, maybe the side trip to Disney World is not such a great idea . . . .”), but so long as they consult me before invitations are issued and itineraries decided, I’ve never had to say, “No, you can’t do that.”

My thanks to the Professor for asking me to sit in for him while he and his family take a well-deserved vacation. I hope I’ve offered some additional practical advice in this area, though I know the readers are all looking forward to your return. Hook a few northern pike for us, Mike! (But make sure your fishing license is in order so that we don’t end up with an embarrassing incident involving things of value and government officials, especially if you stray too far north into those foreign, Canadian waters . . . . )

*****

Brian Chilton has been practicing in the area of anti-corruption, including as a former federal prosecutor, for over 20 years. His first novel in a three novel series, Issachar’s Heirs (White Feather Press, LLC), is due to be released around August 2013.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:04 am. Post Categories: Affirmative Defense - Promotional Expenses • Guest Posts

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May 21st, 2013

Can We Bring Quality FCPA Compliance and Investigative Services to the Underserved Middle Market?

Today’s post is from David Simon (Foley & Lardner).

*****

Professor Koehler (my former colleague at Foley & Lardner) has been critical of “FCPA Inc.” and, in particular, the astronomical costs associated with certain FCPA investigations and compliance measures. My friends in the C-Suite of FCPA Inc. have responded defensively – reacting at least in part to a perception that these criticisms suggest a corner-cutting approach to important work that must be done properly.

As an FCPA lawyer with a foot in both camps, let me try to find some common ground.

I share Mike’s concerns. While I understand that each case is different and that it is often necessary for investigating counsel to respond to outside forces that drive up costs, some of the eye-popping numbers can’t help but make one question the FCPA investigation/compliance value proposition.

This dynamic is especially troubling because, I fear, it drives the perception among many smaller and mid-sized companies that anti-bribery compliance is simply out of reach financially. A recent survey of global corruption compliance in the middle market conducted by McGladrey confirms that this segment of the market is underserved. That is dangerous and bad for all the interested parties – including the DOJ and SEC. It simply isn’t good public policy for sound FCPA compliance advice and investigative resources to be available only to the Exxon Mobils of the world.

That said, the quality of the work should not be compromised by maintaining some focus on the value proposition. Corner-cutting is not appropriate (and is almost never in the company’s long-term interests). But aren’t there ways to manage costs and still produce quality work? The answer is clearly yes. And while the options for delivering more for less are myriad, let me propose three fairly modest concepts, which, if implemented, would help bring quality FCPA representation to many more companies that really need it:

1. Give Strong but Practical Compliance Advice

We can start by heeding the counsel of the SEC and DOJ in last year’s Resource Guide:

“DOJ and SEC have no formulaic requirements regarding compliance programs. Rather, they employ a common-sense and pragmatic approach to evaluating compliance programs.”
“[T]here is no one-size-fits all program. . . . Indeed, small-and medium-sized enterprises likely will have different compliance programs from large multi-national corporations, a fact DOJ and SEC take into account when evaluating companies’ compliance programs.”

In other words, take it seriously, but be practical. And take a risk-based approach to FCPA compliance.

In a world where FCPA compliance was the company’s number one focus (above and beyond making and selling stuff), a company would conduct “Full Monty” due diligence on all of its distributors (maybe even its customers). It would employ a rigorous system for reviewing all gifts, meals and entertainment expenses in excess of $25. (After all, $25 is a lot of money to a customs official in Borneo . . .) It would conduct annual compliance audits of the books and records of all of its third-party intermediaries.

But really, does that approach make sense for most of our clients? While there may be companies that have a risk profile that justifies these procedures, for many – indeed, the vast majority – such an approach is simply impractical. Let’s not make the perfect the enemy of the good.

To lawyers and compliance professionals: Be practical. Be willing to sign-off on compliance procedures that are effective but tailored to the actual risk posed. Don’t be afraid to divert from “best practices” when best practices are not risk justified. Take a stand. But be prepared to defend your decisions.

And to the enforcement agencies. Be true to your word. “[D]o not hold companies to a standard of perfection.” Accept common sense compliance judgments, even when things ultimately go wrong.

2. Appropriately Scope FCPA and Bribery Investigations

When a company discovers conduct that may violate the FCPA or company policies, an investigation is necessary. It never makes sense for a company to ignore such a discovery. You are simply not serious about compliance if you do not take steps to understand what happened, why, how, and to respond appropriately. The enforcement agencies are entirely justified in requiring this and in taking companies to account for failing to investigate and respond to indications of wrongdoing.

The problem for many companies is that they hear the words “FCPA investigation” and think millions of dollars – or tens of millions, or hundreds of millions – in costs and fees. Too often, this leads companies to make the bad decision to forgo an investigation altogether.

But just as there is no “one-size-fits-all” FCPA compliance program, there is no “one-size-fits-all” FCPA investigation. Proportionality and reasonableness are key.

The main driver of investigation cost is scope. FCPA investigations that spin out of control usually do so because the scope is never clearly defined at the outset or because of significant scope-creep during the investigation. Think about our country’s history with Independent Counsel investigations. Without a clear, narrowly defined mandate, investigations can go on interminably. Investigators investigate. There is always some new lead to pursue, another witness to interview, another document to request and review.

The investigation scope needs to be reasonable and appropriately calibrated to the issues under investigation. Scope must be clearly defined, and the investigator must keep the scope front of mind. Discipline is key.

This is not to say that the scope should never change once defined. Often, new significant facts are discovered and new issues identified. Many times, these developments warrant a modification to the scope. But those decisions should be approached thoughtfully and intentionally. Scope modification is not the same thing as scope-creep.

Appropriately scoped investigations cost less. Companies with limited legal and compliance resources can access quality investigative services and can fulfill the agencies’ directive that “companies should have in place an efficient, reliable, and properly funded process for investigating the allegation and documenting the company’s response.”

To the SEC and DOJ: To make this work, you need to apply these same common-sense principles to your assessment of company investigations. Be reasonable. To outside auditors assessing the company’s response: Ditto.

3. Disaggregation of Services in FCPA and Bribery Investigations

One final modest idea to manage the cost of FCPA investigations: Consider disaggregating services.

It is not necessary to have high-priced lawyers conduct every aspect of every investigation. In the health care industry, they refer to “working at the top of your license.” In other words, to enhance the efficiency of the provision of care, each professional should be put to his or her highest and best use. Move the work down the chain of training and expertise where appropriate. Application of the same concept in FCPA investigations can have the same pro-efficiency effect.

As a preliminary matter, it isn’t necessary for a company to hire outside counsel to conduct every FCPA investigation. There are certainly some situations where the exclusive deployment of inside investigative resources is appropriate.

Even when outside counsel properly leads the investigation, the lead investigator should consider non-traditional deployment of resources so that everyone on the team is being put to his or her highest and best use. A couple of examples:

Consider enlisting internal company resources to accomplish some investigative tasks. Under the right circumstances, company IT personnel can help gather and process data for the investigation; internal audit or finance resources can help with the analysis of the books and records; and in-house counsel can perform certain investigative tasks. Independence and perceptions of independence must be taken into consideration in every case, of course. In some investigations, it won’t be appropriate to involve company personnel. But in some, it will be entirely reasonable and appropriate. And where it is, there will be substantial cost savings.

In addition, investigative counsel should consider outsourcing or alternative-sourcing aspects of the investigation. Document review is an obvious example. Consider using data review software to cull the relevant documents that warrant review. (It is noteworthy that DOJ recently approved the use of this approach in the AB InBev/Grupo Modelo merger review. If it works in antitrust, why not FCPA investigations?) This can save hundreds of hours of lawyer and staff time. It also often makes sense to outsource document review. There are a number of firms that conduct quality document review at a much lower cost than using attorneys (even contract attorneys.) I personally have used Novus Law, a document-related discovery firm, to handle all of the document review, management and analysis on a couple of document-heavy FCPA investigations. They do an outstanding job (no quality compromises) at a fraction of the cost.

These are just a few ideas for changing the way we provide compliance and investigative services to give better access to these critical services to more companies. How we do this is less important than that we do it.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:05 am. Post Categories: FCPA Investigative Costs • Guest Posts

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May 20th, 2013

U.K. Deferred Prosecution Agreements Expected In Early 2014 – A Work In Progress

Today’s post is from Robert Amaee (Covington & Burling). Amaee is the United Kingdom Expert for FCPA Professor.

*****

The UK Crime and Courts Bill, which contained the implementing legislation for Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”), received Royal Assent on 25 April 2013. The legislation will enable the UK Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Prosecution Service (the “Prosecutors”) to enter into DPAs with organisations — most likely from early 2014 — to deal with a specified list of economic crimes, including bribery, fraud and money laundering.

The move by the UK government to introduce implementing legislation for DPAs reflected an acknowledgement expressed in the UK Ministry of Justice’s May 2012 consultation paper on DPAs that: (1) there was little incentive for companies to self-report due to uncertainty over where that process would lead and (2) the options available to the Prosecutors for tackling economic crime were unduly limited.

The Prosecutors will welcome the addition of DPAs to their armory and the likelihood of there being a greater number of global settlements in multi-jurisdictional cases involving economic crime. There are, however, a number of factors peculiar to the UK version of DPAs that organisation will need to examine before a decision is taken to self-report instances of suspected wrongdoing or to enter into DPA negotiations with the Prosecutor.

The Process

The newly-enacted legislation contemplates that – following the commencement of an investigation into suspected economic crime – the Prosecutor may decide to enter into DPA negotiations with an organisation. Once the Prosecutor and organisation have formulated an agreed statement of facts concerning the alleged offence, which may or may not include admissions, that statement will be presented in private to a Crown Court judge. Details of the alleged offending, a draft indictment, the agreed – or contemplated – conditions to be included in the DPA and a list of any issues that have not yet been resolved also will be provided to the judge at the preliminary hearing.

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the judge will be asked by the Prosecutor to declare that resolving the matter by means of a DPA is in the interests of justice and that the proposed terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate. The judge could decide that certain steps must be taken, or further lines of inquiry pursued, before he/she will consider issuing the declaration at the subsequent preliminary hearing or hearings.

Following the preliminary hearing(s), agreement of the terms of the proposed DPA between the Prosecutor and organisation and the resolution of any outstanding issues, the Prosecutor and organisation will return to the Crown Court for a final hearing in private. The purpose of that hearing is for the Prosecutor to seek the judge’s approval of the DPA and its terms. If the DPA is approved, the Prosecutor must publish details of the DPA and the declarations made and reasons provided by the judge at the preliminary and final hearings.

In the event of an alleged breach of the DPA by an organisation, the Prosecutor can make an application to the Crown Court. In such circumstances, if the judge finds – on the balance of probabilities – that the organisation has breached the DPA, he/she can either: (1) ask the Prosecutor and organisation to agree to a proposal for remedying the breach or (2) terminate the DPA. Once the DPA has expired – assuming that the organisation has complied with the terms of the DPA – the Prosecutor is unable to bring criminal proceedings against the organisation for the same offence(s) unless it can be shown that the organisation knew – or ought to have known – that it provided inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information to the Prosecutor.

It is expected that the Director of the SFO and the Director of Public Prosecutions shortly will issue a draft Code for Prosecutors that will contain further detail on the DPA process, including guidance on the principles to be applied by the Prosecutor when deciding whether a DPA is the appropriate means of resolving a particular case and the disclosure obligations of Prosecutors. In addition, the UK Sentencing Council is expected to produce guidance on corporate criminal fines, including for those offences eligible for resolution by means of a DPA.

A Work in Progress

While the UK approach toward DPAs builds upon the US system, there are a number of noteworthy factors unique to the UK system. One such factor is the significant role played by the judiciary. In contrast to the US, the UK DPA process mandates a notable degree of oversight and involvement by the judiciary from an early stage in negotiations through to the handling of any alleged breaches of a DPA.

The level of judicial involvement built into the UK system is intended to enshrine transparency in the DPA process and takes the ultimate outcome of a DPA negotiation out of the hands of the Prosecutor. An inevitable consequence of this judicial involvement is the introduction of additional uncertainty into the DPA process. It is not difficult to conceive of negotiations that have taken a number of months to reach the Crown Court being greatly protracted or even terminated by a judge who takes the view that what has been proposed is not fair, just or reasonable or that it is not in the interest of justice to pursue discussions. By that stage discussions may be at an advanced stage and the Prosecutor will have amassed case materials provided by the organisation in the course of the negotiations. While the Prosecutor, in most cases, will not be able to rely either on the fact that it conducted DPA negotiations with the organisation, or on any draft DPA in future criminal proceedings, he/she is entitled to rely on evidence obtained from investigations pursued as a result of anything said in any unsigned statement of facts or in the draft DPA. Any pre-existing material provided by the organisation during the DPA process also could become admissible in subsequent proceedings.

Another factor worthy of consideration is the nature of the admissions that may have to be made by an organisation to secure a DPA. In particular, it is unclear whether the Prosecutor is likely to need to insist — as a condition of agreeing to a DPA — on an admission of the involvement of a “controlling mind” of the organisation in the alleged wrongdoing or, in the appropriate case, the lack of adequacy of an organisation’s anti-bribery systems and controls.

In order to attribute criminal liability to an organisation for offences requiring mens rea, a UK prosecutor needs to prove that the offender was a directing mind and will of the organisation. This ‘identification principle’ requires that the acts and state of mind of those who represent the directing mind and will be imputed to the organisation. The UK courts have restricted the application of this principle to the actions of ‘controlling officers’ of the organisation, namely the Board of Directors, the Managing Director and senior officers who carry out functions of management and speak and act as the organisation. The Prosecutors have found this test to impose a high barrier to corporate prosecutions, meaning that many cases against organisations do not proceed as sufficient evidence cannot be amassed by the Prosecutor to implicate a controlling mind of that organisation.

It may be that the soon to be issued Code for Prosecutors will address this topics but, at this stage, a question mark remains over whether a Prosecutor can be satisfied with agreeing to a statement of facts or admissions that fall short of implicating a controlling mind of the organisation. If an organisation seeking to resolve matters by way of a DPA is required to provide documentation or make admissions in relation to the role of a particular senior officer and his or her involvement in any wrongdoing during the early DPA negotiations with the Prosecutor, the organisation could be left at a disadvantage in the event that there is a derailment of the negotiations and a subsequent prosecution of the organisation.

It remains to be seen whether concerns about the level of uncertainty inherent in the UK DPA process or about any admissions that may have to be made will be justified and sufficient to deter organisations from reporting instances of possible wrongdoing and seeking to enter into discussions with the Prosecutor. Experience with DPAs in the US would tend to suggest that, irrespective of the legal arguments that could be deployed, the prospect of a settlement may well prove attractive enough for many organisations to prompt them to explore the UK DPA process in the hope of avoiding a drawn-out and uncertain court battle and the associated business disruption and reputational damage.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:02 am. Post Categories: Deferred Prosecution Agreements • Guest Posts • United Kingdom

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May 17th, 2013

Friday Roundup

$1.16 million in FCPA professional fees and expenses per working day, show me the numbers, quotable, and for the reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Wal-Mart’s FCPA Expenses

In this previous Friday roundup, I calculated Wal-Mart’s 2012 FCPA-related professional fees and expenses as being approximately $604,000 per working day.

Yesterday in a first-quarter earnings conference call (see here), Wal-Mart disclosed as follows.

“Our core corporate expenses [included] $73 million in expenses related to FCPA matters, which was above our forecasted range of $40 to $45 million. Approximately $44 million of the expenses represent costs incurred for the ongoing inquiries and investigations, while $29 million covers costs regarding the global compliance review, program enhancements and organizational changes.”

Doing the math, Wal-Mart’s first quarter FCPA-related professional fees and expenses equal approximately $1.16 million per working day.

I observed in this March 2011 article as follows.

“This new era of enforcement has resulted in wasteful overcompliance, companies viewing every foreign business partner with irrational suspicion, and companies deploying teams of lawyers and specialists around the world spending millions to uncover every potential questionable or unethical $100 corporate payment. This new era of enforcement has proven lucrative to many segments of the legal, accounting, and compliance industries and the status quo would, from their perspective, seem desirable.”

The question again ought to be asked – does it really need to cost this much or has FCPA scrutiny turned into a boondoggle for many involved? For more on this issue, see my article “Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era.”

Sticking with Wal-Mart, this Bloomberg article provides an update on certain of the civil cases pending against Wal-Mart based on the company’s FCPA scrutiny.

Show Me The Numbers

This previous Friday roundup highlighted comments by Senator Elizabeth Warren concerning the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy and how it creates conditions in which there is “not much incentive to follow the law.” Senator Warren now wants to see research and analysis of the pro and cons of this policy and other related regulatory settlement devices.

In this letter to, among others, Attorney General Eric Holder and SEC Chairman Mary Jo White, Senator Warren writes, in pertinent part, as follows.

“There is no question that settlements, fines, consent orders, and cease and desist orders are important enforcement tools, and that trials are expensive, demand numerous resources, and are often less preferable than settlements. But I believe strongly that if a regulator reveals itself to be unwilling to take large financial institutions all the way to trial — either because it is too timid or because its lacks resources — the regulator has a lot less leverage in settlement negotiations and will be forced to settle on terms that are much more favorable to the wrongdoer. [...] Have you conducted any internal research or analysis on trade-offs to the public between settling an enforcement action without admission of guilty and going forward with litigation as necessary to obtain such admission, and if so, can you provide that analysis to my office. I am interested in learning more about how your institution has evaluated the cost to the public of settling cases without requiring an admission of guilt rather than pursuing more aggressive actions.”

Senator Warren is obviously concerned that settlement policies and procedures facilitate the under-prosecution of alleged corporate wrongdoer. This is a valid concern. Yet so is the concern that such settlement policies and procedures also facilitate the over-prosecution of corporate conduct. For more, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement“, including reference to the SEC’s acknowledgment that settlement of an SEC enforcement action does “not necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s position over the other.”

Quotable

Michael Crites (Dinsmore & Shohl and the former U.S. Attorney for the S.D. of Ohio) stated as follows in a recent Law360 interview.

“The federal government passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 after discovering that American companies were making millions of dollars in bribes to various foreign government officials. The law was heralded as solving the problem by prohibiting companies and individuals from offering or making payments to any foreign official with the purpose of inducing the recipient to use their official position by directing business to or continuing business with the briber. Over 35 years later, the basics of this law are still necessary to prevent and punish unethical bribes but businesses have discovered that the Department of Justice’s interpretation of the law is broader than anyone intended.”

“DOJ has increased dramatically the number of investigations and enforcement actions under the FCPA, creating what DOJ calls a new era of FCPA enforcement. Unlike the activity in 1977, this heightened enforcement does not come from illegal bribes but the DOJ’s broad interpretation of the law which is now being applied to otherwise legitimate and ethical actions. The law is undeniably vague and few judicial decisions exist to provide additional guidance. Without these restraints, DOJ has embraced their power to apply the FCPA to unintended situations, resulting in a climate of fear for American businesses that conduct any business abroad.”

Reading Stack

More from the recent Corporate Crime Reporter sponsored conference. This article concerns a panel on corporate monitors. Participating in the panel were Dan Newcomb of Shearman & Sterling, George Stamboulidis of Baker Hostetler, Gil Soffer of Katten Muchin, Joseph Warin of Gibson Dunn, and John Buretta, chief of staff of the Criminal Division at the Department.

Posted by Mike Koehler at 12:03 am. Post Categories: FCPA Investigative Costs • Monitor • Neither Admit or Deny • Wal-Mart

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